


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


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
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THE  
PERIOD OF THE REFORMATION,

1517 TO 1648.

By LUDWIG HÄUSSER.

EDITED BY

WILHELM ONCKEN,

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF GEISSEN.

TRANSLATED BY MRS. G. STURGE.

New Edition, complete in One Volume.

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## TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

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[T is unnecessary for me to say more than a very few words in introducing this work, by the late eminent German historian, Professor Häusser, to English readers. It contains not only a spirited sketch of the history of the Reformation in Germany, Switzerland, France, Denmark, Sweden and England, but also gives a comprehensive survey of its influence on the course of thought and action during the period of which it treats, and offers, in a compact form, information which has otherwise to be sought for over a wide field of literature. It is hoped, therefore, that it will be no less interesting to English than to German readers; that it will be found not merely to traverse well-trodden ground, but that, from its comprehensiveness, and the learning, impartiality, and insight of the author, it will prove a valuable addition to the history of the Reformation period. It is translated with the sanction of the Editor.

SYDENHAM, June, 1873.





## P R E F A C E.

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THIS history of the period from 1517-1648 forms part of a course of lectures on the history of the three centuries, 1517-1789, which Häusser used to deliver at Heidelberg in the winter, and which, during the winter half-year 1859-60, I took down in shorthand.

They were preceded by an Introduction, which treated in broad outline the history of the period preceding the Reformation; but, unfortunately, I did not take it down. This was followed by a brief review of the history of the European States from 1648-1789. Nothing has been decided as to the publication of this; but among Häusser's remains there are ample materials for working it up.

The text which I now give to the public has originated in essentially the same manner as that of the history of the French Revolution which appeared last year, and which has been received by the German press with unanimous approval. But in this case my MS. has had to form still more exclusively the groundwork of the narrative; for not a single MS. has come to hand in answer to a public appeal; and in consequence of the scanty material left, I have been compelled to have independent recourse to the literature referred to, to a far greater extent than was necessary in the former case. There was full material for three sections only, and these could not be adopted unaltered: for

Philip of Hesse, Maurice of Saxony, and the Thirty Years' War, 1632-48, which had only been cursorily treated in the lectures. With these exceptions, for all the other sections that were wanting in completeness I was obliged to refer to the most important sources and materials. Such supplementary matter is introduced in many places in order to complete characteristic descriptions and narratives by adding specially distinctive features, serving to authenticate the statements in the text ; but it is only in the most important cases that they are indicated by notes. Besides frequent interpolations, which I could not specially indicate, most of the passages in quotation marks have been inserted by me. I need not say that my additions are not derived from the views or judgments of foreign historians, but always from original contemporary testimony. As a whole and in detail, all that has been aimed at is what Häusser would himself have done could he have prepared a text for publication.

I lay claim to the predicate of a verbatim reproduction of these lectures, as in the case of the history of the French Revolution. I have proceeded precisely in the same way in preparing them for publication, and have received express and ample testimony from many former hearers of Häusser that I have succeeded in finding the right method. Nevertheless, I must remind those who have never undertaken a similar task, of the great difference between words heard and read. For this difference, with which a speaker is perfectly familiar, and which is especially striking when there is a gift for improvisation, the shorthand writer must have a practised eye. In most cases it is indispensable to give a certain finish in the choice of words and construction of sentences in preparing for the press. If the speaker does not give it himself, the shorthand writer must take it in hand, and must be guided by tact. No rules

can be laid down, but it is not unnecessary to call attention to it.

The consciousness of the great responsibility which rested on my shoulders occasioned me to plead, in the preface to the history of the French Revolution, for a lenient judgment. I repeat the request now, but with more confidence, for I judge with pleasure from the appreciative notices of the most eminent organs of our press, that that which I proffered before was not made in vain.

And so I send forth this second posthumous production of Häusser's mind, hoping that, like the other, it will find its way to the hearts of the German people, to whom he belonged with every fibre of his being.

W. ONCKEN.

HEIDELBERG, *July 3rd*, 1868.





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## PART I.

### HISTORY OF THE REFORMATION IN GERMANY TO THE TREATY OF NUREMBERG, 1532.\*

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#### CHAPTER I.

Martin Luther. November, 1483, to February, 1546.—Youth.—Eisleben.—Mansfeld.—Magdeburg.—Eisenach.—Life in the Monastery at Erfurt.—Theological Development.—Justification by Faith.

IN the state of things which existed about the year 1517, a trifling incident might have been the spark which was to set the whole nation in a flame—an insignificant man might have given the impetus to that which was inevitable. But events did not take this course; the exciting cause was indeed scarcely proportionate to the results, but the indi-

\* Literature:—For the reign of Maximilian, see Müller, *Reichstagstheatrum*. Jena, 1719; and *Reichstagstaat*. Jena, 1709. Datt, *De Pace Imperii Publica*. Ulm, 1698. Chmel, *Urkunden zur Geschichte Maximilian's*. Stuttg., 1845. *Monum. Habsburgica*. Ed. Lanz, 1853. I. *Fontes rer. austr.* Ed. Karajan, 1855. I. *Monum. Habsburg*. Ed. Chmel, 1854, ff. i. ii. Klüpfel, *Urkunden zur Geschichte des Schwäb. Bundes*. Stuttg., 1846, i. L. Ranke, *Geschichte der Römisch- und Germanischen Völker von 1494-1535*. Berlin, 1824. Hege- wisch, *Geschichte Maximilian's*. Hamburg, 1782. On the Reforma- tion and Karl V., besides the writings of the Reformers. Luther's Werke. Ed. Walch, and his Letters edited by De Wette. Luther's Werke. Erlangen, 1826-57, 67 Bde. Melancthon's *Schriften im Corpus Reformatorum*. Ed. Bretschneider; then Lörcher, complete Reforma- tions acta. Leipzig, 1720. Hortleder, *Handlungen und Ausschreiben von den Ursachen des Kriegs K. Karl V. wider die Schmalkald. Bundesverwandten*. Frankfort, 1617. Lehman, *De Pace Religionis Acta Publica*. Frankfort, 1707. Förstemann, *Urkundenbuch*. Hamburg, 1841. Sleidanus, *De Statu Religionis et Reipublicæ, Carole V. Cæsare Argent*, 1555. Ed. Am Ende, Frankfort, 1785. Spalatinus, *Annales Reformat.* Leipzig, 1718. The same, *Chronicon bei Menken*, T. ii.

vidual whose theses were to remodel the world was a man of the first class—so great, so eminent, that he was not engulfed in the stream of events, but struggled with them, guided and ruled them until his death.

Martin Luther was completely the child of those deeply agitated times, and a true son of the people whose leader he was destined to be. He had all the traits of the true German character, the downright sincerity, the steady endurance, the deep and earnest inwardness, united with a tendency to mysticism, to gloomy and ascetic views of life, which were then peculiar to the more earnest minds among our people. The agonizing spiritual conflicts, the fierce struggles, the sharply defined contrasts of that great transition period can scarcely be so distinctly traced in the career of any other historical personage. We see his cheerful Thuringian nature in perpetual conflict with the dark results of mediæval monasticism; we see a childlike and modest disposition united with a defiant and passionate spirit; together with the deep contrition, the tears and groans of a soul struggling for redemption, he displayed the lion-hearted courage of a hero of the faith, and the lenient and reasonable judgments he passed upon human affairs are often in strange contrast with the unyielding, relentless rigour of the monk and the priest.

Seckendorf, *Commentarius de Lutheranismo*. Frankfort, 1688. Joh. Cochläi, *Comment. de Actis et Scriptis M. Lutheri*. Mogunt, 1549. Charles V. in particular,—Sepulveda, *De Rebus Gestis, Caroli*, 1657. Sandoval, *Historia de la Vida del Emp. Carlos*, 1604 ff. 2 Bde. K. Lanz, *Correspondenz Karl's V.* In the Royal Archives, &c. Leipzig, 1844, 3 Bde. The same, *State Papers of the History of Charles V.* Stuttg., 1845. *Briefe Karl's V. an seinen Beichtvater*. Edited by Heine. Berlin, 1848. *Die Urkunden sammlung von Gachard und Le Glay. Monumenta Habsburgica*, vol. ii. 1853. Relating to Luther: K. Jürgens, *Leben Luther's*, 1846, i. ii. iii. This part in general—L. Ranke, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation*. Berlin, 1853, 2 Aufl. 6 Bände. K. A. Menzel, *Neuere Geschichte der Deutschen seit der Reformation*. Breslau, 1826, ff. 6 Aufl. Berlin, 1854, 6 Bände. K. Hagen, *Deutschlands literar. und relig. Verhältnisse im Reformationszeitalter*. Erl. 1841, 3 Thle. Neudecker, *Geschichte der Deutschen Reformation*. Leipzig, 1842. *His Urkunden aus der Reformationszeit*, 1836, und *Merkwürdige Aktenstücke*, 1838, 2 Thle. Förstemann, *Urkundenbuch zur Reform.* Geschichte, 1842. Spalatins Nachlass, Herausg. von Neudecke, 1851. Strauss, *D. F. Leben Ulrichs von Hutten*, 1857, 2 Thle. Bischof, Seb. Frankfort, 1857. Rossmann, *Betrachtungen über das Zeitalter der Reformation*, 1858. Gust. Pfizer, *Luther's Leben*. Stuttgart, 1836. Burkhardt, *Luther's Briefe* (emendation of De Wette's edition), 1866.



A creative master of our language, both in writing and speaking, a bold yet moderate reformer, an embodiment of our noblest characteristics, he became a blessing to the whole nation.

He was born in very narrow circumstances, on the 10th of November, 1483. The home of his family was at Möhra, near Altenstein, in Thuringia, and the name of Luther still occurs there. His father, a slate-cutter by trade, had emigrated to the rich mining district of Eisleben to find work, and there Luther came into the world. The characteristics of the Thuringian race are strongly marked, and are clearly distinguishable in him. It may be known everywhere by its sturdy simplicity, and an unconstrained, fresh, and joyous temperament. It forms, to a certain extent, the connecting link between what has been called North and South German individuality; many of the characteristics of both are united with it: together with the North German repose, reserve, and sobriety, we find the keen enjoyment of life and cheerfulness of the South German character, and the combination may be traced in Luther.

He was thoroughly the child of the Thuringian peasantry. Although he lived almost exclusively in towns, and now and then said bitter things of the peasant class, still he remained a peasant's son in the best sense of the word, and was proud of it. "I am a peasant's son," he says in his "Table-Talk;" "my father, grandfather, and ancestors were all peasants." The training in the parental home was strait, strict, and harsh, not well adapted to cherish the love of harmony, the profound and kindly serenity which never left him in his later years.

Both parents worked very hard to support their children; the mother, so her son tells us, herself carried the wood on her back; the father spent his life as a poor miner. Hans Luther always comes before us as a sturdy, energetic man, with an air of great strictness, if not severity; he was devoted with his whole soul to the ancient faith, but was none the less a bitter foe of corrupt monasticism.

Luther's youth was not a happy one. We shall make the acquaintance of another reformer, also a peasant's son; but his parents were well to do, he was treated like the child of rich people, grew up in a free state, and was early accustomed to think about and take part in public affairs. Luther's lot was very different. He knew what it was to

raise himself out of the dust, and in after life he often spoke of what such as he have to bear. Having nothing whereof "to boast and brag," he learns to trust in God betimes, "to suffer and hold his peace."

But notwithstanding his limited means, Luther's father had an ambition to make something better of him than a miner; but, at all events, he treated him with the greatest severity, and in this his wife was entirely of one mind with him. He was harshly punished for trifles; corporal chastisement was a very common thing; he never forgot how he was cruelly flogged for childish faults; how even his mother whipped him about a nut till she drew blood. He said that it had an effect on his whole after life.

"My parents' severity made me timid; their sternness and the strict life they led me made me afterwards go into a monastery and become a monk. They heartily meant it well, but they did not understand the art of adjusting their punishments."

He did not fare much better at the school at Mansfeld, where his parents lived from 1484 to 1497; the teachers behaved to the pupils "like gaolers to thieves." He was soundly thrashed fifteen times in one afternoon, and all his life spoke with horror of the "purgatory of schools, where we are martyred over the *casualibus* and *temporalibus*, and yet learn nothing from all this flogging but terror, fear, and misery."

But it was a lasting satisfaction to him that many who got on better than he did at school, and did not get so many stripes, did not afterwards "cackle and lay eggs."

His religious training was strictly orthodox. If any one had a living faith in the mediæval Church it was he; he often remarked, both in jest and in earnest, what a powerful effect the Romish Church had had on him. This was specially the case when he went from Mansfeld to Magdeburg in 1497.

Magdeburg, with its forty thousand inhabitants, was at that time the largest and most flourishing city in the north of Germany, and, as the seat of a bishopric, was the brilliant centre of the Catholic Church in the north.

The boy, then fourteen, went to a Franciscan school. The teachers had a reputation for skill, but were disposed to live on the generosity of pious people. In this school he acquired what we should call the elements of gymnasial

instruction, and in the city he received the first ineffaceable impressions of the majesty of the Catholic Church. Here, too, he witnessed a spectacle which affected him deeply; he saw the son of a German prince, Wilhelm von Anhalt, whom his father, in an attack of melancholy, had forced to become a monk. Luther saw him "go about the streets in the cowl of a barefooted friar, with a beggar's wallet, begging for bread, and he had been scourged and made to fast and watch until he was the picture of death—nothing but skin and bone." But this sight had not then the repelling effect upon him which it would afterwards have had; on the contrary, it stimulated him; he vowed to himself that he would follow in the steps of this Prince of Anhalt. "I was naturally disposed to fast, to watch, to pray, to do good works, that I might thereby expiate my sins." He had already vowed to himself to make a pilgrimage to Rome, and to be religious.\*

His subsequent opposition to the mediæval Church, therefore, did not arise, as with the Humanists, from a tendency to scepticism; he had been devoted to it with his whole soul, and only forsook it when he had discovered the falseness of the Church system.

He next went to Eisenach. Here he was dependent for support on alms from strangers. It is still the custom in Thuringia for the poorer scholars to go about the streets at certain hours and receive alms for singing hymns. Luther himself relates how he had been such a *partekenhengst*; † had said "panem propter Deum" at the doors of strangers, and sung songs for bread; how he and his comrades often met with a rough repulse, and at many wealthy houses did not even get the crumbs from the table. But at the house of Conrad Cotta, a prosperous citizen, it was very different; there the mistress accorded him her sympathy. She made him generous presents, had him into the house, allowed him to come to her table and to have lessons with her children. Luther afterwards recurred with pleasure to this kindness, and it was a proud moment for him when the son of the

\* Jürgens, i. 221.

† I can find no equivalent for this word, probably coined on the spur of the moment. *Parteken*, crumbs, broken bread; *hengst*, a stallion, is used among the common people as an expression for an ardent lover, or for one who pursues an object passionately. Luther meant therefore that he was so poor as to be eager for broken food.—TR.

widow Cotta afterwards came to him at Wittenberg, and he was able to requite it. He never knew how to keep money or property together, and his house was always open to poor scholars if they were talented and eager to learn; when any one remonstrated, he would remind him of his own life at Eisenach. It was here that he first made acquaintance with family life, the mind of woman and parental love, for he had never known them in their gentle and genial aspect at home. He was treated like a favourite adopted child; the classical languages were studied in the spirit of the Humanists, and music, that choice gift of God, which brightened so many hours for the poor timid student, was also lovingly cultivated.

He was not to be a miner or a slate-cutter like his father. It was his wish to make his son a lawyer or a statesman. With all his deep and heartfelt faith, he despised theology and the Church system; monastic life seemed to him the very path to destruction.

But it was on this very point that his son was, for the first time, disobedient.

In 1501 he went to the university. Among the universities of that day Erfurt took the first rank as the seat of Humanistic studies. Lawyers, doctors of medicine, and theologians, all belonged to the new school. The excellent philological teaching, the schools for Greek and Latin, and the new grammatical method, were of great service to Luther; but there is no evidence that he had any inclination to make these studies his profession. He regarded them as means to an end. Besides, his vocation was marked out for him; he was to be a lawyer. For a time he studied jurisprudence, but without any pleasure in it, and therefore without success; the impulses of his soul strongly attracted him in another direction. Moreover, his mind was at that time out of tune; a profound melancholy had taken possession of him, which left him neither time nor taste for this branch of study.

He felt dissatisfied with all his pursuits. It is a phase which earnest minds often have to pass through, especially about the time of transition between youth and manhood; a certain melancholy overpowers even healthy minds, an unknown something is wanting to them, an enigmatical longing impels them to restlessness, they seek satisfaction everywhere and find it nowhere. Luther could not find it either in heathen antiquity or in jurisprudence.

The poverty and austerity of his youth, the stern parental training had early driven him within himself. The eager perusal, the diligent study during the night watches of works which suited his religious tendencies, had interested him in subjects which had no connection with jurisprudence. He had, as it were, been led to theology by himself; he had become more and more deeply engrossed in the study, which, as he says, "seeks for the kernel in the nut, the marrow in the bones." He had studied the fathers, particularly Augustine, then the Pauline Epistles and the writings of the mystics—Tauler, Suso, and Eccard—whose views were strangely in contrast with the prevailing Church system, not however in a sceptical, but a mystical direction.

While pursuing these studies, the thought ripened within him that it was not his vocation to follow his father's plans, but to devote himself to theology, and that in the strictest sense of the word. He would enter an order of monks, like the Prince of Anhalt, and renounce the world.

There is an old and well-known tradition\* that he was impelled to this resolution by the untimely death of a friend by his side. We have no thoroughly trustworthy authority for it; it is possible that this may have increased his previous melancholy, and put an end to long hesitation. But the resolution was certainly not formed all in one night; in real life things do not happen in this dramatic way; it undoubtedly was preceded by a long process of development, to which such an event may have given the last decisive impulse.†

It gave rise to severe conflicts with his father. He had been accustomed to implicit obedience from his son; now, for the first time, he declared that he neither could nor would obey, for that his conscience, his salvation, his all were at stake. A separation took place, which Luther could never mention without emotion. The grey-headed old man went away in despair, feeling that his son was lost to him.

Martin Luther joined the Austin Friars in 1505, and

\* Mathesius, quoted by Jürgens, i. 521.

† It is certain that in the dedication to his father of his work on monastic vows, Luther refers to "a forced and extorted vow," taken when he was "encompassed with the fear and horror of death;" and here and afterwards he states that he "never became a monk of his own free will;" that "his vow was not worth a fig;" that it was not taken heartily and willingly."—JÜRGENS.

earnestly desired, if any one ever did, to be a true monk, and "with tonsure and cowl," by the service of God, to earn his soul's salvation. There was at that time a proverb current, "Despair makes a monk," and in Luther's case it was strictly true. He imposed all sorts of privations on himself, mortified the flesh, passed whole nights in prayer and fasting, and practised all those self-inflicted torments which the Middle Ages were so clever in inventing, as if he would take heaven by storm. The gloomy, intolerant monastic rigidity, the want of sympathy for any other conception of life, took firm hold of his character; he compares himself to those who build up funeral piles, and we shall find moments in his life when this tendency, in its most exclusive form, got the upper hand of him.

But in spite of this melancholy and mediæval state of mind, a great development was taking place within him; he scourged himself, but he no less zealously pursued his studies. The monks bore him a grudge for this, for they thought, "If this brother studies he will rule us." But he was not to be deterred by this, and even during these early years he impressed unprejudiced persons with an idea of superiority. Those who knew him at that time agree in assuring us that there was something remarkable in his appearance; all who came into close contact with him were struck with, and many awed by him. Even so short a time afterwards as 1509, the learned Pollich of Wittenberg, who kept strictly to the ancient Church, said of him: "The monk with the deep-set eyes and the strange fancies will lead all the doctors astray, set up a new doctrine, and reform the whole Romish Church." In 1518 Cajetan said of the pale, emaciate recluse with the awe-stricken look, "I could hardly look the man in the face, such a diabolical fire darted out of his eyes."

The question that was agitated within him was a vital one for the whole Church, and is so in every age, but it was of special significance then. The feeling of universal human sinfulness, the impossibility of redemption from the curse of sin by the means which had hitherto been considered sufficient, burdened him with an almost crushing weight. He found no solution in dogmatic teaching as then set forth, because, on the one hand, he felt repulsed by the Old Testament God of revenge and wrath; and, on the other, the doctrine of remission of sins by outward acts was



repugnant alike to his understanding and his heart. To purchase absolution from the burden of sin by pharisaical works, by fulfilling outward duties, by the punctual observance of ecclesiastical requirements, appeared to him to be frivolous, and the angry God of the Old Testament terrified him. The severe penances which he inflicted on body and mind gave him no comfort, for the words were always present with him: "The justice of God is the wrath of God." "As often," he says, "as I read this passage, I wished that God had not revealed the Gospel; for who could love the God who is thus angry with us, judges and condemns us?"

The great minds of Christendom had always been exercised by such conflicts; none more so than Augustine. After a wild, erring, and agitated life, he had found inward peace in a faith which he then formed into a rigid dogma. And this Augustinian dogma of justification by faith alone, and by the election of God, provided that this faith be sincere and complete, powerfully affected Luther. The very peculiar thinkers of the mystic school of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had said the same thing; they looked for nothing from outward works, but for everything from the inward sanctification of men, and these were the views of all the more superior minds of early times. Luther never speaks more frequently of anything than of the change which took place within him as the result of this enlightenment; he is for ever thanking his faithful patron, Staupitz, for helping him to find the right path, and for ever recurring to the mental torments from which these views delivered him.

"When," he says in one of the many passages in which he refers to it, "I began to meditate more diligently on the words just, and the justice of God, which terrified me, and considered that the justice which avails with God is manifested without the deeds of the law, I began to be otherwise minded, and thought from that hour: If we are to be justified by faith, if the justice of God is to save all those that believe, such passages will not alarm poor sinners and terrified consciences, but rather comfort them." The saying of the prophet Habbakuk, "The just shall live by faith," came to him like redemption. "From this I have deduced that life must spring from faith. I connected the word justice with the word just; namely, that man becomes

just before God by faith—the whole Scripture, heaven itself was opened to me.” \*

This led to something more than an ordinary scholastic controversy; it led to a great conflict between the Pauline and Augustinian doctrine and the prevailing one. The difference was such that it of necessity made a wider schism in the Christian world as it then was, than it at first sight appeared likely to do. That which tormented Luther's conscience was a result of the worldliness and shallowness of the Church polity, and this was the cause of numerous other grievances, by no means religious only. Herder once said: “A religion begins to fall into decay when its interpreters have lost the key to it.” The remark applies to the case before us. People had quite forgotten what the Church should be, and once had been, as is plainly shown by the fact that, among the higher grades of society, and even by the Church itself, religion was looked upon as something very good for the masses, but as a luxury with which those above them could dispense; nobody cared for faith or moral worth, and the worship of God was held to consist in the strict performance of outward acts.

This was not the ancient view of the Church; even Pelagius, who had not stated it so broadly, had been condemned. The Church was entirely secularised, and what was meant to look like religion was nothing but a hypocritical show of outward conformity to law without the least earnestness of mind, simply external performance of duty without any co-operation of the conscience and heart.

\* The authorised version has been purposely not followed in this passage, but a more literal translation of Luther's words “gerecht,” “gerechtigkeit,”—as the use of the words “just,” “justify,” and “righteousness,” is confusing. The terms adopted by Dr. Young (“Life and Light of Men,” p. 161, &c.), “right,” “rightened,” “rightness or righteningness,” would perhaps best convey the meaning to English readers. It is necessary to call attention to the sense in which Luther uses the word “justice.” He says further: “And now as much as I had formerly hated that word, the justice of God, so much did I now love it and extol it as the sweetest of all words to me. . . . Afterwards I read Augustine, ‘On the Spirit and the Letter,’ where I found that he too interpreted the justice of God in a similar way, as that with which God endues us when He justifies us. And although this was as yet but imperfectly expressed, it was nevertheless satisfactory that the justice of God was taught to be that by which we are justified.”—TR.

He who laid bare the essential falseness of the existing Church system, and set himself with holy zeal to restore to religion her forgotten sincerity and defunct faith, was not merely opening a controversy, he was making a schism in the world. The "good old times" of the fifteenth century, as seen from this point of view, are the most odious of all times, not even the notorious eighteenth century excepted. The corruption of the Church makes one shudder. She displays the wild fruits of a conception of religion without earnestness, faith, or shame. He who was the centre of the ancient teaching of the Church, Christ the Redeemer, who had saved men from sin by his blood, and reconciled the avenging God of the old covenant, was entirely lost sight of, and a shameless abuse of holy things prevailed everywhere.

In this state of things lay the great enigma which distracted the times; the faithful were filled with indignation, and the rest sent empty away. The issues of Luther's spiritual conflicts in his narrow cell were of world-wide import; the sort of Christianity and Church polity which had hitherto prevailed was done away with. Even the Romish Church, when restored at the Council of Trent, quietly laid aside her old practices on these vital points, and adopted a conception of them which, while it steered clear of Lutheran one-sidedness, completely disowned the attitude she had maintained from the beginning of the fifteenth century.

The doctrine of indulgences, according to which men could be absolved from any sin by the payment of money, the most outward of all outward acts, the mind having no part in the transaction, was the most glaring instance of the abuses which had arisen in the Church; and when Luther afterwards opposed it, it was not only because, like many others, he was offended by the shameless extortions and characters of the dealers in indulgences, but because the practice had a close connection with the question on which he had passed through the severest struggles. Others were vexed that Tetzel should extort so much money from Germany, or thought it a disgrace that Rome chose to levy such heavy contributions on the stupid Germans, while she did not dare to carry it so far in other countries. But this was but a superficial view, and Luther's "Theses" are something very different from an angry protest against a growing

abuse ; they bear the stamp of his whole religious system, based upon the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith, and the Augustinian doctrine of the election of grace ; they set forth an entirely different view of life and of the relation of men to God and the Church, and had a far deeper significance than a mere attack upon the traffic in indulgences as an abuse.

Luther's great mental development was completed in the monastery at Erfurt. If, now that he was at peace with himself, he should go forth into the world and be placed in a position favourable for the exercise of his talents, a tremendous commotion might be looked for. They could not be developed in a monastery ; they could but be stunted ; the power of his words which arose from the depth of his convictions, the force of his teachings and his writings, his mysterious influence upon men, could only be developed in the world without. Just at this time an opportunity was afforded him of testing his powers ; he was called to the newly founded university of Wittenberg, in order that he might, for a time, devote himself entirely to academic teaching and preaching beyond the walls of the monastery.

## CHAPTER II.

1508-1520.

Call to Wittenberg, 1508.—Journey to Rome, 1510.—The Indulgence of 1517.—Attempts of Leo X. (elected Pope 1513) at Mediation.—Cajetan at the Diet of Augsburg, October, 1518.—Miltitz's Discussion with Luther at Altenburg, 1519.—Disputation at Leipzig, 27th June to 13th July, 1519.—The Turning-point with Luther.

THE university of Wittenberg, the creation of Frederic the Wise, had been founded in 1502, entirely in the modern Humanistic spirit; indeed, to found a university at that period, was to create an organ for the modern tendencies. Luther was called to it through the mediation of Staupitz, and arrived there at the close of 1508. Up to this time he had shown a tendency to gloomy reserve, which was not natural to his character. At Erfurt he had been entirely the monk who renounces the world, and knows no other calling than the solitary and earnest conflict with God and his conscience. This was obvious from his appearance, and yet no one was better adapted to influence the world and men. His new position introduced him into an arena for which he possessed incomparable gifts. The fire of his character, his talents for writing and speaking, now first came into play. He was not then at all conscious of his powers. For the first few years it was agony to him to ascend the pulpit stairs; when at length he yielded to the persuasions of his friend Staupitz, he said, "You will kill me; I shall not go on with it for a quarter of a year;" and even in 1519 he declared that nothing sustained him in the office of a preacher but obedience to another will, the will of God.

It was with great difficulty that he overcame the shyness which he took from the parental home into the monastery, and thence into the world, but he distinguished himself from

the very first. Literary celebrities did not grow up then so fast as they do now, but Luther soon became known in his own circle. His preaching made a very unusual impression, not only on account of his new doctrines, but because his teaching came from the very depths of his soul, and was the outcome of a deeply agitated spirit. It was very different from the customary drawl of empty and hackneyed phrases, or the reading of old manuscripts by other people ; for his preaching came from a fiery soul, every word was spoken in holy earnest, and therefore produced an immense effect upon young and old. Whenever he preached the church was crammed full up to the pulpit, and he was listened to with breathless attention. This period was also of importance to himself ; he shook off much of the monastic reserve which clung to him, his monkish acerbity decreased, he was no longer a monk in the sense in which he had been one.

The young teacher and preacher was not only honoured, he was almost spoiled by the Elector and the public. The convictions at which he had arrived at Erfurt became clearer and more mature. He now took a wider and more independent view of the central point of his theological ideas, the doctrine of justification by faith, and specially devoted himself to the study of that part of the New Testament which most fully unfolds the subject, the Epistle to the Romans. He was now ready with his system ; it was not in contradiction to that of the Church—indeed, he was supported by her great authorities, Paul and Augustine ; it was very far from being heretical, yet it was opposed to the Pelagian Church system, though the opposition as such had not yet appeared.

In 1510 Luther set out for Rome, either because he was charged with some errand for his order,\* or to fulfil the vow made while yet a boy, that he might “find peace and comfort for his conscience ;” perhaps for both reasons. The journey was a marked event in his life ; the monk who had hitherto lived in a small territory now for the first time went forth into the wide world. He passed through a great part of his own country, made acquaintance with South Germany, Bavaria, Austria, and Italy, and with this fulfilment of his

\* Jürgens observes that Luther nowhere mentions any commission from his order.



boyish longings, a pilgrimage to Rome, closes the first period of his life. It is not correct to say that this pilgrimage turned him into the bitterest enemy of the Papacy, after being its most devoted adherent. For years after this we find him strictly retaining the same relation to the supreme authority in Christendom which had always been characteristic of him; and even in 1517 and 1518 he expressly makes a distinction between the Papacy in its existing form and its original vocation as head of the Catholic Church. He cannot have been in 1510 in the path which he had scarcely entered in 1517. We by no means find that the sight of Rome produced so rapid a change in him; his veneration for the majesty of the Church was too great. We learn from himself that, true pilgrim as he was, at the first sight of the eternal city he threw himself upon the ground, and exclaimed, with hands uplifted to heaven: "I greet thee, holy Rome, thrice holy, from the blood of the martyrs which has been shed in thee." And he adds: "I did not then know that I was to be the hermit about whom there was a prophecy that he would rise up against the Church." Keen observer as he was, he soon saw more than was good for his veneration, and then, of course, made the observations on the actual state of things at Rome which he afterwards wove into the fearful accusations contained in his writings against Rome, especially in his work addressed to the German nobles; but they did not then change his fundamental views, nor estrange him from the ancient Church, for it was not until long afterwards that he was convinced that she was incapable of reform. One thing is very evident, the aversion of the good German to the Italians. Italian cunning and knavery, the abundance of fine but meaningless words in the language, the external softness and polish, which barely conceal the hollowness within—all this produced an irritating effect on the nerves of the Thuringian peasant. In his bitterest writings the vices of the Italians play a conspicuous part.

Until the beginning of 1517 he lived at Wittenberg, teaching and preaching. Now and then he was sent on a journey. With regard to the main point, he continued to cultivate his mind and to complete his theological studies. Between 1509 and 1517 the new Indulgence was proclaimed.

There was nothing so very repulsive in the doctrine

and practice of indulgence in the ancient Church. Moral repentance was held to be the main thing; but the dangerous addition had been made that outward signs of repentance were pleasing to God. Afterwards release might be obtained from the performance of such signs—fasting, scourging, and going on pilgrimages—by the payment of money, which, however, was not meant to absolve from sin, but was considered as a sign of the inward change of mind. But this old doctrine of the Church had been greatly altered, and in the fourteenth century, during the Babylonish exile, financial considerations had been allowed to prevail over moral ones. At Avignon the popes in some measure consoled themselves for the pain of exile by inventing all possible means of enriching the pontifical chair at Avignon, not at Rome. John XXII. came from Cahors, which in the Middle Ages was held to be the seat of the cleverest financiers. It was there that the practice arose which made such a disturbance in Germany that the unconditional abolition of it was demanded by the Germans at Constance and Basle. “It is most abominable,” said the Germans at Constance who burnt Huss; “the last popes have put a price upon sins like shopkeepers’ wares, and have sold remission of sins by means of indulgences for jingling coin!” It ended, however, in a proposition for restrictions upon indulgences; but such a system cannot be restricted, it must be abolished. The abuse continued. An urgent appeal was again made to Pope Martin V., who was elected at Constance, to put an end to it: this he agreed to do, but did nothing. Indeed, a sacrilege was practised which would have deserved that name before any religious systems existed: general indulgences were proclaimed and general Church taxes imposed; a pardon was granted to merchants, bankers, and bill-brokers, for farming the tax, and they undertook the traffic in pardon for sins for whole countries. It seemed as if all the warnings of the councils were forgotten, and everything that had given most offence was carried to the greatest extent. Thus a tariff of taxes was formed for all manner of sins, like the *taxæ cancellariæ ecclesiæ Romanæ*, which appeared at Herzogenbusch in 1517. In Tetzel’s instructions sodomy was rated at twelve ducats, sacrilege at nine, murder at seven, witchcraft at six, murder of parents or brothers and sisters, at four. From the time of Innocent VIII. you

could buy immunity from purgatory, and in 1507 and 1512 Julius II. extended indulgence even to heresy.

Between 1500 and 1517 five extraordinary indulgences were proclaimed, and that at a time when men's minds were beginning to be stirred up against them. It was quite incomprehensible. The Church was acting on the shameless principle of the chamberlain of Innocent VIII., who said, "God willeth not the death of a sinner, but that he should *pay* and live."

We still have originals of the pardon tickets of that time.\* There is one of 1517 for example, on which there is a figure of a Dominican monk, with a cross, crown of thorns, and a burning heart. In the upper corners is a nailed hand of the Saviour, and in the lower ones a nailed foot. On the front are the words, "Pope Leo X. Prayer. This is the length and breadth of the wounds of Christ in his holy side. As often as any one kisses it he has a seven years' indulgence." On the reverse side: "The cross measured forty times makes the height of Christ in his humanity. He who kisses it is preserved for seven days from sudden death, falling sickness, and apoplexy."

The dealers in indulgences put up such notices as this: "The red indulgence cross with the Pope's arms suspended on it has the same virtue as the cross of Christ." "The pardon makes those who accept it cleaner than baptism, purer even than Adam in a state of innocence in Paradise." "The dealer in pardons saves more people than Peter," &c.

Thus the abuse went on, until it became madness, and it had been practised five times on the same generation. Some were disgusted that the sacred mysteries of the Church should be thus abused, others appealed to the former decrees of the Church, which had condemned the scandal. That Germany specially should be laid under contribution on account of her political disruption was felt to be degrading. Still the money that was required, nominally for a war with the Turks, flowed in streams to Rome; the bishops complained that "hundredweights of German coin flew light as feathers over the Alps, and that no bearer of the heaviest burdens, not even Atlas himself, could drag such heaps of money." So said the spiritual princes whose material interests suffered from it; and it was no wonder

that the temporal princes fully sympathized in their displeasure at seeing money going out of the country on so large a scale for no useful purpose whatever.

Luther was not influenced by these external reasons. A faith had grown up within him which was utterly at variance with the principle of this outrage. The grounds on which others opposed it lay on the surface; his resistance to it came from the depths of his soul, and therefore he brought the struggle to an issue on other grounds, and raised the fundamental question, "Which then is the doctrine of the Church, that preached by Luther or by Tetzel?"

In 1517, John Tetzel, with his assistant, Bartholomew Rauch, appeared in Central Germany as a dealer in indulgences under the protection of the Elector Albert of Mayence. He had been preceded by annoying mountebank-like notices. He found moderate support in the Albertine part of Saxony under Duke George, but in the Electorate, under Frederic the Wise, he found no favour. He set up his shop at Leipzig and in the surrounding places, and thus came into Luther's immediate neighbourhood. When he arrived at Jüterbogk, near Wittenberg, Luther was seized with indignation. He had already admonished some of the bishops to do their duty by taking measures against this abuse, he had publicly thundered against it in the pulpit, when on October 31st he affixed his ninety-five Theses against Tetzel's doctrine of indulgences to the church door at Wittenberg. In these he unfolded his views of true repentance, as they had become clear to him since his monastic life at Erfurt; they did not express the least enmity to the Pope, but were so much the more bitter against "the Indulgence preacher's shameless and wanton words," which he strictly distinguished from the doctrine of the Church. The Theses made a deep impression in Germany; the state of the public mind was such that an insignificant cause might have led to great results, and the cause was not insignificant. Many controversial writings appeared: some sided with Luther; there were those who defended Tetzel; few had courage to defend the practice as it existed, but Luther's sharply defined doctrine of the uselessness of good works gave rise to much discussion. Wimpina at Frankfort on the Oder, Hogstraten at Cologne, Eck at Ingolstadt, exclaimed against the

heretic ; for others, the matter was but one more of those intestine paper wars, of which there were so many instances among learned theologians in the Middle Ages. The only difference was, that this time the question at issue was a vital and fundamental one for religion itself, not a mere scholastic difference, and the public mind was still deeply agitated by the contest between the Humanists and the Dominicans, out of which during the previous year the *Epistulæ Virorum Obscurorum* had arisen. Meanwhile the first attack came from Rome. Silvester Prierias, the fanatical Dominican who had just prevented the Reuchlin trial from being decided in favour of the accused, issued a publication against Luther's heretical doctrine of repentance. It was not of much importance ; Eck's was much cleverer, but the significant fact was that a voice should proceed from Rome before it was perhaps wise for the Church to take part in the discussion.

An accusation was brought against Luther at Rome, and Prierias was called as a theological authority in the court in which it was tried. Hot-headed people thought that sentence of excommunication must follow, but this Leo X. declined to pronounce. He was a great Mæcenas to artists and learned men, and was too much of a Medici not to be entirely indifferent to theological quarrels.

It was one of the tragical links in the chain of the history of the Church at this momentous period that a man was at her head who was personally entirely a stranger to the great questions which agitated her. In Reuchlin's case his idea had been not to injure a learned man, and at first he had much the same idea about Luther, not from clemency, but indifference. He looked down upon the squabbles of the people with the princely contempt of the Medicis, never suspecting that they might give rise to a conflagration which might reach his triple crown. His desire was to see them peaceably settled.

A Diet was convened at Augsburg. The Papal Legate had a number of demands to make at it which concerned the German treasury, and they would perhaps be less readily granted if Rome took severe measures against a German monk, who was in favour with an influential prince like Frederic the Wise, who sided with those who were against the levy of Church taxes. The Cardinal Legate Cajetan was therefore commissioned to get the question settled with

as little disturbance as possible. He was to send for the monk, talk it over with him, and try to persuade him not to make any further disturbance, and thus put an end to this controversy.

In answer to a justification of himself which Luther had sent to Rome in May, 1518, couched in the most modest tone, he had received an invitation to come there. He says: "When I was looking for a blessing, a storm broke over me." On all sides people were interesting themselves about Luther, and the result was that the invitation was changed into a summons to defend himself before the Cardinal Legate at Augsburg.

The Legate does not seem to have carried out the papal commission very strictly; he certainly did not act the part of a kindly diplomatist, but that of a proud spiritual prince, for whom it was a great condescension to enter into discussion with an insignificant monk at all. Besides this, he, as a rigid Thomist, could not abstain from opposing the nominalistic monk. At first Luther was constrained and embarrassed, but as the discussion gradually took the form of a theological disputation, he grew warm and bold, and Cajetan declared that he felt quite awe-stricken in his presence. In answer to the decrees of the Church and the tenets of the Dominicans, Luther brought forward Paul and Augustine, who indeed were strangers to the Church of that day; he would hear nothing of recantation, and so they parted, each feeling that he was himself in the right, and that the other had not so conducted himself as to promote peace.

Thus failed the first attempt to settle the business by diplomacy. This was in October, 1518. Luther fled from Augsburg by night, fearing, and not without reason, for his personal safety; he rode hastily through by-ways back to Wittenberg, and the controversy continued. Leo was still of opinion that the time was not come for extreme measures, and a second attempt was therefore made.

Carl von Miltitz, a native of Saxony, an adroit man of the world, was now selected to settle the difficulty. It was the Pope's custom on New Year's Day to present one of the most eminent princes with a consecrated golden rose. This year the Elector Frederic of Saxony was to have it, the man who had founded the modern Humanist university of Wittenberg, and undoubtedly favoured Luther.

The Nuncio, Miltitz, was to be the bearer of it, and to take the opportunity of seeing Luther, as if accidentally, and to repeat the attempt made by Cajetan.

Miltitz was no theologian, nor a man of any system or school, and he was therefore specially adapted for his mission. He was clever, his manners were polished and agreeable, and, when desirable, he could display a winning cordiality.

After the failure of the conference at Augsburg, Luther had issued the usual *appellatio a papa male informato ad papam melius informandum*, and as this produced no effect, he entered a second appeal, this time from the Pope to a General Council. It was unusual for a simple monk to make so determined an appeal to the highest court, but it was not prohibited or illegal.

Miltitz arrived at the beginning of January, 1519, and on the 3rd he had a conversation with Luther. He had entered upon his task with great skill. On his way he had been rather communicative, had complained in large companies of the scandal occasioned to the Church by mischievous individuals, asserted that Tetzels proceedings were not approved at Rome, and was so hard upon him that no one doubted his sincerity. He opened his heart to Luther in the most unreserved manner, said that he was astonished to find the celebrated doctor a young and vigorous man, instead of an old theologian, and that he would not undertake to conduct him to Rome with twenty-five thousand armed men, for he had observed everywhere that for every adherent of the Pope, Luther had three; he himself was entirely of Luther's mind. Having thus, as he thought, gained his opponent's confidence, he proceeded with his plan. He told Luther that it did not become him, an isolated monk, to carry on a contest like this with the Pope single-handed. He had occasioned his Holiness much uneasiness, and it was his duty to make amends. Luther was still within the bounds of the mediæval Church, and held a monk's opinions of the Pope's authority. This mode of approaching him was therefore safer than the imperious style adopted by Cajetan. Miltitz knew how to attack Luther on the ground on which he was still a monk—respect for the authority of the Church.

A formal agreement was entered into; and it is significant that the Romish Church already, to a certain extent, stipu-



lates with the simple Augustine monk as one power with another.

As Luther himself informed his protector the Elector, there were two clauses in the agreement.

1. "Both parties are forbidden to preach or write on the subject, or to take any further action upon it.

2. "Miltitz is to communicate the exact position of affairs to the Pope, and the Pope will commission a learned bishop to investigate the controverted questions."

"And then," Luther adds, "if I am convicted of error, I shall willingly retract it, and not weaken the power and glory of the holy Roman Church." He also consented to write a second letter to the Pope, to apologize for having been so sharp and hasty, and to say that he had no desire to injure the Church as such.

He went, therefore, to the verge of retracting, but on conditions. His silence was to be dependent on the silence of others, and he declared that he would retract when refuted—not before. This attitude was not a mediæval Catholic one. Huss also had said at Constance, "Let them refute me," and instead of this he had been condemned. This proposition was the germ of Protestantism. From the Church's stand-point, no such opposition, no such conditional subjection as this could be tolerated. When authority spoke the individual must give way. Luther had already taken one step beyond what may be called the boundary line of the mediæval Church.

One thing, however, was attained: there was an armistice; there was a cessation of the scandalous disputing and wrangling which so disturbed the Pope; a curb was put on the bitterness of party spirit. But the over-zealous friends of the Church were very soon again to disturb her peace. The armistice was interrupted by a zealot of the Church herself.

In March, 1519, Eck proclaimed a great discussion at Leipzig. Some of the Theses were aimed at Carlstadt, who was invited as opponent. But when they were more narrowly examined, it was evident that they were really intended for Luther, not Carlstadt. This was a virtual though not a formal breach of the armistice. Luther declared at once that he was released from his promise. "This wrong-headed fellow," he writes, "is fuming against me and my writings; but he challenges some one else

as his adversary and attacks him;”—“but this discussion will turn out badly for the Roman claims and usages, and these are the staff upon which the Church is leaning.”

The celebrated discussion at Leipzig began on June 27th, 1519.\* Eck, Luther, Melancthon, and Carlstadt appeared with their friends. The discussion was opened with all the pomp with which these disputations used to be conducted. There seemed to be a feeling that it was not an ordinary scholastic tournament, but that questions of world-wide importance were at issue. The chief combatants were each in his way excellent disputants. Eck was known as a remarkably skilful debater, and was at least a match for Luther in the discussion, while in knowledge of philosophy and theology, ecclesiastical history and law, he was decidedly his superior. Luther had as yet scarcely approached the latter subjects, and now first learnt their importance. His strength was of another sort, in which Eck was not equal to him.

Beyond the recent centuries Eck's knowledge was threadbare, and where Luther was quite at home he was almost a stranger. Luther was better acquainted with Augustine than with any one else; he had also diligently read the other fathers, both of the East and West, and the earnest study of fifteen years had made him perfectly familiar with the passages in the Bible relating to the subject.

After Eck and Carlstadt had disputed for the first week on free will, the contest began with Luther. For two days they disputed on justification and good works without making any approach to agreement. On these subjects Pelagian and Augustinian Christendom were in absolute opposition; there was a world-wide difference which it was impossible to reconcile. Eck then shifted the question to the subject of the papal authority.

Luther maintained that proof was wanting that the power of the Pope of Rome was as old as the Church of Christ. This is no longer a question for us, but it was one in those

\* The reports of it are to be found in Löscher. First ■ report by Melancthon, then Eck's letter to Hogstraten, Luther's own report, and several others; then the protocol of the discussion between Eck and Luther, in which that held from July 4th to 8th on the Pope's supremacy is of interest. All the heresies are summed up by Eck in his letter to Hogstraten.

days when people believed in a large number of pious frauds. Luther was of opinion that the papal authority was not more than four centuries old, but Eck refuted him at once, and gained an advantage ; but when he added that the Papacy dated from the beginning of the Latin Church, and that all who were not within the Church were damned, he exposed himself to attack, and Luther at once availed himself of it. He asked where in the Scriptures, where in the writings of the early fathers, was there any mention of the Papacy, and whether Eck believed that the whole Greek Church, and her great fathers, such as Gregory of Nazienzen and Basil the Great, were damned ?

This embarrassed Eck, but he soon recovered himself, and referred to the councils. At Constance, for example, the papal supremacy had been acknowledged : did Luther no longer adhere to the authority of the councils ? The council had condemned Huss and his theses : did he hold that the judgment was just or not ? This was a *quæstio captiosa*. The Hussites were in bad odour in Saxony. Luther considered for a moment, and then said he thought that the council had condemned propositions of Huss that were entirely Christian and evangelical. This occasioned great excitement, and Eck answered : " Then, worthy father, you are to me a heathen man and a publican."

Luther had now overstepped the boundaries of the Church. When at Erfurt, some work by Huss had fallen into his hands, and, as he read, he discovered with astonishment that on many points he agreed with the burnt heretic. Seized with anguish, he closed the book, and rushed from it with " a wounded heart," for he thought that at the mere suspicion that the " cruelly condemned man " was right, " the walls must become black and the sun veil his light ; " yet now he had courageously confessed him and rejected the recent authoritative decision of the Church. He had been driven to take one step after another ; but one authority remained for him, that of the Scriptures, the New Testament, and that he never rejected. Thus this discussion led to his defection from the Church, whose highest authorities he no longer acknowledged as binding. The circumstance was of great importance to him, for it led to his seeing clearly how fundamentally he was at variance with the Church when he sincerely thought that he was strictly within her fold.

The two opposite modes of thought, the utter irreconcilability of which was first developed at Leipzig, had nothing in common with the party conflicts of the Middle Ages. The very principle of authority was attacked, the foundations of the rock of Peter were shaken, and its historical title distinctly denied. This had never been thus declared before the whole nation. From this time any attempt to hush the matter up was quite vain. Luther did not retreat even when he expected to share the fate of Huss. But circumstances were not the same as at the time of the Council of Constance.

The favour of the nation increased in proportion as Luther's defection was decisive. He had never been weaker than when negotiating with Miltitz—never stronger than after the discussion. All the Humanist party, then the dominant party among the learned men of the day, and among them the best spirits of the nation, were on his side. The stormy and passionate youth, who had hitherto regarded the contest with quiet indifference or contempt, now began to take an interest in it, and to show that they did so. Ulrich von Hutten, their boldest mouthpiece, and politically and nationally Luther's *alter ego*, openly joined his cause. Hutten was the most elegant, most polished member of the younger school of Humanists, who revered Reuchlin and Erasmus as their models. In July, 1517, he had reached the highest summit of ambition—he had been crowned by the Emperor as the first German poet. He was an impersonation of the Humanistic spirit; yet a feeling began increasingly to creep over him that there was something unreal in his culture, that he was not true to himself while he spoke and wrote in a foreign tongue. It was entirely in a Humanistic spirit that he said to a monk, on hearing of the doings at Wittenberg, "Devour one another that you may be devoured by yourselves," and then wrote to Hermann von Neuenaar: "My special desire is that our enemies may live as much as possible in discord, and persist in destroying one another. Perish all those who hinder the dawning culture, that the glorious virtues they have so often trodden under foot may at length take root."\*

But he learnt to think otherwise. On closer observation he found that it was something more than an ordinary

\* Strauss, Hutten.

monkish quarrel, and he had above all learnt from Luther the wonderful power of the German tongue; he had seen how this man electrified the nation with the force of his words, and he turned completely round. He wrote to Luther: "I will renounce all my poetic fame, O monk, and follow thee like a shield-bearer." He gave up his elegant Latin, wrote German both in prose and rhyme, and became a political Luther.

Before this Philip Melancthon had joined Luther, and was invaluable as a complement to him. In his case the Humanist preponderated over the theologian. Melancthon was of incomparable service in the exposition and translation of the Scriptures, because, with all his immense learning, he put no preconceived theological views into the text.

Then he was more cultivated than the Thuringian peasant's son, and his manners were more polished.

The discussion was also a turning-point for Luther in his studies. It vexed him that he had not been able to say anything against the ecclesiastical laws to which Eck appealed. He now studied the history of the Church, more particularly in recent times. He made acquaintance, during the excitement in which the discussion had left him, with the stormy councils of the fifteenth century; he saw how nearly the nation had seen her hopes of reform realised, and how shamefully she had been deceived. It made a deeper impression upon him than it could ever have done before, but still it cost him some pain to tear himself entirely away from the ancient Church. He still drew a distinction between the *Curia* and the *Ecclesia Romana*, which were then really scarcely distinguishable at all.

As he pursued his studies he became more and more opposed to particular dogmas which he had not before specially examined. At Leipzig he had disputed the infallibility of the Pope and the councils; he now disputed the right of the Pope to proclaim laws, to canonise, and to withhold the cup; he protested against the doctrine of purgatory, and the number of the sacraments, though he had not yet attained to the doctrine of two only. It has been proved that Huss, at Constance, did not maintain doctrines much more heretical. His doctrines had often been confounded with those of his disciples, and a good deal ascribed to Huss that did not belong to him; we know now that in principle his views did not go much further than

the point at which Luther had now arrived. Luther was continually astonished anew at this unconscious agreement. In 1520 he wrote to Spalatin: "We are all Hussites without knowing it. Paul and Augustine are Hussites. I am so amazed I know not what to think."\*

In June, 1520, Luther's address "To the Christian Nobles of the German Nation" came out. Although but a few pages, it was the work of an agitator, and written in Luther's most masterly style. Its main proposition is that the Romish Curia must be resisted, and the walls which it had built around Germany thrown down, and that it would especially become the German nobility to take the lead in the conflict. The address produced great excitement; it was useless now to think of silencing the bold monk; but whether it was wise for the Pope to have recourse to the last resort, and excommunicate him, at the risk of its taking no effect, was the great question.

Eck, Luther's literary opponent, was guilty of the indiscretion of bringing to Germany the bull which the Pope had reluctantly issued. It was received with open repugnance, or at least with indifference; some governments were reluctant to proclaim it, others declared that in the existing state of things it was not necessary to obey it: they appealed to their own judgments against the Church in true modern fashion.

The Elector Frederic the Wise openly disclaimed obedience to the bull; the university of Wittenberg decidedly took the part of Luther and Carlstadt, which encouraged Luther to venture on the unheard-of step which he took on the 10th December, 1520. He was not the man to go to extremes for the purpose of arousing the passions of the populace; he had no wish to have "Mr. Omnes, who has no sense," for his master, but he did not shrink from any step which might at a critical moment lay bare the weakness of the adversary. He resolved to take the monstrous step of publicly burning the papal bull in presence of the professors, the students, and the citizens of Wittenberg.

On December 10th the solemn procession, to which Luther had invited the people by a notice on the church door, went through the Elstergate; and the people looked on while the

bull, whose predecessors had dethroned many a proud emperor, and condemned many a good reformer to the flames, was consumed in the fire, amidst the blank amazement of the Romanists and the rejoicings of Luther's adherents.

Luther had shown that, without incurring danger to himself, he could hold up the Pope's last missile to derision. Rome had exhausted her weapons; admonition, warning, advice, ban,—not one of them had produced the least effect. The greater the dismay at Rome, the greater had been the monk's audacity, the more numerous his followers. But one resource was left,—the temporal power.



### CHAPTER III.

**The Last Days of Maximilian I., January, 1519.—Election of a new Emperor.—Francis I. of France and Charles V. of Spain.—Political Position of the Emperor Charles V.—The Election in June.—The Election Bond, 3rd July, 1519.**

#### LAST DAYS OF MAXIMILIAN I., JANUARY, 1519.

**B****O****T****H** parties, Luther and the Pope, had gone to extremes. It was now in the hands of the temporal power of the empire to decide between them. The Church had to look about her for support, and she looked, in the first place, to the arm of the Emperor. The King of Rome had not only to keep political order, he was also the guardian of the Church. It was both his right and duty to uphold her authority, to administer her laws, to carry out her decrees. It was therefore not an unusual demand, but, in the existing state of things, quite a natural one. In 1415 the Emperor had carried out the decree of the Church in a similar case. That the imperial power had not interfered before was only caused by the interregnum then existing. From January to June, 1519, the throne was unoccupied, and after June it was only nominally occupied, for the new Emperor was not yet present in the empire.

The position of affairs had not been so advantageous during the latter part of Maximilian's reign as had been hoped at the beginning. He was but little beloved, and that little because his happy temper and engaging disposition prevented actual disaffection and restrained open ill-will. But a great change was observable. Many things had conduced to it. It was not only that he had injured the domestic interests of this or that dynasty; there were real grounds for discontent. The reforms of 1495, to which he had reluctantly given his consent, were not only



not carried out, he had even allowed those already established to fall into disuse.

The Aulic Council, which was to be constituted without him, and to oppose him, had always been repugnant to him ; he had also only grudgingly tolerated the Imperial Chamber for a time ; and both had at length been suffered to fall into disuse. Nothing remained but the Internal Treaty of Peace,\* the administration of which mostly depended on himself, and the division of the empire into districts, which served him as a counterpoise to the sovereignty of the princes. This was all that remained of the great project of reform which was looked for throughout the empire, especially among the upper circles, at the beginning of his reign ; and some of the states which had promoted the changes in 1495 now reproached him with it.

Another and equally well-founded reproach was that he had made the empire a means of aggrandising his hereditary power as a Hapsburg ; had merely made a tool of it to carry out his purely Austrian plans in Italy and elsewhere. To enforce his claims upon Bohemia and Hungary, thereby to complete the Hapsburg dominions, to become master of Milan in Italy by the aid of the ancient imperial rights, to form the marriage treaty with Spain ;—these were the great aims of his policy, and they had nothing whatever to do with the interests of the empire, as they were conceived of by the states and the nation.

His position, therefore, although he knew how to maintain it with skill and prudence, became more and more isolated, and he saw an opposition growing up among the most distinguished princes of the empire who had formerly sided with him.

His relations with the Church were by no means satisfactory in the eyes of the Curia. He knew very well that the empire could not exist unless the Church, in a general sense, ruled Western Europe ; but he did not at all approve of the administration of her policy, and by no means submitted unconditionally to the power of the Curia. The Popes had been so often opposed to him that he did not cherish any good-will towards them ; nor did he overlook the frightful abuses which were eating into the spiritual

\* Landfriede. The decree of the Diet of Worms, 1495, by which all independent warfare amongst members of the empire was forbidden, and the "law of the fist" abolished under pain of ban, &c.—**Tr.**

and temporal life of Christendom. It was, indeed, at his instigation that the accusation by the German nation against the Curia had been put forth; and, with the approbation of the states, he had proclaimed the edict from Innsbruck "against the unspeakable greed of some ecclesiastics, who know no bounds in the acquisition of Church property and benefices." His audacious idea of himself seizing the reins of ecclesiastical power, as Charlemagne and Henry III. had done, indicates his relations with Rome.

When the contest at Wittenberg began, he at first looked on with malicious pleasure. He had just then fallen out with Rome on political grounds, and it was a satisfaction to him that she should have the millstone of a monastic controversy hung about her neck. "Let the Wittenberg monk," he said to Frederic the Wise, "be taken good care of; we may want him some day."

But during the latter part of his reign all this was changed; his domestic policy induced him to seek an understanding with Rome. Although he did not anticipate his approaching death, he was anxious to secure to his family the succession to the empire. His son Philip had met with an early and tragic death, but he had left a son (Charles V.) who would certainly inherit Spain, and for whom Maximilian wished to secure the German crown. If he could succeed, the imperial glory and greatness would be restored in all its mediæval splendour.

The foreign powers, especially France, were against it, and in his isolation in Germany the Emperor had no other ally but Rome to aid him in his projects. Things were in this position when Cajetan was sent to the Diet at Augsburg. He brought large demands for men and money against the Turks, which the Emperor was willing to grant if the Church would support him. But the scheme entirely miscarried. It was not only that public opinion, led by Ulrich von Hutten, declared loudly against the Papal Legate; the Diet refused his demands, and refused them on the ground that the just grievances of the Germans must first be redressed. The annats,\* the pall-money, interference with the rights of patronage, the numberless infringements of the concordat, all these were brought up afresh, and some of the

\* A year's income of a spiritual living originally given to the Pope on the death of a bishop or abbot, and paid by his successor.—TR.

spiritual princes brought in petitions against special grievances. Thus the Bishop of Liège proved by a long statistical paper that the German benefices became a prey to Roman courtesans. If the spiritual princes spoke in this way, it may be imagined how the Legate's propositions were regarded by the temporal rulers.

Among the circumstances which occasioned this failure, the passiveness of the imperial government respecting the affair of Luther was a principal one. When the controversy began, the government was at variance with Rome, and looked on with satisfaction; but when it wished for reconciliation with Rome, and Rome wanted to employ it against Luther, both schemes were frustrated at the Diet. This plan, therefore, did not aid the Emperor in securing the succession for his house. Shortly after this, in January, 1519, the Emperor Maximilian died quite suddenly. He was no longer young, but was still so vigorous that his death was quite unexpected.

#### ELECTION OF A NEW EMPEROR.—FRANCIS I. OF FRANCE AND CHARLES V. OF SPAIN.

All these circumstances greatly helped forward the Reformation. The imperial power was for months in abeyance, the papal power at least lessened; the regency which now existed did not in any way alter the aspect of affairs. The Count Palatine of the Rhine, with whose house the Emperor had lived in bitter discord, was regent in the south; the Elector Frederic the Wise, in the north and east. It was plain that no steps would now be taken against Luther. The Elector Palatine was not in the least disposed to burden himself with this troublesome business; the Elector Frederic was the avowed though prudent friend and protector of the monk of Wittenberg.

The election of a new emperor was a grave question. Had the old Elector Frederic, who had vigorously aided the reforms in 1495, and at first maintained a close friendship with the Emperor, had any ambition to be emperor, he would probably have been chosen unanimously. But he was too old, too cool-headed and sober, to put this thorny crown into the scale against his secure position. After he had declined, there was not one among the German princes who would have had any chance of being

elected, nor was there one among the electors who coveted so burdensome an honour. Outside this circle candidates were not wanting. Two foreigners, Francis I. and Charles V., put forth their rival claims.

We often confound the Empire with the Kingdom of Germany, because the latter had for centuries grown up together with the former. But the imperial crown was a universal dignity, and therefore, the actual state of things notwithstanding, it was quite possible that it might one day devolve upon other than a German house. It was on this ground that France now strove to attain it. France had become a more thoroughly compact and united state than any of its neighbours, and therefore Francis I., from the security of his domestic position, was the most powerful monarch in Europe. He had still various projects on hand. He already enjoyed a European reputation; he had not long before begun his reign with the successful Italian campaign; he had subdued the hitherto unvanquished Swiss at Marignano, and garrisoned the coveted city of Milan. These successes had attracted a vast deal of attention; he was looked upon as a great general, though he was in fact, as afterwards appeared, only a brave cavalier, ever ready to risk his own life, but incapable of directing a campaign or even a battle.

Charles of Spain had as yet nothing of the kind to show. He seemed to be indebted for the lustre of his name to his descent from so many great princes. He was not yet even King of Spain. Maximilian's son, the handsome but dissolute Philip, had married Joanna, daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, and Spain and the New World fell to her lot. Joanna seems to have been early subject to melancholy. She is said to have given her husband a poisoned love-potion, from jealousy. When Philip soon afterwards died with all the symptoms of poisoning, her melancholy passed into madness, from which she never recovered.

This Spanish melancholy had momentous results for the house of Hapsburg, for it was transmitted through this ancestress, and has never since disappeared. The earlier Hapsburgs had nothing of it; down to Maximilian they were of an energetic, enterprising temperament, more likely to incur blame for daring rashness than for any tendency to passive melancholy.

Charles was the child of this unhappy marriage. He

was nominally regent while his mother was still queen. From what was known of his character it was not supposed that he would be likely to vanquish Francis I. Both the fame and the powers of Francis were in their prime ; he was a brilliant, if not a weighty personage ; he was possessed of showy, thoroughly French talents ; he was eloquent, amiable, gallant, a type of the national character, including both its good and bad features. Francis was overrated, Charles underrated. Charles could not be compared with so brilliant an individual ; he was a delicate youth of scarcely nineteen, had been reared with difficulty, and had inherited his mother's gloomy, phlegmatic temperament ; in spite of his youth, he seemed to have scarcely one youthful trait in his character ; he had done nothing for immortality ; in his heavy Spanish manners there was not a spark of French *savoir-vivre* ; he had no valiant deeds, and but few gallant adventures to boast of ; in short, in every respect he was thrown into the shade by Francis.

This insignificance was partly caused by the melancholy circumstances of his youth, and by the fact that he was always surrounded by powerful men who governed in his stead. He afterwards acquired all that was now wanting to him, and proved himself quite equal to great political projects ; indeed, it became evident that he possessed many great political virtues, untiring industry, steady perseverance and patience in a high degree, that he was the man to devote his life to a great enterprise ; and the more evident this became, the more did he acquire supremacy over Francis. But at the time when nothing of all this had been proved, the decision, of course, rested on other grounds.

In expenditure and energetic measures to insure election both parties were equal. It cannot be reckoned to a florin how much each spent, but it is certain that neither failed in this respect. Heavy bags of gold came from France, and we now know that the same came from Austria. The well-known leaning of Francis towards absolutism was against him. It was known how he treated parliaments in France, how he commanded the levy of illegal taxes under pain of execution : this did not accord with "ancient German liberty." It was also taken into account that Francis was a foreigner, while Charles was at least half a German : he was descended from a German father and German ancestors.

Since Maximilian's death, his good qualities had been more thought of; his people would not insult his house by choosing his natural enemy as emperor. It was considered, further, that the kingdom and the empire had been united for centuries; that by reason of this union Germany took a foremost place among the nations, which she would no longer hold if the imperial crown were worn by a foreigner. It was by a true instinct that the nation shrank from the ambitious projects of the French king.

By degrees, however, the West German courts were reproached with favouring the French too much, when Frederic the Wise turned the scale; he summed up all the points in Charles's favour, his descent, his ties with the empire, his natural enmity to France, and he openly declared that he should vote for him.

The French party vanished, no one knew how. Every one was ashamed to belong to it, and Charles was unanimously elected, although subject to stipulations which showed that the people desired not to let the opportunity slip of obtaining from the new emperor all that had been withheld by the old one. They made an election contract, or, as it is called in the Northern States, an election bond.

#### POLITICAL POSITION OF CHARLES V. AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS REIGN.

Charles was elected on June 28th, 1519, and on July 3rd the election contract was settled, which strictly defined the limits of his authority. Hereafter the Emperor was not to employ any foreign troops in the imperial wars without the consent of the empire; not to convoke any Diet beyond the bounds of the empire; he was to give the offices of the court and empire to natives of Germany only; no language was to be employed in State transactions but German or Latin; the states of the empire were not to be subject to any jurisdiction beyond the bounds of the empire. The Emperor was to be the protector of the Church, but was to abolish everything which the Court of Rome had introduced contrary to the concordat with Germany; he was to confirm the sovereign rights of the princes, and to establish an Imperial Chamber. He was not to alienate any imperial possessions, not to issue any sentence of outlawry

without a trial, to maintain customs, duties, and privileges, and to abolish the covenants between the knights and their vassals.

There are three points in this bond which are of special interest. The German empire endeavours to protect its individuality against the foreigner, the Spaniard, which afterwards proved to be of great importance. Then the Imperial Chamber, formed of the electors, which Maximilian so obstinately opposed, was really established, and at a most critical time ruled in the Emperor's stead. Finally, by the clause relating to the ancient concordats between the German empire and the Pope, the empire assumed a position towards him which was quite in accordance with the transactions of the last Diet, but which, in the matter of the existing ecclesiastical controversy, showed more favour to Luther than to his opponents.

Thus the imperial throne was filled just at the time when Luther was separating himself from the Church. No one yet knew the intentions or tendencies of the new Emperor; he was like a blank sheet of paper upon which every man inscribed his hopes and wishes. Some expected from him the rescue of the Roman power from pressing danger; others, like Hutten and Luther, the salvation of the nation and the Reformation. Charles took a course of his own, and probably disappointed them all.

A most important accession of power had all at once accrued to the empire. Charles was not an emperor without territory, and, as so many had been before him, unable from lack of means to confer dignity on the crown; he brought more to the throne than any emperor had ever done before. He was the hereditary Prince of Hapsburg, possessed the German-Austrian territories, had established his claims upon Bohemia and Hungary, which formed a territory in the east which even then defined the outlines of the present Austrian empire. Besides this, he was heir to Burgundy, which his grandmother brought to the Emperor Maximilian. It was hard to keep, indeed, but it was a jewel of a possession, rich in all that nature and industry can offer, covered with the most flourishing cities in the world, now that the glory of the Italian cities was departed. Besides this, there was the crown of Spain with its Italian appendages—Naples, Sicily, the islands of Majorca and Minorca, and the newly acquired and daily increasing possessions in

admission council



the New World. No one had ever attained to such power before, and Charles was dowered with it while yet in his cradle.

The mediæval empire once more blazed up in splendour; never before had it had possessions of such magnitude at its disposal; never had a man ruled over it who was so cool and sober a calculator, so little of an enthusiast as Charles V. In the last moments before its dissolution, mediævalism once more put forth all its strength to oppose the spirit of the coming times; yet this colossal power, wielded by such a personage, was not able to turn the world aside from the course it was taking.

Both parties viewed the election of Charles with extravagant hopes. Luther and Hutten, as well as the Curia, indulged in great expectations for their cause, and both parties forgot Charles's standing in relation to the empire. For Charles the imperial throne was only the crowning honour of a position which doubtless received an accession of glory from it, and yet was without it of great importance. His position in the empire, in spite of its splendour, was uncertain; its real significance was dependent on the fluctuations of party feeling among the princes and the people; his crowns, his inherited dominions, were his permanent possessions, without which the imperial crown was but an empty name. In one scale lay his imperial dignity, in the other his inheritance: should it become necessary to balance them, it could not be but that the latter would outweigh the former. It was in the nature of this empire, composed of various elements, that it must comprise a variety of political sentiments. It could not be said that these possessions in Italy, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, in the Mediterranean and beyond the sea, had any natural connection. A government based on any homogeneous national policy was impossible. In Spain Charles was called a German, in Germany a Spaniard, and both were right and both wrong; he was not intimately and nationally connected with any one of his dominions; he could not from policy devote himself to any one: the prescribed construction of the empire forbade it. The German princes, therefore, sought to secure themselves against Spanish influence, and at a later period complained of Spanish tyranny; on the other hand, the Spaniards tried to defend themselves from what they called German influence and tyranny. That kindly relation of personal good-

will which can only exist between a native prince and subjects who are also his countrymen was as impossible for Charles in Spain and Italy as it was in Germany. It existed, to a certain extent, between him and the Netherlands. The circumstance of his having been born at Ghent seems to have inspired him with some affection for it, but he was a foreigner in Spain, and in Germany he understood neither the language nor the spirit of the nation.

All this was the result of circumstances which Charles could not alter. The fulfilment of Ffütten's hopes, especially that he would inaugurate his acceptance of the imperial crown by restoring the kingdom of Germany, that at the head of the nation he would institute reform, and thus win back for Germany her lost political, national, and ecclesiastical rank, was rendered impossible by the conditions of his power. The moment was certainly a critical one, and it was by a rare combination of events that this nation, once the most powerful in Europe, distracted by a great religious movement, had re-entered into the old struggle with Rome in a way which might enable their leader, in case he rightly apprehended the tendencies of the people, with their aid to create a consolidated power such as had never existed in Germany before. It was this that occasioned Napoleon I. to say that Charles V. was a fool not to take advantage of such a moment to depose the ruling princes, upset the papal power, make Germany a united state, and thereby the greatest power in the world.

Napoleon would have done it, but Charles V. was not the man; the idea never entered his head, even had his position out of Germany allowed him to entertain it.

He had no taste for such hazardous games which lead either to immortality or to sudden destruction. His strength lay in patient perseverance, in the energy with which he sought gradually to disentangle perplexing circumstances; but he had nothing of the adventurous spirit which stakes everything on one throw.

Charles V. had grown up in Spain, where Catholicism had preserved its life in the greatest freshness and vigour; for up to recent times it had had to maintain its existence against Islamism, and by the perpetual crusade against the infidel the Church had been preserved from sinking into that indolence into which she had sunk elsewhere. A Spanish prince who had grown up in such an atmosphere

would bring with him decidedly Catholic sentiments; he might not, perhaps, be confirmed in a rigid faith, but such general religious impressions as he had would unconsciously take this stamp. This was the case with Charles V.; but other considerations came into play. He regarded the imperial crown as an important lever of his power; and, in the true mediæval spirit, he considered it to be closely connected with the unity of the Church, which he must under all circumstances uphold, however she might be constituted in other respects.

From this stand-point he might easily come into collision with both the Pope and the Protestants. He disgusted the latter when he let them feel his power as Mediæval Emperor for rebelling against the unity of the Church; he would quarrel with Rome whenever her secular interests interfered with his political schemes.

In spite of his pronounced Roman Catholic views, he was by no means unconditionally submissive to the policy of the Church. In the course of the last decades Rome had more than ever become a temporal power; Julius II. and Leo X. were far more of temporal than spiritual rulers. Rome now paid dearly for having been actuated in her policy solely by worldly motives, like any other state of Italy; for, lamentable as this might be, it was the fact. It might easily happen that Charles V., once so good a son of the Church, might, from political reasons, become unfriendly to Rome. Indeed, such a case had just occurred, for Rome had exerted herself against Charles's election, because at that time very powerful princes were dreaded in Italy and in the rest of Europe.

They had seen through this at the court of Madrid, and were at no loss for a counter-stroke. On May 12th, 1520, Manuel, the Emperor's commissioner, wrote to him: "Your Majesty must go to Germany and show some favour to a certain Martin Luther, who is to be found at the court of Saxony, and is a cause of some anxiety to the court of Rome from the things which he preaches."

Charles's mode of looking at things was exclusively political, and the aim of his education had been to make it so. He had had no real youth, and was wanting in the elasticity and spirits which are characteristic of that period of life. The pupil of the cold Burgundian-Spanish school was destitute of every youthful trait; but in diplomacy, which was his calling, he surpassed many of the maturest

princes of Europe. In his circle religious matters were regarded with great indifference. People permitted themselves to say very bad things about the Church and the Papacy, while they earnestly desired that the people should retain their very useful superstitions, but did not imagine it possible that men's minds could ever be deeply affected by such things; in fact, they were as completely strangers to the real nature of religion as were the proud and worldly dignitaries of the Church. It was in this that the fundamental error of Charles's policy lay with regard to the great question of the age. He made his calculations in a wonderful manner; in the long labour of a lifetime he cast up everything figure by figure; but one thing he could not discover, the logarithm for the religious commotions of his time. He could not comprehend them; he thought a monk might be set up like a puppet, and then be suffered to fall down again; he once even imagined that the matter could be settled with a few thousand dollars. This narrowness of view, combined with his otherwise magnificent diplomatic virtuosoship, is exceedingly remarkable, and it occasioned his fall. It was this that occasioned the greatest power which the world had seen to suffer shipwreck in the tumults of the age stirred up by a single monk. It was with the feeling of his powerlessness against this unknown something that Charles abdicated and went into a monastery.

A man may be an eminent personage and have powerful means at his disposal, but if he does not comprehend the ideas of his time, if he does not with his whole soul take one side or the other, he will be an alien in a world where a man must be either hammer or anvil, and he will not escape the fate of Charles V. The well-known story of the two clocks well illustrates his position; at all events, he may have so spoken and acted, for it was in accordance with his character.

The character and policy of Charles V. cannot be defined with a word. A multitude of contradictory ideas and qualities were jumbled together in his mind. His position as Prince of Burgundy, hereditary Prince of Hapsburg, as King of Spain, and Emperor of Germany, gave him a number of complicated problems to solve, and they were decided in favour of one interest or another, according to the number of the factors. He was never influenced by any but external motives in his decisions, and this was his ruin.

It was in the nature of things that it should be so. None of those who approached him with great hopes appreciated the necessities imposed upon him ; but for us this complication of circumstances had tragic results. An emperor had appeared once more with a dazzling position in Europe, but his heart was a stranger to the thoughts that were agitating Germany ; he did not even understand the language of the nation whose patriots were looking to him for the prosperity of their country ; and thus the empire again became the sport of European complications, the fate of the nation was again enchained to aims and enterprises which had nothing to do with her future.

## CHAPTER IV.

**The Diet of Worms, Spring of 1521.—Agreement between the Emperor and the Pope.—Negotiations about Luther.—The Mandate of 8th—26th May, 1521.—Growth of the Regal Power in France under Francis I., 1515-47.—His Domestic and Foreign Policy.—The First War, 1521-26.**

**THE DIET OF WORMS, APRIL AND MAY, 1521.—AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE POPE AND THE EMPEROR.—NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT LUTHER.—THE MANDATE OF MAY.**

ROME had exhausted her weapons against Luther; the papal ban had fallen powerless to the ground; unless the Emperor interfered, the cause of the Curia was lost.

The young Emperor now came to Germany for the first time to arrange the details of the election contract at the Diet, and at the same time to speak the decisive word on the question of Church reform. This latter task was peculiarly difficult. On the one hand, the unity of the Catholic Church must be maintained, yet the abuses within her, of which even his own confessor Glapion thought seriously, must be remedied. On the other hand, the clamorous demands of the Germans must be satisfied. They had been asking for reform for centuries, and it could scarcely be any longer denied; yet it must be so carried out that, if possible, the whole nation should share in the benefit of it: in short, Charles was to carry out reform in such a manner that neither the unity of the Church nor that of the nation should suffer. Everything else that devolved upon him at the Diet was thrown completely into the shade by this task.

But he was met at the outset by the unfortunate fact, that he had no clear comprehension of the situation, nor of the importance of the commotion in Germany; and a new

combination of his worldly plans and the Romish policy had just arisen, which might determine his course on the German question. A war with France was threatened, about the old question of claims to Northern Italy: in such a war it would be of the greatest moment for the Emperor to have the Pope, the most distinguished ruler of Italy, on his side. The Church party saw plainly that nothing could be accomplished in Germany without the Emperor, and so they met each other half-way.

They came to a preliminary agreement which amounted to this: the Pope is to support the Emperor in Italy against France, and in return the Emperor is to help to put an end to heresy in Germany.\*

This was not in accordance with the duty or the position of the German Emperor; it was far, indeed, from acknowledging the nation's right to Church reform, while saving it from a religious schism. It was a case, at this first momentous crisis, in which the domestic interests of the Hapsburg-Spanish house were allowed to triumph over the most sacred interests of the nation. It was a course which bitterly revenged itself on Charles. What would he not have given, nine years later, could he but have bought this moment back! Both parties were then looking to him; both were ready to abide by his decision, if it were practicable and reasonable. Had he taken the right course, he would have had far more power at his disposal than he could ever acquire by the most dexterous intrigues with Rome. The evil consequences of the error of 1521 cannot be over-estimated.

Charles had in the main arrived at a decision before the Diet assembled. The Diet, therefore, was a court whose sentence was ready before the parties had been heard; the Emperor had made up his mind that, to please the Pope, he must put an end to heresy.

Charles did not perceive that this was impossible, even at the cost of a civil war, for his thoughts were beyond the Alps; he had turned his back upon the German business before he had publicly taken it in hand. The Edict of Worms was, therefore, not only an injustice, because it pronounced sentence upon a question which had never been honestly investigated; it was also an error, for by it

\* There was no formal agreement till May 8th, 1521. See Ranke.



a most valuable opportunity was lost, and the imperial authority was as much weakened by it as the papal authority had been by a bull that nobody heeded.

From the immense popular interest excited by the citation of the Wittenberg monk, it was plain that the nation cared for nothing so much as for this question. Luther felt this, and determined to go to Worms before he knew whether safe-conduct would be granted him or not. He set aside every suggestion of recantation, and was ready joyfully to give his life for his convictions. He wrote to Spalatin, who was negotiating with him on behalf of the Emperor and the Elector:—"If it should ever be that I should be delivered up, not only to the high priests, but also to the heathen, the Lord's will be done. I hereby give you my advice and opinion: you may expect everything from me, only not that I shall flee or recant; I shall not flee, far less recant, so surely as my Lord Jesus strengthens me, for I can do neither the one nor the other without danger to godliness and the salvation of many." And in another letter to the same he says:—"If his Majesty calls me to account so that I am ruined, and am looked upon on account of my answer as an enemy to the empire, still I am ready to come. For I have no intention of fleeing, nor of leaving the Word in danger, but I mean to confess it unto death so far as Christ's grace sustains me! But I am certain that the bloodhounds will not rest till they have put me to death."

Luther felt to the full the responsibility of the steps he had taken; he thought it doubtful whether the Emperor's safe-conduct would protect him; he knew the fate of Huss well; but he knew also that to go back would be to condemn himself and ruin the object he had in view, and he therefore acted with all that fearless courage with which his good conscience and trust in God inspired him. The juxtaposition of affairs was this: on the one hand, political calculation, which thought it had taken everything into account, and yet failed; on the other, manly faithfulness to conviction, which did not weigh or calculate, but acted with the feeling that the future depended upon it. The Edict of Worms was torn in pieces a few days after it was issued; the simple man in a cowl, who went to Worms with the feeling that he would rather die than flee, belonged henceforth to the world's history.

The court was conducted with great pomp, but all its solemn apparatus was an empty pageant ; for, however the accused might defend himself, the sentence had been already arranged with Rome.

On the first day, the 17th of April, the style of his defence was embarrassed. The sight of this great assemblage of dignitaries of the empire and Church abashed the monk, who, as we have seen, still found it difficult to surmount his timidity in the pulpit. He spoke low, often scarcely intelligibly ; and it was not till near the close of the second hearing that he regained facility of utterance and the full power of his voice. There was something rustic and unaffected in his mode of speaking ; he had nothing of the diplomatic polish which the strangers among the audience might have expected, but his bearing was thoroughly firm and unyielding. He maintained that nothing but the plain words of Holy Scripture, no threat nor power should induce him to recant, and exclaimed, " Here I stand ; I can do no otherwise ; God help me ! Amen."

The Spaniards present could not comprehend how so insignificant an individual, who displayed so little talent or learning, should have caused such a scandal in Germany, and Charles V. exclaimed, " The monk would not make a heretic of me."

But the German princes, Frederic the Wise, Eric of Brunswick, and Philip of Hesse, were proud of their countryman, and agreed that he had stood out bravely for his convictions against all objections and threats. By their advice he took his departure immediately after the hearing at Worms ; they did not think it safe for him to linger ; the Elector Frederic even thought it needful to place him in safety by a nocturnal surprise, and to withdraw him for a time from the eyes of the world.

The rest of the Diet was occupied with transactions of a different kind, and it did not appear as if any steps would be taken about the heresy, when, on the 25th of May, the Emperor had the princes who were still present suddenly summoned, to submit for their approval the decree which had been prepared concerning Luther. Many of the representatives were no longer present, particularly those from whom opposition might be expected ; but in order to make the world believe that the decision had been arrived

at in the presence of all the princes, the prudent precaution was taken of dating the decree, of which nobody had heard till the 25th, back to the 8th. This artifice of the Papal Nuncio, Alexander, showed that his party were not sure of their ground, and were obliged to smuggle in a sentence which a fortnight before they could not have hoped to carry. The decree thus obtained was signed by the Emperor on the 26th of May, and pronounced upon Luther, his friends, followers, and patrons, a sentence of ban and double ban, and condemned his works to be burned. The sentence enumerates all Luther's heresies, and then says :—

“Thus this individual, not a man, but one like the evil one in human form, under a monk's cowl, has gathered together in one stinking mass a number of heretics who have been long concealed, and hold most damnable heresies; and he has even devised some fresh ones under pretence of preaching faith, which he has so assiduously made every one believe, in order that he may destroy the real true faith, and under the name and guise of evangelical doctrine, put an end to all evangelical peace, and love, and all good order.”

The proceedings at Worms are then related; how, in spite of all admonitions, “which might have moved and softened the most obdurate man, even had he been harder than stone,” “he had refused to recant,” and with “those unbecoming words and gestures which in no way beseem any thoughtful ecclesiastic of good repute, openly declared that he would not alter a word in his books.”

Safe-conduct was granted to Luther for twenty days after his departure: after this, that is, after the 14th of May, it was forbidden under severe penalties “to give the aforesaid Luther house or home, food, drink, or shelter, to afford him help or countenance, openly or secretly, by words or actions.” He is rather to be secured and given up wherever he may be found. In conclusion, measures were taken against the printing and printers of his works.

Thus, after a blow had been struck at heresy by the ecclesiastical ban, it was sentenced to death by the secular ban of the empire. The Lutheran heresy was to be exterminated by all the weapons of the temporal power, so it was stated in the edict of the 26th of May. But the edict shared the fate of the papal bull. Nobody heeded it. Two years later the Diet came to a precisely contrary resolu-

tion ; and after nine years, the Emperor, on his return, found that the disturbance, instead of being quelled, had attained gigantic proportions. The opportunity of 1521 did not occur again. It was a misfortune for the Emperor, but it was also a misfortune for our nation ; it suffers from it to this day.

#### GROWTH OF THE REGAL POWER IN FRANCE.\*

It was the impending war with France that mainly induced Charles to treat the German reform question in such a manner as to please the power on whose support he was relying in Italy. The struggle in Northern Italy now began which occupied the Emperor for almost a generation, and completed the estrangement between him and the Germans. These tedious complications were a great help to the Reformation ; but France was even then beginning to acquire that power and unity as a state which were so fatal to Germany and Europe in the seventeenth century.

We linger for a time over the growth of the French power, in order that we may understand the causes of subsequent developments.

The internal constitution of France was essentially different from that of Germany. Both countries had originally belonged to the Carlovingian empire, but both had separated from it at an early period. The character of the nations differed too widely.

While the tendency of public life in Germany during the course of centuries has increasingly been towards the manifold forms of individuality, and the old Germanic spirit of liberty has asserted itself, in France we may observe the tendency of the Romanic nations to submit with more facility to great organizations.†

In France, or in the west of France, there was no thought

\* Ranke, "French History."

† Thus broadly stated, I do not consider this distinction just, though it is frequently made. The consequences of our want of political unity are too often taken for the causes. That spirit of individuality which is inimical to the State was no less strongly developed among the great men of France in the Middle Ages than among the Germans, and I see no difference between the loyalty of the French citizen class and the loyalty of the German cities to the Emperor which is at all to the disadvantage of the latter. But in France the highest powers in the State knew better who were their natural allies than they did in Germany.—ED.

of resistance to Charlemagne, for ever since the battle of Alesia the people were accustomed to renounce their individual liberties and to submit to a monarchical government. There was a centralizing tendency in the tastes of the people earlier than there was in Germany. There were, indeed, greater and lesser vassals, even independent princes, in comparison with whom the impotence of the sovereign was painfully obvious, but the national characteristics were different from ours, and prevented the divisions of territories and families from destroying unity, as has been the case with us.

After the end of the tenth century came that manly though not highly gifted race of the Capets, who, favoured by fortune, went quietly to work, step by step, to found the monarchy. Germany was also distinguished from France by this, that in the former the principle of election was in favour, which is incompatible with a solid government, while in France a hereditary monarchy was early established without difficulty.

France thus had a people disposed for, and for centuries trained to, monarchical unity, and a hereditary dynasty which therefore had not always, like the German kings, to make a fresh start; then they had long reigns, from forty to fifty years, which were admirably adapted to accustom the people to transitions to new orders of things; and France was much more favourably situated geographically.

It was open on the eastern side; none of the country to the east, from the Rhone to Flanders and Artois, belonged to France till a much later period; but the rest was admirably fitted by nature for one united state, bounded as it was by the Pyrenees on the south, and by the sea on the two other sides.

But Germany, which might have had, although she never had, a southern boundary in the Alps, really had a good boundary on the north side only, in the North Sea and the Baltic; on the east and west she always had to guard an insecure and ill-defined frontier. The Germany of to-day was only conquered late in the Middle Ages, and the Elbe, which now flows through its centre, was then its boundary.

Then the position of France, though not a brilliant one, involved no European complications. The *kingdom of Germany* was united to the empire, whose glory had been dearly bought, and whose foreign policy was always interfered

with and rendered uncertain by the slow processes of the internal administrative system. Germany had to thank her perpetual wars with Italy for this state of things, in which, for whole generations, the best blood of Germany had been shed for no good purpose; and, finally, there was the great conflict with the Church, which the King of Germany had to fight out alone because he was also Emperor. While in the eleventh century Germany was subject to fearful convulsions, France was pursuing the even tenor of her way, and, unmolested by any foreign or especially Roman influence, she was in a far better position for setting her house in order. This is why the struggle between Church and State in France was never so vehement as in Germany; on the contrary, they worked together against the system of secular vassalage.

The first of the Capets was, like the rest, a duke, and not even one of the most powerful; but the gradual extension of the dukedom by means of the confiscation of expired or forfeited fiefs was much easier than in Germany, where the principalities had a strong leaning to particular dynasties, while in France no one raised a finger against confiscation. The divisions of the empire which have been so fatal in Germany, the custom of granting principalities to faithful vassals or near relatives, was unknown in France: the French princes remained merely princes. Once only was a principality bestowed on a relative: by this the Duchy of Burgundy was created, but its rulers, Philip the Good and Charles the Bold, entirely forgot that they were vassals of France, which served to teach the kings not to depart from their ancient policy.

Thus the period of the Crusades found France in a more settled state than any other country of the Continent, and the nation entered into the movement with real enthusiasm. The romantic and adventurous character of it fascinated the nation, and the kings headed these national enterprises, although they did not offer much prospect of gain to France; but the kingdom derived this great advantage from them, that they provided an outlet for the superfluous energies of the high aristocracy, who more and more disappeared from the scene. Thus as early as in the thirteenth century, while the kingdom of Germany, in perpetual conflict with the Principalities and the Church, was making no progress, the French kingdom was advancing rapidly towards unity:



and St. Louis, who as a cavalier and good son of the Church was a genuine Frenchman, was diligently and successfully employed in founding a monarchy which should outlive the storms of time.

Then came the severe test of the long war with England, in which two aristocracies tore each other to pieces for nothing. England repeatedly had her kings proclaimed at Paris, and no decisive result took place until the French people were roused and asserted their independence with the sword.

This took place under Charles VII., from 1421—61. He was one of those far-sighted, cautious, agreeable people who accomplish a great deal by patience, perseverance, amiability, and good-nature, and often easily attain an object which much more talented men find it very difficult to reach by an attitude of defiance.

After a foreign war which had lasted a century, and had developed into a civil war, a royal dictatorship was most necessary; it gave the State peace, legal protection, power, and unity; and Charles VII. understood his mission: he was thoroughly a king, like Louis IX. He did not disgrace his victory over the city of Paris by any acts of revenge: for the first time during this long struggle the supremacy of one resulted in reconciliation to the rest, instead of fresh subjection. The Pragmatic Sanction, which was solemnly confirmed by the French clergy at Bourges in 1438, secured the national Church of France against illegal gifts of benefices and extortions by the court of Rome, and the new parliament, removed from Poitiers to Paris, became the centre of the regal administration of justice, and preserved France from all encroachments of ecclesiastical power. At a meeting of the States at Orleans, in 1439, the lawless paid troops of the nobles were disbanded, and the right of maintaining a paid army, and of levying a tax for the purpose, delegated to the king alone.\*

Thus were laid the foundations of the modern monarchical military system and political economy. And all this was amicably accomplished by one man with the aid of the country itself. What Charles VII. had thus slowly and cautiously established was carried on with far greater energy by his son.



Louis XI. was a tyrannical character, after the pattern of the Italian statesmen of the fifteenth century, hardened in all the unscrupulousness and rudeness of the age, and when they served his purpose he did not shrink from the most frightful crimes.

Louis XI. (1461—83) had again to defend what his family had laboured so hard to acquire from a revolt of all the great vassals, under the greatest of them, Charles the Bold of Burgundy, in 1465. After suffering defeat at first, Louis triumphed finally over the dynasty: with the help of the Swiss he utterly vanquished Charles and his proud domain. This at once brought Picardy and Burgundy under his sway, and no one ventured to oppose when he added Guienne and Provence to the crown. He was utterly unscrupulous as to the means he employed in his struggle with the great nobles; but the citizens and peasantry sided with him, for he confirmed their ancient provincial rights and conferred new privileges on the cities. In one place he was ready to convoke the States; in another he allowed the citizens to meet and choose their own officials; and to the peaceable inhabitants of town and country he gave the benefits of an impartial administration of justice by the parliamentary judges, who could not be dismissed. In spite of his execrable private character and his utter want of moral greatness, France justly considers him one of the most meritorious founders of her unity as a state.

Thus, at the close of the fifteenth century, a powerful monarchy existed in France, not as yet unlimited, but moderated by law and usage: still it was a royal dictatorship of extraordinary power.

#### FRANCIS I., 1515-47.—INTERNAL AND FOREIGN POLICY.

Francis I. had succeeded to the monarchy in 1515. He had at once distinguished himself on his accession to power by asserting the claims of his predecessors in Italy, gained the victory at Marignano (September, 1515) in a rapid campaign, and took Milan, by which he acquired a more brilliant reputation than he was able to maintain.

In his internal policy, all the principles which afterwards actuated the kings and statesmen of France may already be recognised. He tries to free the monarchical power

from all limits from within: a sole monarchy being established, his aim now was to make it absolute. One of his first acts was the Concordat with Rome in 1516, which sacrificed a portion of the liberties of the Gallican Church to the Pope, but it gave the King in return boundless influence over the Church in France.

At the great councils of the fifteenth century France had succeeded in preserving the peculiar rights of her national Church, which Germany had also ardently longed to do, but in which, thanks to her political disruption, she had not succeeded. The Council at Bourges, 1483, had proclaimed the freedom of the Gallican Church by the Pragmatic Sanction. The Church government of France, her episcopal system, her general position in relation to Rome, had become more independent than that of any other country, and the odious custom of the distribution of benefices according to the arbitrary will of the court of Rome was abolished. But Rome did not easily submit to this: having defrauded Germany of her promised liberties, the hope was not given up of reinstating the old state of things in France. In the Concordat of 1516, the King, who was above all things desirous of a reconciliation with the Pope, succeeded in obtaining some important decisions of the Pragmatic Sanction relating to the superiority of councils to the Pope, the papal supremacy, and annats; but the King did not yield these points for nothing; the Church had to indemnify him abundantly, and grant him the right of presentation to an enormous extent. According to French accounts, France had then ten archbishoprics, eighty-three bishoprics, five hundred and twenty-seven abbasies; and the King obtained the right, under merely nominal limits, of nominating the holders of all these offices, who had previously been elected. *French*

It was conceded to Rome that the Gallican Church should give up a portion of her liberties, and the King assumed the right of nomination at the expense of the elective right of the clergy—a privilege which gave him enormous resources for providing for followers, granting favours, and making the Church an institution entirely devoted to himself. Whether this was an advantage to the Church we shall see by-and-by.

It is a fundamental principle of French rule to nominate to as many posts as possible from one centre, in order to

provide for as many dependants as possible. This system has been pursued ever since the time of Francis I., under the old *régime*, the Republic, the Empire, the Restoration, the Government of July, and the second Empire.

A second innovation was the plan of selling legal and administrative offices. *eminent courts*

Each of the ancient crown lands had a parliament, or superior court, and during the second half of the fifteenth century, in 1444 and 1501, parliaments were granted to the new provinces also. By introducing the custom of selling places in these parliaments, Francis I. attained two objects: he suppressed the provincial spirit which reigned in these courts, and superseded it by the submissive spirit of members who were dependent on the crown; and it created a great source of income, which, together with the increased military tax, raised his revenues to a sum far above that of any other prince.

Besides the sale of the judicial places, there was the sale of offices of every sort, the number of which was immensely increased, to the great advantage of the royal coffers. The annual income from this source is estimated at four hundred thousand francs. But these novel practices gave rise to opposition, and the parliaments protested. This showed what the royal authority could venture to do even then. Francis I. behaved as imperiously as Louis XIV. afterwards did, when he entered the parliament whip in hand. Francis told the malcontents that he gave them twenty-four hours to consider, and if they would not then submit he would have them imprisoned; and so little independent spirit was there, that they actually submitted.

As may be supposed, the relation of Francis to the religious questions of the day was a perfectly simple one: his sentiments on these subjects were as frivolous as those of all the dignitaries of both Church and State at that period, and his life and morals were a pasquinade upon all religion. He regarded the subject in a purely political light, and said to himself, "Protestantism, in the shape it takes in France, makes a division in the nation; it destroys the unity of the monarchy. Calvinism, indeed, has a strong democratic element in it; it is based upon the principle of self-government and individual independence; it is therefore an enemy to be resisted to the utmost." Catholicism, in fact, signified national unity in France, which had developed into the

essential characteristic of the monarchy, and every other consideration had to give way to it.

But this did not prevent Francis from being a warm friend and ally of Protestantism in Germany, though he burnt and persecuted its adherents in France; the policy which suffered no schism at home found it very judicious to foment it with all its might abroad. Indeed Francis I. was so free from any mediæval prejudices that he did things which no Christian of those times could think of without horror. On one point, in spite of its national and dogmatic schisms, all Christendom was agreed—that the Turk was the hereditary enemy of Christendom, and that it must prepare for a fresh crusade to repulse the roughest and most degenerate race of Turks that had settled not only in Asia, but also in Europe. In face of this common enemy religious differences disappeared, even in Germany. When the Turks approached and threatened Vienna, there was a general call to arms, which was eagerly obeyed both by Catholics and Protestants.

But for Francis I. the Turk was only a political factor, like Protestantism in Germany and Calvinism in France. The Turkish difficulty was a millstone which might be hung round the neck of the Hapsburger to insure peace and quiet in the West. The King did indeed bear the title of *Rex Christianissimus*, but on this point he had no conscience. The French, who now first broke with the Middle Ages, have always kept to this policy of setting the Osman upon Germany, that they themselves might grasp at the Rhine.

All the features of the domestic and foreign policy of modern France now begin to be discernible. The monarchy, absolute and strictly centralized, is bent upon foreign conquest.

The attempt of Francis I. to obtain the imperial crown introduced him at once into the vortex of foreign politics. He had no delusions on the subject of the real power conferred by the imperial crown. Still the name and glory of it excited his ambition. It never occurred to him to wish to rule in Germany as he did in France; he did not covet any more intimate connection with the chaotic elements of the German constitution; but it would have been quite enough for him, and would have justified his being a candidate, from the French point of view, to have exercised a little authority as Protector of the Confedera-

tion of the Rhine, and thus to exert a legitimate French influence over the west of Germany, and avert the rise of a formidable rival power.

This would have made Francis I. an opponent of any German emperor, especially of one with such a patrimony as Charles V. Two such powers could not have existed side by side, even had they been less directly brought into contact. France was always striving to obtain a natural boundary on the east and north-east as well as on the south, but Charles V. was ever in his way: in one case as inheritor of the Duchy of Burgundy, the confiscation of which by Louis XI. he of course did not acknowledge; in the other, as King of Spain, whose natural Pyrenean boundary was not then exactly the boundary of France. This alone rendered it certain that a collision would sooner or later take place.

The outbreak occurred in Northern Italy. The houses of Valois and Hapsburg made equal claims upon the ancient imperial territories of Milan and Genoa, and this was their first battle-field.

Thus arose the great war of 1521-26, which neither answered the King's expectations nor added to his fame.

#### CAMPAIGN OF 1521-26.

The contest began at the end of 1520 in Navarra. This campaign is only interesting from the fact that it was at the defence of Pampeluna against the French that Ignatius Loyola received the wound which led to his renouncing this world's chivalry and devoting himself to spiritual warfare.

At first, in 1521 and 1522, fortune favoured Charles V. In spite of the faithlessness of the Confederation, which at first placed all its infantry at the disposal of the Emperor and the Pope, and then suffered them to be diverted by French money, the allied armies were everywhere successful. On the 27th April, 1522, the Swabian vassals, under the imperial Captain George Frundsberg, supported by Spanish and Italian auxiliaries, defeated the Swiss and French troops at Bicocca, and the whole of Milan again came into the hands of Francesco Sforza, who acknowledged the Emperor as feudal sovereign. As the Swiss returned home and the French gave up the campaign for lost, Genoa

could no longer be held, and thus in a few months the Emperor became master of the whole of Northern Italy.

Meanwhile the position of European affairs had become extremely favourable for Charles V. Francis stood quite alone, and was threatened with internal divisions. England sided with the Emperor, and the papal policy and his own were closely united.

Leo X. died in December, 1521, and his ally the Emperor found no difficulty in exerting a strong influence over the election of his successor; his former tutor, Cardinal von Utrecht, was made Pope. He was a strict and simple monk, brought monastic discipline, in its best sense, to the Holy See, and in this spirit he was ready to promote a reform in the Church. Dogmatically he maintained the old doctrines of the Church; but upon the necessity for improvement in the lives and conduct of the ecclesiastics he was of the same opinion as the Reformers. The short reign of this pope is especially instructive as bearing on the question how far it was possible to carry out reform in and with Rome. We shall recur to this again.

In politics the Pope was entirely submissive to his pupil. Francis I. could not hope for any advancement of his cause from this quarter any more than from his arms. A catastrophe then happened in France itself, which appeared to promise unexampled success to the Emperor. The system of vassalage, the great feudal power which seemed to have been for ever abolished by Louis XI., once more rose up against the King, and with a sufficiently threatening aspect, though it had but one formidable representative.

A relation of the royal house on the paternal side, not only the most distinguished man in the kingdom, next to the King, but also the most wealthy, the Constable Charles of Bourbon, took the side of the enemies of Francis.

In the thirteenth century St. Louis had married one of his sons to a wealthy heiress, who brought to her husband the territory of Bourbon. The last of the Bourbons, Duke Peter, had no male heir; his daughter Susanna was his heiress, and Louis XII. gave her in marriage to the prince of the younger line, Count Charles of Montpensier. By this marriage he received no less than two principalities, two duchies, four earldoms, two viscounties, seven considerable territories, and an almost regal income. As a relation of the reigning house he acquired the office of Constable,



and might even one day aspire to the crown. This contingency, which then appeared somewhat distant, soon really happened to the other Bourbon line. It then appeared extremely improbable that of all Francis's sons only Henry II., whose children died early, would survive him.

The character of Charles of Bourbon was entirely different from that of Francis I. Better acquainted with serious business, less devoted to the frivolous arts and pleasures of the court, not only a brave soldier but an experienced general, not a rash Hotspur upon the battle-field like the King, possessing cool, calculating, far-sighted ambition, he was a man whose personal qualities made him greatly his superior.

Favoured at first by the King, he was afterwards neglected, and after the death of his childless wife Susanna they were at open enmity. The Queen-mother, as niece of Duke Peter, wanted to deprive him of his possessions. It came to a trial and a rupture, and in August, 1522, Charles applied to the Emperor and to Henry VIII. of England to help him to become independent of Francis.

There were great expectations from such revolts, which, when the system of vassalage was still in its vigour and was supported by a sentiment of historical clanship, were often successful; but this was not then the state of things in France, where the instinct of nationality and loyalty to the regal government already prevailed over every other consideration. At first the affair had a formidable aspect, for it appeared as if a long train of retainers would follow the most powerful noble in the kingdom. Bourbon had promised ten thousand infantry if the allies would attack the country in three places simultaneously. But, in truth, all that resulted from it was that the Emperor acquired in Charles a brave general, who was condemned as a ruler in France from the moment when he called in the aid of foreign arms. The kingdom gained more than it lost by this circumstance. The whole enterprise which was built upon the revolt failed. The scheme had been to carry the war into the heart of France, to excite all malcontents to take up arms against the King, and to divide the kingdom into two parts; but the German, Dutch, and Spanish troops who invaded Champagne, Picardy, and Languedoc, found no support anywhere, and when, in the summer of 1524, Bourbon himself led an army, consisting of German,



Spanish, and Italian troops, into Provence, it was only with difficulty that town after town was taken, and while the assailants were losing precious time over the fruitless siege of Marseilles, France was making immense sacrifices for the very princes against whom the revolt had been made. Thus the failure of this campaign and the awakening of a national instinct in France changed the military aspect of affairs in favour of King Francis.

In spite of his victories, the Emperor was not in a position to carry on the war long without a decisive result. He fully experienced the curse of hireling troops. The Swiss, who were dependent on the policy of their cantons, were twice recalled, desertion affected the rest on a large scale, and nothing availed to prevent it. The German vassals alone remained true to him, and these were commanded by brave and trusty generals, who did not fail the Emperor even when he was short of money.

Under the impression of the recent turn of affairs, Francis I. had applied to the people for aid, and an extraordinary war-tax was granted him voluntarily by the towns and extorted from the clergy and nobles. With these means he had assembled a new and brilliant army, and in the winter of 1524-5 it had crossed the Alps and advanced into the plains of Lombardy. Francis drove the imperial troops before him, and everything appeared to be in his favour when, on the 24th of February, 1525, the imperialists resolved to give battle at Pavia, for their only chance was starvation or a decisive encounter. They relied upon the superior generalship of Pescara and Frundsberg, the tough resistance of the German troops, and the fearful effect of their hooked arquebuses; and they were right. The mail-clad French knighthood fought valiantly, Francis at their head, always in the thickest of the fight, and forgetting the part of commander in that of a cavalier. For an hour and a half the combat continued; first the German vassals, from Guelders and Lorraine, in the right wing of the French, were cut down by their imperial countrymen; then the centre, composed of the knights in coats of mail and the Swiss, was broken, and the army thereby almost annihilated: the King himself was taken prisoner. Peace was now inevitable, and Charles V., as victor, was in a position to dictate the terms.

Charles was then at Madrid, and was so little prepared

for victory that from every messenger he expected news of defeat. He is said to have received the news of the brilliant victory of Pavia with indescribable emotion; the revulsion of feeling affected him deeply.

Thus the result of Charles's campaign was entirely different from what the world expected. At the beginning of the contest there was a general opinion that Francis would be the victor. The abilities of the chivalrous King as a commander were greatly overrated, and the means and talents of the youthful Emperor undervalued. The French had not one victorious day during the whole campaign, and the victor of Marignano was a prisoner in Charles's camp.

The five years of war were very decisive for the position of Charles: they, to a certain extent, gave him a place in the world's opinion. It had before been said that he was nothing but the heir of his forefathers; that opinion was now changed. He had certainly had more good fortune than he had shown personal prowess; but in the arrangement of the whole, and in the selection of those under him, he had shown talents for which he had not before been given credit. He was no longer the insignificant Burgundian prince to whom birth and destiny had assigned an unmerited importance; he now really assumed the dignity of a world-wide empire with which he had previously only seemed to be invested by a strange caprice of fortune.

This campaign made a pause, during which the Reformation movement went on in peace, unmolested by any edict of the Church or exercise of imperial power.

## CHAPTER V.

The Situation of Germany during the absence of Charles V.—Luther in the Wartburg.—The Translation of the Bible and its Significance.—Luther and the Radicals at Wittenberg.—The Eight Sermons against Carlstadt, March, 1522.—Luther's cause before the Imperial Chamber and the Diet of Nuremberg, 1522-23.—The Resolution of January 13th, 1523.—The One Hundred Gravamina.—The Decree about the Preaching of the Gospel.

GERMANY DURING THE ABSENCE OF CHARLES V.—LUTHER IN THE WARTBURG. — THE TRANSLATION OF THE BIBLE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE.

WHEN Luther left Worms, before sentence was pronounced, he was seized by the vassals of Frederic the Wise and taken to the Wartburg. In taking this precautionary measure, which Luther does not seem at first to have understood, the Elector was providing against the possibility of things coming to the worst. In the mood in which Germany then was, Luther had in reality little to fear; no one had any inclination to employ the temporal power to enforce the Edict of Worms. If Luther could not set foot in the enemy's country, he could remain at home without danger. Nevertheless, it was prudent that he should be withdrawn for a time from the eyes of the world.

"Junker George" set himself, in the Wartburg, to a task which was the most important of all his labours; he began the translation of the Bible for the German people.

The idea of a translation into the vernacular was not a new one. A considerable number of German translations of the Bible might be mentioned; they have all become bibliographical curiosities, and nothing is known of their influence upon the nation. Luther's translation, on the contrary, is a historical event, both for those who regarded

the book as their rule of faith, and for those whom it prevented from longer withholding it from the world.

The Lutheran translation has some special merits. Not that it is free from defects; not that critics, theological and philosophical, have not pointed out a multitude of errors in it—it would be sad if no progress had been made beyond the point reached by Luther and his learned friends by the researches of three hundred years—and yet we have had no translation for three hundred years which can even dispute the palm with this one.

This is the result of its masterly language. There are some translations which are as much masterpieces as the originals; a certain congeniality of mind and soul is necessary to reproduce the true tone and spirit of the original. Such is Luther's translation of the Bible.

In order faithfully to reproduce the patriarchal simplicity, the homely and childlike character of the Old and New Testaments, to imitate the poetic strains of the prophets and the Psalms, and again the popular straightforwardness of the Gospels, requires a vein of congeniality—the spiritual affinity of a mind which has preserved the simple and honest originality of an unsophisticated people. This cannot be acquired by all the learning in the world, though it may easily be unlearned in the world and among books.

It was precisely these qualifications which Luther possessed. A genuine son of his own people, gifted with all the wealth and depth of the German mind, he could enter into that age of simple national faith; he made its spirit and language his own, and thus acquired the power of translating into German the religious-poetic and poetic-religious mode of expression. This is nowhere more striking than in the Psalms. Herder's translation is much more poetical, but he sacrificed theology to poetry. Luther had a perfect conception of this part of his task. "Now no fine courtly words," he wrote to Spalatin; "this book can only be explained in a simple and popular style."

But Luther took incredible pains. Few of his readers know by what hard work the task was accomplished. We still have some of his translation in MS. He often struck out a passage as many as fifteen times, until he had found the right expression; and this when he was wrestling with his own tongue. But what difficulties he must have encountered in Greek and Hebrew, at a time

when the necessary precursors in the study of both were wanting, and when Hebrew could mostly be learned only from Jews! Then he was convinced that, as a monk and a bookworm, he was unacquainted with many things with which the ancient world was familiar; that he was ignorant of many of the clues which he wanted, and which could not be found in books. He once wrote to Spalatin to ask for the names and descriptions of the precious stones in Revelation xxi. At another time, that he might be able to describe the slaughter of beasts for sacrifice, he had "some sheep killed for him" by a butcher, that he might learn "what every part of a sheep was called."

The New Testament, which was finished in 1523, was comparatively easy; he found the Old far more difficult, and it was not completed till ten years afterwards. He was assisted by a whole consistory of learned men, who, as Mathesius relates, "just like a private Sanhedrim, met for several hours before supper every week in the doctor's monastery." They were Dr. Johann Bugenhagen, Dr. Justus Jonas, Dr. Cruziger, Philip Melancthon, Mattäus Aurogallas, George Rorer, and several rabbis. Luther once wrote, when among this circle, "We are working very hard to bring out the Prophets in the mother tongue. Good God! what a great and difficult work it is to make the Hebrew writers speak German! they resist it so, and are not willing to give up their Hebrew existence and imitate German barbarism."

The language used by Luther in both the Old and New Testaments did not exist before in so pure, powerful, and genuine a form. He was right when he once wrote, "I have not yet read any book or letter in which the German language is rightly used. Nobody takes the pains to write German correctly." The high German prose style had to be created, and it was created by Luther's labours.

Up to this time Germany had a high and a low German dialect. Like the Thuringian race from which he sprang, Luther occupied the boundary-line between the two idioms; the language that he used was neither high nor low German, but a union of the two, forming a common third—the high German as a written language. In his controversial writings Luther had already written German in so masterly a style that it excited Hutten's lively admiration. Up to this time it had been the opinion of the Humanists that you could

only thus express yourself in Greek and Latin. Luther taught them that German prose might be written which was not put to shame by the languages of antiquity.

This new intellectual possession secured unity for us on one point at least, at a time when our religious and political unity came to an end, and we have preserved it through the most unhappy period of our history.

It also involved a most important step in the progress of modern Christendom. The Scriptures were taken out of the hands of a privileged priesthood, and given to the people in a popular form intelligible to every man. The most unnatural of the barriers between the Church and the people was broken down, and the idea realised of the universal priesthood of all. It was an irreparable breach in the old order of things, and of this the opponents of the new tendencies were deeply sensible; but it was one of the most blessed revolutions which has ever taken place in the world. It was doubtless much more comfortable for the Church to invent dogmas to be received by the faithful without doubt or question; it was much pleasanter that there should be no controversy or conflict of opinion, for thus a certain peace and harmony was maintained.

But this state of things was come to an end. Amidst storm and tempest a voice began to make itself heard which was new to all, and by which many were awed. After the seven seals of Revelation were loosed, and every man claimed the right to interpret the Bible for himself, the masses began to take an interest in the disputes of the learned, and a religious commotion stirred every rank of the people.\* Not all were chosen, though many were called; but the fact that the exclusive interpretation of the Bible was taken out of the hands of the Church was a stupendous event on which too much stress cannot be laid, since even from the midst of Protestantism the complaint is sometimes heard that the golden age has passed away. It was hard for the scribes, for they were deprived of their monopoly, but it was quite in accordance with the spirit of a religion not intended for

\* An enemy of Luther, Cocklaüs says: "Mirum in modum multiplicabatur per chalcographos novum testamentum Lutheri, ut etiam sutores et mulieres et quilibet idiotæ qui teutonicas literas uticunque didicerant, novum illud testamentum tanquam fontem omnis veritatis avidissime legerent quicunque Lutherani erant illudque sæpe legendo memoriæ commendarent in sinu secum portantes codicem," &c.

the scribes and Pharisees, but for those who labour and are heavy-laden.

Finally, this work was a blessing for the national and intellectual life of our people, whose greatness first became evident in the succeeding centuries.

One is often tempted to ask how it is that our nation, which ever since the sixteenth century has been subjected to so many fearful commotions from within and from without, has still retained within it an indestructible germ of religious and moral national culture. It has not always been found among the higher ranks of society, which have too readily succumbed to foreign influences; but among the lower classes it has been constantly kept alive; and neither the devastations of the 'Thirty Years' War nor the flood of foreign affectation in the succeeding generations could in any way affect it.

This arose from the fact that no hut was too small, no household too poor, to possess this book; that Luther's Bible was not only a prayer-book and manual of devotion, but a family reading-book; it was the intellectual world in which the young people grew up, to which the old folks recurred; a man inscribed in it his family history, the memorials of his children; and the weary and heavy-laden found consolation in it in times of trouble. The wars which have made a huge burial-ground and a smoking ruin of our beautiful land have not been able to exterminate the Bible: it was the secure possession of the pith and marrow of the nation when our learned men were again writing Latin, and people of culture were speaking French.

For the preservation of our healthy national spirit this book was more of a panacea than anything else, and it has prevented foreign cankers or fashionable follies from ever destroying it. It was from the simple homes of our country pastors, our citizens and peasants, to whom Luther's Bible was everything, that the reformers of our national life in the eighteenth century went forth, and when they began to purify our language from foreign additions, they recurred to the inexhaustible philological treasures of this book; they agreed with Lessing, that compared with its riches our language is poor, and they found the keenest appreciation not among the learned theologians of the old stamp, but in circles where Luther's Bible had remained the Organon ever since the sixteenth century. It was here that the depth and



inwardness of the German character found satisfaction ; it also had an effect, though at second hand, upon our Roman Catholic fellow-countrymen ; and the other tendency of our nation to the adoption and incorporation of foreign elements found in this a perpetual and healthy counterpoise, which the Romanic nations did not possess.

### LUTHER AND THE RADICALS AT WITTENBERG.

While Luther was busy upon the translation of the New Testament the Edict of Worms was waiting in vain to be enforced. He was even then aiming a bolt at the most sensitive part of the ruling Church : what "Junker George" was doing under the Elector's protection looked like utter defiance of the angry glances of Pope and Emperor.

In the midst of his studies news arrived which summoned him once more into the arena, but this time to face different foes from those with whom he had measured his strength before.

Out of the commotion which he had stirred up, another school of reformers had arisen who went much further than he did, for whom his proceedings were not thorough, nor his programme decisive enough. Their opinion was that all tradition should at once be set aside, and everything not expressly enjoined in the Bible summarily abolished. Away then with images of saints and crucifixes ; away with the mass, priests' vestments, confession, and the host ; away with fasts and ceremonies, and the idolatry of church decorations !

At the head of these turbulent reformers stood Carlstadt, whose teaching had already betrayed a tendency to reckless innovation, and who now, instigated by the zealots of Zurich, and no longer kept within bounds by Luther, proclaimed his doctrines more and more openly.

A certain consistency cannot be denied to these radicals. In times of commotion it has always been difficult to draw the line where disavowal and destruction are to end, and toleration and reconstruction to begin. But Luther, notwithstanding the vehemence of his character, was not the man to go to aimless extremes, which arose from a legislative instinct, one of his peculiar gifts. He well knew how easy it apparently is to strike a decisive blow at a declining religion, but that a reaction is inevitable, which will extend

much further than the short-sighted zealot imagines, and he never forgot how much there is that is great and eternal in the structure of the Roman Catholic Church, which ought to predispose a thoughtful man to caution. He fully recognised the value of adherence to the existing historical institution: the least which he asked for tradition, even when it appeared to him to have but little meaning, was the same liberty that he craved for himself and his teaching. "There are many things," he said, "which an individual may do or leave undone. When they are imposed as laws from without I reject them, but I equally reject their prohibition. He who likes to confess is at liberty to do so. To me personally, auricular confession has often been a real relief to the conscience, but I do not wish that the Church should enjoin it."

He mentions several other such points of indifference (*ἀδιαφορα*): whether the Lord's Supper should be received in both forms, whether it is right to stay in a monastery, to have pictures in churches, to observe fasts,—all these appeared to him to be non-essentials of the faith; he gives neither command nor prohibition about them, and his views contain the germ of true liberty of conscience and mental freedom.

From this stand point he could not but disapprove the doings of the Wittenberg iconoclasts. He wrote to them in December, 1521,\* "Now this business has been undertaken in a harum-scarum fashion, with great rashness and violence. I do not like it at all, and that you may know it, when it comes to the point, I will not stand by you in this business. You have set about it without me, and so you may see how you can get out of it without me. Believe me, I know the devil well enough; it is he alone that has set about it to bring disgrace on the Word."

But such admonitions were vain. Luther could no longer stand it in the Wartburg; in spite of the ban of the Church or imperial edict, he felt compelled to go forth, and when his Elector warned him of the neighbouring Duke George and begged him not to go beyond the boundaries of the electorate, Luther wrote back, "One thing I can say for myself, if things at Leipzig were as they are at Wittenberg, I would still go there, even if it rained Duke Georges for nine days, and every one of them were nine times as fierce

\* The whole letter is in the Erlanger edition.

as he. Therefore be it written to your Electoral Highness, though your Electoral Highness knows it very well, that I go to Wittenberg under much higher protection than that of the Elector. I therefore have no intention of asking protection of your Electoral Highness; no sword will or can afford this cause help or counsel; God alone can prosper it without human aid or care. He therefore who has the most faith will be the most protected by it. Now as I perceive that your Electoral Highness is still very weak in faith, I cannot by any means regard your Electoral Highness as the man who can protect or save me."

On the 3rd of March, 1522, he escaped from his asylum, and with a sword by his side, and in Junker George's doublet, he arrived at Wittenberg, determined valiantly to oppose the disturbers of the peace.

For eight consecutive days he preached against Carlstadt and the fanatics of Zwickau, and his eight sermons contain a most important memorial of the genuine spirit of Luther. He proceeded with wonderful tact; he did not mention any of his opponents by name; not an abusive word escaped him; his language was most skilfully adapted to convert misguided followers and to restrain excess of zeal.

These sermons contain golden words. Among other things he says, "We must have charity, and from charity do for one another what God has done for us by faith; without charity faith is nothing. Now, dear friends, on this point you have failed almost entirely: I cannot trace a spark of charity in any one of you. I observe that you know very well how to talk about the doctrine that is preached to you, which is no marvel,—an ass may almost be taught to sing,—but the kingdom of God is not in sermons or in words, but in deeds and in power. Finally, we must have patience. In this life every one must not do what he has a right to do, but must forego his rights and consider what is useful and advantageous to his brother. Do not make a 'must be' out of a 'may be,' as you have now been doing, that you may not have to answer for those whom you have misled by your uncharitable liberty."

Against any compulsion in religious matters he speaks most decidedly:—

"The Word created heaven and earth and all things; the same Word must also create now, and not we poor sinners. Summa summarum, I will preach it, I will talk of

it, I will write about it, but I will not use force or compulsion with any one; for faith must be of free will, and unconstrained, and must be accepted without compulsion. To marry, to do away with images, to become monks or nuns, for monks and nuns to leave their convents, to eat meat on Friday, or not to eat it, and other like things,—all these things are open questions, and should not be forbidden by any man; if they are forbidden it is wrong. If thou canst do these things without burdening thy conscience, continue to do them, but if not, forbear, lest a heavier burden come upon thee.” “If we reject everything that is abused, we shall have to play a strange game. There are people who worship the sun, moon, and stars: shall we therefore fall to and cast the stars from heaven, and hurl the sun and moon from their places? We may as well leave it alone. Wine and women bring many to grief, make fools and madmen of them: shall we therefore pour away all the wine, and put the women to death? Ah, if we want to be rid of our worst enemy, who does us more harm than any one else, we must get rid of and slay ourselves, for we have no worse enemy than our own hearts.”

And these sensible words were not spoken to the air; the leaders, indeed, were not converted, but their followers fell off, and peace was restored.

#### THE LUTHERAN CAUSE BEFORE THE IMPERIAL CHAMBER AND THE DIET OF NUREMBERG, 1521-23.

It would have been all the same for Germany if the Edict of Worms had not been pronounced, for nothing like the execution of it worth mentioning occurred anywhere. In some cases this arose from sympathy with the new doctrines; in others, from impotence, and a feeling that more active interference would only increase the evil.

Thus the Elector of Mayence, the Primate of Germany, would not allow the order of Minorites even to preach against Luther, because he was convinced that it would only feed the flame of heresy.

Luther's books, as well as his followers, were to have been annihilated with fire or sword; but, instead of this, they were spread far and wide. All the literature of the period, with very little exception, takes the Lutheran side. Finally, the outlaw ventured out of his hiding-place into the

world again; and we do not find that it was ever suggested to the Elector to recapture and punish him.

The secret cause of that suspicious manœuvre which had been found necessary to obtain the Edict of Worms at all—a distrust of the sentiments of the influential classes—now received a striking confirmation.

The new Imperial Chamber, in which the German States ruled in place of the absent Emperor, only represented the prevailing sentiments of the people, by not only not persecuting Luther, but by increasingly adopting his cause, and by in fact, though not in words, revoking the edict of 1521.

The new pope, Adrian VI. (January, 1522—September, 1523), regarded the abuses in the Church with the eye of a strictly moral monk; yet, as an orthodox Dominican, he abhorred Luther's proceedings, and sent a Nuncio to Germany to demand, as he certainly was entitled to do, the execution of the ban pronounced at Worms. But the Committee of the Imperial Chamber declined to comply, because they did not wish it to appear "as if they would put down evangelical truth by tyranny, and maintain unchristian abuses, which would only result in resistance to the rulers, insurrection, and defection." They reminded the Pope of the ancient concordats with Germany, so often infringed, and demanded, within the course of a year, the convocation of an open council, in which laymen should have seats and a voice, and the creed should be an open question. The document drawn up on this subject is one of the most valuable of the period.\* This proposal to the Nuncio shows what a luxurious harvest had sprung up from the papal policy since the Councils of Pisa, Costnitz, and Basle. It was the voice of the nation, not merely of a party.

In the first answer of the Imperial Chamber it is stated in a decided tone why neither the ban of the Church nor the imperial edict had been executed, nor was likely to be so. The great majority of the people were convinced that the Roman Curia, by certain abuses, grievously injured the German nation; and disturbances and civil war had been the result whenever the attempt had been made to defend these abuses by force.

The rejoinder of the Papal Legate was followed by the hundred Gravamina. A hundred was a round number. It

\* Goldast

is expressly stated at the end that more could have been adduced, and that it was only for the sake of conciseness that they had limited themselves to these, with the expectation that when those specified were done away, some of the others would go with them.

The subjects of complaint were the following :—Dispensations, indulgences, and the sale of them ; legal abuses, delegates, and commissioners ; the administration of offices from Rome ; the reforms, commendams, incorporations, annats, abuse of bans and interdicts ; the excessive number of festivals, illegal acquisition of property, arbitrary grants of benefices, pilgrimages, unreasonable demands of money, new tithes ; the decision of secular questions, especially the disputes about marriage, by ecclesiastical courts ; “the toleration of illicit cohabitation, and usury for the sake of gain ;” unreasonable rates of interest and wages ; the withholding of the sacraments, the unclerical conduct of the clergy, legacy hunting, the mendicant orders, &c.

They conclude with a threat that in case no attention is paid to these complaints, they will take the matter into their own hands : “If these things are not speedily abolished, which, however, the temporal powers do not expect, they will not conceal from your Holiness that they can no longer submit to such intolerable and pernicious grievances, but will be under the necessity of themselves finding some other ways and means of putting an end to, and being relieved from, such impositions and oppressions from the clergy.”

In 1521 the Hapsburg policy had come to an agreement with the Pope at Worms against Luther. Two years later, at Nuremberg, the nation declared for the unconditional accomplishment of reform of the faith and of the Church.

The Papal Legate had to renounce all idea of accomplishing anything with this Diet by negotiation, although the Emperor's representative, Ferdinand, was on his side. The voices of the secular and ecclesiastical states, of the moderate and extreme parties, were not, indeed, unanimous upon particular questions ; but, on the whole, the Diet presented a compact phalanx to withstand Rome ; and that it was so was rendered quite evident by the fact that the final resolution about preaching was only passed by way of compromise.

It was decided that nothing should be preached but *verum purum, sincerum et sanctum evangelium*, and indeed

*pie mansuete Christiane*, in accordance with the teaching and interpretations of well-known works approved by the Church. The decree was sufficiently strong against Rome, and sufficiently liberal for the party of the new tendencies ; it was calculated to satisfy them, yet their opponents could not reject it.

The Edict of Worms was thereby reversed ; the condemnation of Luther and his followers retracted ; the sword of the secular power which had been hanging over him was withdrawn, and free scope given to his propaganda. This propaganda would have made much more rapid progress than it did make if obstacles had not presented themselves, which were so much the more dangerous because closely connected with the moving causes of the Reformation. Revolution attached itself to the wheels of the car of Reform, and effectually hindered its progress.



## CHAPTER VI.

Reform and Revolution.—The Nobles of the Empire.—Ulrich von Hutten, 1488-1523.\*—Franz von Sickingen, the Feud of 1522, and the Catastrophe of 1523.—Reaction upon the Reformation.—Activity of the Curia.—Adrian VI., January, 1522, to September, 1523.—Clement VII., September, 1534.—The Convention of Ratisbon, July, 1524.

ULRICH VON HUTTEN,\* 1488-1523.

WHAT Luther was for the religious, Hutten was for the Humanistic aspect of the opposition of the sixteenth century,—the man of action who took the initiative in contrast to the many congenial spirits whose hearts were full of sympathy, but who were not men of independent enterprise. But while Luther was the advocate of reform, Hutten was the leader of political and social revolution; while Luther gives the impression of ripe experience and maturity, Hutten represents the impetuosity and fire of passionate youth, of one who had not come out of solitary conflicts in a convent, but who had early taken part in the struggles of the age in the world's arena.

X Theirs are, indeed, two remarkable careers, for a long time running parallel without coming into contact: the son of the Thuringian miner, who, from the meanest circumstances, rises to be the leader of the greater part of the deeply agitated nation, and has a voice amongst rulers on questions affecting their fate; and the scion of a most ancient race of nobles, who descends from his father's castle, exchanges the sword of chivalry for the citizen's pen, and after passing through strange vicissitudes, is engulfed in the stream of the German revolution.

The German nobles hated the new order of things in all its aspects; not so much the Reformation as that which

\* Ulrich von Hutten, von D. Strauss.

gave it so great an impetus—the increasing power of the reigning princes, the growing prosperity of the cities, the preponderating influence of money and trade. All this was utterly distasteful to the old free hereditary proprietors of the soil. The same need which made them waylay travellers and commit highway robberies made them hate the modern system of administration with a deadly hatred, for it brought peace, and aimed at extinguishing feuds. Everything that was regarded as intolerable by this modern system involved something essential to the very existence of chivalry. It was a misfortune for Germany that there was no natural and healthy position for the nobles in the State, but the nobles were greatly mistaken in imagining that they could regain their supremacy by blindly struggling against the new order of things—it could but hasten their downfall. The modern system made its way in the world, and crushed whatever came in its way.

Ulrich von Hutten did not belong to the nobles of this sort. It was his conviction that the order of the nobility, as then constituted, was no longer capable of achieving anything—that it must learn the use of modern weapons. He himself tried to gain a position in the world by his pen and his talents rather than by his sword; and he wished for his order to secure a place at the head of the new ideas. In alliance with the citizens and the peasantry embracing the project of national and religious reform, it should lead the struggle which aimed to free the nation from the oppression of temporal and ecclesiastical rulers, whether German or foreign.

The embitterment which we find among the other imperial nobles had, in his case, cleared off into a certain far-seeing conception of the position of affairs in his country. Sorrow for the melancholy fate of his order did not induce in his mind a blind hatred of the new powers, but a deeper insight into its causes.

His personal position almost led him to take these views. The glorious old race of the Huttens was dispersed, separated, and their property was fallen into confusion. They had become poor, and their traditions and claims to consideration were in curious contrast to their possessions and actual importance.

Ulrich von Hutten was born on the 21st of April, 1488, at the Castle of Stackelburg. As the boy grew up, either

some pious vow or an idea that he was wanting in stamina, occasioned by his delicate appearance, caused his father to destine him for the Church. This was often the vocation of younger sons, though not of the first-born. It was an intervention of fate in young Hutten's life, and was favourable to his early inclination to strike out a new career for himself. He went as a pupil to the monastery of Fulda—not to become a monk, but only to have the benefit of the teaching of the brothers as a layman. He resolutely withstood all attempts to induce him to enter the order.

He learnt many things there to which he would otherwise have long remained a stranger, and laid the foundations of the solid classical culture in which he early distinguished himself. But this was all that attached him to the monastic walls of Fulda.

When he gladly turned his back upon the profession of arms, the foundation was laid of an aspiring energy which could find no satisfaction amongst troopers and dogs, plunder and the chase. Desiring to pursue a course which he could not take in his father's castle, he renounced the traditions of his race; but he had no intention of passing his life in a monastic cell. He wanted to go out into the world, to visit the universities where the modern Humanistic tendencies were most eagerly fostered; but his father did not approve. He was a noble of the old school, and thought it a disgrace that a son of his house should set his heart upon such idle trifling, while he looked upon the ecclesiastical vocation as a solid maintenance—nothing more nor less.

The monks, discerning his talents, tried by intimidation to secure him for their order; the friends he had made outside the convent advised him against entering it. Of this his father knew nothing; and so Hutten, then a youth of sixteen or seventeen, resolved on flight.

About 1504 or 1505 he left Fulda, and went forth homeless and penniless into the wide world. About the same time Luther was quitting the world and entering a monastery in order to clear up his doubts. No doubts had ever assailed Hutten. What *he* wanted was to be up and doing; to have free scope for his energies; and nowhere could he find so little as in a monastery.

But evil days were in store for the fugitive.

We have no precise knowledge of the places he visited

he went through various countries as a wandering student. We find him at Cologne, Erfurt, Frankfort-on-the-Oder, Greifswald, Wittenberg, Olmütz, and Vienna; and when we learn anything of his circumstances, they are of the most wretched kind. In many places he was entered as *Clericus Fuldensis*, perhaps because, in this character, he could live more simply, and more easily find bare subsistence, than if he gave himself out as a distinguished noble. Youth did not present itself to him under a very cheerful aspect. Indeed, to him, as well as to Luther, it was a hard and joyless period. Both the great spirits of the age had to be prepared by suffering for the warfare that awaited them. He met with every disaster that can befall a man—hunger, nakedness, sickness, and every kind of deprivation; false friends who took him up, and then cast him off; capture by robbers, who compelled him to drag himself, ill and half naked, from one place to another. Thus, after his flight from Fulda, his fate was not unlike that of knights-errant of that age; but with this difference—that while they were often left lying by the wayside to come to an ignominious end, he always rose up again with fresh spirit and courage.

It was his astonishing zeal for learning that sustained him. Amidst all the depressing influences of his outward life, his intellectual powers never failed him; and, with the indestructible enthusiasm of his youthful spirit, he more nearly approached the Humanistic ideal than any other man of his time.

The ancient classics incited him to independence and originality. He had a keen and superior mind, with abundant natural creative talent, and he was perfect master of the elegant grace of the classic style. That which cost others great labour to produce, flowed from his lips and pen with perfect ease. His was a poetic nature, and we can but regret that he hampered himself with a foreign tongue and foreign forms. But it was then the object of the highest ambition to be an accomplished Latin poet—the mother-tongue was not as yet held in honour.

When he entered his twentieth year he knew Germany well. He had made the round of the universities at the great cities, and was attracted to Italy, impelled by the Humanist home-sickness of the pupil of antiquity, and enthusiasm for the birthplace of the culture of the Renaissance. This was at the time of the Venetian war, when Italy was

less attractive than ever to such dilettante travellers. Hutten went into the tumult of war, entered the imperial army at Pavia, thus returning to his calling as a knight; and he did his duty valiantly, though without any mental satisfaction. He wrote epigrams and satires in camp, in elegant Latin verse. What is noteworthy is, that he begins to break away from the rigid forms of ancient mythology; to cast off the tinsel of a foreign garb, and to take a keen interest in the present. He treats of the course of the war and the Italian policy, and lashes the shameless traffic in indulgences and bulls by Pope Julius II. This constitutes an essential difference between him and the rest of the Humanistic school, who kept their readers in the misty and colourless region of Mars, Ceres, and the Muses, as in a barren waste. He acquired fame even in Italy; the charming elegance and extraordinary finish of his verses were much admired. No one would have given a heavy German barbarian credit for so much skill.

This sort of light literature was much encouraged in Italy. Hutten made a name for himself—it was his first triumph after his dreary wanderings; it was to his own pen and his own talent that he owed it, and he might well be proud of it. But this by no means satisfied him; he was pursued by the feeling of an inward void, which could not be filled by poetic fame. He returned to Germany. At the paternal castle they would have nothing to do with him—to them he was a “nameless nobody;” but at the court of Mayence he found an honourable reception as a talented poet and Latin scholar. Hutten, like others of the Humanistic school, had an idea of making a career for himself at the courts of princely patrons of arts and in the abodes of wealth. Impelled by necessity, he did occasionally follow this course, but without any inward satisfaction.

While seeking health at Ems, news reached him of a fearful event which had occurred in the family (1515). Duke Ulrich of Würtemberg, already at variance with his subjects and neighbours, was also involved in a personal quarrel, which now caused a sad catastrophe. He murdered Hans von Hutten like a bandit in a wood. The deed was quite in accordance with his wild and lawless character; and it was his own conduct which had brought the difficulties upon him which now hedged him in on every side. The Hutten family was powerful enough to unite the neighbouring

families to execute vengeance on the Duke, and to incite the Emperor and the empire to take up its cause.

Ulrich von Hutten wrote a number of addresses on the occasion, which produced a great impression. These philippics against Duke Ulrich are entirely in the style of the Humanistic school. They are elegant compositions, evidently formed upon the models of Cicero and Demosthenes, and you feel that the author's main object is to show how successfully a German can write in this style. But, at the same time, beneath these artistic periods there is the glowing enthusiasm of a soul pining for freedom, a deep pathos and consuming passion. It was felt that the writer was no common man, that he took the Duke for his subject—because a subject he must have—that he was not merely a poet, a Humanist of the common stamp, but an orator and an agitator.

These addresses greatly increased his fame; they made the war against Duke Ulrich popular; every class of persons had a grievance, and for a long time the Duke's cause was lost. Then this eloquence, this wonderful art of writing impressively on the topics of the day in antique forms and fine sonorous periods,—it was something quite novel.

After this feud we again find Hutten in Italy. While his father was hoping that he would at length diligently study the law, he was completing his classical studies; and, instead of bringing with him the degree of Doctor of Laws, on the 12th of July, 1517, he received from the Emperor Max at Augsburg, in presence of the whole court, the laurel crown as the greatest poet of Germany. We have testimony from Italy, England, and France, with what envy and admiration the poet was regarded.

Having reached this lofty height, one aspect of his life closes; he was now to enter upon a new career. During his residence in Italy the contest between Reuchlin and the Dominicans had broken out, in which the German Humanists first appear in compact phalanx. He received the first series of the *Epistulæ Obscurorum Virorum* at Bologna in September, 1516. They pleased him greatly, for he found a congenial spirit in them. He had not contributed to the first series, but the second is enriched by him.\* He took a keen

\* If, as is supposed, the letters dated from Rome are his, they indicate that he was less skilled in the use of the light weapons of derisive satire than in wielding the heavy guns of passionate invective.

interest in all Humanist affairs, was in close intimacy with Reuchlin, and defended him against the Grand Inquisitor and monastic scholasticism. But he was still a stranger to all the other great movements of the age. When Luther first appeared on the stage of the world, and affixed his ninety-five Theses to the church door at Wittenberg ; when an agitation was arising, compared with which the affair with the men of Cologne was a harmless jest, Hutten was simply conscious of being the crowned Latin poet ; and when Tetzels and Eck attacked Luther, he wrote a letter full of malicious pleasure that the monks should be tearing each other's hair. He was still the distinguished knight, doubly ennobled by his talents and acquirements. One man in a crowd was to him the same as another, and their disputes were but a subject for his passing derision. He was altogether a stranger to Christianity : to the Humanists, classic culture was religion.

When Luther had the memorable dispute with Cajetan in 1518, Hutten was also at Augsburg under the care of a physician ; but he neither sought out Luther nor took any account of the fact that he was there.

But it was not in vain that Hutten had been in Italy ; not the Humanist only, but the patriot also had learnt lessons there. He had felt with burning shame the ignominy of the foreign Italian yoke, the decline of the German empire. The contempt of the foreigner for the nation that had once ruled the world cut him to the heart. Even in the Venetian war he had made a glowing appeal to the Emperor Max to place himself at the head of the nation, to inaugurate a regeneration of this great people, which would make it once more united and powerful. Max listened to appeals of this sort with a gracious smile, but he was too old, and his heart too cold to be kindled by them. Charles V., a young emperor, with splendid patrimonial power, seemed to be the man to remodel the world. The old imperial reminiscences, the glory of the German name, urged Hutten to make a similar appeal to him ; but he was still less disposed than Max to be influenced by the enthusiastic dreams of youth. Meanwhile, the power of the reform movement was increasing ; the tide was rising higher and higher.

Such men as Crotus Rubianus excelled him in the former, but it did not go so deep, as the subsequent falling off of this great satirist proves.



From Luther's writings Hutten derived a new idea of the man and his cause, and learned that a German could move men's hearts in his own tongue, that its sonorous tones produced an effect far greater than laboured imitations of the scholars of antiquity, and that a great mind would not degrade itself by following such an example.

It was plain that this simple monk was beginning to move the masses, to set the nation in a novel ferment, and among the people the influence of the learned had been very moderate. A new spirit was stirring, which, though not at enmity with that of the Humanists, took quite another form. Upon no one did all this make a deeper impression than upon Hutten. With all his poetic fame, he bowed down before this despised monk, who had dared to do what no one else had done, and who could handle his own language so dexterously. He had never been able to think without shame that a German emperor should humble himself before the Roman Curia, and here was a monk burning the papal bull. He was quite excited by the daring deed; he saw that all his poetic fame, all his poems and fine speeches were nothing in comparison with what had been accomplished by the Wittenberg monk, and an entire change took place in him. He gave up the office of poet-laureate, renounced the pride of his Latin muse, and began to write German. His opposition to the Church of Rome had begun early. He had said cutting things of Rome in his verses written in Italy.

The day before he set out on his return to Germany the second time, he made acquaintance with a rare work by Laurentius Valla, an enlightened Italian patriot, an eminent statesman, and the accomplished translator of many of the Greek classics. It was the work on the "Gift of Constantine" (*De Donatione Constantini*). Valla wrote at a time when educated men were already alienated from the Church; but few had the courage resolutely to make researches into her pious frauds; and therefore a number of ecclesiastical archives, relating to the reputed gift of the States of the Church by Constantine, were held to be indisputably genuine documents. It was a significant event when a distinguished author ventured for the first time to attack the Pope's temporal power. Hutten adapted this work for Germany, endeavoured to circulate it, and to give it fresh effect against Rome—a purpose the animosity of which was

not lessened by the fact that he dedicated the book to Leo X.

He now attained to a comprehension of what Luther was, and what he was aiming at; and the change took place which converted Hutten to his own nation. He had hitherto only exercised himself in the field for which his tastes and talents especially fitted him. He now no longer wrote satirical dialogues, but fierce invectives, in which he discharged whole quivers full of arrows. He no longer addressed himself in a foreign tongue to the cultivated classes, who had hitherto to a certain extent admitted and deplored the evils of the times among themselves; he addressed the nation, the nobles, the knights, the cities, the peasantry, every one who grumbled at the old order of things, and was disposed at any cost to put an end to it.

He prepared to join the new movement, which, however, he regarded only as a means to an end; for he was a stranger to the theological ideas of the Reformation. It served as a lever for political and social aims which went far beyond those of Luther. Hutten advocates taking the law into their own hands, while Luther maintains that "rebellion will do no good." But it was not only that Luther repudiated these means of obtaining political reform; he was averse to the end, for he was convinced that the two objects are essentially distinct, and cannot be forcibly joined together. He often said to the hot-headed politicians, "You will not attain your own object, and you will ruin mine. Such things cannot be taken in hand at the same time. It is enough for me to accomplish the religious revolution. By such a rebellion as you want to excite, you may attain great results for the moment, but they will not be lasting."

It was on men's minds and consciences that Luther wished to work; Hutten appealed to their passions. Luther was constantly repeating, "I will talk, write, and preach about it;" but anything that went beyond that appeared to him to be mischievous.

After 1520 Hutten and Luther were seemingly pursuing the same course; but it was only seemingly, for there was a contrast between them which could not long be concealed.

Thus it was that Hutten was led into an arena from which he had hitherto kept aloof, but in which he seemed born to

rule ; for he possessed rare gifts as a popular agitator, and, by his genuine eloquence, knew how to move men's minds to their very depths. He had also a peculiar vein of satire : his little dialogues are masterpieces, as well as his popular poems, such as the " Lamentation over, and Warning against, the Unchristian Power of the Pope, and the Unholy Men in Holy Orders," which appeared in December, 1520 ; and in which the abuses in the Church, the disgraceful rule of Italian courtesans, all that for more than a century had so deeply embittered the nation, was expressed in almost doggerel rhyme, bound up as it were as a quiver full of arrows, and flung at Rome.

Then came the Diet of Worms. There it was manifest that even among his own class Hutten was not alone in his views. The nobles of the empire regarded Luther with interest and good-will. His bearing especially excited their sympathies. Sickingen offered him a safe retreat in one of his castles. This was just at that time a fact full of significance, for it was not then known that not a man would be found in Germany to carry out the imperial edict.

Hutten was already intimate with Sickingen ; he had made him acquainted with Luther's mind and writings at the Ebernburg in the winter of 1520-21.

#### FRANZ VON SICKINGEN AND THE FEUD OF 1522-23.

The character of Franz von Sickingen was entirely different from that of his young friend ; but, like him, he was one of the most notable representatives of sharply defined tendencies. He did not belong to the literary school in which Hutten had early distinguished himself ; he was pre-eminently a cavalier. He was not so much averse to study, as so many of his class were, as indifferent and unaccustomed to it. Neither had his religious views any very definite character. It was somewhat difficult to interest him in the pressing questions of the day. This was undertaken by Hutten. He, no doubt, approached him on the side of his national sensibilities, which was the best way of gaining him for the cause. He submitted in his old age to the new teaching of the purified gospel, took the communion in both kinds, and allowed the teachers of the Lutheran doctrines to preach and hold services in his domains. Not only the Ebernburg, but all the country belonging to it between the

Rhine, the Nahe, and the Neckar, was a "refuge for righteousness."

The mere possibility of so exceptional a position as that occupied by Sickingen in the German empire proves the unusual and contradictory nature of the elements existing at that time in Germany. He was undoubtedly the last of the German knights who held such a position.

He had early devoted himself to the profession of arms, had become not only an expert and gallant swordsman, but possessed extraordinary talents for organization, which enabled him to manage the rabble; and it implied a good deal of talent to make anything harmonious out of this motley material.

Out of German soldiers, wild young fellows of every sort and the scattered members of noble families, he formed the best armies of the day: there was a motley crew of infantry who had rifles and pieces of ordnance, and the mailed cavalry whose mode of warfare was a relic of mediævalism. Sickingen stood on the boundary-line between two periods, and belonged to both. He was a knight of the empire, and all the Rhenish nobles were closely bound to him: a call from him summoned them all to arms. Yet he was at the same time a modern soldier, the commander of a paid army with modern weapons, which he organized on modern principles and according to the system of modern tactics.

What Wallenstein afterwards was on a large scale, Sickingen was on a smaller one. His call to arms attracted all whom taste or habit inclined for war to fight beneath his banners.

In those times of scarcity of money, when there was no longer a national call to arms and the modern system of recruiting did not exist, a man who maintained and headed such an army was a valuable ally to any prince. When the Emperor had a war in prospect he dispatched a messenger to the Ebernburg to obtain Sickingen's aid, and to avail himself of his credit with the knights and their retainers. Maximilian I. well knew how to uphold him; he acknowledged his services and distinguished him, so that in spite of the smallness of his territory he was an important political factor; and so widespread was his reputation, that France offered him tons of money to fight on her side.

For the rest there were many points in Sickingen's character which belonged to the genuine knight of those

days. He hated the rule of the princes, justly feeling that the nobles would be gradually absorbed in their supremacy; neither could he endure the cities with the power conferred by their movable capital, their immense wealth, and the contempt with which they looked down on the pride of the poverty-stricken nobles.

Still he had too much good sense not to come to terms, as circumstances required it, even with these factors. He also hated the freebooting exploits of the knights who infested the highways, and deliberately broke the newly made treaty of peace (*Landfriede*). Not that he had not often broken it himself, but then it was in open feuds between one power and another.

Combined with his outward-bound and worldly tastes there was yet something about Sickingen which recalled Hutten to mind; a certain halo of romance which still encircled the brows of the best representatives of the nobility, and which was derived from the glory of the Holy Roman Empire. With this man Hutten allied himself, the highly cultivated idealist with the matter-of-fact realist. It was a singular alliance: one was the greatest popular author whom, next to Luther, Germany had produced; the other, the greatest soldier of the age, a true German knight, who could assemble ten thousand men under his banners, for whose favour the great powers eagerly sued, and who boasted that he had turned away the French ambassadors who brought gold to the election of the Emperor, when his neighbours, spiritual and temporal, had received them with open arms. It was obvious that this alliance must have other objects than to promote the preaching of the pure gospel. Not that either of them was indifferent to this great question of the day. They advanced the cause zealously in their own fashion, but only as means to an end. We often find a parallel between the purposes of this alliance and the objects and doings of the Hussites: they threw off the yoke of the Church in spite of the Emperor and empire, and why should not we? The following points formed the groundwork of their programme, in which national, moral, economical, and ecclesiastical elements were all mingled together: the restoration of order, that is, of the ancient liberties of the empire, with the Emperor at the head and the nobles by his side; abolition of mercantile monopolies; abrogation of foreign laws and dismissal of

foreign administrators of the law ; diminution of the number of ecclesiastics and monks ; the enactment of laws against foreign manners ; cessation of the drain of German money by the Fuggers and other bankers for indulgences and other Church taxes imposed upon Germany by Rome.

The Emperor was absent, and the many-headed Imperial Chamber reigned in his stead. It was a well-disposed government, but it wanted monarchical power and the means of keeping the peace, even in its own immediate neighbourhood, and therefore the time seemed adapted for a great undertaking.

In the spring of 1522, Sickingen, like a lord and master as he was of the nobles of the Upper Rhine, summoned them to Landau and conferred with them as to what was to be done. They formed themselves into a league of brotherhood, and bound themselves, with Sickingen at their head, to resist the encroachments of the reigning princes. There were branches of the league throughout the Palatinate, the provinces of the Upper and Middle Rhine, to the Taunus, and probably extending to Swabia. As leaders, besides Sickingen and Hutten, we find Hartmuth von Kronenberg ; and there is a letter of Sickingen's of this year which appeals to the free German cities to enter into the league with the nobles to rebel against the princes.

Sickingen's first enterprise in this year was the occasion of a widespread commotion. One of his neighbours was the Archbishop of Treves, with whom Sickingen had had various transactions, and whose post just now was a difficult one. He was strongly opposed to the Reformation, but there was an active religious movement going on in the city. From this place Caspar Olevian afterwards came, who was one of the originators of the new doctrines and of the Heidelberg Catechism. The reform movement here also was combined with discontent with the ecclesiastical government.

Sickingen was aware of all this, and laid his plans so as to take advantage of the strife. His plan was to attack Treves, to take possession of it, to put his party at the helm, and establish the new doctrines. If he succeeded, he would with one blow make himself master of an important part of the imperial territory, and his position would be doubly strong from the triumph it would furnish to the great reform movement.



Sickingen thought it would be an easy task to conquer Richard Greiffenklau of Treves, and had no fear but that he could obtain succour. Richard's old patron in the Palatinate, Albrecht of Mayence, would, he thought, at any rate remain neutral; he had always been a time-server, and would not risk much to aid his colleague. The fourth Rhenish Elector, Hermann von Wied, had always been indifferent to worldly affairs, and was not, like Richard von Greiffenklau, a mounted priest; he cared nothing for politics, and was exclusively devoted to ecclesiastical pursuits. It was he who astonished the empire by suddenly accepting the new doctrines in the evening of life; there was nothing, therefore, to fear from him.

But there was an error in these calculations: whatever might be the sentiments of the princes of the empire on other subjects, there was so much *esprit de corps* among them that they at once recognised to the full the danger of a rising of their natural enemies, the nobles. "If we let one go we are all lost." This was the opinion even of Albrecht of Mayence; but it was a point entirely overlooked by Sickingen.

Early in the summer of 1522 he collected together horses and horsemen, arms and stores, fortified his castles, and summoned the hired soldiers. It was easy to find a pretext for a quarrel with the Archbishop of Treves, and he advanced against him. On the 7th of September he suddenly appeared before the city, but the resolute archbishop was not taken by surprise. Sickingen could not take even the suburbs; the city itself was crammed full of knights and soldiers; the clergy and citizens stood armed at their posts; and while his attack was ward off, the reinforcements on which he had relied were partly driven back and partly beaten.

A failure at this juncture was most disastrous. The world was to be astonished by a *coup de main*, the enemy to be startled by a sudden success; but if the enemy had time to consider and make preparation, Sickingen would have to contend with a power that even he was not man enough to resist.

Things came to the worst for him. Forsaken by his allies, threatened with the advance of the Elector Palatine and the Landgrave Philip of Hesse, by the 14th of December Sickingen was compelled to retreat. Condemned to act fruitlessly on the defensive himself, he had to witness the



punishment of his allies, Hartmuth von Kronenberg and Frowen von Hutten, and the humiliation of the rest of his followers; and in the spring of 1523 he saw his two ill-defended castles of Ebernburg and Landstuhl threatened with an alliance which could not fail to crush him.

In April the Elector Palatine and the Landgrave advanced with their artillery. Sickingen looked down from Landstuhl for succour in vain. The nobles would not run any further risk, and the Reformers abjured any part in the revolution. Even the first guns which were fired against Landstuhl, on the 30th of April, showed that there was no chance for the old walls against this kind of warfare. Seriously wounded, Sickingen was obliged to capitulate. "This unfortunate firing," he said, "has ruined my castle;" and he died in presence of his victors.

The nobles were vanquished with him in their first attempt to resist princes and priests, and to regain the liberties which acknowledged no other rule than that of the Emperor. The victory of the princes was also a triumph of modern warfare, with which even the chivalry of a Sickingen could not compete.

The nobles of the empire were now, one after another, attacked; everywhere the opportunity was eagerly seized by the neighbouring prince to restrain the insolent knight, and to accustom him to the position of a subject freeholder. One thing is noteworthy in the events of this period—that the elements between which some affinity existed never united together. Sickingen perished in 1523; in 1524 the peasants rose; in the spring of 1525 they set the south and west of Germany in flames, yet there was no connection between the two events, though the objects of both parties were so closely allied. Although here and there a noble headed the peasantry in the peasants' war, it is well known that it only took place from compulsion. Yet in the declarations of the peasants we often find the programme of the nobles repeated almost word for word. Each class went its own way and perished alone; the nobles like an army of officers without soldiers, the peasants like soldiers without officers. Had they united their forces, they would have formed a lever which would have produced a tremendous commotion. These two elements afterwards combined to upset the ancient monarchy in France.

Except Hutten, who by no means disdained a league

with the peasantry,\* the nobles were too proud to have anything to do with them, and a victory gained at the price of the enfranchisement of that class would have seemed to them too dearly bought. They were themselves in part the oppressors of the people, and many of the people's bitterest complaints were against the nobles. Thus the gulf between them was impassable; and it was not without cause that the hatred of the peasantry was afterwards directed not only against the priests and princes, but also against the nobles.

Hutten took flight after the failure of Sickingen's enterprise, for the ecclesiastical and temporal powers combined to persecute him. Weak and ill, at variance with his old friends and with himself, and not approving of many of the proceedings of the nobles, he fled to Switzerland, where he closed his life in great misery, in the island of Ufnau, a few weeks after Sickingen had perished in Germany.

Thus ended the first revolutionary revolt which accompanied the Reformation. It was soon to be followed by another, which was joined by much larger numbers, at first presented a threatening aspect, and then fell to the ground like the revolt of the nobles.

#### THE REACTION.—THE ZEAL OF THE CURIA.—THE CONVENTION OF RATISBON.

The course which events took in this rising among the nobles resulted in no good to the Reformation. However decidedly reform and revolution may be opposed to each other, the former always has to help to expiate the sins of the latter. So it was in this case. Sickingen's enterprise was ascribed to the Reformation. It was of no avail to say that Luther had taken no part in it, for the Reformers to declare that they had altogether declined to share the responsibility of Sickingen's projects, and that Sickingen had only wanted to make a tool of the Reformation, and would not take the right means to carry it out; it was all in vain. To some it was a reason, and to others a pretext, for saying, "These are the consequences of the Reformation."†

We now first hear of decided measures being taken

\* See poem of 1522, "Neu Karsthaus."

† Hagen.

against the new preaching. Individuals were persecuted as abettors of it who were not so; the Reformers were intimidated, and their efficiency diminished. The Imperial Chamber also felt the effects of the reaction; it was reproached with having favoured the cause, and with having secretly aided Sickingen. This was absurd. The Imperial Chamber had not been able to protect its own members from highway robbery, to say nothing of defeating a martial leader like Sickingen, and the Chamber was the representative of the very authority against which Sickingen took the field.

At the Diet in 1524 most of the members of the Chamber resigned, and the Papal Legate, Campeggi, thought the time was come to make his previous demands with more chance of success. In 1523 a reminder of the Edict of Worms had been answered by the one hundred Gravamina. He now alluded to it again, but they were not yet ready for that. The Legate again mistook the signs of the times: although the Chamber was composed almost entirely of new members, the majority was still against the edict. It was certainly a question how long this was to go on; whether a fresh disturbance would not lessen this majority; whether after this second unfortunate experience it would not be decided, if not to carry out the edict of 1521, at any rate to upset the decree of 1523.

A schism among the German princes on the great religious question now arose for the first time. Influenced by the Legate, a fraction of them would hear nothing more of reform.

Up to this time a certain absolutism had prevailed at the Diets; there were really no parties, no Lutherans, only German Christians who wished for reform—no Catholics who deprecated it. Men of all shades of opinion were united on the basis of their grievances and demands for their reform, and these had been repeated ever since the Councils of Costnitz and Basle. The formation of sects was looked upon as a dangerous hindrance to any improvement. The formula of the Diet of June, 1523, had united all Germany.

But a change took place under the influence of the events of the summer of 1523. A party of the German princes banded together and adopted as their watchword, "Let us have no more changes, let all remain as it is;" and the

Curia came to terms with them and refused reform, though it made a partial concession.

Pope Leo X. had died in December, 1521, just when Charles's successful campaign in Italy was filling him with anxiety, and his successor was Charles's old tutor, Adrian von Utrecht. He was by no means unworthy of the dignity which the Emperor's great influence had conferred upon him; and his character was so strongly marked, that great anxiety was felt as to the part he might take in the movement in Germany.

Adrian XI. had grown up under the strictest monastic discipline; he was thoroughly but sincerely the monk, and as such he took up his position with regard to the Reformation. As a Dominican he hated the new doctrine, hated any rebellion against the authority of the Church; but on the subject of the corruption of the clergy and the fearful decline of morality, even among the highest dignitaries of the Church, he was at one with the heretics. He acknowledged this openly as no pope had ever done before him. One of his first acts was to issue an instruction to Chieregati,\* in which the following passage occurs: "We know that for a long time many abominations have been perpetrated in the Holy See; abuses in ecclesiastical affairs, violation of rights; everything has gone wrong. From the head the mischief has extended to the limbs, from the Pope to the cardinals; we are all gone astray; there is none that doeth good, no, not one."

This was of the greatest importance. Never had the Curia so expressed itself before. And they were not empty words: Adrian was in earnest. He began with the head, that he might work upon the limbs. He began to establish a simple apostolic household, to abolish the luxurious habits of the court, he lived as he had lived as a monk, slept at Rome on the same hard couch that had served him in a monastery, and continued his scourgings like any insignificant brother; but he demanded the same simplicity and self-denial from others, and the splendid papal establishment was suddenly abolished.

He encountered opposition everywhere, which was not unnatural, as the previous state of things had existed for centuries, and the superior clergy and the Roman people regarded all this state as indispensable to the Church; be-

\* Ranke.

sides this, they looked upon the Pope with suspicion as a foreigner. When he died, after a short reign, rejoicings took place at Rome.

Thus failed the attempt to reform the Church at the head : how could reform ever reach the limbs ? His successor, Clement VII., 1523, to Sept., 1534, was a Medici, and, like the rest of that family, was a man of varied intellectual culture, a connoisseur of art and patron of learning, and a thorough man of the world. It was not one of the least misfortunes of the Catholic Church that in this century the papal chair was repeatedly occupied by Italian princes, who were more intent on advancing their worldly interests than on the duties of their spiritual office. In such times a simple but earnest monk of good principles was far better adapted to the post than a prince who saw in the dignity of his office nothing but a means for the aggrandisement of his house. This is what Leo X. attempted, and his successor succeeded in. Clement VII. brought it to this—that when the situation was such that he should have been ready to make any sacrifice to keep on good terms with the Emperor, that he might, with his aid, put a stop to heresy, a mortal enmity sprang up between them, and the Emperor sent his hired troops to reduce the Eternal City to ruins.

Nothing was to be expected from this pope for the cause of reform. He had not even the wish to promote it, to say nothing of the power. For him the secular interests of Italy were paramount ; and there is nothing in his administration to remind us of the great crisis through which the Church was passing.

The first act of the new papal government was, by dexterously taking advantage of the revolutionary movements, to warn the princes who had hitherto been the most zealous adherents of the ancient Church to go no further, but to agree on a programme which should prevent any further concessions.

This was in the summer of 1524. At the end of June the so-called convention took place at Ratisbon, at which Austria, Bavaria, and the ecclesiastical states of South Germany were represented. An agreement was come to on two points :—

That there should be reform in the Church to a certain extent, and concessions to the temporal powers ; but that in

that case any extension of the new doctrine should be strictly prohibited.

What I call reforms and concessions related to the most glaring abuses in the existing Church system. It was decided that the appointments to offices in the Church should be made with more regard to personal merit ; that a number of ecclesiastical extortions should cease ; that a stop should be put to the sale of indulgences ; that financial extortions should be restricted ; that a portion of ecclesiastical estates and incomes should be set apart for the secular princes of Bavaria and Austria.

No further concessions were to be made to the new doctrine on any pretence whatever, and anything having even an appearance of favouring it was to be strictly prohibited. The redress of the one hundred Gravamina was no longer insisted on.

The position of affairs was greatly changed, when we compare this convention with the Diet of 1523, when there was not a single prince to take the Legate's part. It was the first triumph of the new papal policy in the matter of reform. The only reforms ever promoted at Rome were in the spirit of these concessions made at Ratisbon : by partial concessions to particular princes and the abolition of minor abuses an attempt was made to save the whole ; and even these were often nothing more than empty promises, defeated by the unconditional engagement to oppose all further innovations.

This was the situation of affairs when, at the end of 1524 and beginning of 1525, the clouds of a new and still greater revolution were gathering over Germany, which was but foreshadowed by the events of 1522-3. This was the Peasants' War.

## CHAPTER VII.

The Great Peasants' War, 1524-5.—The increasing Oppression of the Peasantry.—The Prelude to the Peasants' War in 1514.—Influence of the Reformation.—The Twelve Articles.—The Heilbronn Scheme.—Thomas Münzer.—Luther's Attitude.—The Catastrophe, May and June, 1525.

### THE PEASANTS' WAR OF 1525.\*

THAT which occasioned so fearful an outbreak in the winter of 1524-5 had long been fermenting in the blood of the people and the tendencies of the age. Ever since the Hussite wars the fermentation had been going on among the peasant class. The execution of some of the leaders had only given fresh courage to others—such as the “Käsebröder”† in the Netherlands, the “Bundschuh”‡ in Baden—but the position of the peasantry was in no way improved. Thus the discontent increased; even in 1476, 1491, 1498, and 1503 there had been outbursts of a threatening character on the Maine, the Rhine, and in South Germany; and the causes of discontent were increased rather than diminished.

None of the abuses by means of which the rulers, the

\* Zimmermann, *Geschichte des Bauernkrieges*, 1854. Bensen, *Geschichte des Bauernkrieges in Ostfranken*. Erlangen, 1840. Jörg., *Deutschland*, 1521-26. Ratisbon, 1852.

† Literally, Cheese-brothers, a name adopted by a league of rebellious peasants in the Netherlands, in 1491.

‡ Bundschuh, a tied shoe, as worn by the peasants, in contrast to the buckled shoes of the upper classes; and a shoe being an ancient symbol of subjection, by adopting one of their own shoes fastened to a pole as their symbol, the peasants meant to denote that they were rising against the rule of the nobles, and meant henceforth to be their own masters. The word afterwards came to be used for any rebellious league, when the origin of it was forgotten, and the word Bund was supposed to mean a league or union.—Tr.



ecclesiastical proprietors and the nobles, oppressed the peasants, had been abolished. Some partial rebellions had met with the usual fate of such attempts; they had no effect as warnings, or in inclining the rulers to clemency, but rather occasioned the reins to be drawn still tighter. Then with the increase of luxury, the demands on the peasantry, the beasts of burden of society, had greatly increased.

Ever since intercourse with the New World had been opened, a great change had taken place in all classes of society. The new markets and sources of income created immense riches; new pleasures and new wants gave rise to luxury such as had never been known before. The wealthy merchants of the cities could afford it, but it was emulated by those who could not. Knights and nobles had to find fresh sources of revenue, or illegally to increase those they had before; and since the treaty of peace (*Landfriede*) they were in a great measure debarred from their profitable and favourite occupation of plundering the cities. Thus the peasants only were left them for a prey, and they screwed them more cruelly and systematically than ever before.

Most of the taxes were imposed by ancient legal covenants, but even the opponents of the revolt could not deny that they had been illegally and unreasonably multiplied.

In many districts the oppression of the peasants had occasioned violent outbreaks. One of these took place in 1514, in Würtemberg. A "*Burdschuh*," or peasants' league, had existed there in profound secrecy for years. No one was admitted to membership who possessed property, but neither were vagrants nor persons of evil repute: "poor Kunz" or "Conrad," the industrious artisan or honest labourer, was the privileged person. Their captain stalked about in a tattered cloak, and assumed the airs of an imperial general; it was connived at as mere sport, but it was a dangerous sport, like that of the "*Beggars*" at a later period. The police, in their short-sightedness, often mistook symptoms for causes, and at other times did not perceive their dangerous character.

It was a godless government in Würtemberg, which might have driven the most patient people to desperation. The lawless Duke Ulrich was at length at enmity with all the world, and most of all with his cruelly used subjects. He was a despot of the modern fashion, of whose sports,

pleasures, and banquets fabulous stories are told; but there seems to be too much foundation for most of them.

When the new tax on property and articles of consumption became insupportable it was resisted, but at first by harmless methods. When false weights were introduced, this thumb-screw to increase the tax on meat, bread, and wine, the league formed a procession with fifes and drums to the Rems, jestingly tested the weights over the river, and the Duke's weight was found wanting.

From the valley of the Rems the disturbances spread to other districts; the arrest of one of the leaders called up thousands of armed peasants like magic. They advanced to the cities, and took possession of some of them. Before it came to bloodshed a treaty was entered into with the leaders; the Duke and the Diet promised that everything should be honestly investigated and reformed. This dispersed the people, but the government then faithlessly seized upon the leaders, to whom safe-conduct had been promised; the Duke sent his soldiers into the peaceful villages, took the conspirators captive, and innocent and guilty were alike barbarously plundered and ill treated. This was ten years before the events which agitated the country far beyond Würtemberg.

There was, in fact, no material legal redress in prospect for the peasants. However highly the Roman law might be valued, still it was a misfortune for this part of the population that a foreign system of laws, administered in a foreign language, should prevail. It was from this that the blind hatred of the peasants to the *doctores juris* arose. It was a well-grounded complaint in this case, if in any, that the national law had been superseded by a foreign one, which rendered the common people defenceless against legal chicanery. Nowhere had the poor man equal rights with the rich and great. This was one of the greatest grievances in the condition of Germany. The guardianship of the Emperor and the Church, which had lightened the burdens of the people in the Middle Ages, which everywhere represented the milder forms of subjection, and whose yoke was an easy one, now no longer existed. This was the inflammable material into which the spark of the Reformation fell.

The Reformation was not the exciting cause of the commotions among the peasantry. There were revolts among them of an earlier date than these religious conflicts, and

they must be included among the symptoms which portended the convulsions of the sixteenth century. It is certain, however, that under the influence of the Reformation the commotions assumed a different character. It always makes a great difference whether resistance arises from local and individual oppression, or whether it is aroused by a state of things contrary to the universal principles of morality and religion—whether the revolt of individuals against intolerable oppression receives a sort of sanction from a new constitution of society and the state. Now that a doctrine had come to the aid of the peasants, which promised deliverance to the human race from burdens and bondage of every sort, the case was quite other than it was when they were only complaining of tithes and compulsory service.

It was quite intelligible that the Reformers should understand the gospel in a purely spiritual sense; but it was also intelligible that the peasants, in their pitiful condition, should prefer to take it literally. When the Scriptures were in their hands, when they found in this simple and popular book a number of sayings which seemed favourable to their cause, it appeared as if they had found an organ, and their spokesmen could say, "We ask nothing but what is promised by the founders of the Christian religion, and we are supported in our demands by the Scriptures."

There was nothing in the Bible about the hierarchy, or the distinction between the clergy and laity, nothing about the caste-like distinctions which were universal in the mediæval world, nothing about the duty of the poor and the weak to bear for ever the boundless oppression of lords spiritual and temporal; no, the Founder of this faith addressed Himself to the poor, the weary, and the heavily-laden; His teaching seemed to be aimed against pharisaic tyranny. It is undeniable that there is a large democratic element in Christianity, only an attempt was made to take it in too literal and material a sense. Before the Reformation the peasants' wars were occasioned simply by natural hatred of unjust oppression; after it a strong religious element was mingled with it, a faith that they were fighting for true Christianity, a fanaticism which joyfully encountered death for a great cause.

From the end of 1524 there were symptoms in important isolated risings that a general insurrection was at hand, and

it was a singular fact, which alone preserved the existing order of things in Germany, that the two most dangerous opponents of the power of the rulers, the nobles and the peasants, rose up, not together, but in turn, only in turn to be vanquished.

The insurrection began in the summer of 1524, on the Upper Rhine, along the Swiss frontiers. On the other side of the river the peasantry were free, and the unhappy people, encouraged by their success, gradually set South, West, and Central Germany, Alsace, Mayence, and the borders of the Neckar, in flames. North Germany only was spared.

In this revolution, as in every other, there were many shades of opinion—from the moderate party, whose desires were certainly reasonable and practicable, to the extreme set, who called the whole existing order of society in question. So it had been in the Hussite wars. When there is no longer any faith in the old order of things, and “Mr. Omnes” appears on the scene, such extremes are never wanting. They are not, as many nowadays maintain, an invention of modern times; they are as old as humanity itself. The only difference I see is, that among the masses a feeling of their own importance and self-confidence in the contest has greatly increased.

The Twelve Articles which were circulated in Hegau and the borders of Lake Constance formed a comparatively moderate programme for a revolution, and its practicability cannot be disputed.

But there was another party in Franconia, from Rothenburg and Bensheim, as far as Würzburg and the Tauber, comprising not peasants alone, but some educated people, who thought that the time was come for reconstituting the whole empire. They were the advocates of a strong monarchical power, the opponents of subdivision into principalities, and of the oppressive feudal system; they demanded uniformity in the coinage, measures, weights, customs, and the legal administration, and the abolition of a foreign system of laws. Their programme has a singular resemblance to that of 1789. These demands could not, of course, have originated with the peasantry alone; the plan was drawn up by learned men who had been in office, and they hoped by one stroke to put an end to all the misery in the German empire. This party was again surpassed by another, who

were to be found farther north, in Thuringia and Saxony—the followers of Thomas Münzer, who projected a revolution of the most radical sort, which could only have been carried out by subverting every existing institution.

Thus popular, national, religious, political, and social elements were all in commotion together. This was unfortunate for the healthy and justifiable part of the plan: had this been unanimously kept to, the world must have submitted to it without bloodshed.

It was not at first the intention of the peasants to use violence: they rather meant to obtain concessions by resolutions at great meetings, and by popular demonstrations. Their opponents dexterously, but dishonourably, took advantage of this, and promised redress: courts of arbitration should be established, in which it should be thoroughly investigated what was legal and what illegal, and improvements adopted accordingly; but this was only a feint. We have proofs in writing that those who thus pacified and dispersed the malcontents made themselves merry because the peasants had fallen into the snare. The object was to gain time for preparation at any price. If the peasants broke out just then they would find their opponents unprepared, and inflammable material in plenty; there was no disciplined army in all South Germany capable of opposing a front to them.

In February and March, 1525, the revolt broke out everywhere simultaneously. The faith of the peasants in redress was betrayed, oppression by no means lessened, and a longer delay would only give their lords and masters time to arm to the teeth.

The coincidence of the outbreak in various places was not so much the result of an understanding as of the fact that circumstances were everywhere the same. The flames burst out in the Schwarzwald, at Hegau on Lake Constance, at Kempten and Salzburg. The Franconian peasants soon joined the rebels, and there was a similar rising from Würtemberg to Nuremberg. It soon spread to the provinces of the Middle Rhine, to the Palatinate, Alsace, and the Taunus, throughout the dominions of the nobles of the Middle Rhine.

It is beyond the province of a general history of the period to specify the individual conflicts. When the storm broke in the south-west corner of Germany, and, under the

leadership of Hans Müller of Bulgenbach, extended itself to the Lake of Constance, a programme was put forth and circulated throughout the empire, which was considered to be that of the German peasantry generally. There were Twelve Articles,\* the majority of which have now been universally carried out.

In the preamble the reader is reminded that the peasants were demanding nothing but what was justified by the principles of the gospel; it was not they, therefore, who were rebels, but those who refused their just rights in opposition to the teaching of Christ. They had no desire for revolt; they knew that the gospel preached a religion of peace and love. If, nevertheless, things came to the worst, they would not be responsible for it. But they trusted in God. "Will God blame the peasants who anxiously strive to live according to His will? Who will find fault with His will? (Romans xi.) Who will interfere with His judgments? (Isaiah xl.) Who can resist His majesty? (Romans viii.) Did He not hear the children of Israel when they cried unto Him, and deliver them out of the hand of Pharaoh, and will He not deliver His people now? Yes, He will avenge them speedily. (Exodus iii., xiv.; Luke xviii. 8.) Therefore, Christian reader, read attentively the following articles, and then judge.

1. "The whole congregation shall elect and choose a minister, and shall have power to dismiss him, should he conduct himself improperly. (1 Timothy iii.; Titus i.)" (This was not demanded by Luther, though it was by Zwingli.) "The elected minister shall preach the pure gospel to us plainly, without human addition, human learning, or commands. (Acts xiv.)"

2. Only the great tithe (the legal tithe of corn), as ordained in the Old Testament, shall be paid in future; and, after the maintenance of the minister is provided for, the remainder shall be for the maintenance of the village poor, and a little laid by for times of war. But they will no longer pay the small tithes; "they are unjust tithes of man's invention," for "the Lord God created beasts for man's free use."

3. They will no longer be held as "bondsmen," "since Christ has bought us and redeemed us all by His precious

\* Given in detail in Zimmermann.



blood. The Scripture teaches us that we are free, and we desire to be free. Not that we want to be so free as to have no rulers; God does not teach that." They were willing to "obey in everything reasonable and Christian the elected rulers ordained by God."

4. Game, fowl, and fish shall be free as God created them, and they will no longer endure "that what God has permitted to grow for man's use shall be wastefully devoured by irrational creatures."

5. The management of woods is unreasonable, for the upper classes have appropriated all the firewood to themselves. "It is our opinion that whatever firewood they have not bought, if in possession of ecclesiastics or laymen, should be restored to the commune, and every one in the commune shall be at liberty in reason to take what he wants for his house without payment, also to take it for carpenter's work, but with the knowledge of those persons appointed by the commune to the office (of inspector), whereby the destruction of firewood will be prevented."

6. The burden of compulsory service shall be restricted.

7. The peasant especially shall not be compelled to do "more than he is bound to do by the contract between the master and peasant. Anything over and beyond this shall be done for reasonable pay."

8. Rents are so high that they ruin the peasants. They shall be regulated afresh according to reason.

9. Arbitrary punishments and perpetual fresh inflictions of them shall cease.

10. The pastures and fields which have been taken from the communes shall be restored.

11. The right of heriot, by which widows and orphans are deprived of their inheritance, shall be entirely abolished.

12. All these propositions shall be tested by Scripture, and if they can be refuted, but in that case only, they shall not stand.

The two main points in this programme are liberty in Church matters and for the preaching of the new doctrine, and the abolition of feudal oppression, which was an intolerable burden to the poor man. Ancient rights were expressly recognised, but ancient abuses of them assailed.

It was a moderate programme—humane, practicable, and justified by Scripture. Had it been carried out in 1524, Ger-



many would have been spared an immense calamity. Besides all individual suffering, the nation as a whole would have been spared the evil consequences of an unsuccessful revolution. The healthy interest in politics and public affairs which in those stirring times began to be manifested would have been fostered, instead of being crushed.

The Twelve Articles were at first the programme of the whole peasant class; thousands upon thousands of the little handbills were circulated. It was an unhappy thing for the peasants that they did not keep to these demands, that they split up into parties, and weakened the force of their just requests by want of unanimity. It was quite intelligible that the ruling powers should oppose the fanaticism which prevailed in Saxony and Thuringia under the leadership of Thomas Münzer, Carlstadt, and the men of Zwickau; common prudence should have prevented claims so preposterous as theirs from being put forth.

Besides the Twelve Articles another programme appeared, which originated with the more educated classes, and in their earnest desire for a thorough reform of the German State and Church. The desire of this party was to lay the foundations of a new constitution for Germany amidst the commotions occasioned by the Peasants' War, and their demands had considerable resemblance to those advanced in 1789.

The scheme had been drawn up by Wendel Hipler, formerly chancellor to Prince Hohenlohe. Heilbronn, where it originated, was selected as the seat of a provisional government, as the central point of the Peasants' War.

The demands, comprised in fourteen articles, were:—That all ecclesiastics, high or low, of whatever name and rank, be subjected to reform; their property confiscated and devoted to the common good, after enough has been assigned to them for the necessities of life; that all temporal rulers, counts, and lords be reformed, in order that the poor man may be no longer oppressed, but that the most humble may have equal rights with the most exalted; that all cities and communes be reformed in accordance with Christian liberty and natural and divine laws; that all taxes upon the land be abolished; that no doctor of the Roman law be admitted to any office; that no ecclesiastic have a seat in the councils of the empire nor hold any temporal office; that sixty-four courts of justice be

established in the empire composed of members of all classes of society, sixteen provincial courts, four superior courts, and over them all an imperial supreme court of judicature; that all roads be open, the merchants safe in their journeys, but that the prices of their merchandise be regulated; that there be no tax but the old imperial tax; a uniform system of coinage, weights, and measures throughout the empire; that the usury practised by the great bankers be limited; that the nobles be free from ecclesiastical feudal obligations; that the dominion of the ruling princes be abolished; that there be but one rule and one authority, that of the Emperor.\*

This Heilbronn scheme breathes a very different spirit from that of the twelve Swabian articles. While it demands a subversion of the German ecclesiastical constitution, there is nothing expressly said of the teaching of the gospel; and the material demands, which in those occupy so large a space, are in this only cursorily touched on. This, on the contrary, presents the last bold sketch of a plan of imperial reform, in which the ancient idea of the empire is presented from the democratic, not the imperial point of view, or that of the ruling princes. This scheme projected its shadow far into the future, and was for a long time partly carried out and partly refused. Had the leaders united in proposing a plan of this sort, and had the masses adhered to it as one man, it would have afforded material for a tremendous revolution. And the first successes of the peasants were surprising: prelates, nobles, and cities submitted to them in continually increasing numbers. From the left bank of the Rhine far into Austria and the Tyrol, from the Lake of Constance to Franconia and Thuringia, the revolt had engulfed all cognate elements, and partly vanquished, and partly stunned, whatever was in opposition to it. The successor of the Elector Frederic of Saxony, who had just died, once exclaimed, in melancholy jest, "Who knows how long my power may last?" and it was no wonder that the reigning princes thought things looked ominous for them.

It was natural that it should be an enigma to Napoleon I. that Charles V. did not take advantage of the situation to make Germany a united empire. But it was not natural that a monarch should think of it who was always occupied

with other things than reforms in Germany, spiritual or temporal, who had just fought the battle of Pavia, and was meditating at Madrid on the fruits of his victory.

Of much greater moment than the Emperor's attitude was the bearing of the citizen middle-class portion of the nation, among whom the Reformation had its seat, and who were accustomed to take command from Luther. If he joined the peasants in their revolt, if he echoed their demands, social, national, and ecclesiastical, the movement would be irresistible, and would carry the reigning princes along with it; but if he held back or opposed the revolt, its wings would be clipped, and a reaction would set in.

Before Luther had declared himself, the masses counted on him as their leader, or reckoned at least on his silent approval. The opinions entertained even among the governing classes were very various, and many of the imperial cities were in favour of the peasants' demands, and thought that an effort should be made to carry out other needful reforms with their moderate help.

But when Luther disclaimed all participation in the rebellion, and then expressed a downright condemnation of it, all the middle class, the great camp of his party, turned against it, and the fate of the movement was virtually decided. The error in this, as in so many other revolutionary movements, was want of moderation.

Thomas Münzer stands foremost among the travelling preachers of the Peasants' War who were against everything which the middle class held sacred. The opposite tendencies of the age are curiously united in this remarkable man. He is at enmity with the entire existing order of things, yet quarrels with the leaders who are beginning to reconstitute it. He hates the constitution, service, and doctrine of the ancient Church; but he hates Luther still more, because he has stopped half-way. As a rationalist he is opposed to Luther's doctrine of justification and election of grace; yet he is enough of a mystic to boast that he receives divine revelations, and to address the people as a prophet. He leads the onslaught against convents, images, priests, and the professional garb; but the revolt of the peasants against the arbitrary power of princes, nobles, and priests is not enough for him; the treaties which abolish the oppression of the old order of things are preposterous; princes, nobles, and priests should no longer exist; property

itself is an evil ; the subversion of Church and State must be followed by that of the whole existing order of society. Between the Maine and the Rhine, between Upper Swabia and Thuringia, he inflamed the people with his fiery harangues, in the style of the Old Testament, against palaces and courts and the temporal and spiritual rulers. "Look not on the sorrow of the ungodly, let not your sword grow cold from blood, strike hard upon the anvil of Nimrod, cast his tower to the ground, because the day is yours." Thus does he incite them to murderous onslaughts, and from the security of Mühlhausen he prepared for a decisive stroke.

We know well what was Luther's opinion of everything like attempts to redress grievances by violence, whether by high or low, in a good cause or a bad. It was his firm conviction that rebellion is always an evil, that it is contrary to the divine order, and only increases the mischief. On no point is he more thoroughly consistent than on this.

For the princes, who at a later period would have fought for his cause against the Emperor, he had the same answer as for the nobles when they rebelled against the princes. His attitude in relation to the Peasants' War was therefore settled beforehand ; it resulted from an essential feature in his character ; and the accusation is quite false which was made against him by the party spirit of the time, that he held back at first because he had not the courage to speak out, and that it was the triumphs of the reaction which again emboldened him. Before anything decisive had occurred he did the most courageous thing he could do—he broke with all parties. He was convinced that temporal and spiritual objects could not be pursued together ; that reform had no worse ally than revolution ; that teaching, preaching, schools, education—all would fall to the ground if this turbulent movement proved victorious. The experiences of 1793 justified this opinion. Amidst civil war, accustomed to violent and aimless revolution, the people would become uncivilised, the simple religious feeling of old times would be quenched, the gradual growth of a new spirit could not prosper amidst the storm and tumult of revolution.

Luther at once replied to the Twelve Articles of the Swabian peasants with an exhortation to peace : he endeavoured to moderate the peasants, but at the same time reminded the

princes and nobles of their old and manifold wrongdoings. "You must be changed, and submit to God's word," &c. But writing could do no good in this case; the peasants thought him lukewarm, and the princes and nobles considered his representations too unfavourable to them. The storm now broke wildly over palaces, churches, and convents, caused by the incendiarism of the well-known "murderous prophets and factious spirits," as Luther used to call Münzer and his followers. Luther was then stirred up, and wrote his second paper "against the rapacious and murderous peasants," the tone of which was as violent as the peasants themselves. He stormed against the shameful deeds of the rebels, and was so far carried away as to call upon the authorities to take severe measures against them; they should "stab, kill, and strangle" them without mercy. This could but do harm: the authorities were already so exasperated that he should have urged moderation upon them.

The part that Luther took against the movement had very decisive results: the great body of the middle class, which had been undecided before, now received their watchword. Those upon whose sympathies the peasants had counted took no part; the rest prepared for armed resistance.

The Peasants' War failed for want of skilful leaders, through the indiscretion of the masses, from want of unanimity among their leaders and their plans, and from the attitude of the party who, though not at first unfavourable, afterwards either took no part in it or openly joined their adversaries.

Münzer's peasant army, badly armed and worse led, was entirely defeated at Frankenhausen by the troops of the Landgrave of Hesse, the Elector John, and the Dukes George and Henry of Saxony, on the 15th of May, 1525. The captain of the Swabian league, Truchsess von Waldburg, and the Electors of the Palatinate and Treves, put an end to the rebellion in Würtemberg, the bands of soldiers in Alsace and on the Tauber were cut down, the defenceless farms and villages burnt, and the remnant of the rebels treated with the greatest cruelty.

The peasants experienced the usual consequences of an unsuccessful revolt in their worst form: the vanquished party were inhumanly punished, and the oppression against which

they had rebelled became greater than ever. A very few masters had sufficient self-denial to loosen the reins a little, but most of the peasants suffered more than before. The effects of the reaction were very great, and caused all attempts at reform, to which so lively an impulse had been given, to be looked upon as suspicious and revolutionary. It is easy, when an alarming rebellion has been quelled, to condemn without discrimination all that appears to have any connection with it. The real grievances were not in the least degree remedied, only put aside, so that the mischief was still raging in secret. The Peasants' War not only did nothing for the class who originated it; it occasioned a great schism in the nation, injured the great cause of reform, and quenched men's interest in politics for a long time to come.

## CHAPTER VIII.

**Reaction of the Revolution upon the Reformation.—Charles V. and the Peace of Madrid.—The Diet of Spire, August, 1526.—Spread of the Reformation.—Its share in the National Disruption.—The new War in Italy.—The League of Cognac, May, 1526.—The Storming of Rome by the Imperial Troops, 1527.—Advance of the French to Naples, and Dissolution of their Army there, 1528.—Peace of Barcelona and Cambray, 1529.—The League between the Pope, the Emperor, and the King against the Heretics.**

WHILE these events were transpiring in Germany, Charles V. was at Madrid, deliberating how he should compel his royal prisoner, Francis I., whose army was destroyed at Pavia, to conclude a peace in accordance with his brilliant victory.

His exorbitant demands were clearly a mistake. Had he been reasonable a lasting peace might have been secured ; but he exacted conditions from the King which he could not adhere to, and which were simply impracticable for any king of France.

By the peace of Madrid, of January, 1526, the following conditions were imposed upon Francis:—All French claims upon Milan, Naples, and Sicily were to cease ; Flanders and Artois to be restored to the Emperor ; the King to marry the Emperor's sister as a pledge of perpetual alliance with him ; and Burgundy was to be surrendered.

The first two conditions were hard, the last two absurd. The Emperor and the King were natural enemies whom no marriage could make into allies. Such a cession as that of Burgundy could only properly be asked or granted if France itself had been annihilated. Francis had been at war for twenty years, and, though continually unsuccessful, he had always made peace on better terms than these. The oath by which Francis confirmed the treaty was quite unnatural ; he took it with the criminal frivolity which charac



terized the morals of the sixteenth century, for he had even beforehand circulated a document among his friends, in which he declared the oath about to be extorted from him to be null and void.

One point there was in the treaty on which the policy of the parties might coincide—in proceeding against the Turks on the one hand, and the heretics who *had escaped from the bosom of the holy Church* on the other.

The course European politics were taking tended in the same direction as the reaction against the Reformation which resulted from the horrors of the Peasants' War.

In fact, the Emperor's first proclamation after the peace of Madrid, dated March, 1526, and addressed to some of the princes of the empire, informed them that decided steps were to be immediately taken against heresy. A league of the orthodox would be desirable as a preliminary step, but the Emperor was himself about to take the question in hand at Rome.

Charles was then counting upon his allies, King Francis and Pope Clement VII., but a few weeks later he could no longer do so. On the 22nd of May, Francis and Clement had formed a conspiracy against the Emperor at Cognac; a European war was in prospect; and when, at the Diet at Spire in June and July of the same year, the question of the Church in Germany was again brought up, the states were justified in assuming that the imperial instructions against reform and enforcing the Edict of Worms were superseded by other events, and that there could be no longer any serious intention of doing a service to the Pope, whose troops were already advancing against the Emperor. Nevertheless no resolution was passed by vote of the majority. There was at first an attempt made on both sides to form parties, but there was as yet no sharp division into majority and minority; and the final decree enacted, in accordance with the advice of the Committee, that in the matter of religion and the Edict of Worms "every state shall live, rule, and believe so that it shall be ready to answer for itself before God and his Imperial Majesty."

This decree has had most important results. Many things occurred afterwards to modify it, but it was, in fact, the principle upon which the German national Church and the modern states of Germany were developed. It is evident that an imperial law which asserted the autonomy in matters

of religion, not only of every ruler, but of every imperial city and every imperial noble, would promote vast dissensions; and it is mainly this which has given rise to the dictum that the Reformation laid the foundations of the disruption of Germany, a dictum which is regarded as a truism to which some assent as to an undeniable though melancholy fact, and which others assert in a tone of bitter reproach.

The dictum is false; it is contradicted by history. The disruption of the German empire existed long before the Reformation took place; it was the result of processes which had been going on for centuries, and was by no means the effect of religious dissensions. If Germany had not been in a state of disruption, the history of the German Reformation from 1521-26 would have been quite other than it was. Had we had a compact German state at the time of the Diet of Worms, the atrocious edict would never have been smuggled in. No monarch of a really united Germany would have adopted a resolution which was openly opposed to the sentiments of the nation and to the opinion of the majority of its states, both temporal and spiritual, and which it was impossible to enforce.

But it may be justly said that the Reformation might have given a powerful momentum to national unity. If in 1521 we had had a monarch who would have settled accounts with Rome, put an end to old sins in relation to her, and at the same time had entered into the greatest movement of ideas which had ever agitated our nation, unity might have been inaugurated on a firmer basis and a grander scale than it had been for centuries.

But the opportunity was lost, and never recurred. The affairs of Germany took such a course that destiny but once offered this enticing opportunity to the Emperor, and as it was not seized, it was lost for ever. Two years later we hear nothing more of the Emperor; the states decided for themselves, and in order to prevent dissensions, agreed that the pure doctrine of the gospel should be preached. Then came the Revolution; the existence of the reigning princes was threatened, first by the nobles and then by the peasants, but in both contests the princes were victorious, and chose to take advantage of their victory. They had long been looking for a pretext for strengthening their power, and embraced the opportunity which the Emperor had let slip. The decree of Spire gave legal sanction to the attempt, but

this was not the consequence of the new doctrine, but of ancient political developments which now had a decided influence on its fate. If this were not so, the Reformation must have occasioned disruption everywhere, whereas in other countries we find that it was precisely the contrary.

From this time Germany has not deviated from this course. Every country decides the reform question in its own way. Not that free individual development is permitted; every country takes vigorous and sometimes arbitrary measures, while in other lands these are taken by a central power. The hopes of those who thought that the decree of August, 1526, would be a death-blow to the new doctrine were utterly disappointed; it rather became the basis of a greater extension of it. Saxony, Hesse, Anhalt, Franconia, Lüneburg, East Friesland, Schleswig-Holstein, Silesia, and Prussia adopted the Reformation, as did also the important imperial cities of Nuremberg, Augsburg, Ulm, Strasburg, &c.

The breach became irreparable. There was a Roman Catholic party in South Germany, who gave up all thought of reform, and another party for whom reform was an accomplished fact, and who would no longer have anything to do with the ancient Church: Austria, Bavaria, and the South German bishoprics as a compact territory on one side; on the other, less compactly grouped, a great part of ancient Saxony, the ancient Frisian district, and the eastern colonies of Germany, on what was formerly Slavonic territory; not to mention the inhabitants of the imperial cities of the North and South. The results of the decree of Spire began to appear; it became more and more impossible for the ancient Church to regain her former supremacy, but it was also impossible for Protestantism to gain undisputed sway. That the actual decision still remained for some years in the balance is to be explained by another turn in the imperial papal policy.

It is extremely curious to observe the attitude of the respective representatives of the papal and imperial dignity at this crisis. While in Germany the consciences of men from the highest to the lowest were stirred to their very depths, not only were the Pope and Emperor strangers to any such ideas, they acted against the simple and natural dictates of policy. The Emperor was always seeking an untenable alliance with the Pope, while repulsing his natural allies; and the Pope continually overlooked the fact that his alliance

with the Emperor against the heretics would only advance their cause.

In the peace of Madrid Charles V. and Francis I. joined cause against the innovations in the empire, and futile as the treaty was in all other respects, the Pope should have tried to grasp it by this handle at any price.

If he could have succeeded in keeping the allies to this, it would have been fearfully perilous for the German Reformation. Such a consideration, according to the views of mediæval Catholicism, should have been supreme with the Pope. But Clement VII. was a Medici, and had been schooled in the vacillating policy of the family; which had always induced them to throw their weight into the scale which threatened to be found wanting. Their fine principality, with its commanding position in the peninsula, must be oppressed neither by the Germans nor the French, and to this purely political consideration, which had nothing to do with the Church, the Pope sacrificed ecclesiastical unity.

He was the first to provoke war, and it was a curse to the Church that her head had no insight into her real situation.

On the 22nd of May, 1526, the treaty of Cognac was entered into between Clement VII. and Francis I. against the Emperor, whose supremacy ever since the battle of Pavia had begun to be alarming. They tried to exact conditions from the Emperor in favour of France and Italy to which it was impossible for him to accede, and then to extort them by force of arms.

In this position of affairs the Emperor wrote a remarkable letter to the cardinals under date of October 6th, 1526, which is printed by Lanz. He had heard that the Pope had combined with the King of France to attack him. This was the last thing he should have expected. "For I believe there is no prince more devoted to the Romish Church than I; witness Parma and Piacenza." He had borne the bitter complaints of the German states and princes of the many abuses in the court of Rome into the bargain. "The Pope, therefore, does me a very great wrong, when I have done so much for his sake, and have thereby alienated the princes of the empire not a little." He reminds them of the necessity of peace at this critical moment for the Church, and of the long-promised council. "If the Christian republic suffers harm in consequence of a council not being convened or

longer delayed, I solemnly declare that I at least am not to blame for it."

But these admonitions had no effect. Just when the Emperor was offering his aid to France and the Pope to put down the heretics, he received for answer a declaration of war from both. So, as a commentary on the provisions in the peace of Madrid against the enemies of the Pope, an imperial army advanced towards Rome to call the head of the Church to order with pikes and spears.

Early in 1527 a numerous army, such as had not been seen within the memory of man, headed by Bourbon and George Frundsberg, whose German soldiers marched with real fanaticism against the Pope, appeared on the way to Rome. The famishing mercenaries, among whom a dangerous mutiny broke out on the way, were eager to pounce upon the treasures of Rome. On the 6th of May Bourbon led them on to storm the Eternal City. Rome was defenceless, and was taken by the Germans on the first assault. The Pope had taken refuge at Engelsburg, and refused all the enemy's demands, as he was in constant expectation of succour from the French. The Spanish and German soldiers then betook themselves to plunder, and fell upon the treasures in the palaces and churches. The booty was immense, but was mostly soon frittered away. The Germans mocked at the sacred relics of Rome, and proclaimed Luther as Pope.

Charles V. was master of the greater part of St. Peter's patrimony, and intended to take permanent possession of the States of the Church, in order to render the Pope's temporal policy innocuous, when the Pope found an unexpected ally in Henry VIII., and a French army under Lautrec, subsidised by England, came to his aid.

The French arrived at Naples at the beginning of 1528. Fortune now seemed to favour the allies. The Imperialists, driven to the sea, could not, in their perpetual want of money, venture to incur any further risk, and in the summer it appeared as if a great catastrophe must happen to the imperial power, but at Naples fortune again turned the scale in the Emperor's favour. While, within the city, the Germans, Italians, and Spaniards, in spite of their great distress, were uniting to make a desperate resistance, a fearful pestilence attacked the French camp without the walls, and so much insubordination ensued, that it prepared

the way for the utter annihilation of the army without a blow having been struck, and some successful sallies of the besieged gave it the finishing-stroke. Thus the kingdom of Naples was as quickly lost to the French as it had been won, and the allies never obtained a success which counter-balanced this defeat.

In the summer of 1529 a reconciliation took place between the Emperor and the Pope. By the peace of Barcelona, of the 29th of June, the States of the Church, and Florence, which had rebelled against him, were restored to the Pope; he also received the assurance that the extermination of heresy should be now vigorously taken in hand. In July of the same year the negotiations took place which resulted in reconciliation with France at the peace of Cambray.

Charles V. conceded more than might have been expected from the success of his arms. He gave up his demand for Burgundy, and in consideration of a large ransom, released the French princes who were detained as hostages, and no longer insisted on the impracticable conditions of Madrid, while Francis had to give up his claims upon Italy and his feudal sovereignty in Flanders and Artois. The articles of Madrid against the heretics were renewed.

Peace was now restored to the Church and empire, but on condition that *pestifero morbo hæreticorum* should at length be checked. Three years had indeed again passed away, during which the new doctrine had made great progress, and churches had been organized in accordance with it all over the country.

## CHAPTER IX.

Reaction of Italian Affairs upon Germany.—Aggravation of the State of Affairs by Otto von Pack.—Altered Relation of Parties.—The Diet of Spire and the Protest of the Lutheran Party, April, 1529. —The Turks before Vienna, 1529.—Diet of Augsburg and the Confession of Augsburg, June 25th, 1530.—Threats against the Protestants; their first Meeting and League at Schmalkald, December, 1530—March, 1531.—Danger from the Turks, and the Religious Peace of Nuremberg, July 23rd, 1532.

IT cannot be denied that the position of the adherents of the new doctrine was by no means safe or enviable. They had taken advantage of the decree of 1526, which, however, according to the traditions of the Diet, was no decree at all, and the question was whether the Emperor would not reverse it as soon as it was in his power to do so; they would then at once lose all legal standing, and be confronted with an inimical power.

The dreaded alliance between the Emperor, the Pope, and the King had just been concluded, and it was not easy to see how the Lutherans could stand against it.

The adherents of the Reformation had followed the course of events in Italy with great anxiety. It is evident that they were in a state of excitement from the alarm occasioned by some communications from Otto von Pack. Even in 1528, when the war was near its close, outrages were feared, and the most extraordinary stories gained credit.

Otto von Pack, a dismissed minister of Duke George of Saxony, had come to the Landgrave Philip of Hesse, and told him that an infamous plot was brewing against him and the Elector of Saxony. He stated that the Catholic Electors of Mayence and Brandenburg, the Dukes of Saxony and Bavaria, and the Bishops of Salzburg, Bamberg, and Würzburg, with King Ferdinand at their head, intended to



make a sudden attack upon them, to dispossess them of their lands, and draw over their subjects to the reactionary Catholic party. He brought forward written proofs of it, and both the Landgrave and the Elector gave credit to it. Yet Pack was an adventurer whom it was not difficult to suspect of the falsification of documents, and there was nothing in the character of the accused princes, obstinate adherents of the old faith as they were, to justify the opinion that they were likely to make a nocturnal attack upon their nearest kinsfolk, and drive them from their possessions and subjects. It was, however, the circumstances of the times which gave rise to fears of this sort.

In the year 1529 one blow quickly followed another: first, a dispatch from the Emperor, in which he coolly referred to the Edict of Worms of 1521, as if nothing fresh had happened since; then the altered attitude of the Diet; the reconciliation between the Emperor and the Pope, which had been publicly confirmed; and finally the return of the Emperor himself, who now came as a mighty ruler, who had been most successful in war, had twice humbled France, had conquered and then restored Italy, and who now, in the height of his power and flower of his age, was justified in imagining that he had but to command to attain all that he desired.

The first signs of the change were the imperial warnings to the Protestant states that in the spring the Emperor would conclude peace, and put the penalties in force against Luther and his followers. This was accompanied by threats or flattery, according to circumstances; the smaller states were threatened, and a tone of respect adopted towards the larger.

On the 21st of February, 1529, the Diet assembled at Spire.

The Emperor's plan was contained in an advice, the purport of which was as follows:—The edict of 1521 is to be held as still in force; the later ones, especially that of 1526, as null and void. Peace, which an attempt had been made to purchase by concessions, had not been secured, nor any restriction put upon the spread of the new doctrine; it was therefore best to return to the edict of 1521, which had been illegally departed from. This was the decided proposal of the imperial commissioner on the 15th of March.

It was now for the first time probable that this resolution would be carried by a majority. There had been no prospect of it in 1523, and none in 1526, but the change was no longer dubious. The mediating princes who had before counselled both parties to peace, now went over to the Emperor's side. The final decree enacted, in accordance with the Emperor's advice, that "whoever has hitherto acted on the edict shall continue to do so. In those districts where it has not been observed no further innovations shall be made, and no one shall be prevented from celebrating mass."

This sounded milder and more tolerant than it was meant to be.\* Those whom it concerned did not for a moment doubt its meaning. But during the Diet there was an evident desire to proceed as peaceably as possible, and to avoid exasperating the people. The majority informed the minority, almost with regret, that the decision was unavoidable; the minority, with all due respect, regretted that they could not acknowledge it.

On the 19th of April they entered a protest against the final decree of the Diet; on the 22nd an appeal; and in both cases they took their stand upon the modern principle that religious matters could not be decided by majority and minority, but only by the conscience. They desire that the decree of 1526 shall be held valid, for otherwise peace can scarcely be maintained. They cannot approve adherence to the Edict of Worms, because they would thereby condemn their own doctrines. They are ready to render obedience to the Emperor in all things wherein it is due, but these are things "which concern the glory of God and the salvation of the soul of every one of us, and in which, according to God's commands, and for the sake of our own consciences, it is our bounden duty, before all things, to have respect to the Lord our God;" and they hope the Emperor "will kindly excuse this refusal." The decree of Spire of 1526 can only, "in accordance with propriety, reason, and law, be annulled by a unanimous resolution, and such this was not; but apart from that, in matters relating to the glory of God and the salvation of our souls, every one of us must stand before and give account of himself to God."

\* See Ranke.

*True 1/30*

This protest was signed by John of Saxony, George of Brandenburg, Ernest of Lüneburg, Philip of Hesse, Wolfgang of Anhalt; and then by the representatives of fourteen cities—Strasburg, Nuremberg, Ulm, Costnitz, Lindau, Memmingen, Kempten, Nördlingen, Heilbronn, Reutlingen, Sny, St. Gall, Weissenburg, and Windsheim.

The position of affairs was materially aggravated by this step. If the dreaded alliance now took place between the great powers and the Pope, the gravest and most alarming complications must be looked for. The Emperor made himself ready to advance with an army to Germany. He had just assured himself at Barcelona and Cambray of the assistance of the Pope and the King of France, when the capital of his Austrian dominions was menaced by the most powerful army of Turks that had ever been seen on the Danube.

Suleiman, the last great martial ruler of the Osmanli, with a just conception of the fundamental idea of a state like Turkey, well knew that it was only amidst active warfare and conquest that such a people could be kept in a healthy condition, and he poured his immense army—it was computed at two hundred and fifty thousand men—like a national migration over the German possessions of Charles V. The old Osman spirit of warlike propaganda had revived. All Christendom was to be subdued by the sword of the Prophet, and the moment seemed favourable. The Church was torn by bitter dissensions, just then coming to a decisive issue, and the monarch through whose dominions their path lay was just making ready to strike a decisive blow at the apostates.

It was an anxious moment, not only for the Emperor, but for all the West. However little credit might be given to the Turks for power to do much permanent mischief in the invaded countries, yet the danger of seeing the culture of the West even temporarily overrun by the Eastern barbarians was quite enough to throw all that divided Christendom into the shade, and, menaced by a common enemy, to cause it to unite its forces for a vigorous resistance.

The terrible danger was averted by the heroic defence of Vienna, and by the noble enthusiasm by which, in spite of ecclesiastical schisms, Germany was animated. It was clear that on this question there were no parties in Germany.

How angry the Reform party had been over the abuse which the Curia had made of the threatened Turkish war! But now that the danger was clothed in flesh and blood, they preached most zealously, Luther himself at their head, in favour of combined resistance to the enemy as subjects of the Emperor; and among the princes who were foremost in making sacrifices for the cause were the leading adherents of the new doctrine, especially the Landgrave Philip of Hesse.

Vienna held out until the Sultan perceived that it would be impossible to maintain his army in the exhausted country, and with the remnant which alone, if he lingered, famine and the winter season would leave him, to oppose the brave troops which were arriving from all sides.

After an attack on the walls of Vienna which utterly failed, on the 14th of October, without being exactly beaten, he was compelled to retire, and this was, in fact, the most humiliating defeat which he could have suffered. He had advanced so far unhindered, but he was forced to withdraw without any decisive engagement. This was a severe reverse for the Turkish power.

The Emperor was thus unexpectedly relieved from deep anxiety. In those anxious September days, when the Grand Turk had drawn up his forces in Charles's eastern dominions, and the fate, not of Vienna alone, was in the hands of the troops in his ill-fortified capital, he might well be in doubt whether he ought not to forget Pope and Church, heretics and all, and go to the aid of his threatened heritage; but relief had come without his help, Vienna was saved, the onslaught of the Turks had collapsed at the most critical juncture, his star was once more in the ascendant, and higher than ever before.

Everything had been propitious to him. By a successful campaign he had obtained peace with the Pope and the King of France. He had vanquished the greatest military power in Europe; the laurels of Francis I. had faded before the martial glory of the young Emperor; the Grand Turk, after some brilliant successes at first, had hastily retreated, and now he was only opposed by the handful of German princes and cities who had protested at Spire in 1529.

They were, it was true, resolved to sacrifice everything to their convictions; but how insignificant did their power appear compared with that of the Emperor! And besides

this, they were too divided and disunited to withstand a policy which now for the first time seemed to have a definite object in view.

Another attempt at conversion had been projected by the allies at Barcelona; if that did not succeed, "the insult offered to Christ" should be avenged by all possible means. The Protestants were proof against conversion by threats, intimidation, or flattery; but how would it be if the Emperor's threats were actually carried out?

On this point they were not agreed. Some had conscientious scruples against vigorous self-defence. There was at first a conflict of duties, of which at a later period we hear no more. While the worldly element in the party had no doubt that force must be met by force, the theological leader of the party, Martin Luther, adhered firmly to the opinion which he had always maintained, that spiritual results can only be effected by spiritual means, that the Word would only be established by the Word. "The authorities," he says on the 28th of November, 1529, "are not to be withstood by violence, but by confession of the truth; if they are converted by it, well; if not, thou art excused and sufferest for God's sake. We had ten times better be dead than have it on our conscience that by our means our gospel had been the occasion of blood and violence."

An armed resistance to the Emperor appeared to him, with his mediæval views, to be a criminal rebellion. It was only with great reluctance and under pressure of necessity that he gave up his respect for the imperial power and his allegiance as a subject. It is not easy for us to form a just idea of his views on this point. The greatness of soul which they evince will be obvious to all, but it will also be obvious that the views of a theologian on politics—that is, on the subject of resistance to tangible forces—cannot be taken as a rule of action.

To these differences between the men of action and the men of doctrine a theological controversy was added. It referred especially to the dogma of the Supper.

As early as 1519 Luther had decidedly dissented from the Romish view of this sacrament.\* He rejected first the withholding of the cup, and then the idea of sacrifice which

\* See his "Sermon vom Hochw. Sacrament des heil wahren Leichnams Christi," Erlangen Ausgabe.

was bound up with the Roman Catholic doctrine; and, in order that the Supper might not be regarded as a good work, he rejected also the dogma of transubstantiation.

Instead of a direct transformation, he adopted the idea of a sort of mystical presence of the Redeemer in the sacrament; and this, according to his teaching, had the same effect as the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation.\*

In Switzerland another view had developed itself. Zwingli could not believe in either of the two miracles; with his unimpassioned way of looking at things, he could not understand these mystical ideas; he took the words, "This is my body," to mean, "This signifies my body;" and he adduced a number of passages in support of his view, such as "I am the vine," which must obviously be explained in this manner. These were the differences which played a part in the world's history, and divided the Protestant camp when absolute unity was more essential than ever.

In 1529 warnings were not wanting from those who, with just political insight, perceived that it would be disastrous for the cause of reform if the free study of the Scriptures was begun with dogmatical disputes, and if on the most vital questions the party should divide. It was therefore advised that some accommodating formula be sought for. The Landgrave Philip took the greatest interest in it, for personally he was more inclined to the views of Zwingli than to those of his own theologians, and Melancthon, Bucer, and others did all they could to bring about a reconciliation with the Swiss, but in vain.

At length, at Michaelmas, 1529, a theological conference was arranged at Marburg, where, at the instigation of Philip, the Swiss and Saxon theologians met in order to agree upon a formula. On some important points they came to an understanding, but on the mystery of the real presence, which was with Luther the main question, he prevented their coming to any agreement. He kept to the words which he wrote on the table before him, "This is my body." The passionate intolerant spirit of the monk, of unyielding ancient scholasticism which could brook no opposition, was aroused in him; the simple temperate character of the Swiss Reformer was repugnant to him, and he never overcame his distrust of him and his doctrines. Luther refused all inter-

• Schenkel, Wesen des Protestantismus.



course with him, and allowed himself to say many things which he could not maintain, and which he himself regretted on reflection. Zwingli and his followers preserved a far more gentle and conciliatory tone towards him.

Upper Germany, Swabia, and Switzerland adopted Zwingli's view. Some of the imperial cities were inclined to it, and Philip of Hesse did not conceal that he thought it more natural and tenable, though he was prudent enough not to press it.

Protestantism was thus divided not only on the great question of resistance to the Catholic reaction, but divided amongst itself. There were two distinct camps, either of which might perhaps say, in the first moment of danger, "What are the others to us? Let us wait and see what happens."

In May, 1530, Charles came to Germany. He had just put the finishing-stroke at Bologna to the peace which was to reconstitute Italy, and had confirmed his reconciliation with the Pope by his solemn coronation. There also, doubtless, the final conferences took place about the Church and the heretics. Judging from circumstances, we may conclude that Pope and Emperor were agreed that the obstinate apostates must be made to return to the bosom of the Church. But there their opinions diverged. Clement VII. and his successors thought that sufficient. The only reform of which they had any idea was the restoration of the lost unity under their rule, by whatever means it might be brought about. But Charles V. was of opinion that when the outward breaches were restored, internal security should be given by a general council which should accede to the justifiable demands for Church reform. If this was the alternative, the Pope would sooner submit to the continuance of heresy, to the defection from the Church of one hundred thousand souls, than consent to a repetition of the stormy Councils of Costnitz and Basle, which haunted the memory of the Curia like spectres.

Then came the Diet of Augsburg. Germany had not witnessed so brilliant a one for centuries. The German empire shone once more in its mediæval splendour. And how different was the Emperor's arrival now from that when he came up the Rhine to Worms! He was then known only as Maximilian's grandson; now the world was ringing with his exploits. Twice he had humbled the pride of the



conqueror of Marignano, he had compelled both Francis and the Pope to enter into treaty with him, his generals and statesmen had been everywhere victorious, and the glory of their deeds was reflected upon him. It was perfectly natural that in the pride of these successes, and after France and Italy had submitted to him, he should imagine that he could adjust the affairs of Germany with a word.

He made his entry into Augsburg with extraordinary pomp. He was not fond of show in general, but this time he wanted to dazzle men's eyes. He wished that both friend and foe should feel that he was Emperor; that, in the old sense of the word, he was ruler of the world and guardian of the Church; and when he was solemnly brought in by the princes of the empire who had loyally gone forth to meet him, his first act was to summon to his presence the protesting princes of Saxony, Brandenburg, Lüneburg, and Hesse.

In a not unfriendly, but very decided tone, he informed them through his brother that the toleration of the Lutheran preaching and the observance of the modern forms of worship must cease; the rest would follow. He had no idea that it would not suffice to issue this command; the princes would submit, as far greater powers had submitted. There was no fear then of political opposition; it was different in the next generation, but this one was free from all suspicion of disloyalty to the imperial house.

Frederic the Wise had been foremost among the promoters of the election of Charles as emperor; his successor John, and Philip of Hesse, had distinguished themselves by their zealous and faithful services against the Turks; and the old Margrave, George of Brandenburg-Ansbach, had grown grey in the Emperor's service, whom, with the dutiful spirit of a vassal, he always regarded as his supreme lord. Nothing but the gravest questions of conscience could induce such men to resist their imperial master.

They unanimously declared, and as decidedly as he had demanded obedience, that they could not obey; these were matters of conscience, and in matters of conscience the Emperor's mandate had no power. The Landgrave Philip began at once to prove the doctrine of justification by faith from St. Augustine and the New Testament, but that was an aspect of the business with which the Emperor was not

at home, and he impatiently and angrily interrupted him by reiterating his command. The aged Margrave of Brandenburg then threw himself on his knees before him, and exclaimed, "I would sooner lose my head than God's Word."

This moved the Emperor deeply. His well-known answer, "Dear Prince, no heads off" (*Lieber Fürst, nicht Köpfe ab*),\* implies that he shuddered at the precipices to which this path might lead him.

Thus the first assault, which he had hoped would have been enough to intimidate the princes, was repulsed; the Lutheran service was solemnly celebrated in the quarters, so called, of the princes and the lodgings of the wealthy patricians; and when, on the following day, there was a procession of the festival of Corpus Christi, the protesting princes declined the invitation to attend it. So little had the Emperor been able to accomplish with the professors of the new doctrine, even with his personal presence and all the pomp of his retinue.

The Emperor then desired that an abstract of the differences between the two doctrines should be laid before him. They were prepared for this in the circle of the allied princes; they had been preparing for it ever since the Diet had been convened; and in a very short time a statement of the doctrinal differences was committed to paper, and handed to the Emperor on the 25th of June, 1530. This was afterwards called the Confession of Augsburg.

The differences between the old doctrine and the new were unfolded in this document as mildly and dispassionately as possible, and the teaching of justification in the latter, as might be expected from Melancthon, was delicately and skilfully explained.

This was answered by the Roman Catholic theologians of the other side who had accompanied their princes, as the Protestants had theirs. Luther was not present. As under sentence of excommunication he would not give the challenge of appearing in person in the place where the validity of the ban was to be discussed; but he was at Coburg, and carried on a brisk correspondence with his party.

The negotiations set on foot by the Emperor did not lead to any reconciliation. Besides the wide differences

\* Ranke.

between the parties, the Emperor was partly to blame for this, for though he wished to mediate, he would not enter into any discussion of the question of conscience; and though he was less violent in his opinions than his spiritual and temporal advisers, as guardian of the Church he expected blind obedience; and the most favourable terms he could propose were that until he should arrange the promised council with Rome, the Protestants should submit to the Pope!

The final decree of the Diet stated, with offensive severity, that the Protestants would have till the next spring to consider whether they would voluntarily return; and the Emperor added that if they did not accept this decree, measures must be taken for the extermination of this sect without delay.

Under the impression of these threats, at Christmas, 1530, the Protestant princes assembled for conference at Schmalkald. Their first object was to determine what position they should take towards the imperial court, should steps be taken to carry out the Augsburg decree, and it resulted in the formation of the armed League of Schmalkald in March of the following year.

They had previously come to an agreement with Luther on the question of resistance, should it become necessary. It was not without a struggle that he consented that the Protestants should have the right of self-defence.

The execution of the decree of the Diet, announced for the spring of 1531, did not take place. If, in spite of the advice of Loysa, who said of the heretics that "it was not a question of saving the souls of the dogs, but of compelling their bodies to obedience," they had hesitated to proceed against them in July and August, 1530, when they were not a united body, there was much more reason to hesitate now that they were so, especially as the situation of affairs was also changed.

The peace with France showed itself to be more than insecure; the Turks were preparing to avenge their disgrace in 1529; the Emperor's hereditary foes were busy both in the East and the West. Would the empire itself be entirely at his disposal if he proceeded to punish the Protestants?

His cherished scheme, that his brother Ferdinand should be elected King of Germany, met with opposition, even in the Catholic camp. The house of Bavaria especially, which

had secretly hoped to attain this dignity for itself, complained of the undue supremacy of the house of Hapsburg, and afterwards made proposals to come to an understanding with the League of Schmalkald. If Charles, therefore, entered into a conflict with the Protestants, he would have not only his enemies from without to fear, but must look for opposition—or at all events could hope for no assistance—from the Catholic princes of his own camp.

Thus everything concurred to incline him to peace. He had been seriously thinking of a peace since the summer of 1531; negotiations were opened, and all prospect having disappeared of coming to any peaceable settlement with the Turks, on the 23rd of July, 1532, the peace of Nuremberg was concluded, in which both parties made concessions in order to unite in vigorous resistance against the Turks.

The finest army which the united forces of Christendom had ever assembled marched against the Turks, who did not venture on any decisive engagement. After several minor defeats they evacuated the field without a battle, as in 1529.

## PART II.

### THE REFORMATION IN THE OTHER GERMANIC STATES; IN SWITZERLAND, DENMARK, SWEDEN, AND ENGLAND.

#### CHAPTER X.

##### THE REFORMATION IN SWITZERLAND.\*

Early Life and Mental Development of Ulrich Zwingli, 1484-1519.—Study of the Classics.—Curate at Glarus, 1506-16.—Study of the New Testament.—Sermon against the Desertion of their Country by the Swiss.—Labours at Einsiedeln, 1516-18.—Call to Zurich.—The Reformation at Zurich, 1519-25.—Zwingli's Sermons in the Great Cathedral.—Decree of the Council of 1520.—The Sixty-seven Articles of 1523.—Progress of Reform.—Reformed Zurich and Switzerland in 1526-31.

##### EARLY LIFE AND MENTAL DEVELOPMENT OF ULRICH ZWINGLI.

WE have already alluded to Ulrich Zwingli on the occasion of the religious conference at Marburg, and shall now make closer acquaintance with him.

The suspicious dislike with which Luther regarded him, and which prevented any intimacy between them, was also mentioned.

They were indeed as widely different in character, origin,

\* Bullinger, *Reformations Geschichte Frauenf.*, 1838. Hottinger, *Helvet. Kirchengeschichte*, 1708. L. Wirz, *Neuere Helvet. Kirchengeschichte*, Zurich, 1813. Joh. v. Müller's und Glutz-Blotzheim's *Geschichte Schweiz*. Eidgenossenschaft, fortgesetzt von Hottinger, Zurich, 1825. Ulr. Zwingli Opera, 1544, und Zwingli's Werke. Herausg. von Schuler und Schulthess, Zurich, 1828. Zwingli's Leben von Hess, Zurich, 1811. Sigwart, Ulr. Zwingli, Hamburg, 1855. Röder, Ulrich Zwingli, St. Gallen, 1855.

and education as two men between whom there was any mental relationship well could be.

They were both the sons of peasants ; but the parents of one are so poor that, with all their laudable ambition to make something out of their talented son, they are not able to educate him without aid from strangers ; the parents of the other are well-to-do, respectable people, whose children have no need to sing for their bread. The childhood of the one is rich in bitter experiences—he was often obliged “to suffer and hold his peace ;” the other grew up as the child of the chief man of his native village, and early learnt to feel and act with the independence of a young republican of good standing. The monkish melancholy of the one leads him to adopt a monastic life, the other takes a keen and lively interest in the affairs of the world ; the one becomes a disciple of the mystics and the fathers of the Church, the other of the Humanists and the sages of antiquity. Both leave the Church, but the one amidst conflicts which the other never knew—Luther, because he was more true to the Church than she was to herself ; Zwingli, because, almost like a Humanist critic, he compared the false Church with the true, and found their differences irreconcilable.

Ulrich Zwingli was born on the 1st of January, 1484, at Wildhaus, in the district of Toggenburg, and was the son of the magistrate (Amtmann) of the little community. Insignificant as the little commonwealth was, its inhabitants bore a sturdy, independent character. Under the dreaded Crosier of St. Gall, they had freed themselves from the burdens of the feudal system, and Zwingli's father had been their courageous spokesman. The straightforward simplicity, cool practical sense, and ready wit of a simple race of mountaineers pervaded the house in which the future Reformer grew up, like a fresh Alpine breeze. He never knew anything of the tendency to mysticism which early weighed upon Luther's soul. He received his first instruction from his uncle, who was Dean at Wesen, and then went to Basle and Berne, in order to acquire the elements of classical learning.

In free Switzerland, that connecting-link between Italy and North Germany, the Humanistic studies had early taken root, and had given rise to a decided ecclesiastical liberality. This had great influence on Zwingli's early culture.

Heinrich Wölfin, or Lupulus, as he called himself, the talented founder of the classical schools in Switzerland, was

Zwingli's instructor at Berne, and his teacher and model at Basle was the courageous theologian, Thomas Wittenbach, who ventured openly to preach "that the whole system of indulgences is a delusion; Christ alone paid the ransom for the sins of mankind." The state of mind of the superior circles, both with regard to learning and religion, prepared them for independent attempts at reform, and Zwingli was right when he afterwards said to his accusers, "All deference to Martin Luther, but what we have in common with him was our conviction before we knew his name."

In 1499, at the age of fifteen, Zwingli went to the university of Vienna, having positively declined the proposals of the Dominicans of Berne, who wanted to make a monk of him. Well schooled in all Humanist accomplishments, such as modern Latin prose and poetry, he returned to Basle, where Wittenbach exercised so powerful an influence over him that he resolved to devote himself entirely to theology. In 1506 he obtained the degree of M.A. in the liberal arts, and in the same year he was chosen curate of the congregation at Glarus.

At Glarus his labours were manifold and uninterrupted for ten years, and he continued to cultivate his mind. It was here that he first pursued those deeper studies which the importance of his subsequent vocation demanded, and amidst which he ripened into manhood. It was here also that he became conscious of the political and national grievances of his country, the redress of which he desired as ardently as he did the reform of the Church. The contrast between the course of his studies and those of Luther is remarkable. His early letters are the letters of a Humanist, whose vocation is the Church, but whose heart belonged to the great spirits of antiquity; he orders editions of Cicero, Sallust, Seneca, Valerius Maximus, Horace, heartily rejoices at the blows which the enemies of the light (*Dunkelmänner*) at Vienna, Basle, and Paris have received from the humanistic free-thinkers, and instructs some of his young countrymen in his house with so much success that even an Erasmus does not refuse his admiring recognition of it. With the study of Greek, which he now first took up in earnest, a new world was opened to him; he studied the Greek grammar of Chrysoloras with eager zeal, and wrote to a friend: "Nothing but God shall prevent me from acquiring Greek, not for fame, but for the sake of the Holy Scriptures."



He read Plato, Lucian, Homer, Pindar, with delight, and the New Testament, in order, as he says, that he might "study the doctrine of Christ from the original source." He copied the Pauline Epistles in the original, and made explanatory notes in the margin, and learnt them word for word by heart. The copy is still extant. He thus arrived at the choked-up springs of revelation, in which Luther at length found consolation at Erfurt, but not as he did by the circuitous paths of scholasticism, mysticism, and the fathers, but from the soul-purifying study of the Scriptures. By the true text he tested the doctrines of ancient and modern Christian thinkers, both of the celebrated fathers of the Church and the learned heretics, and thus he gradually formed a system of conviction independently, and firmly took his stand upon it as a Reformer.

Such ecclesiastics were as scarce in Switzerland as anywhere else. At a meeting of all the deans of the Confederation, it was found, as Bullinger says, that not more than three were at home in the Bible; all the rest confessed that they had never even read the New Testament through. Here as elsewhere the clergy were utterly sunk in luxury and hypocrisy; the preaching of the ill-educated consisted of second-hand clerical twaddle, that of the more educated of dry scholasticism.

Zwingli's mental alienation from the ancient Church is even at this time evident from the spirit and tendency of his sermons, but it was years before the breach took place. Meanwhile he twice accompanied his warlike countrymen as army preacher to Italy: the first time, in 1512, he witnessed the triumphal march of the Swiss through Lombardy; the second time, in 1515, he witnessed the ignominious end of the brilliant army which the Swiss had raised for foreign pay; he saw how some of them, bribed by the French, left their countrymen in the lurch before the enemy, and how the rest, dispirited and at variance among themselves, were beaten at Marignano. During the hopeless days before the battle, the young preacher appealed to the consciences of his countrymen, spoke of the curse of their desertion of their country, the decline of ancient discipline, and Swiss military honour.

He thus touched upon the most incurable disease of the Confederation; the country had been the recruiting-ground for Emperor, King, and Pope, in their perpetual struggle for Lombardy. The inhabitants of towns and villages and

whole cantons were in the pay of one foreign power or another, and for ready money they gave up their youth fit for military service to fight under foreign colours. The confederates changed their colours according to the sums offered; people were on one side one day, on the other the next; in short, it was a disgraceful traffic, ruinous to the honour and faith of the people, and every honest patriot was deeply ashamed of it.

It was advantageous to the cause of Church reform that the papal policy could not dispense with the Swiss renegades. Rome looked on for years at the proceedings of the innovators, hoping to come to terms with them that they might not be deprived of this support.

From 1516-18 we find Zwingli as curate at Einsiedeln, an abbey which was then in the hands of a free-thinker, whilst the place itself, with its wonder-working image in St. Meinrad's cell, was a centre of gross superstition. It was here that Zwingli began to preach the gospel. The new curate ventured to tell the thousands of pilgrims, who were seeking healing for their bodies or pardon for their sins, of a forgiveness of sins which was to be obtained not by pilgrimages or empty vows, nor by holy altars and miraculous images, but by amendment of heart and life, by sincere repentance and moral reforms. "Do you think," he said, "that those elect of God to whose feet you are flocking attained the glory of heaven by the merits of others? No; it was by keeping to the paths of the law, by subjection to the will of the Highest, and by devotion to their Saviour unto death. Let the holiness of their lives be an example to you, walk in their footsteps, be not turned aside by danger or temptation; you will thus prove yourselves worthy. In the day of trouble, put your whole trust in God—upon Him who created the heavens and the earth. In the hour of death, call upon Jesus Christ alone, who bought you with His blood, and is the only mediator between God and man." \*

This sermon excited a vast deal of attention. The orthodox shook their heads; the liberal already recognised Zwingli as their most talented spokesman; they encouraged him by letters, and many great schemes were propounded here. Attention was also aroused at Rome, and in 1518

the legate Pucci sought to divert Zwingli to the interests of the Curia by smothering him with favours and flatteries. Zwingli was still within the folds of the Church, in whose house there were certainly many mansions, and with honest zeal he tried to awaken the spirit of reform within her, and to induce her herself to exercise her authority in putting an end to the most flagrant abuses. It was not till he had found all admonitions vain that, like Luther, he came to an open rupture with her. In a letter to a friend, in 1525, he gave an account of the many representations he had made in private to cardinals, bishops, and prelates, that they "must begin to reform abuses, or they would come to an end themselves with far greater commotion." But it had been all in vain, and he could say with a good conscience, "I have never done anything in holes and corners like a thief, but have always given timely warning, and have had an answer for all men."

The Church was already on the threshold of that transition period when it had become impracticable to distinguish between usage and abuse, faith and superstition, at least for those who had no wish to do so if they had the power. The grievance of indulgences existed also in Switzerland. No sensible man ventured to defend it, but it clung to the system like an incurable canker.

#### THE REFORMATION AT ZURICH, 1519-25.

Zwingli was curate at Zurich when Tetzels Swiss counterpart, Bernhardin Samson, proposed to bring his shameless indulgence shop thither from the Forest Cantons. Zwingli prevailed with the Diet then sitting to send the barefooted friar out of the country; and Rome was still so intent on keeping on good terms with the Swiss Confederation, that the episcopal vicar praised him in a letter "for driving the strange wolf from the flock."

From the beginning of 1519 Zwingli had been giving a course of sermons, in the great cathedral of Zurich, on the interpretation of the gospel. He treated of Matthew, the Acts, the Pauline Epistles, "in simple Swiss language," and taught justification through faith in the Saviour, as he had learnt it from these sources. He also spoke against "superstition, bigotry, and hypocrisy," rebuked the vices of individuals as well as the general decline of moral disci-

pline, spoke of the abuses in the Church, the degenerate spirit of the cantons, their injustice to the weak and obsequiousness to the great, and mourned over the loss of the freedom and glory of the Confederation, through party dissensions, desertion of their country by the inhabitants, pensions, and bulls. Zwingli preached the word like a native orator ; his language was simple, but deeply impressive, for it glowed with profound conviction, and it therefore powerfully affected even those who did not share his views. People who felt that his words were applicable to themselves thought he was aiming specially at them, when he would say, "Good man, take it not to thyself." Those who had kept away from preaching and the church for years said, "This is a real preacher of the truth ; he will tell us how things really are ;" and honest Thomas Plater, a travelling scholar, said that when listening to Zwingli's sermon on John x., "I am the good Shepherd," "he felt as if some one was pulling him by the hair."

Just at this period a war was in prospect about the Duchy of Milan, and again came the French "sack of crown-pieces" to bribe Swiss soldiers. All the Confederation took the side of Francis I. ; Zurich alone declined all overtures, so great had been the effect of Zwingli's admonitions. This was in May, 1521. But when the ambassadors of the Pope and Emperor arrived, and the former demanded troops, by right of ancient treaties, to defend the States of the Church, Zwingli was varquished. It was now that he first began to say bitter things against the Pope. His patriotism was touched, and he saw all the grievances of his country summed up in this pernicious desertion of it. "I wish," he said, among other things, "that they had bored a hole in the Pope's letter, and hung it to his messenger's back, that he might carry it home. If a wolf is seen in the country, you sound an alarm that it may be caught ; but you will not defend yourselves from the wolves that ruin the bodies and souls of men. How appropriate are their red hats and cloaks ! If you shake them, out fall ducats ; if you wring them, out flows the blood of your sons, brothers, and friends !"

Zwingli's opponents now began to be more bitter ; both political and ecclesiastical enemies began to revile this other Luther, and to stir up the people and the congregations against him ; it went so far that his life was hardly safe, so

that the council placed a guard before his door, and when he went out in the evening a body of young men accompanied him as a volunteer guard. In the same year the Papal Legate demanded that Luther's works in Switzerland should be burnt, and his followers exterminated. The Diet obeyed, and set house to house visitations on foot, especially at Lucerne, in search of the forbidden books. "All that is scribbled over," said the agent of the Council of Lucerne, "is Lutheran, and is to be burnt." With these words he seized Erasmus's Greek edition of the New Testament to burn it.

The Council of Zurich found out how to rob the Edict of its sting; the mandate which it put forth in 1520, in apparent accordance with the decree of the Diet, in reality gave free scope to the forbidden doctrine. It ordained that all curates, pastors, and preachers, as is also declared by the papal laws, "*are to preach the holy Gospels and Epistles agreeably to the Spirit of God, and the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament*, to keep to what they receive from and is proved by the aforesaid Scriptures, and not to teach any adventitious innovations or dogmas."\*

In accordance with the principles of this decree, the cause of reform might progress unhindered. Since the heads of the Church had declined to abolish grievous abuses, the communities began to do it for themselves, and the spirit and tendency of the Swiss Reformation are indicated by the fact, that they began by abolishing outward forms which had become empty and meaningless, instead of, as Luther had done, pressing for a decision on the deepest principles of the Christian faith.

Scarcely had Zwingli proved the absurdity of the rules about fasting than some of his followers treated the prohibition of certain kinds of food in Lent as no longer binding, and used them without buying dispensations or indulgences, which was all they could be blamed for. The suffragan Bishop of Constance brought an accusation against them before the council. Zwingli was heard, and, to the confusion of his adversaries, appealed to the plain words of the Apostle Paul to Timothy, that "every creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused, if it be received with thanksgiving: for it is sanctified by the word of God and prayer."† He pub-

\* Röder.

† 1 Timothy iv. 4, 5.

lished the sermon which had given so much offence, and the contents of this, his first publication, may be thus summed up: "If thou art disposed to fast, do so; if thou wishest to eat meat, eat it; but allow the Christian his liberty."

The clamour which the monks everywhere raised against it, put an end to a decree which, still more clearly than that of 1520, favoured preaching according to the Scriptures, to the exclusion of the scholastic expositors.

Zwingli continued to preach in the same spirit. The misfortunes of the Swiss renegades at Bicocca again incited him to warn the "dear honourable people of Switzerland against taking pay from foreign masters who will ruin us;" and in August, 1522, he published a new and complete work, in sixty-nine articles, against the orthodox party.

After the victory on the subject of fasting followed the storm about the celibacy of the clergy. The fearful immorality resulting from the prohibition of marriage is evident from two facts to which Zwingli refers in his address to the Bishop of Constance—first, that the bishops formally impose taxes on the concubines and illegitimate children of the clergy; and, secondly, that, according to an ancient usage, many Swiss congregations require, for the sake of peace and the honour of families, that a newly appointed priest shall "keep a concubine for himself in his house." It was necessary that for once the truth on this subject should be plainly and honestly spoken, and this Zwingli did in a petition signed by many others, addressed to the Bishop of Constance, and in a second letter to the same.

In spite of all this Pope Adrian VI. made another attempt to make a favourable impression on the brave Swiss, or, as the latter somewhat coarsely expressed it, to "uncouple" him. But Zwingli was now urgent for a decision. He prevailed upon the Council of Zurich to arrange a public discussion, in order that, Bible in hand, he might measure his strength with his opponents. The council consented, and appointed it for the 23rd of January, 1523. Zwingli had previously drawn up a full confession of faith in sixty-seven theses, which contain the outline of his views of life and religion. The fundamental principle of it shows the marked difference between him and Luther. Zwingli's endeavour was to exclude everything from the Church and the faith which could not be justified from Scripture, instead of, like



Luther, to maintain all that was not expressly contradicted in Scripture.

Thus he says, in reference to the gospel: "They are in error and blaspheme who ascribe no authority to the gospel, unless it is confirmed by the authority of the Church;" he speaks of Jesus as "the only guide and captain of salvation, he who seeks or points out any other door is a thief and a robber;" of the Papacy, "Christ is the only and eternal high priest; from this it follows that those who have given themselves out for high priests are rejecting the glory and authority of Christ;" of the clerical garb, "Nothing is more displeasing to God than hypocrisy, it follows therefore that everything which assumes sanctity in the sight of men is hypocrisy and folly; this condemns cowls, symbols, and tonsures;" of sects and orders, "All men are brothers in Christ and brothers one to another; therefore they should not exalt any man to be their father upon earth; this condemns sects, orders, and factions;" of celibacy, "When the clergy feel that God has denied them the gift of continence, and do not marry, they commit sin;" of government, "There is no ecclesiastical but only secular government, to which all Christians without exception owe allegiance, unless it enjoins what is contrary to God's will; if it does this, it may be deposed with God's help;" of purgatory, "The Holy Scriptures say nothing about purgatory after death;" of the abolition of abuses, "The ecclesiastical rulers must hasten to humble themselves before God, and they should set up the cross of Christ, not the box for offerings, or their end is drawing near; the axe is laid to the root of the trees." In conclusion, he says, "Let no one undertake to discuss these subjects in a sophistical and trifling spirit, but bring the Scriptures as the test, that the truth may be discovered, or if, as I hope, it is already discovered, that it may be maintained. Amen. May God grant it!"\*

The discussion took a disastrous course for Zwingli's opponents. Six hundred people had assembled to hear the debate on religion. Zwingli opened it with a short address, which closed with the words, "Now then, in God's name, here I am." The episcopal vicar, who spoke next, spoke of everything except Zwingli's theses, promised a council and a

\* Röder, Gieseler.



decision by the bishops, prelates, &c. When asked to prove the charge of heresy from the Scriptures, he persisted in silence, and on the afternoon of the 29th of January the council was justified in stating, that as no one had appeared to convict Master Ulrich Zwingli of error, it earnestly desired that he should continue to proclaim and preach the holy doctrines of the gospel and the precepts of the Holy Scriptures in accordance with the Spirit of God, as he had hitherto done." The same was to apply to all other ministers of the divine word, and abuse and slander were forbidden under heavy penalties.

By this resolution Zurich separated itself from the bishopric of Constance; the congregation of the faithful took possession of the rights which Zwingli's constitution of the Church assigned to it; the ecclesiastical authority, which he held to be an illegal assumption of power on the part of the heads of the Church, was practically abjured, and the foundation-stone was laid of his Church polity, the absolute power of the congregation.

And now the innovations which were based upon this principle followed step by step; the mother tongue supplanted Latin in prayers and the baptismal and marriage services; the incomes of chapters and monasteries were applied to purposes of education both for the lower and higher classes, the cells of monks and nuns were set open, priests entered into holy matrimony, the abolition of the mass and image-worship, as part of the same system, followed. On the 26th of January, 1524, the Diet passed a resolution at Lucerne against the reforms; in March messengers from the twelve districts appeared before the Council of Zurich and remonstrated, but Zurich and its communes remained firm, and after the spring of 1524 took a new and more decided course. Processions and the festival of Corpus Christi were abolished, the shrines were opened, the bones buried, the organs removed from the churches, tolling for the dead and ringing for mass, the benediction of palms, salt, water, ashes and tapers, and the last unction were done away with, and the administration of the Holy Supper in both kinds was celebrated by a solemn communion of all the reformed congregations on Maundy Thursday, 1525.

## REFORMED ZURICH AND SWITZERLAND.

Amidst the repeated attempts of the orthodox party to incite the whole Confederation to oppose the heretics at Zurich, the Confederation had separated into two camps, and the heresy which was to be exterminated had spread its roots far and wide beyond Zurich, and had allied itself with political and intellectual movements of all sorts. The educated citizens in the larger cities of Basle, Berne, and Schaffhausen, and the country-people in Appenzell, Glarus, and the Grisons, who had been prepared for the new doctrine by liberal preachers, resisted all attempts to put it down by force, and it was only in the five Forest Cantons of Lucerne, Zug, Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden, to which Freiburg and the Valais joined themselves, that the orthodox party kept strictly together. It had its seat, generally speaking, in the patrician oligarchies, whose dominion and richest sources of income would be dried up if religious democracy prevailed, and if papal pensions and favours came to an end, while all persons of democratic tendencies in town and country naturally took the side of reform. The tendencies of the dependencies or common territories were mainly determined by the chief places in them; in Thurgau, the Rhine Valley, Aargau, and the free corporations, through the influence of Zurich, St. Gall, and Berne, the Reformation prevailed; while Sargans, Gaster, Uznach, Baden, the greater part of the Forest Cantons, the Italian dependencies (now the canton of Tessin), Beltlin, Bormio, and Chiavenna, after a little vacillation, adhered entirely to the ancient Church.

Thus in this case the course of political and ecclesiastical affairs coincided, and Zwingli's position was from the first different from that of Luther. Luther kept strictly within the limits of pure Church reform. In the existing situation of affairs in Germany this was certainly the more modest as well as the more prudent course, but it was not possible in the little commonwealth of Switzerland.

The way in which Zwingli apprehended the necessities of his position indicates his great superiority of mind. Having established the Church on the basis of the congregation, he entertained similar projects with regard to the State, not only in relation to the individual commonwealths of the

cantons, but the great commonwealth of the Confederation.

It was he who first entertained the great idea of giving a general constitution to the Swiss cantons, similar to the representative democracy which has after three centuries been realised ; of putting an end to the unnatural supremacy of the small Forest Cantons, of depriving the prefects of their jurisdiction, and of giving to the larger cantons the position to which they were entitled by their extent, power, property, and culture. The system of equalisation, by which the five Forest Cantons had as many seats and votes in the Diet as the larger ones, was a political absurdity. It is only in our times that this has been altered. Zwingli was the greatest political as well as ecclesiastical reformer whom Switzerland has ever seen. His ideas may be said to have triumphed in the constitution adopted in Switzerland about ten years ago.\*

This formed one of the most powerful levers of his propaganda, but it was also the main cause of the animosity of his opponents. For the Forest Cantons it was a question of existence ; the erroneous doctrines were in their eyes revolution and anarchy ; opposition to the ancient Church was also opposition to the existing government, with which they must stand or fall.

The victory which the democratic reform party gained at Berne over the oligarchy was a decisive event. The religious controversies had roused the masses out of their passive traditional obedience ; at the elections of 1527 the Reformers broke through the compact phalanx of the oligarchy in the great council, and the masses demanded the rights of which they had been deprived for the last twenty years, and instituted a solemn religious discussion at the beginning of 1528. The doctrines of Zwingli again obtained a great victory ; it resulted not only in a general attack upon the pictures and images of saints in the churches, but in an entire revolution in the State ; the two councils, instead of being filled up in a brotherly manner by each other, were formed upon the elective rights of the reformed communities, and the scandal of the pensions which had hitherto connected all the great families with France was finally put a stop to.

A great reaction followed this stroke. Fresh impetus was given to the spread of the new doctrines, and the mountain

\* Written in 1859 or 1860.—Tr.

fortresses of the five Forest Cantons, strong though their internal position was, were now encompassed by a storm which made their situation day by day more untenable.

The Forest Cantons had an existence beyond their mountains; they had a share in the territories which were ruled by the prefects of several districts (Orte) at once, or in rotation. There were districts governed by Zurich, Berne with Schwyz, Lucerne, and Zug all at once.\*

Some adopted the doctrines of Zwingli, others adhered to the old forms; some persecuted what the others held sacred; there was thus abundant occasion for strife. So complicated a political system as this of ancient Switzerland, with its governing districts (Orten) and its associated and subject districts, could not but get out of joint, unless one party or the other gained a decisive victory, or a boundary-line could be drawn between them.

The party of the oppressed Forest Cantons adopted desperate measures of self-defence. In 1526 a reformed preacher was publicly burnt, as a signal that the discussion of religion proclaimed a few days afterwards at Baden was to be only a great Inquisition. They inflicted fines, imprisonment, whipping, mutilation, and death, so far as their power extended, upon the reformed preachers and their followers. The reformed cantons did not disgrace themselves with personal violence, but almost every victory of their enemies was followed by attacks upon images in the churches.

It was amidst all this irritation that the decisive struggle drew near. It threatened to break out in 1529, and the Forest Cantons renewed their alliance with the house of Hapsburg, with the reasonable hope that the Emperor would succeed in Switzerland in what he was trying to carry out in the empire. The Reformers, on the contrary, relied on those who held opinions similar to theirs in the states of Upper Germany, Constance, at Ulm, Augsburg, Nuremberg, and on Phillip of Hesse.

In June, 1529, both parties were ready for battle. Zwingli had from the first come to a conclusion on this subject different from that of Luther. "Thou dost not know these people," he said to his friend Œcolampadius in reply to his

\* Thus Thurgau in matters of government belonged to seven, in the administration of justice to ten districts (Orten). In the valley of the Rhine, Zurich, Glarus, and Appenzell had authority besides the five districts (Orten).

warnings. "I see the sword already drawn, and shall do the duty of a faithful watchman." He plainly saw that the peace which was necessary for the new doctrines could not be obtained without war; he therefore wished to see the combat decided by a well-aimed blow at a favourable moment, and, martial son of the Alps as he was, he advanced on horseback, halberdier in hand, to the frontier with his followers, to help to subdue the ill-equipped enemy.

They did not come to an engagement. The governor, Aebli, of Glarus, intercepted the men of Zurich just as they were about to cross the frontier, and persuaded them to return. Zwingli said to him: "Gevatter Amman" (Father magistrate), "thou wilt have to answer for this before God. Our enemies have deceived thee with fair speeches. While they are unarmed and unprepared thou believest them and departest; but hereafter when they *are* prepared they will not spare us, and then no one will depart."

The military force of Zurich, in spite of the scanty aid of the allies and the disinclination of Berne for war, must have been at this time considerable, for the peace to which the five Forest Cantons agreed at Cappel, on the 25th of June, 1529, was a confession of the failure of their cause.

It ran as follows: "As God's word and the faith are not things in which it is lawful to use compulsion, both parties shall be free to observe what they think right, and in the common territories the majority in the congregations shall determine whether the mass and other usages be retained or abolished. The five cantons shall break off their alliance with Duke Ferdinand, pay the expenses of the war, and be advised to put a stop to the foreign annuities;" and a threat was added that any infringement of this treaty would be followed by "a fresh embargo on produce and merchandise."

Had it been possible to confine the controversy to the religious question, the Reformers would doubtless have obtained a lasting victory on the basis of this treaty; but it was not so, and Zwingli himself was by no means disposed thus to separate political and ecclesiastical questions. Thus after the victory a political rupture took place among the elements which, on the religious question, were at one. Berne and Zurich were agreed on the subject of Church reform, but when the question arose of giving Switzerland another federal constitution, with a new metropolis, neither city would yield to the other. Three centuries passed before

this dispute was arranged, when Zurich, in our own days, but not without loud lamentation, agreed that Berne should be the seat of the federal government. Formerly, however, the struggle for supremacy was still more difficult to settle, as Zurich, where the doctrines of Zwingli were first adopted and where he lived, decidedly had the advantage over its rival in the cause of reform.

The treaty of Cappel soon led to fresh disputes. Both parties complained of the other, and neither without reason. The Forest Cantons complained that in the districts with mixed governments Zurich and Berne did all in their power to further the progress of the new doctrines; that in doubtful cases everything was determined by the greater power; that in every territorial dispute the religious question was made use of to their prejudice; that the rights of the newly elected Prince Abbot of St. Gall, himself a fugitive in a foreign land, were shamefully disregarded.

On the other hand, Zurich and Berne complained that the five cantons did not observe the main provisions of the peace; the new doctrines nowhere enjoyed the liberty promised them by it; wherever the Reformers appeared or essayed to preach, they were imprisoned, persecuted, even put to death; their followers were treated as enemies of the country, and hatred was stirred up by lampoons and slanders of every kind. Both complaints were justified, and in the existing state of things it was quite explicable that they should be so.

By 1530, the very time when an explosion seemed to be near at Augsburg, things began to look serious. An outbreak was warded off, but things could not long remain as they were. In the spring of 1531 Zurich proposed to attack the Forest Cantons, but could not prevail upon its allies to join. At the Diet at Aarau, on the 15th of May of the same year, fatal half-measures were resolved upon. In spite of Zwingli's wise warnings they resolved to prohibit the entrance of provisions into the Forest Cantons, thereby irritating them to the last degree, yet doing nothing to promote a settlement.

Had Berne and Zurich been agreed, it would have required no great effort, with the aid of their reformed allies, to defeat the far weaker Forest Cantons; but the spirit of discord was as rife here as in Germany, and the Forest Cantons dexterously took advantage of it. Zwingli justly said: "If you



have the right to starve the five cantons, you have the right to attack them. It is weakness which prevents your doing so; when you are irritated you will do it with the courage of despair."

Early in October the five cantons secretly collected a little arm; brave soldiers were not wanting, nor the reinforcements for a hasty sally, and their numbers were sufficient to fall upon one of the allies before succour could arrive.

The people of Zurich were taken utterly by surprise when they saw the little banner of the five cantons advancing on the lake. They had scarcely time for any preparations; slowly and wearily their troops assembled on the heights of the Albis, while the vanguard was already fighting at Cappel below. Zwingli was present himself, encouraging his followers. They had but about two thousand men to oppose a far more numerous enemy.

On the 11th of October, after brave resistance and a contest that was long doubtful, the men of Zurich were defeated at Cappel. It was a result from which important consequences flowed for a long time afterwards. Zwingli himself fell in the tumult of battle. This formed another striking contrast between him and Luther, who would have nothing to do with warfare, and whose last words were, "Keep the peace."

They represent two widely differing views of the world, each of which is right in its place, but they cannot be reconciled.

The second peace of Cappel, of the 20th of November, 1531, was unfavourable enough for the Reformers; they were compelled to do as the five cantons had had to do by the terms of the first peace—pay the war expenses and give up their foreign alliances.

On the other hand, each canton was to retain its distinctive creed as before, and in the common territories the majority in each congregation was to determine the creed and regulate the distribution of Church property.

Thus in Switzerland as well as in Germany the question was left to the individual states. Protestantism was not coerced, the supremacy of Catholicism was prevented; it was for both parties to conduct themselves peaceably in future.

There was not in Switzerland any more than in Germany



any power to enforce a decision of the religious question, or to give unity either to reform or to the Church. Neither of the contending parties was strong enough to defeat the other, and the result in both cases was dualism of Church and creed.

A general principle of Church government was evolved from Zwingli's labours : the supreme power of the congregation. Zwingli detached himself more thoroughly than Luther from the external framework of the ancient Church; but in this doctrine he gave the world a principle of inexhaustible fertility, and which, as we shall yet see, has proved itself to be so, not only in ecclesiastical, but in political and social life.

Sax. : Balh  
Lutheran

## CHAPTER XI.

### DENMARK.\*

**The Period between the Union of Calmar, 1397, and the Reformation.**—Position of the Danish Monarchy.—Policy and Character of Christian II., 1513-23.—Complications with Sweden.—The Massacre of Stockholm, November, 1520.—Course of Reform in Denmark.—Revolt of the Nobles.—Election of Frederic I., April, 1523-33.—His Domestic and Foreign Policy.—The Diet at Odensee, 1527, and Toleration of the New Doctrines.—Complete Victory of the Reformation under Christian III., 1534-59.

THE spectacle presented by the course of the Reformation in the Scandinavian states is very different from that which we have witnessed in Germany and Switzerland. What was accomplished in those countries either without the aid of, or in opposition to, monarchical power, became in the North a weapon in the hands of royalty itself; it established its power by the aid of the Reformation; and while with us the empire, which had long been declining, came to an end by means of Church reform, the same revolution was, for the Scandinavian North, the beginning of its historical existence.

At the time of the dawn of the Reformation the affairs of Scandinavia were in singular and, as it appears, hopeless confusion.

In 1397 the great idea had been carried out of treating the cognate Scandinavian nations as different branches of one people, and of uniting the three kingdoms into one. This was the celebrated Union of Calmar, which was effected under Queen Margaret.

There are ideas which, though sound and natural in them-

\* S. Hvitfeld, *Danmarkis Rigis Krönike*, 1652, fol. Holberg, *Dänische Reichshistorie*, 1757. Gebhardi, *Geschichte Dänemarks in der Allg. Welthistorie*, Bd. 32, 33. Pontoppidan, *Reformationshistorie*, 1734. Dahlmann, *Geschichte von Dänemark*, 3 Bde., 1843.

selves, are yet not feasible in practice, because propounded too early or too late. It is now beyond dispute that this idea of union was a good one. There is at this time a widely distributed party in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, which is steadily labouring to establish a united Scandinavian state. By the loss of its eastern possessions, which Russia now holds, Sweden has been for ever deprived of its position as a great power, and naturally looks for support to the neighbouring kindred nations. Denmark is declining; it cannot maintain its ancient colonial and maritime power; a line of demarcation between its German and Danish elements has become inevitable; and thus the proposition advanced by one party is very intelligible—"Leave the country to the Germans as far as the Eider, and let what remains be the Danish province of Scandinavia."

But at that time the case was different. The Scandinavian Union was entirely a dynastic affair; it did not originate with the people, while now it is the people who wish it and the rulers who oppose. The differences between allied races were then much greater, and the need of mutual support much less, than now. Both Denmark and Sweden felt strong enough to stand alone or to rule the other. If the monarch of the Union were elected in Denmark, he would be practically powerless in Sweden; if in Sweden, he would be powerless in Denmark. Thus after 1397 the federal king nominally ruled over the three kingdoms, but in two-thirds of his dominions his empire was *in partibus infidelium*.

Besides the enmity of the nations to each other, the cause of Union had to contend with the impotence of the monarchical power, which was more counterbalanced by strong aristocratic influences than in any other country. It is only among the Romanic peoples that monarchical power has taken root; among the Germanic nations it was unspeakably difficult to establish even an elective monarchy; and as the German Electors used to protect themselves by an election treaty, in the North a powerful Church and a more powerful nobility used to protect themselves by what was called a "bond" (*Handfeste*).

The bond to which the early kings of the house of Oldenburg had to swear reduced them to absolute powerlessness. The King could do nothing without consulting the Council of State, which had every place in its gift, even the

offices in the royal household. He could not make war or peace, impose taxes or confiscate estates, without the council; the nobles and the Church had their own courts of judicature, expired fiefs fell back to the nobles, the nobles were exempt from taxes and had feudal rights: there was, in short, more than German "liberty."

Thus the King had to contend with the enmity of his subjects among each other (and the enmity between allied nations is more bitter than any other), a territorial nobility, and a proud and powerful Church, both possessed of immense wealth.

From this doubly circumscribed position royalty sought to extricate itself by taking advantage of the Reformation; with its aid it attacked and subdued one adversary, the Church, and was then strong enough to be a match for the nobles.

Denmark was still the centre of the northern kingdom. Her king was king of the Union, and since the middle of the fifteenth century the throne had been filled by the Dukes of Oldenburg. Members of various German princely houses had previously been elected—Erich VII. of Pomerania in 1412, Christopher III. of Bavaria in 1440. The Danes now formed the clever project of electing the distinguished Duke Adolf of Holstein and Schleswig, in order to bring the duchies into a sort of personal union with Denmark. Adolf declined for himself, but he was too much of the ruling prince not to seize the opportunity of seating his relative Christian I. of Oldenburg on the Danish throne, 1448-81.

Thus at Adolf's death that fatal personal union took place between Denmark and the duchies which he wished to avoid. It is from this period that the incessant disputes originate about the rights of the duchies, which, although chartered by the clearest documents, have been so perpetually questioned and infringed.

Christian I. was succeeded by his son John I., 1481-1513, on the Danish throne, and by Frederic in the duchies. The reign of the son of the former, Christian II., 1513-23, falls precisely at the period of the Reformation, and it was he who made the attempt, supported by the innovations in the Church, to found a royal supremacy on the widest possible basis. That his plan miscarried is explained by the way in which he went to work and the weakness of his character.

Christian II. inherited the elective crown of his father John, and the duchies were conferred on his uncle Frederic I., afterwards his successor on the Danish throne. Sweden had for a long time been governed by two distinguished nobles, the Stures, who called themselves Stadt-holders, but who were really more powerful than the King, and his influence was no greater in Norway than it was in Sweden; added to this there was the commercial dependence on the Hanseatic League which ruled the sea, and a bond which to this uncontrolled and passionate prince was peculiarly galling. He sought to relieve himself from this hampered and humiliating position; he wanted to overthrow the power of the two aristocracies which imposed so many restrictions upon him, and to rule Sweden from Denmark, while he kept each nation in check by means of the other.

King Christian II. was one of those people who, though they may possess a certain knowledge of, and insight into, the position of affairs, are wanting in that maturity of character which is indispensable to great undertakings. He undoubtedly possessed talents of no common order, but he had not received an education calculated to develop and guide them, and his rash, fierce temper especially had been left without any wholesome counterpoise. He was adventurous rather than courageous, brave in the onset, but not persevering. He would hazard the most dangerous enterprises, but had no patient endurance in peril. Then he could not brook contradiction or even opposition, he had no moral fear or political conscience, and was so thoroughly frivolous and faithless that at length all parties forsook him. His life was anything but exemplary. He brought back a mistress from Holland who was personally pleasing, amiable, and harmless, who was called, half in jest and half in earnest, "the Little Dove" (Düveke). But through her mother, who was absolutely hated, she brought a fresh influence to bear upon the government.

Madame Sigbritt, who was of Dutch descent, was possessed of unbridled ambition, and delighted in exercising her influence over the young King. The hot democratic blood of the Frieslanders flowed in her veins, and she hated the aristocracy. She was continually telling the King that a nobility holding three-fourths of the land, keeping the citizens and peasants in shameful subjection, and even im-

posing disgraceful fetters on the King, was unknown in Holland.

Thus Christian soon began to entertain the idea of a new order of things, which should confer such an amount of liberty on the oppressed classes as had hitherto been impossible, remove the restrictions on trade and commerce, and put an end to the exclusive supremacy of the nobles and the Church. In the midst of the first efforts in this direction, in 1517, the King's mistress died, with symptoms of violence. The King's mind became more and more gloomy; he committed acts of wild passion and revenge against distinguished Danes whom he suspected, and although one party in the court contrived to make him believe that she had not been faithful to him, the event greatly increased his misanthropy.

Just then the reform movement began, and Christian took it up, not at first from any special sympathy with it, but in order with its aid to change the aspect of Scandinavian affairs.

His first idea was to excite the different nationalities against each other, and to rule each by the other two. It was a method that had been repeatedly tried. He intended to avail himself of the Danish hatred of the Swedes to bring them into subjection, and, once victorious, to rid himself of the Danish aristocracy.

The Union monarchy was utterly powerless in Sweden; the most prominent nobles had gradually established a sort of regency there, which exercised regal power in all but name. The Stures filled this office of regent with honour and success, but as is generally the case when any aristocratic family exercises supreme power, it had all the other families against it; the clergy especially were opposed to the Stures. Their government was inimical to the solidarity of the two aristocratic corporations, and was especially directed to lessen the oppression of the common people by the Church. This laid the foundations of the bitter feud in which Christian was projecting an interference.

The Archbishop of Upsala, Gustavus Trolle, was at open enmity with the Regent. His party wanted to dissolve the Union of Calmar, while the Bishop stood by Denmark. In November, 1517, they had measured their strength in an assembly of the states at Stockholm, and the Archbishop had been defeated and deposed.

In January, 1518, Christian landed in Sweden, hoping that the feud between Trolle and Sture would furnish him with an occasion of stirring up the two aristocracies against each other. But in this he did not succeed. Although really King of Sweden, he did not once enter Stockholm. The attempt was an utter failure, and the hostages who were given him as a safe-conduct at his departure, and whom, instead of sending back, he illegally carried off as prisoners, were his only booty. Among them was the future king, Gustavus Vasa.

His next scheme was more successful. He sought aid from his Burgundian relations, the house of Hapsburg, and even from its foe, Francis I. ; he represented to them that it was a matter in which all kings were interested, and collected a splendid army of German and French troops.

In January, 1520, he marched into West Gothland, defeated the Swedes, subjugated the southern part of the kingdom, and made his entry into Stockholm. The Swedish nobles, having lost their leader by the death of Sten Sture, had capitulated at Upsala in March.

The first condition which the King swore to observe was the immunity from punishment of all those who had fought against him. Stockholm was only opened to him on his giving this assurance. But now his utter want of good faith appeared ; the amnesty did not prevent him from making a sanguinary attack on the leaders of the Swedish nobles, and he had an abominable piece of sophistry ready to absolve him from his promise. In the feud between Sten Sture and Gustavus Trolle, the latter had obtained a papal ban against the party of the former, and the King of Denmark had been named as executor of the sentence ; this was now used as a handle for his perfidy. The King's adviser was an unscrupulous adventurer, Dietrich Slaphök, whom Madame Sigbritt had raised from the very dregs of the people. He persuaded the King that he had taken the oath in favour of his foes as King of Denmark, but that as executor of the papal ban he was not bound, to spare those against whom the sentence had been pronounced ; and amongst the various proposals made to the King this appeared to him to be the cleverest.

On the 4th of November, 1520, he had himself solemnly crowned, and all kinds of festivities followed for two or three days. On the 7th he began to show open hostility to the adherents and party of the Stures, and on the 8th began



those savage executions of eminent ecclesiastics, nobles, and citizens known in history as the Massacre of Stockholm, and which sowed the seeds of an indescribable hatred of Denmark in Sweden, not yet extinguished.

Christian thought that the masses would have rejoiced over the fate of their noble oppressors, but in this he was mistaken; a feeling of the deepest indignation pervaded the whole of Sweden; there was no thought of parties or of rights; it was enough that they were Swedes, who, through an unparalleled outrage, had bled on the scaffold. The echo of this deed resounded throughout Europe, and not least in Denmark itself. Although the Danes had gladly taken part in curbing Swedish arrogance, it was quite otherwise now they saw through the game the King was playing; they thought that he might attempt in Copenhagen to-morrow what he had done in Stockholm to-day, and on his return he found the Danish nobles deeply embittered against him.

He now tried a second experiment; he began to dally with Protestantism. Not that he was convinced of, or had any real interest in, the new doctrine; he had just massacred the Swedish nobility wholesale from pious regard to the papal ban, and now he all of a sudden conceived an enthusiasm for the heretics, the Pope's enemies, to whom the ban would have justly applied. The change was too transparent to deceive any one.

Protestant movements had taken place among the masses at Copenhagen. There was sufficient intercourse with Germany to give rise to them, and the oppression of the aristocratic ecclesiastical government, with all its abuses, was felt here as elsewhere. All the North had been early infected with the opposition spirit of the new doctrine; the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein first, thence it spread to Jutland, and it was not too far for it to leap over to the islands with which there was so much intercourse, and where the same grievances existed.

But Christian II. was not the man to lead the movement, and the new doctrine could not have had a worse fate than to make its entry into Denmark soiled by such hands and weighted with such a burden. His interest in Protestantism did not extend beyond some futile manœuvres, but he took more vigorous measures against the privileges of the nobles and the clergy.

In 1522 he instituted new commercial regulations which

were intended to relieve the city merchants of the monopolies of the clergy and the nobles, and from foreign competition; then he limited the privileges of the nobles in exacting service, in the chase, and in the use of wood, for in all these respects they oppressed the heavily burdened peasant; he extended Copenhagen, formed a project for constructing a harbour; in short, he broke with all the traditions of the past in the country.

But none of his schemes prospered. Even the good that he did only appeared like a fresh artifice to defend himself from the increasing number of his enemies. The citizen class felt that his only object was to entice them to oppose the Church and the nobles, and even those who secretly approved of his innovations shunned contact with the assassin of Stockholm. From that time no blessing rested on his labours; his dalliance with Protestantism estranged the Catholics, yet did not gain the hearts of the Protestants. His reforms embittered the aristocracy, both spiritual and temporal, yet did not gain him favour with the masses. In Sweden a party had already gathered around the fugitive Gustavus Vasa, which threatened a dangerous revolt, when the universal discontent in his own country came to an outbreak.

The nobles in Jutland had risen, and were soon joined by the prelates and barons of the islands; in January, 1523, they renounced their allegiance to the King, on account of his violation of the bond, his tyrannical conduct, his threats to the nobles, clergy, &c. The revolutionists offered the crown to the King's uncle, Duke Frederic, of Schleswig-Holstein; he accepted it, which settled the matter, though Christian, forsaken by all, ignominiously craved pardon, and in pitiful accents promised amendment.

In April, 1523, Christian fled without hazarding any attempts at self-defence, leaving the field open to his successor. During his exile he penitently returned to the Romish Church, and in 1531 landed in Norway with a fleet and army, and instigated a rising of the Roman Catholic peasants against the King of Denmark, but in the spring of 1532 he was compelled to lay down his arms and return as a prisoner to Copenhagen. He remained in imprisonment till his death in 1559.

With the accession of Frederic I. the relation between Denmark and the duchies was again introduced, from which

they are suffering to this day.\* When Christian II. began to reign, in 1513, a separation happily took place; the duchies had their own duke, but now their duke was again king, and the unfortunate personal union was permanently established.

The new King was an entirely different person from his nephew; he was circumspect, prudent, considerate, and conciliatory; not the man to undertake an enterprise lightly; he was ready to make concessions, though sufficiently jealous of his own power never to endanger it. The great point was that he would probably bring Protestantism to the Danish throne. The duchies were already Lutheran; the clergy had only reluctantly consented to the Duke's election, and now he was about to ascend the throne of Denmark it was scarcely likely that he would uphold the ancient Church.

Frederic I. acted in his difficult post with unusual dexterity; he renounced all foreign schemes; he gave up the Union; dominion in Norway and Sweden, the hostile intentions of his predecessor towards the Hanse Towns and the native nobles, were all allowed to drop, and all his attention was concentrated on the one point of ecclesiastical reform. He concluded a treaty with Gustavus Vasa, by which Sweden was declared independent, and another with Norway, which gave it the right of election; he also made concessions to Lubeck, as he did on every question of foreign policy, but on the reform question he would not yield.

He had, indeed, been compelled to take an oath, among other things in the bond, that he would not introduce the Reformation nor attack Catholicism; but the oath was not broken by his doing nothing to hinder its progress, and he could not be reproached because reform spread more and more widely in Schleswig, Holstein, and Jutland, or because he would not dam up the stream which, without his aid, was undermining the Church with which he was personally and politically at enmity. We can scarcely be mistaken in supposing that he was influenced by two considerations. In the first place he was devoted to Lutheranism body and soul, and then he saw as clearly as Christian II. that it would be an immense advantage to his crown if he

could crush the great aristocratic Church system, put an end to its political power, and confiscate its lands to the crown, and thus so completely lame one arm of the aristocratic opposition, that the crown would finally be able to vanquish the other. By these circuitous paths he was more successful than his predecessor in accomplishing an object no less in accordance with his personal convictions than calculated to secure the authority of a hitherto powerless crown.

He did not attack Catholicism, but he did not prevent Lutheran preachers from coming over from the Continent to the islands to spread their doctrines. How could he dismiss the professors of his own creed?

All the nobles in Jutland had already joined the Protestant cause, and in the islands the dioceses of the orthodox bishops were continually diminishing, when at the end of 1527, a Diet was convened at Odensee for the final settlement of the question.

At this diet Frederic demanded toleration for Lutheranism, which was granted by a formal edict.\* This gave the signal for Catholicism to be swamped by the new doctrine.

At the death of Frederic, in 1533, a crisis took place. The clergy took up the cause of the second son, John, who was a Catholic; the Protestant party advocated that of the Protestant Prince Christian. Foreign influences decided between them.

The difficulty with Lubeck induced the aristocracy to favour the election of Christian III., 1534-59, who, with Swedish help, and by a successful diversion to Lubeck, occasioned the fall of Wullenweber and gradually reconquered the country.

The Reformation was now completely introduced, not with violence, but its progress was irresistible. The Catholic Church was reduced to a ruin, and the supremacy which she had shared with the nobles overthrown. An independent Danish monarchy was established, supported, especially in Jutland and the Duchies, by a proud secular nobility; one of the enemies of the throne was defeated, and its spoils served to endow the monarchy.

## CHAPTER XII.

### SWEDEN.\*

**The Revolt under Gustavus Vasa, 1523-60—His Character and Policy.—**1521 Regent, 1523 King of Sweden.—Internal and external Embarrassment of his Position.—Struggle with the Clergy.—Decree of the Diet of Westerås, 1527.—The Reformation.—Extension of the Royal Power.—Independence and internal Prosperity of the Country.

THE struggle for the Crown and the Reformation in Sweden was on a far larger scale than in Denmark, and of far more moment, on account of the great man who headed it, and the power which arose out of it.

We left Sweden at the massacre of Stockholm. This fearfully inflamed the old hatred of Denmark, and above all party conflicts, which were not wanting, the idea of shaking off the yoke of this cruel government was predominant. But Christian held Stockholm, the southern parts of the country and the harbours were garrisoned, and in the north, though there were no Danes, there were but few towns, and but few centres where means of resistance could be gathered together; a sturdy race of men lived widely scattered in their solitary farms and villages, but so dispersed that the south could not look to them for aid.

But at this juncture one man alone succeeded in delivering the people from the most hateful foreign tyranny, in securing the independence of Sweden, and creating a splendid power, at a period when no one had ventured to lift a hand against the enemy.

Among the hostages treacherously carried away by Chris-

\* Geschichte König Gustavs I., v. Ol. Celsius. übers. i. ii. Leipzig, 1749. Fryxell, Gustav Wasa's Leben, 1831. Geijer, Geschichte Schwedens, Deutch von Leffler. Hamburg, 1832.

tian II. was a youth named Gustavus Erichson, born in 1490. He belonged to one of the most distinguished noble families, connected with the Stures by party and family ties, and bore on his arms a sheaf or bundle of flax called "Wase," hence the surname of Vasa.

He was taken as a prisoner to Copenhagen in 1518, and passed a dreary time in prison. His indignation at his country's disgrace gave him strength for the most daring enterprises, to flee alone over land and sea, to seek foreign aid for his fatherland, and afterwards to undertake to liberate it himself. In September, 1519, he arrived at Lubeck in disguise. All opposition to the hated Christian was welcome there, and they refused to deliver up the prisoner; but more than this they would not do. A powerful kingdom in Sweden was as little desirable as a powerful kingdom in Denmark; on this point the maritime merchants agreed in opinion with the jealous aristocracy of the northern empire. Besides, nothing was known as yet of the foreign fugitive; he had still to show of what he was capable.

When the news reached him of the massacre of Stockholm, he returned unrecognised to his country. All his family had been destroyed in one day; his father and brother-in-law were murdered; his mother and sisters taken prisoners to Denmark; all his friends were butchered, and a price set upon his own head. Pursued by the King's myrmidons, surrounded by treachery and treason, he wandered about for months as a day labourer and vagrant, suffering dangers and privations of every kind.

At length he suddenly appeared in his own character at a great meeting at Dalecarlia, in the north of Sweden.

He was singularly endowed by nature; even in early youth his imposing presence, and the charm of his appearance, had made a great impression upon all. He had not failed to make some impression even upon the inhabitants of Lubeck, who had regarded the views of the friendless youth with the cool, calculating spirit of shopkeepers. He was a specimen of a powerful Northman, with a singularly attractive presence, a rare gift of speech, and a natural tact in intercourse with all men, the most distinguished as well as the most humble, and by skilful negotiations he contrived to find a solution for every difficulty.

He now appeared in his peasant's jerkin as the deli-

verer of his country, and stirred up the north of Sweden against the Danes. Similar stories are told of him during the time of preparation to those of King Alfred when in a like situation; how he gave vent to his grief in old national songs, discovered people's opinions by cunning questions, tried to gain them by burning words, wandered from farm to farm, here and there making himself known, gaining adherents everywhere, but particularly in Dalecarlia. With these northern dalesmen, with rustic equipments, unused to military discipline, but possessing great physical strength, and implacably hating the Danes, he undertook a desperate campaign against a considerable army, which was in possession of the most important places in the country, and by virtue of tremendous exertions, and the perplexities in Denmark, the daring enterprise was successful.

He was elected regent in August, 1521, and proclaimed king in June, 1523; soon afterwards, scarcely three years after his first promotion, he made his entry into Stockholm as ruler of the country amidst the rejoicings of the people.

It was only with reluctance that the nobles had consented to his election, but the voice of the people was too powerful to be overruled, and for them a king of Sweden like Gustavus was the only pledge of national independence.

But the throne was at first nothing but an empty title to which the wearer must give significance. Gustavus found a country in his hands which had long had a vacillating connection with Denmark, perpetually severed and renewed. It had been sometimes ruled by strangers, sometimes by natives, so that at last nobody knew whose right it was to rule. Law and right had almost disappeared; every one had forgotten how to govern or to be governed. Amidst the manifold changes of the Union kingdom, no government had attained to effective power or general respect; every class of the people had become accustomed to take care of itself as it best could; the nobles would submit to no one; the Church had become a power partly independent of the country, and preyed upon the kingdom as if it had been but a province; the people were as independent as the two ruling aristocracies permitted.

And what means could Gustavus Vasa find for the



construction of a new edifice in this country, in which anarchy had reigned unrestrained for a century and a half? Two-thirds of the land were in the possession of a proud and powerful clergy, and the greater part of the remainder in that of a wealthy and ambitious nobility. The regular expenditure of the Crown was 60,000 marks, its income 24,000. The debt to Lubeck for aid during the war amounted to 1,000,000 marks. The south of Sweden was still in the hands of the Danes; commerce, the coasting trade, and the harbours were monopolized by Lubeck.

When, therefore, Gustavus Vasa was raised to the throne amidst the acclamations of the people, he found a crown without significance, a country unaccustomed to the restraint of law, a throne deeply in debt, liabilities which amounted to fifty times more than he could raise.

His policy was simple. He purposed to overthrow the supremacy of the clergy in order to enrich himself with the spoils, and, if it could not be helped, to share them with the nobles; but at all events to take care that the citizens and peasants should be gainers by the transaction, that they might not be estranged from him as they were from Christian II. If this object could be attained, something might be made of the Crown from its own resources.

Gustavus Vasa was not a man with a keen sense of the distinctions between religious creeds. His character was simple, moral, and earnest. Even in his youth, with all his taste for lofty schemes, with all the fervid glow of his love of honour, his actions had been guided by a certain cool sagacity and sober determination. His was a character in which a strong tyrannical vein was united with wonderful tact and a habit of self-control, qualities which are seldom found together. He had never tormented himself with the religious controversies which were then agitating the world, but it did not escape his quick perception that the way to the proper development of the regal power was over the necks of the clergy, and that the universal animosity of the ancient Church was a mighty weapon in the hands of the secular power.

He eagerly adopted this political view of Protestantism, and nowhere else was it so consistently acted upon; but it contained a principle of universal application. The statesman might ask, Are states to be ruined that a time-honoured

abuse may continue ; are the people to be consumed by the monopolies of the clergy, who not only have the consciences of the people in their keeping, but also usurp their means of living ? The ancient amalgamation of spiritual and temporal power was now avenged. If it was called robbery, the people looked upon it as a much greater robbery that, by surreptitious documents and artifices of all sorts, the clergy had obtained possession of nearly all the land.

The combination of prudent foresight and relentless energy with which Gustavus Vasa went to work is admirable. There was something magical in the sway he exercised ; he had the most seductive power of speech, which enchanted the masses, though some of his actions betrayed the claws of the despot.

But his plans were more easily conceived than carried out. The nobles probably shrank back when they found that the clerical power was to be undermined. Was not their own position based upon similar foundations, and might they not well say, "If the clergy are overthrown, who will protect us ?"

The brave peasantry who had risen up against the Danes with Gustavus in Dalecarlia clung to their ancient faith ; they had not yet come in contact with the Reformation. If the priests succeeded in influencing these simple, unsuspecting people, the hands which had once borne Gustavus Vasa aloft would probably be lifted up against him. And in isolated cases this did occur. What could he do ? Turn to the citizen class ? There was none, for Sweden had no trade, no marts, no fleet ; all its commerce was in the hands of Lubeck.

Thus it was necessary to proceed cautiously, and by indirect paths, to allow time for the state of opinion that he required to grow up gradually. Without expressing any opinion of his own, he secretly favoured the Lutherans while he ostensibly maintained the best understanding with the Pope. That eager desire for reform and excitement which we have seen in central and southern Germany did not exist among the masses in the north ; the people required to be inoculated, and Gustavus took care that it should be done with consummate prudence, tempered with zeal. He had been preparing the way for Lutheranism ever since 1523, without undue haste, with the patient persistence that suited the people. Sweden had a small

reform party even among the clergy; as, for instance, Lorenz Anderson and the brothers Peterson.

Gustavus got men like these to preach against abuses and the sale of pardons, moderating their zeal by sensible admonitions; and when the clergy complained, he said that if they *were* abuses that were attacked, let them be reformed, but if not, let it be proved from the Bible. He gave the greatest possible publicity to the strife between the old and new doctrines. While the subject was being agitated in discussions, sermons, and pamphlets, he concealed his own convictions, and it was only on one point that he spoke out—on the right of the State to the Church property. At two Diets in 1526 a very heavy tax was imposed upon the clergy. Prelates and monasteries were to pay eight-ninths of their income; but this was the most unwise thing he could do, for it excited a revolt which was headed by two of the bishops.

These leaders of the rebels treated the saviour of the country as a vagabond usurper; they thought that they themselves were safe, even should others lose their heads. But, like Napoleon, Gustavus Vasa could not see why bishops should not lose their heads as well as other people. He quelled the revolt in Dalecarlia, and had the leaders tried by a secular tribunal, by which they were condemned to death. In February, 1527, the sentence was executed; but the misguided multitude went unpunished.

In June of the same year Gustavus convoked the Diet at Westerås, at which, besides the clergy and nobles, representatives of the citizen and peasant class appeared for the first time. The citizens felt flattered by the honour; the peasants regarded it more as a debt owing to them for their help; but the interests of both were identified with those of the King, and in case of necessity they were disposed to impress upon the clergy by force the sacrifice that was required from them. It is with the decrees of this Diet that the historical greatness of Sweden begins, and it steadily increased up to the time of the misfortunes and blunders of Charles XII.

At this Diet, purposely convened at a remote little town to guard against any compulsion from without, the King brought forward the demands which formed part of his programme, and which were necessary to give security to the Crown, to insure a proportion between the income and

expenditure of the State, to meet a daily increasing deficit, to discharge the colossal debt to Lubeck, and at length to put an end to its burdensome monopoly of trade ; and all this was to be done at the expense of the enormous wealth of the Church. The discord in the Church was also mentioned in the King's communication, and he offered to prove that he was not a heretic, as had been slanderously reported, but believed the pure word of God. The existing discord, however, must be put a stop to.

But his views found no favour. The nobles expressed their displeasure, the clergy were turbulent and excited, and declared that in the matter of Church property they would only yield to force. The King then began to address the Assembly. He possessed not merely courage such as few historical personages have exhibited, but that gift of eloquence and personal influence over men which is peculiar to those who are born to rule. The Swedes themselves have described to us how the masses were moved by his stately presence and eloquent words ; he had given proof of this when, as an outlaw and hunted fugitive, he had incited his down-trodden countrymen to fight against the Danes, and he gave proof of it now in contending with the ecclesiastical aristocracy.

He stated that he had wished to make a final experiment, whether it were possible to reign there as king. He considered that the experiment had failed. Rain and sunshine, famine and pestilence, all were laid to his charge, and every priest was allowed to sit in judgment on him ; yet it was not from ambitious motives that he had ascended the throne, but that he might save Sweden ; he had sacrificed his patrimony to the public good, and he was repaid with ingratitude. Sweden was not yet ripe for a king, and with a voice almost choked with tears, he said, " I must lay down this crown."

With these words he left the astonished assembly, which immediately broke up in confusion. Subsequent scenes in the Diet when left to itself showed what would become of Sweden without a king. The four estates fell together by the ears. Amidst the stormy scenes that took place, not a single decree was formed, and the result was that the dissensions between parties became greater than ever ; this anarchy would soon prevail over the whole of Sweden, if some powerful arm did not intervene.

The result that the King expected soon followed. A division took place among the nobles, and a large party of them were of opinion that the clergy must make sacrifices: no State could exist with so sparse a population and a sterile soil if two-thirds of the land continued to be held in mortmain. Thus the nobles deserted the clergy, and it was quite intelligible that the citizens and peasants, who had everything to gain and nothing to lose, should be impatient, and proceed from threats to blows.

Three stormy days after the King's abdication, he was urged again to appear before the Diet. A new oath of allegiance was taken, and his proposals now met with a different fate. Deserted by all parties, the clergy gave way, and were so abject as to be quite undignified. It generally happens that political parties, who have for a long time insolently rejected all reasonable terms, suddenly come round to ignominious submission. The clergy in this case submitted to conditions which entirely reversed their position in the State, and deprived them of everything for which they had been passionately contending.

The Diet decreed precisely in accordance with the King's demands:—

1. That it is the duty of all the estates in common to quell all rebellion, and to defend the Government from foes from within and from without.

2. That monasteries and Church property are entirely at the disposal of the King.

3. That the nobles are justified in taking possession of their estates, which have become Church property since 1454.

4. That the preaching of the Lutheran doctrine be permitted.

The bishops signed a special declaration, that "they were willing to be as rich or as poor as his grace the King willed; but, with their diminished incomes, they wished to be released from the duty of attendance at the Diet."

With this the ancient clerical estate of Sweden collapsed. The Church still existed in sufficient splendour, but it had no longer any political existence; it was too poor and too entirely dependent on the King, who, as may be supposed, took abundant advantage of the concessions of the Diet of Westerås. The victory of the Crown was obtained at a price which might be afterwards regretted, but it was then

an inevitable necessity ; the power of the nobles was increased by the defeat of the Church, for they shared its spoils with the Crown. They gave the succeeding Kings of Sweden plenty of trouble, but it required a Charles XII., with his disregard of all the rights of the country, to make the Swedish nobles dangerous again. Stormy scenes still took place in the Diet, but Gustavus obtained the mastery. He was not crowned till 1528, and then the favourable aspect of his sway began to be apparent. The Diets of Oerebrö, 1540, and Westerås, 1544, settled the succession of the Swedish crown on his house, and abolished the elective monarchy. Meanwhile the Reformation made astonishing progress ; though it had only begun as a small sect, it was now dominant in the nation. For the first time since there had been a kingdom of Sweden the country knew what it was to have a monarchical government of the modern stamp ; she enjoyed for the first time conscientious administration of the laws, legal equality and domestic peace and security. The King had a handsome income, a trustworthy military force, and faithful and devoted officials. With these means the foundations were laid of a sovereign power, such as had never before existed.

The debt to Lubeck was next discharged, and Sweden was relieved from the monopolies of the Hanse Towns ; commercial treaties were entered into with Denmark ; Russia, England, and the Netherlands ; a market was opened for iron, the chief product of the country, and the budding trade of Sweden put under the protection of a little fleet of its own. All foreign and commercial yokes were thrown off, domestic resources developed, and all that can conduce to the wealth and prosperity of a State wisely fostered and encouraged until the death of Gustavus in September, 1560. During the whole of the King's reign every one had some complaint against him ; the clergy did not forget their losses, the nobles were jealous of the supreme power of the Crown, the citizens and peasants took the blessings of the new government as a matter of course, and grumbled at fresh taxes and burdens, every one rebelled against the novel administration of a strictly monarchical government ; but no sooner had the King closed his eyes, than the surpassing lustre of his name was acknowledged. The contemporary generation certainly had to pass through a painful transition period, but the founda-

tions of the power were then laid which was established in the seventeenth century. The great north-eastern kingdom of the coming age was now founded, and it took many misfortunes and disasters to reduce it to ruins. This was the reason why the time of peaceful labour and construction under Gustavus Vasa was afterwards so gratefully recurred to.

This was the course events took in the Scandinavian empire, among a race of Germanic origin, and which, though politically distinct from Germany, had in many respects grown up on similar principles. It now received the germs of a new political existence from the Reformation. In Denmark as in Sweden, a great political regeneration was connected with the religious revolution; in neither country was Church reform the result of a great religious movement among the masses, as in Germany, but it was the lever of a political revolution, which brought a change in the religious sentiments of the people in its train; but in both countries the crisis gave an impetus to national power and historical significance, which was far from being the case in Germany.



## CHAPTER XIII.

### ENGLAND.\*

**England before the Tudors—Henry VIII., 1509-1547.—His Character and Attitude at first towards the Church.—His Opposition to the Reformation which was demanded by the Mental Development of the Nation.—The Complications with Rome.—The Marriage Question, 1526-29.—Wolsey's Fall.—Breach with Rome.—The Royal Supremacy, 1534.—The Religious War against Catholics and Protestants.—The Secularisation of Monasteries.—The six Articles of 1593.**

#### ENGLAND BEFORE THE TUDORS.

**I**T is only the beginning of the demolition of the mediæval Church in England, and not the Reformation, which falls within our period, and this prelude to the ecclesiastical revolution was performed by a monarch who personally regarded the Reformers and the Reformation with passionate hatred. It was an exceptional case, and by no means a desirable one. The traditional Church might be pulled down, and the ground covered with the chaotic ruins of the old order of things; but if it was not followed by the positive acquisition of a new ecclesiastical and religious life, the event was a very doubtful benefit to the generation then living. But the Government of Henry VIII. cannot

• Hume, *History of England*. Lingard, *History of England*. Hallam, *Constitutional History of England*. Burnet, *History of the Reformation*. Collier, *Ecclesiastical History*. Strype, *Ecclesiastical Memorials*. G. Weber, *Geschichte der Kathol. Kirche von Grossbritannien*, 1845. Ranke, *Englische Geschichte*, 1859. Froude, *History of England*. Brewer, *Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII.* Bergenroth, *Calendar of Letters, Despatches, and State-Papers relating to the Negotiations between England and Spain, preserved in the Archives of Simancas and elsewhere*. Maurenbrecher, *England im Reformations Zeitalter*. Dusseldorf, 1866.

boast of having done more than this. The real Reformation in England began under Edward VI., passed through a fiery trial under Mary, and proved victorious under Elizabeth.

The attitude of Henry VIII. undoubtedly had a significance in the great Church question which extended far beyond his personal aims and objects. He did nothing to benefit either life or doctrine ; or rather, he did all that he could by bad example and confusing men's consciences to make them worse. Still, from a variety of motives, he did bring about a great breach between England and the mediæval Church system, and this remained as a great historical fact, however different the result may have been from what he intended. He wanted to establish a royal Papacy as absolute and persecuting as the purely ecclesiastical one which he was rejecting; but he was in reality making loopholes for liberty.

The Reformation in its widest sense formed an epoch in the development of the English constitution ; and, on the other hand, the peculiar development of the English constitution since the thirteenth century imposed essential conditions on the Reformation.

There were no absolute monarchies, in the seventeenth and eighteenth century sense, anywhere in the West, but the relation between the privileges of the States and the royal authority varied exceedingly. They were compressed within narrow limits in France by Francis I. ; in Germany, grown up together as they had done with the ambitious principalities, they threatened to overwhelm the political and national unity of the Empire ; in Spain, Charles V. had to carry on a great contest with the liberties of the ancient kingdom ; in England the form of government was entirely monarchical, yet modified by certain acknowledged principles of liberty such as nowhere else existed.

The foundation of these principles was the Magna Charta of 1215. It is true that it was a charter of liberty to the great nobles, temporal and spiritual, to defend them from a contemptible king, and it therefore formed the basis of the privileges of the hierarchy and aristocracy ; but it contains some very important regulations, which we look for in vain in any other mediæval charters. He who examines our German royal laws of the thirteenth century will find that the great lords not only claimed all the privileges of princely

rank, but made a tool of the king to limit the liberties of the other classes ; and it was just the same with the privileged class in ancient France.

It is this which constitutes the great difference between Magna Charta and all the other charters of the Middle Ages. It grants the suffrage to ecclesiastics, and mitigations of feudal bonds to the barons ; but it concedes the same mitigations to vassals of a lower grade, and makes regulations for the benefit of the whole nation : uniformity of coinage, weights and measures, security for trade, prohibition of arbitrary taxes and impositions, a guarantee for the liberties of cities, power over the disposition of property, regular courts of justice, the regulation that no man can be tried but by the law of the land, and that his implements of husbandry may never be distrained from a peasant.

This was enough at that time to afford free scope to the development of the powers of the citizen and peasant class, especially in an island empire which was particularly well situated for trade and commerce, was not affected by continental wars, and was less exposed to hostile invasion than any other country. Thus in England, even among the citizen and peasant classes, there was a national prosperity which laid the foundations of political independence. The fundamental law of the country was an unimpeachable palladium of their liberties ; every Englishman knew what his rights were. After 1283, representatives of the citizen class begin to appear among those of the nobles and clergy in Parliament, full two hundred years earlier than in Germany. After 1297, taxes could only be levied with the consent of Parliament, and by degrees the inferior nobility made common cause with the citizens ; for though just as well protected as the great feudal lords, they found the citizens the only counterpoise to the power of the great nobles in Parliament. A more auspicious union than this between the lesser nobles and the citizen class could not well be imagined.

Then came the fourteenth century, a time of disturbances within, and wars without. Wars are not generally favourable to civil liberties ; but this case also was exceptional. Edward III., the most brilliant monarch of the fourteenth century, carried on great wars with France, and finally claimed the French crown. They were purely wars of con-

quest, and had nothing to do with the advancement of English national prosperity. But the King was continually obliged to ask Parliament for subsidies; and thus, even under this monarch, that dependence of the Crown on Parliament on all financial questions was established on which the whole Parliamentary system of England was to take root.

Many a precious germ was crushed in the confusion of the civil wars which followed; but the development of the Parliamentary system made progress rather than the contrary. Three great constitutional principles were already acknowledged and acted upon:—That the King can make no law without consent of Parliament; that he cannot impose any tax without consent of Parliament; that he is bound to administer the Government according to the laws of the country; and if he break these laws, his ministers and agents are responsible for it.\*

Under the new Tudor dynasty, whose legitimacy depended upon the will of the nation,—for the other claims to the Crown of Henry VII., the victor of Bosworth, were of a very dubious nature,—that vigorous administration began which was to heal the wounds of civil war, and tide England happily over the dangers of a stormy transition period.

**HENRY VIII., 1509-47.—HIS CHARACTER AND ATTITUDE AT FIRST TOWARDS THE CHURCH.—OPPOSITION TO THE REFORMATION, THOUGH DEMANDED BY THE MENTAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATION.**

Henry VIII. inherited from his father a kingdom more firmly established than any King of England had reigned over for generations, and he duly estimated the value of his Crown. His natural aristocratic tendencies were increased by a passionate and violent temper, which could brook no contradiction. It is difficult to portray a character like his correctly, and the English have not rendered the task less difficult; for their party spirit has overpowered their historical judgment. Protestant authors have not forgotten the service he rendered to their cause by throwing off the yoke of the Romish hierarchy; and, therefore, notwithstanding the many Protestants he burnt, there is a little too

much *couleur de rose* in their portraits. The Catholics, on the other hand, have not forgotten the breach with Rome, and the unworthy motives which induced it, and have painted him in very sombre hues. We must try to avoid both errors.

Besides the strongly marked love of power which he shared with all his house, and which was fostered rather than checked by a subservient Parliament, he possessed an instinct which was common to all the rulers of that age, and which in his case was more than an unconscious tendency to free himself from all fetters, to be as much as possible an absolute monarch like his ideal Francis I., whom, although he had many a fray with him, he often absurdly imitated.

England has not had any king who possessed in so great a degree the inclination and the power to be a tyrant. The Stuarts had inclination enough, but not the power; although they were constantly declaring that they would be powerful sovereigns, it was all in vain. Henry VIII. was just the man for it; he had an active, diplomatic mind, and knew how to manage men; he had a will which no difficulty could dismay, and great versatility of talent; all this, however, was obscured by his wild passions and his unbridled sensuality, which is all the more odious because a certain theological varnish was put upon it.

Henry VIII. had enjoyed a tolerably learned education, and therefore considered himself an accomplished scholar; he was fond of learned discussions and scholastic sophistry; he even ventured dogmatically to defend his sensual excesses.

In coming in contact with the great religious reformation of that period, a ruler of a character like his was sure to be depicted in an exceptional manner.

The relation of England to Rome was sharply defined, in some respects more sharply than was the case with Germany. If any country had maintained a distant, even hostile attitude, towards Rome, it was England. Wicliffe is justly regarded as the chief forerunner of the Reformation, and except Huss, who was his disciple, there was no one who apprehended and discussed the Church question so independently as he did; only that Huss was burnt for preaching what was allowed to be preached in England unhindered, and some decades earlier.

Besides this the humanistic culture which was everywhere an ally of the ecclesiastical revolt was widely spread in England; in few northern countries was the study of the ancient classics more diligently pursued than here, both in elementary instruction and learned researches. In short, both of the streams from which the Reformation everywhere derived its greatest strength, the spirit of religious opposition, dating from the times of the councils, and enlightenment from classical study, flowed here more abundantly and purely than anywhere else, and partly before Luther, and partly quite independently of him, opinions similar to his had been widely agitated.

But Henry VIII. was entirely opposed to them. No European monarch cherished the conservative Church system with more zeal and passion than he did.

This was all of a piece with his semi-theological culture. There was in his singular character a peculiar doctrinal-scholastic element which was quite compatible with an utter want of religious feeling; a bit of pedantry which now and then incited him to try to pluck laurels to which he had no claim, in this, to other princes, unwonted field.

There was also another thing. All the Tudors, even Elizabeth, had a secret liking for Rome, which arose rather from an idea of political stability connected with it than from any religious reasons. The chief characteristic of this family was a strong dynastic feeling of the dignity of monarchical power; it was very perceptible in both Henry's daughters, Mary and Elizabeth, though they were otherwise so different. Rome is the type of unquestioned authority; it may be dangerous to temporal thrones to shake this authority: this was the instinctive idea which ruled the house.

From this point of view Henry VIII. was decidedly opposed to the revolutionary attitude towards Rome, assumed by the German and Swiss Reformation. He attacked it with systematic and cruel severity; he regarded the heretics as rebels and traitors; trials for heresy were very numerous, and it was only in France that the number of victims exceeded those in England.

Such was the position of England and the King; the nation and he were utterly at variance; germs of reform had been springing up abundantly amongst the people since the fifteenth century, but their natural growth and development were thwarted from the throne.

On Henry's first attempt to engage in the ecclesiastical controversy as something in which he was well versed, he met with a rebuff. He could not resist the temptation to give the Wittenberg Monk a severe lecture on the subject of good works, and, in 1522, he published a work against Luther. Frederic the Great says somewhere, that a king must always be a king and never try to be a priest, but Henry VIII. was unmindful of this wise maxim. His work betrayed the dilettante, whose nakedness the royal authority was meant to hide, and it attacked Luther entirely on the wrong side. He wrote a coarse and angry answer, next to his work against the Duke of Brunswick the coarsest of his writings, on purpose to show that he was not in the least awed by royalty; sentences like the following were among the comparatively mild expressions in the reply of the Thuringian peasant's son: "When God wants a fool he turns a king into a theological writer."

This incensed Henry personally against the Reformation, and, all things considered, nothing appeared less likely than that a breach with Rome would take place under him. Besides, his all-powerful favourite Cardinal Wolsey was at his side, who had no other idea than to attain to the papal dignity, and who already had one foot in the Curia.

#### THE COMPLICATIONS WITH ROME.—THE MARRIAGE QUESTION, 1526-29.

A peculiar question respecting marriage interposed about 1526, which had nothing whatever to do with the Reformation, but which from a purely personal and not very nice business became a matter of world-wide importance.

King Henry VIII. had been married in June, 1509, to the widow of his elder brother Arthur, who had died early; he would have succeeded to the throne, and his sagacious father had secured for him the richest bride that could be found far and wide. This was Katharine of Aragon, the daughter of that powerful pair, Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, who by the junction of their inheritances founded the Spanish empire. The daughter of such parents was a most desirable match, for she brought as a dowry the alliance of the wealthy and powerful Spanish house. But the youthful prince died suddenly, and after so short an union that it was doubtful whether the marriage had been



consummated. The natural course would have been to look upon the alliance between the two houses as dissolved by fate. But Henry VII. entered into negotiations to gain the widow for his second son, now heir to the throne. There were difficulties in the way. First there was the question whether marriage with a brother's widow was permissible. Then Henry was younger and of a very different character from Katharine, whose quiet, sedate Spanish manners seemed little suited to his lawless, passionate temperament. But the shrewd Tudor who had succeeded in so many things succeeded in this also; he united the young pair, but though the marriage contract was ready on the 23rd of June, 1503, it was not until after six years of suspense and discord that it was formally and legally carried out by the voluntary advances of the prince himself, who had just ascended the throne.

In the endeavour to paint the King in as bright colours as possible, the English do not forget to mention, that from the first Henry recorded in a sort of protest his scruples against a marriage forbidden by the decrees of the Church. It is a fact that he did so. It was a sort of theological scrupulosity and casuistry which led him to provide against all contingencies. Rome then came to his aid, and Pope Julius II. issued a bull by which all theological scruples were set aside and the marriage pronounced thoroughly legal.

The course of the union did not appear to justify any of the fears that had been entertained about it. Though the pair were apparently so ill suited, their opposite characters seemed to do very well together. The fruit of the marriage was a daughter, Mary, who afterwards ascended the throne; their sons did not live, and the English assure us that this was the first cause of estrangement. Nothing of this, however, came to light. Katharine, who was of a contemplative and retiring nature, was pliant and indulgent enough, and allowed her frivolous pleasure-loving consort to do just as he pleased.

The union had continued in peace for half a lifetime, when the old scruples, which were supposed to have been buried long ago, were revived. The Mosaic law against such marriages came with fresh force over the mind of the royal theologian and destroyed his peace. N.B.—There was at the court a young and blooming maid of honour,

with attractive French grace, a charming contrast to Katharine's dull monotony; she had charmed the King, and this it was which decidedly favoured, if it did not entirely occasion, the revival of the forgotten scruples. The King was tired of his wife, who was getting old, and hankered for Anne Boleyn. It was only as his wife and not otherwise, that she promised to return his affection; so the King was obliged to think of the dissolution of the old marriage and the contraction of a new one which would be more to his taste, and from which he might hope for an heir to the throne. Sensuality turned the scale. Such motives when naked and undisguised are not pleasing, but when covered with a theological mantle they are odious. All of a sudden the marriage which had lasted nearly twenty years, had, as his court theologians assured him, become invalid, and he was racked with sharp pangs of conscience; but his conscience did not prevent him from zealously courting the beautiful girl, to whom, as he could not gain her for his mistress, he had promised marriage.

Cardinal Wolsey, although still coveting the triple crown, was at length prepared, with a heavy heart, to undertake the negotiation which might cost him not only the papal tiara, but the results of the labours of his life. A bull was applied for from Rome, which should confirm the King's scruples and relieve his conscience, by dissolving the marriage which was contrary to the decrees of the Church. It was a delicate business. Had it not been that Rome had by a previous bull herself removed all obstacles out of the way, considering the spirit then reigning at the Curia, the matter would have been easy enough. But it was felt that it would be very undignified for Clement VII. to pronounce a decree precisely contradicting that pronounced by Pope Julius II. on the same question.

But this was in 1526-7, just when the victory of Pavia and the peace of Madrid had led the Emperor Charles V. to the summit of his fame, and when Rome was courting Francis I., in order to obtain his aid to crush the growing power; and the papal policy was guided from a purely worldly point of view, not by a priest but a Medici. Just at this juncture, the embassy from England arrived, and the position of affairs could scarcely have been more favourable for its success. There was no objection to offering a cruel insult to the Emperor's aunt, Queen Katharine; they were

endeavouring to compass his fall, so why should they scruple to offend him? The Pope was not indisposed to please the King; in his wrath at Charles V.'s successes, in the hope of gaining a new and powerful ally against him, Clement VII. resolved upon the incredible folly of sending an embassy to investigate the subject and to pronounce a divorce according to the result. This was the Legate's commission in his first instructions.

So Cardinal Campeggio came to England. He at first tried to induce the Queen to renounce her rights, and as that failed, a painful and repulsive process was instituted which shocked all contemporaries, and sometimes moved for a moment even the hard-hearted judges of the unfortunate Queen. It was never forgotten how the innocent princess was brought before the court and examined, how simply and plainly but firmly she defended her good cause in her own way, how she called to remembrance her conjugal fidelity and the pledge of her love, and how pathetically she lamented that it had not been possible to her as a foreigner to be all to the country as Queen that she would fain have been.

But this did not turn the judges from their course; they continued the barbarous trial, but the business did not proceed very fast. The Papal Legate was by no means in so great a hurry as the King, who was writing one impatient letter after another to his Anne. It was still very uncertain what turn things might take; the wind blew now from one quarter, now from another. The Legate was in no hurry,—he might have had secret instructions to that effect,—he wanted to see how matters were likely to stand between the Pope and the Emperor, and just then a change was taking place in the relations between them. At the end of 1528, Clement VII. was not in a position to keep the field against the Emperor; his allies had again been unsuccessful, Charles's troops had advanced to Rome, nearly all the Peninsula was in their hands; everything concurred to induce the Pope to conclude peace with the Emperor, and for him the pending divorce was a great inducement to a reconciliation, for it might result not only in an irreparable breach with Rome, but in an irreparable insult to his dynasty.

In July, 1529, Campeggio suddenly received a bull recalling him to Rome; the question was not ripe for a

decree in England, and was to be investigated at Rome. This looked like a response to the appeal which Henry VIII. had himself made to Rome. But viewed in the light of the change in the aspect of affairs occasioned by the reconciliation of the Emperor and the Pope, the meaning of it was obvious, and was from the first perfectly understood by Henry VIII. We have a number of interesting documents relating to this business; the parties are well matched; neither is cunning enough to deceive the other, and they try to maintain a good understanding by hypocritical fair speeches; but each sees through the other entirely; Henry especially saw at once that the Pope would elude him by a side door and never fulfil his promise. When the Legate's departure took place and Henry was informed of his recall, he regarded it as the first retreating step of the Curia; though he was not aware that just then the peace between the Pope and the Emperor was signed, and that it was an essential article of the agreement that the unhappy Katharine should not be disgraced.

Henry now determined to take the matter into his own hands. The first visible effect of this resolve was the fall of Wolsey. Somebody must suffer for it; he could not attack the Pope or the Emperor, and so Wolsey had to pay the penalty for his influence not having been sufficient to obtain the divorce from the Pope. The Cardinal was deprived of all his dignities and all his splendour, and reduced to great distress; he was not the man to bear it with stoical fortitude; his fall broke his heart.

This was a significant event; for Wolsey was still a Cardinal of the Romish Church, and had never, even in the greatest extremities, entirely neglected her interests. This hindrance was now removed, and the consequences were soon to be developed to their fullest extent.

THE BREACH WITH ROME.—THE ROYAL SUPREMACY, 1534.  
—THE WAR AGAINST CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS.  
—THE SECULARISATION OF MONASTERIES.—THE SIX  
ARTICLES OF 1539.

For a time the King reigned without a favourite, without an all-powerful minister. Then he took Thomas Cromwell, a skilful diplomatist, and in his tendencies and bearing the very antipodes of Wolsey; not a man from whose faithful

ness to conviction or independence any good influence over the King could be hoped for, but whose ambition and arrogance were more likely to have an influence for evil ; he was decidedly opposed to the temporal power of the Church of Rome, and an enemy to the interference of Rome in English affairs, and therefore an opponent of the principles that had been represented by Wolsey.

It was probably under the incitement of Cromwell that Parliament now began to stir. Up to this time the King had endeavoured to keep down the national opposition to Rome in Parliament by more or less intimidation, he now left it to take its own course. The old complaints, increased by Wolsey's extortions, were brought forward against the financial and judicial extortions of the clergy ; all the previous subjects of dispute with Rome were again agitated and, in the session of 1529, the wish was expressed that the King should be considered "the sole head and sovereign, arbiter and protector of the spiritual and temporal interests of the nation." The King and his ministers were manifestly gratified at this spirit of opposition, for it showed the Curia that they did not stand alone, but were supported in opposing it by the clear and publicly expressed opinion of the nation.

But just then another influence came into play, the significance of which the King did not rightly estimate, though it was working against him before his eyes, and now in 1530-31, it began openly to manifest itself.

Thomas Cranmer, a highly educated ecclesiastic, who had quietly pursued his studies under Luther's influence, a prudent, pliant man, not a sharply defined character, but a thorough Lutheran at heart, had as Archbishop of Canterbury become, in 1532, primate of the English Church ; this promotion was the first defection of the King from the old ecclesiastical policy, but he certainly did not then know to what an extent Cranmer was a Lutheran.

Both parties were still reluctant to push the matter to extremes. Rome was ready to carry on the negotiation, and the King tried to justify himself by theological authorities ; large sums were expended to procure documents from all the universities of Europe. But it was at the time when Rome was on good terms with the Emperor, and therefore no compliance was to be expected, and so the breach was visibly widening, though neither party was willing to utter the decisive word.

But now many things combined to hasten the crisis: the appointment of Cranmer, the encouragement of Parliament, the declaration that the King was head of the Church at the instigation of the clergy, the abolition of Peter's Pence and of Annats, and finally the marriage with Anne Boleyn in January, 1533, first celebrated in private, and then solemnly proclaimed, and the divorce from Katharine by the sentence of the English courts; these were the chief elements of the open breach, and the sentence of excommunication could no longer be withheld.

Henry VIII. was not the man to burn the bull as Luther had done; he was by no means indifferent to the penalties inflicted by the ancient Church, but he had sufficient aristocratic feeling to think himself deeply aggrieved, and treated with base ingratitude. Had he not done a great deal for the Pope, instituted trials for heresy and written against Luther? and now he was excommunicated. His first relief from the terrors of the bull was the feeling of having received an unmerited insult. He then proceeded to make a decided counter-stroke.

Parliament was called, and under the impression of the ban the following resolutions were carried unanimously:— That the papal supremacy be abolished and the royal supremacy substituted. That the abolition of Peter's Pence and Annats be confirmed; that the clergy hold only the position of a convocation under the King, and no longer of a Church under the authority of Rome. That all take the oath of allegiance to the royal supremacy. Therein was to be affirmed the invalidity of the first, and the legitimacy of the second marriage of the King; Mary's disinheritorance and Elizabeth's right of inheritance; the acknowledgment of the King as head of the Church and "The clergy shall preach Christ and His gospel with a pure heart and in accordance with the words of Holy Scripture and the traditions of orthodox and Catholic fathers; they shall not misrepresent anything, and in their prayers the King shall be mentioned first as head of the English Church," &c.

There was no question here of a change of faith, of an adoption of the newer and purer teaching. The hierarchy was silenced and made subservient to the King, but all else remained as before. The Romish dogmas were unaltered. Woe to him who attacked the mass, transubstantiation, the worship of saints, the seven sacraments, or



the doctrine of good works ; he was sure to be seized and burned as a heretic. But woe to him also who refused to take the oath of supremacy, who would not acknowledge the new royal papacy ; he was seized and hanged as a traitor. It was not a Reformation, not even a new ecclesiastical administration, it was only a transfer of the supreme authority from the Pope to the King ; the creed as well as the forms of the ancient Church remained the same as before ; it was only that an essential difference had taken place in the head of the constitution which would make a continuance of friendship with Rome difficult, if not impossible.

This state of things was tolerable only to pliant, submissive, and timid people ; it was death to men of character who openly confessed their convictions. Whoever, like Sir Thomas More, refused to take the oath, though he had formerly abetted the King in the execution of heretics, or Bishop John Fisher, was pursued and brought to the scaffold, and the same cruel measures were taken against Protestant innovators. Besides the gallows for those whom the King called traitors, there were the scaffold and the stake, the former for distinguished, the latter for common heretics.

If this state of things was to last, no more ruthless sport with religious matters, no more fearful distraction of men's consciences, could well be imagined. The old state of things was put an end to, and nothing substituted for it, but the unbounded supremacy of the King and his personal passions. From the record of the thirteen fearful years which followed, leaving alone the King's marriages, I mention two points which were of great significance in the subsequent constitution of the English State and Church ; the secularisation of Church property, and the terrorism in matters of religious faith.

As was the case everywhere where the ecclesiastical controversy was taken up by the Crown, the immense riches of the Church and the monasteries were confiscated in order to enrich the Crown. We have seen in the case of Gustavus Vasa, what a powerful prince with the instincts of a ruler could accomplish with this booty. Had Henry VIII. possessed the ambition, energy, circumspection, and sagacity of Gustavus, this colossal accession of wealth to the throne might have been fatal to English liberties. Had Henry



been the thrifty, calculating statesman who would have husbanded this immense treasure, and invested it to advantage, he would have left to the heirs of his Crown a capital which would have enabled the Stuarts to free the royal sovereignty from all embarrassment, and to have rendered it entirely independent. But instead of this, the Church property, confiscated with so much severity, was sold without any plan, at ridiculous prices, and the proceeds squandered in pomp and luxury; for a time the Court revelled in plenty, but the old pecuniary difficulties returned in an incredibly short time.

The squandered riches had not, however, melted away altogether. The landed nobility obtained possession of the estates; the great landowning class, which has to this hour ruled and sustained the edifice of the English state, dates its prosperity from this great sale of Church property instituted by the frivolous King, just at the time when, as he contemplated his suddenly acquired wealth, he thought himself the greatest monarch in Christendom.

Coincident with this domestic revolution was a reign of terror in religious matters, during which horrible cruelties were perpetrated, and which fearfully demoralised the nation.

England became the scene of a fierce religious war, which year after year demanded innumerable sacrifices, and the end of which no one could foresee, for no one could answer the question—What then is the right creed of this country, and what is to arise out of this sea of ruins? Parliament itself played a contemptible part—it was the sport of the royal humour. One day it drew up articles of faith, and the next sat as an inquisition upon Catholics and Protestants alike; one day it voted the ecclesiastical estates as the King's private property, and added the next that every one was to believe what the King and his commissioners might hereafter dictate about religion and the ordinances of the Church. One party only profited by this hopeless confusion, the Roman Catholics in disguise in the King's Council, Gardiner and Pole, who, with their cunningly devised tactics, contrived to preserve as much as possible of the old leaven. If Cromwell and Cranmer persecuted the Roman Catholics, Bishop Gardiner and Cardinal Pole kept watch over the Protestants, and, with the entirely arbitrary and very narrow line drawn between the forbidden and per

mitted creed, it was not difficult for either party to justify every act of violence.

The King wavered perpetually between contradictory moods, and no one about him ventured to hold an independent opinion. He played as frivolous a game with the Church policy as he had done with the marriage question. Enraged at the angry documents which issued from the papal chair, he attacked the Catholics and permitted the circulation of the Bible. This was in 1538; in the following year Thomas Cromwell failed in a marriage project, and the Papists obtained his ear again. Parliament was ordered to settle six articles of faith, which could not but lead, and did lead, to fresh persecutions.

1. The real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, and Transubstantiation.

2. The sufficiency of communion in one kind only.

3. The unlawfulness of the marriage of priests.

4. The obligation of vows of chastity.

5. The propriety of retaining private masses.

6. The expediency and necessity of auricular confession.

Severe penalties were attached to every infraction of these laws. All marriages of priests, monks, and nuns were declared invalid, and were punishable with death; the same fate was reserved for those who neglected confession or the supper, or had hitherto withdrawn from them. There was not a single moral idea in these wretched transactions. Henry VIII. left behind him a chaos from which the nation had to extricate itself by severe struggles.

## PART III.

### THE GERMAN REFORMATION FROM THE PEACE OF NUREMBERG TO THE PEACE OF AUGSBURG, 1532—55.

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#### CHAPTER XIV.

**Favourable Circumstances for the Reformation from 1532-42.**—The Restoration in Würtemberg, 1534.—Spread of the New Doctrines in spite of the Excesses at Münster and the Revolution at Lubeck, 1533-35.—The Emperor's Attempts at Conciliation, 1537-41.—His View of the Question.—Instructions and Proceedings of Vice-Chancellor Held.—The League of Nuremberg, June, 1538.—The Discussion of Religion, the Interim of Ratisbon, and the Decree of the Diet, July 29th, 1541.—Decided Progress of Protestantism, 1538-42.—Adoption of it by Brandenburg and the Duchy of Saxony, 1539.—Interference of the League of Schmalkald and the Controversy at Cologne.

#### THE SITUATION OF AFFAIRS FROM 1532-42, AND THEIR FAVOURABLE ASPECT FOR THE REFORMATION.

**N**OTHING was decided by the Peace of Nuremberg, but that both parties should keep the peace until the final settlement of the question. The adherents of the Augsburg Confession were permitted to hold their doctrines, but those doctrines only, and the Emperor promised to stop proceedings against the apostates. The Protestants, taking into consideration the favourable aspect of things, took it for a permanent peace, and did not imagine that any serious attempt would be made to coerce them back into the Roman Catholic Church; but the Emperor regarded it merely as a truce. He had come in 1530 with the fixed intention of creating a reaction, but to his great disappointment he found the spirit of opposition stronger and more universal than ever, and he was only withheld from active

measures because in such a contest he could not entirely rely upon his allies, France, Rome, and the Catholic princes of Germany, and because he could not dispense with the help of the Protestants against the Osman power. But his programme remained the same as before; the Protestants must in one way or another be made to submit to the Church; and this accomplished, Rome was to summon a council, which should decide what reforms were needful.

It was thus that matters stood in 1532. At the last critical moment the Protestants had formed a political league at Schmalkald; this league was the only federal power in the empire, and it appeared hazardous to the Emperor to enter upon a conflict with it, as he could not rely upon the princes who were friendly to him. Great events then again intervened, which prevented him from interfering in German affairs for another decade. Once more, therefore, Protestantism was protected from danger by the entanglement of the Emperor in European politics.

During this period the Emperor was carrying on foreign wars with various results. It was not long before he was at war with France; this was occasioned by the same question as before, and was not followed by more decisive results. The Emperor formed great projects; he thought of conquering the states of Barbary, and of thereby conferring an inestimable benefit on Christendom. His schemes were in part successful, but they withdrew him entirely from Germany. In the empire itself, the storm that had threatened Vienna in 1529, had only been averted for a time. The Turks never appeared with so great a force as the first time, but there was perpetual danger from this quarter; Hungary was overrun again, the German territories threatened; in short, a multitude of pressing difficulties entirely occupied his attention and energies in European politics, and the Protestants were allowed full play.

Even if the Emperor had been disposed, he could not proceed against them, while he was now in Spain, now in Italy, where the new Pope was adhering to the worldly policy of his predecessor against him, now involved in conflicts with the French, the Turks, or the people of Barbary; moreover, excepting in religious matters, the Protestant princes were more devoted to him than the Catholic. The chivalrous Philip of Hesse especially entered into the Imperial schemes as great national enterprises, and offered his services as

commander of the Austrian troops against the Turks in Hungary. The Imperial Court therefore spared him for the present, while its relation to the Catholic princes was sometimes cool and sometimes inimical.

By a favourable combination of circumstances, therefore, the Protestants were able not only to avail themselves of the protection of the Peace, but to go beyond the strict limits of its provisions. Strictly speaking, it only granted toleration to the subscribers of the Confession; no further spread of the doctrines was to be permitted. But who was to prevent it, if individuals here and there, or even whole districts, were converted? In case of need, the League of Schmalkald could have rendered assistance had there been any opposition, but the Emperor was powerless to offer any.

#### THE RESTORATION IN WURTEMBERG, 1534.

Duke Ulrich of Würtemberg, against whom the peasantry had been so embittered in 1513-14, had succumbed in the storm which broke over him in consequence of his feud with the Huttens, and had been driven from his country and subjects; the duchy had been temporarily taken possession of by the Emperor, and was occupied by foreign troops. This had been accomplished by the sworn hatred of an extraordinary coalition; the whole country was against the Duke; his godless government had incensed nobles, citizens, and peasants; the Swabian League was against him, and his own relatives were ready to enrich themselves with his booty. The blow had been aimed at him successfully, but it did not bring succour to the country.

It was discovered that the most frightful tyranny of a native prince may, under some circumstances, be more tolerable than the yoke of foreign soldiery. Ill as Ulrich had governed, still he was a hereditary ruler, and such an one does not forget that a country belongs to him and his house, and must be preserved for it. A bond of union exists between the ruler and his people, but any similar relation with a foreign garrison is inconceivable. Imperial troops and the troops of the Swabian League occupied the country, and who might next get possession of it nobody knew. Thus it was oppressed and drained on every side.

The period from 1520 till after 1530 was one of arbitrary

rule, during which the people were sighing for Duke Ulrich. Not that there was any security that he would return any better than before, but he had a son, now grown up, who was very promising. It was one of those rare cases in which nature gives an unworthy ruler a son and successor who causes his father's vices to be forgotten.

Prince Christopher was exactly the opposite of his father; he was as earnest and moral as his father was frivolous and licentious; as severe to himself as Ulrich was to others; as economical and conscientious in expenditure as his father was reckless and extravagant. And the country was his by right; his legitimate rights were favoured by other rulers, his excellent qualities gained the hearts of the Swabian people, and besides all this there was another very important consideration.

Ulrich and his son Christopher had taken refuge at Mömpelgard, on the confines of Alsace and Burgundy. The young prince had there adopted the new doctrines, and it soon became known that he was one of their most zealous adherents, and that his father was disposed to make concessions on this point if he were allowed to return to his country.

Thus it came about, that in the circles of the League of Schmalkald the project ripened of restoring the dukedom of Würtemberg. The people were sullenly rebelling under the oppression of a foreign yoke, and Protestantism had spread its branches throughout the country.\* The proposal to restore the legitimate house was of course made with the understanding that it would add to the Protestant ranks, and form another member of the League of Schmalkald.

The Elector of Saxony and the Reformers, Luther and Melancthon, had scruples; they called to mind the letter of the Peace, by which any such arbitrary extension of their creed was forbidden, and warned the league that it might unawares give rise to a sharp conflict with the Emperor. But Philip of Hesse overcame all scruples, and it was really accomplished by him, and not by the league.

Philip, who was the grandson of a princess of Würtemberg, had for ten years been espousing Ulrich's cause—

\* Rommel, Philip der Grossmüthige, 1830. Heyd. Ulrich von Würtemberg, 1841. Kugler, Herzog Ulrich von Würtemberg. **Ulmann U. v. Würtemberg.**

had given him refuge, interceded with the Emperor for him, and had in vain appealed for aid to Brunswick, Bavaria, and Saxony. The negotiations he entered into at Bar-le-duc in 1534, with King Francis, were more successful, and led to a promise of subsidies without any more burdensome conditions than the mortgage of Ulrich's possessions on the left bank of the Rhine. Money was also demanded in other quarters, both from princes and cities, and an agreement entered into with Ulrich himself.

Favourable as the circumstances might appear, the Emperor being in Spain, Ferdinand embarrassed by Turkey and Hungary, France won over, the Swabian League dissolved, and eminent princes in favour of the enterprise, still it is evident that Philip regarded it seriously enough, from the regulations he left behind him in case of life or death, and the splendid force he assembled; of this the Hessian nobles formed the nucleus.

The enemy was utterly unprepared for the attack. On the 23rd of April the Landgrave set out from Cassel; crossed the Maine not far from Frankfort; and as Frankfort and the Palatinate refused him a passage, he rapidly made his way by Erbach and Fürstenau into Swabia. From Neckarsulm, Weinsberg, and Neuenstadt on the Neckar, he advanced towards the enemy, who, expecting that he would have come through the Palatinate, had stationed themselves on the Eng, near Vaihingen, and now first assembled at Heilbronn and Laufen. A decisive engagement took place on the 13th of May, in which the Landgrave was victorious. With great promptness and skill he followed up his victory. Within four weeks Würtemberg was taken, the Landgrave's troops had advanced to Upper Swabia, and by the 29th of June the victory was confirmed by the Peace of Cadan. The Imperial troops took their departure, and Duke Ulrich made his entry amidst the rejoicings of the people; he brought with him release from a foreign yoke, and liberty for the new doctrines.

King Ferdinand, the Emperor's brother, renounced his claim to the duchy; the House of Hapsburg reserved to itself certain rights, in consideration of which the Duke and his son were reinstated. So feeble had the Imperial sovereignty already become, that a single resolute prince was able by a *coup-de-main*, in time of peace, to rob it of a possession which it had much coveted.



By this event, a Protestant wedge was driven into Southern Germany, an important accession gained for the Protestant cause, and the League of Schmalkald enriched by a valuable outpost. The events which took place about the same time, of an opposite tendency, were not sufficient to counterbalance it.

In Westphalia, especially at Münster,\* partly at the instigation of foreign fanatics, that hideous caricature of Christian liberty and heathen licentiousness had developed itself which resulted in the extreme form of Anabaptism, and a mad kingdom had been set up. This mixture of real enthusiasm, misinterpretation of Scripture, unbridled sensuality, and mere coarse depravity, represented a frightful form of mental aberration, and had nothing whatever in common with Protestantism, or even with the original doctrine of Anabaptism.

This "Tailor kingdom," † this theocracy with plurality of wives, communism, and bestial licentiousness, had nothing whatever of Christianity left in it. The professors of the original doctrine of Anabaptism entirely declined to bear any of the responsibility of it; and when the rebels were routed by the neighbouring Catholic princes, the Protestants could not complain that it was a victory gained over themselves.

The Protestants, therefore, remained perfectly quiet. They felt, of course, that in this case, as in others, the extermination of fanaticism would involve the destruction of healthy germs of Protestantism: but that could not be helped; it would have been a far greater evil to have made common cause with John of Leyden.

It was but a wild reproduction of the revolution of 1524-5, in which also the Protestants had taken no part. In Würtemberg, on the contrary, genuine Protestantism obtained the victory over the established Catholic government, which was no less than the Imperial government itself.

I need not say that other conversions took place peaceably; that in Northern and Central Germany whole districts went over to the cause—Anhalt and Pomerania, Augsburg, Frankfort, Hanover, Hamburg, and Kempten; nobody hindered them, the League was the only power in Germany,

\* Cornelius, *Berichte der Augenzeugen*, 1853. *Dessen Geschichte des Münsterschen Aufbruchs*, 1855.

† John of Leyden, the leader of this sect, who was called "King of Zion," was a tailor.—TR.

and it might be expected that this would rise in revolt as soon as ever danger threatened.

The disgraceful end of the disturbances at Münster could not be considered a misfortune for Protestantism, neither could the downfall of the rule of Wullenwever at Lubeck\* in August, 1535. The widespread dominion of the Hanseatic League and its mighty capital came to an end; the democracy of Lubeck lost its dominant position, but the Lutheran doctrines did not fall with it. As Lutheranism would from the first have nothing to do with worldly politics, it mostly escaped in Germany the vicissitudes which might have been fatal to it. The vast progress that it was making did not escape the Emperor, but neither did it escape him that he could not prevent it. He stood between two fires. He would have liked on the one hand to put down Protestantism, which is proved by the countless processes in the Supreme Court against the Protestants; and, on the other, he would have liked to settle accounts with Rome. He still demanded a council to make reforms, but when the arrangements were at length made for it, and a council was convoked at Mantua, in May, 1537, he was not in reality any nearer than before to attaining his object. The Protestants acted as if everything had been settled by the Peace of Nuremberg, and Pope Paul III. preferred to put up with schism rather than to concede reforms.

#### THE EMPEROR'S ATTEMPTS AT RECONCILIATION, 1538-41.

How the aspect of things was regarded by the Emperor, we learn from some confidential confessions in his despatches. About the time that the foregoing events occurred, and the preponderancy of the League of Schmalkald was on the increase, he gave, in October, 1536, an instruction to his Vice-Chancellor, Held, for his brother Frederic, the contents of which are very instructive as to his standpoint.†

He lays great stress upon the fact that religious discord in Germany was waxing greater and greater—that if it were not prevented, the political position of the Emperor and his government in Germany would be at an end. But the Emperor required a strong reserve in Germany especially

\* Waitz. Wullenwever, 1855-6.

† Lanz. Correspondenz. From the Archives at Brussels.

against France, and therefore measures must be taken without further delay to redress the evil.

He then complains that the Pope was so little disposed to help, that he persevered in his cold or hypocritical attitude, and would not seriously entertain the idea of the council. If there should be no change, he asked his brother, in profound confidence, whether there was not some method of disposing Germany to such a council, in case of need, without the Pope or King Francis I., who could not be persuaded into it? Should that fail, they must at once look out for some other means of once for all preventing any further declension from the faith, and of enforcing the terms of the Treaty of Nuremberg. Perhaps it might then be possible to convene, if not a council, a national assembly, at which the question might be satisfactorily adjusted.

He then wrote to his sister Mary, the widowed Queen of Hungary, and counselled her to take every means of preventing further divisions.

Meanwhile, Vice-Chancellor Held, by the way in which he understood and endeavoured to carry out the Imperial commission, only threw oil upon the flames. Instead of attempting to mediate and conciliate according to his instructions, he proceeded bluntly and imperiously—demanded in an arrogant tone that the Protestants should, without delay, submit to the Papal Council and the decrees of the Supreme Court, and when they refused, remembering that, even in the terms of the convocation of the council, the extermination of the “pestilent Lutheran heresy” was spoken of, and that in the Supreme Court only sworn enemies of Protestantism had seats, Held rushed from one Catholic court to another, inciting and urging them on, till, on June 10th, 1538, the League of Nuremberg was formed, in which George of Saxony, the two Dukes of Brunswick, Albert of Brandenburg, Bavaria, King Ferdinand, and Salzburg united against the League of Schmalkald. *to another*

This Catholic league was not what the Emperor wanted, and, even according to the views of the instigator of it, it was a great error; an agreement like this, only entered into on paper, without arms, without money, only called the Protestants out, without any sufficient force to oppose them. The Emperor's sister saw this plainly, and her reply to his exhortations contained a faithful reproof for these doings. In the autumn of 1538 she wrote: “As things stand in

Germany, we must try to retain every friendship there that we can. Thus Philip of Hesse was one of the ablest princes in the empire, and he was loyal to the Emperor; a permanent good understanding should have been sought with him, instead of which Vice-Chancellor Held had given him and his allies great offence, and excited their just suspicions by the League of Nuremberg. Why was not the matter allowed to rest until a general council should be held? Every effort must be made to heal the religious differences peaceably, and to this end a good understanding must be maintained with the most able princes, and especially with Philip of Hesse."

To a certain extent the Emperor followed his sister's advice, but with the hesitation and reservation which mark his whole policy in this matter from first to last. Instead of proceeding according to Held's plan, with opposition leagues and persecution, negotiation and religious discussions were tried for a time; these took place in 1540 and 1541, at Hagenau, Worms, and Ratisbon. An attempt was made to come to a peaceful understanding on all points on which there had been the nearest approach to agreement since 1517, and now, for the first and last time, the question was seriously discussed at Rome, whether an attempt should not be made to restore the unity of the Church by honestly meeting the Protestants' justifiable demands for reforms.

The cardinals with whom Pope Paul III. surrounded himself at the beginning of his government were cultivated, enlightened ecclesiastics, and several of them, such as the intellectual Contarini of Venice, Sadolet, Poole, Morone, and at that time even Caraffa, who was afterwards, as Paul IV., the Pope of the reaction, were avowedly in favour of reform. A remarkable project of reform had emanated from this circle, which, though it did not go far enough for the Protestants, was a significant indication of the then prevailing sentiments of the Curia.

The princes being generally in favour of a peaceful settlement of the question, the attitude of the Curia secured that the discussions which were being held should be of a conciliatory character. If there was, however, any approximation on questions of pure faith, on those relating to Church government and the Papal authority, the parties were as far apart at the end as at the beginning. But there was one advantage in this state of indecision, that the peace con-

cluded in 1532 was not disturbed; that, by a favourable interpretation of it, it even allowed Protestantism to make progress, and every fresh adherent of the Confession of Augsburg enjoyed the same toleration as those who then subscribed to it.

Thus the interim of Ratisbon arose, and the decree of the Diet of 29th July, 1541. In order to secure the aid of the Protestants against the Turks, the Emperor conceded as much as possible; besides an exhortation to the Pope "to institute Christian regulations and reforms, which would conduce to good, seemly, and wholesome administration of the churches;" there followed a confirmation of the Treaty of Nuremberg, in which accusations to the Supreme Court and the clauses about new converts were omitted. The exclusion of Protestants from the Supreme Court ceased, the pending processes were discontinued until a general or national council was held, or a general Diet for the settlement of this question; and in conclusion it was ordained "that if anybody else should wish to adopt their religion he was not to be prevented."

This, however, was not sincere, for just at the same time the Emperor renewed the League of Nuremberg against the Protestants, and proclaimed that he had induced the Pope to join it. Moreover, he was just then giving up all idea of a real reconciliation for ever, and was only waiting for better times to take open measures against these incorrigible people.

Meanwhile, favoured by the temporary truce, important changes had taken place, which taught the Emperor that the progress of the new doctrine far surpassed his fears.

DECIDED PROGRESS OF PROTESTANTISM, 1539-44.—  
BRANDENBURG.—DUCHY OF SAXONY.—BRUNSWICK.—  
COLOGNE.

To the progress which Protestantism had made since the Treaty of Nuremberg in Würtemberg, Pomerania, Anhalt, Mecklenburg, and the Imperial cities, may be added the conversion of two whole countries whose rulers had hitherto been among the most faithful adherents of the ancient Church—Brandenburg and Albertine Saxony; the bishoprics of Magdeburg, Halberstadt, and Naumburg had also gone over.

The Elector Joachim of Brandenburg was justly considered to be one of the most decided opponents of the Lutheran doctrines; he had all his life adhered strictly to the old faith, and made strenuous endeavours to prevent his country from falling into heresy after his death. But Brandenburg was surrounded by Protestant influences—on the north by Pomerania and Mecklenburg, which had already gone over; on the west by the bishoprics on the Elbe, Magdeburg, Halberstadt, and Naumburg; and on the south by the Electorate of Saxony, which had been inclined to the new doctrine from the beginning; besides, in the multiplicity of states under the old empire, no country could be isolated as it can now—the states everywhere ran one into another. When the Elector Joachim I. died in 1539, it came to light that the Protestant doctrines numbered thousands of adherents, and that, in spite of all his strict measures, a Protestant community had been secretly formed, which was only waiting for a favourable moment to appear openly. His sons, whose adherence to the old faith he had taken every means to secure, did not continue his policy. The younger, the Margrave John, openly declared himself for Luther, and was the first to grant unlimited freedom to the new doctrines in his little inheritance. The elder, the Elector Joachim II., remained a Catholic himself for years, but he allowed the impulses of his people free course, renounced the fanatical party among the Catholic princes, abolished the mass, and began to reform the Church. It appeared that he dreaded open defection and quarrel with the Emperor, but he was in fact already a convert.

In this case, as in Albertine Saxony, it was not the rulers who gave the impulse to reform, but the people. In both countries the rulers would have abided by the old system, but when it would not work any longer they accommodated themselves to circumstances. In Albertine Saxony the old faith outwardly retained its dominion till 1539. Any one who publicly avowed Lutheran sentiments was threatened with vengeance and punished severely enough, but it was well known that there were thousands who did not hesitate to walk a few miles and go over to the Lutheran Church in Ernestine Saxony.

Duke George was a warm and sincere adherent of the old faith, and he was thoroughly a party man. But he



could not prevent his brother Henry from allowing free course to the new doctrines in the little territory of Freiberg-Wolkenstein, over which he ruled, still less could he prevent that his Ernestine relative should permit Lutheranism to spread in his splendid Electorate, or that his own subjects should cross the border; and thus, in spite of all his restrictions, heresy found its way into the city of Leipzig.

The idea weighed heavily on the old gentleman's heart that the new doctrines would make their entry into his country over his newly-made grave. He projected many schemes which show his earnest desire to avert it at all hazards. Thus in his will he made the unheard-of provision that in case of need his legitimate successor should be set aside; that after his death a sort of provisional government should be established, composed of individuals devoted to him and the old doctrines, and in which King Ferdinand, the Emperor's brother, was to take part. This involved the entire exclusion of his own family in favour of the house of Hapsburg, and this desperate measure was adopted in order to bind his country to the old system.

But still more rapidly than Duke George ever foreboded in his most gloomy moments did the old Church system fall to pieces in Albertine Saxony after his death. On the evening of his death, 17th April, 1539, Duke Henry appeared in Dresden, accompanied by the Wittenberg reformers, and he was supported by the League of Schmalkald, which had twenty thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry at its disposal; the long-suppressed spirit of the new doctrines broke out everywhere, and a single visitation of the churches, on July 6th, sufficed to accomplish the reform, or rather to bring to light the conversion which had long ago taken place.

It was under the impression produced by all these transformations that, about 1540, the Emperor's attempts at reconciliation were made. It was obvious that the Protestants and the League of Schmalkald were in a decided majority, and still greater successes might be feared. In the south, Protestantism had been already adopted by Würtemberg and the great imperial cities of Nuremberg, Augsburg, Ulm, Constance, and Strasburg, which weighed heavily in the scale; then by the whole of central Germany, Thuringia, Saxony, Hesse, part of Brunswick, and the territory of the Guelphs; in the north, by the bishoprics of Magdeburg,



Halberstadt, and Naumburg, and Hildesheim was at least inclined to join them; by East Friesland, the Hanse Towns, Holstein and Schleswig, Pomerania, Mecklenburg, Anhalt, Silesia, the Saxon states, Brandenburg, and Prussia.

Of the larger states that were closed against it there remained only Austria, Bavaria, the Palatinate, and the Rhenish Electorates; how long Duke Henry of Brunswick might keep himself as an oasis in the midst of the desert of North German heresy was very doubtful. The states capable of resistance were only Austria, Bavaria, the Palatinate, and the ecclesiastical Rhenish provinces. But even these were beginning to vacillate, and it is probably correct to ascribe to the indications of this an important influence upon the Emperor's resolutions.

The idea that the Lutheran propaganda would spread and increase in strength, that sooner or later it would be impossible to arrest it, that his own inheritance must finally be overrun by it, and that with the probable desertion of the ecclesiastical electorates the last support of the imperial authority would fall—all this had a decided influence on the course of events which led to the Schmalkald war.

In Austria itself, in spite of the Convention of Ratisbon of 1524, that Protestant movement began which at the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century brought over by far the greater part of the country to Protestantism, and it was only the horrors of the Thirty Years' War that rooted it out. Among the landowning nobility, the peasantry, and in some of the cities, the spirit of innovation grew stronger and stronger; and embarrassed as the country was by Turkey and Hungary, suspiciously watched by Bavaria, and the imperial authority weakened by entanglement with foreign affairs, it was impossible to meet the earnest demand of the States for reform by an absolute refusal.

A similar state of things existed in Bavaria. A Church visitation by the Convention of Ratisbon had shown the state of the clergy. The investigation brought an abyss of abuses to light, and increased the desire for thorough reform. If the desire were granted, there was no saying where it would stop, and whether it would not end in the country's going over to Lutheranism.

The new doctrines had gained the day in Palatine Neu

burg, and it was not likely that the old Palatinal electorates, surrounded as they were by purely Protestant districts, would hold out much longer. Otto Henry had laboured zealously to keep them Catholic; Louis V. had mediated as a shrewd diplomatist between Lutheranism and Catholicism; but Frederic II. was by no means the man to withstand the universal tendency.

In not one of these cases had any pressure been brought to bear from above; it came from beneath, and the authorities yielded to it. Of men like John of Saxony and Philip of Hesse, it may be said that they were Lutherans heart and soul, and laboured actively to spread it; but in Austria, Bavaria, the Palatinate, and Brandenburg, the rulers would have kept to the old faith had it been possible.

Among the North German princes there was but one on whose unconditional devotion the Emperor could rely; this was Duke Henry of Brunswick, the same whom Luther handled more roughly in controversy than he did Henry VIII. He was a man who, though not exactly a dissolute buffoon, was utterly unworthy to wear a crown, and he was extremely active in fomenting quarrels for the Emperor and his brother. He fumed and stormed incessantly against the Protestants, more from his own uneasiness than because the danger was really so great. He was a restless, adventurous spirit, and was given to meddle with the neighbouring imperial cities. Goslar had pulled down a few monasteries, and was therefore laid under an interdict by the Supreme Court. This sentence, however, like all others of the kind, had been expressly declared void by the Declaration of Ratisbon, but the Duke of Brunswick insisted upon its being carried out. Besides this, he had made all sorts of disturbances in the town of Brunswick. Although warned by King Ferdinand that he would have no help from the imperial side, he would not be quiet, and was at length attacked by the League of Schmalkald, which had long wished to come to an engagement with its unfriendly neighbour. Together with the forces of the two cities, the troops of the Landgrave and the Saxon Elector advanced twenty thousand strong; the Duke fled, his country was conquered, and Protestantism established. This was in the summer of 1542.

This event produced great uneasiness at the Imperial Court, but another case was a still greater blow. The eccle-

siastical electorate of Cologne was on the point of being lost to the Catholic Church. If this took place, it would make an irreparable breach in the constitution of the empire, and no one could tell how long the neighbouring ecclesiastical states might stand firm.

It was no uncommon thing for the ecclesiastical foundations to be lost to the Romish Church by the conversion of their dignitaries. The first memorable instance of this was the case of the master of the German Order, Duke Albert of Brandenburg, who, in 1525, in despair proclaimed his country a secular state, left the Church with his Order, and made himself a temporal hereditary ruler.

This was not at first regarded as of much importance, for the country was looked upon as lost before, and moreover it did not belong to the empire. But when the same thing occurred at Halberstadt, Magdeburg, and Naumburg, it began to look ominous, and would be still more so if the Rhenish electoral states were seized with the spirit of defection.

It was only in Germany that ecclesiastical principalities, except the Papal States, existed. In France, England, and Spain the bishops had long been deprived of their temporal power. This amalgamation of temporal and spiritual power was one of the essential conditions of the old German empire, and it was only at the beginning of this century that the anomaly was abolished; at the time of which we speak it was still in full force. Half a hundred bishops, wielding temporal power, scattered over the greater part of the country, gave the Catholic Church in Germany a very formidable and almost unassailable power. In the first rank stood the electoral states of Mayence, Cologne, Treves, and Salzburg; then the Westphalian archbishoprics on the Elbe and the Weser, Würzburg, Bamberg, Freising, Augsburg, and Ratisbon. It was a fine array of ecclesiastical states, and if they once began to be secularised, the Church would lose a powerful support. In our age only a portion of them remained, and when they were suppressed the previous German imperial constitution became impossible.

The defection of a Roman Catholic archbishopric among the Rhenish electorates was therefore a great event; it would, if it took place, change the essential character of the imperial constitution. The Electoral Board would then have a Protestant majority; there were already Protestants

in it, Saxony, Brandenburg, and the Palatinate; if they were joined by Electoral Cologne there would be ~~four~~ <sup>not</sup> against ~~three~~ <sup>to</sup>, and in every future election of an Emperor the Protestant creed would gain the day. It followed as a matter of course that the house of Hapsburg would be excluded from the empire.

In the evening of his days the Archbishop of Cologne, Hermann von Wied, declared his conviction of the truth of the Protestant doctrines; he began to invite Protestant theologians, and seemed resolved to carry out the Reformation in Cologne by virtue of the decree of 1526. This would make a breach in the German ecclesiastical states, and establish on the nether Rhine, between Westphalia and the Emperor's possessions in Holland, a fortress which would soon be impregnable. If the enterprise succeeded, others would be sure to follow. Hermann von Wied was a man devoid of self-interest or ambition, whose only desire was to act in accordance with his conscience; but there were other ecclesiastics whose motives were less pure, and who were tempted to make use of Protestantism in order to become temporal hereditary rulers.

The archbishop found sympathy with the inferior clergy, the secular states, and the country people, but not with the chapter or the population of Cologne. The decision was long in the balance; the Emperor's nearest interests forbade his allowing it to take its course. The events at Brunswick and Cologne would forebode an entire revolution in German affairs if they passed unheeded. If the Emperor waited a few years longer, the conquests of Protestantism would acquire a legal standing; the new doctrines, which already possessed so powerful a reserve in the nation, would then have overpowered the chief constituent parts of the empire, and a restoration such as the Emperor had always projected could no longer be thought of. There was another reason which induced the Emperor to take active measures. He had persisted in the idea that ecclesiastical affairs would be finally arranged by a council. There was a time when it would have been a not unwelcome expedient to the adherents of the new doctrines who had not yet "protested." Had they been offered a council in 1518, 1519, and 1521, instead of being threatened with excommunication, the schism would have been avoided, and the innovators would not have been able to boast of a consolidated power. But all

this was changed after 1526 ; after the Protestants had their own churches and regulations for public worship, any return became every year more difficult, and the breach became wider and wider. The changes that took place between that time and 1532 were secured by the Peace of Nuremberg ; and for the still greater changes that took place afterwards, formal recognition had been extorted at Ratisbon. It was no longer of any use to talk to the Protestants of a council ; for them the question of legality was settled, their own Church system was established, the Reformation in Germany had an undoubted preponderance both in extent and internal strength ; and this they would openly sacrifice if they did but theoretically submit to the papal authority. It was easy to say, " We will grant reforms, but then you must submit to the Pope ;" no sincere Protestant could any longer accept these terms without renouncing the vital principles of his party.

Increasing anxiety at the threatening aspect of the Reformation—the idea that the council and the unity of the Church must be secured at the eleventh hour, or would be lost for ever, turned the scale, and decided the Emperor to adopt the most serious measures.

## CHAPTER XV.

The Schmalkald War, 1546-7.—The Emperor's Preparations for War after 1544.—Security, Dissensions, and Negligence of the Schmalkald Party, 1545-6.—Duke Maurice of Saxony, his character and policy.—League with the Emperor, June, 1546.—The War, from the summer of 1546 to the spring of 1547.—Pitiful Warfare of the Allies on the Danube.—Invasion of Electoral Saxony by Maurice.—Battle of Mühlberg, 24th April, 1547.\*

### THE EMPEROR'S PREPARATIONS FOR WAR AFTER 1544. SECURITY, DISSENSIONS, AND NEGLIGENCE OF THE SCHMALKALD PARTY.

THE Emperor still maintained an appearance of conciliation, but his resolutions were taken. He opened and closed the Diet at Spire in 1544 with smooth words, and in the decree of June in the same year confirmed the previous concessions, and, with special emphasis on his own desire for reforms, he called upon every state of the empire to form plans for their unanimous accomplishment; but none of this was sincere. Preparations for a struggle were already made, and his purpose was to lull the Schmalkald party into illusive security. He had just successfully concluded his fourth war with France. Early in September he had advanced victoriously into the vicinity of Paris, further than any German Emperor since Otto II., and had suddenly concluded a peace more moderate in its conditions than is often granted to a vanquished foe in such circumstances. The Emperor wanted a lasting peace, and a trustworthy ally against the heretics in Germany. By the Treaty of Crespy of the 14th of September a joint action against the apostates was agreed upon, which suffices to reveal the Emperor's tactics.

\* Maurenbrecher, *Karl V. und die Deutschen Protestanten*, 1545-55. Dusseldorf. 1865.

In Germany he allayed the suspicions of the Protestants by a promise of reforms—if not by a council, certainly by a national assembly—and, in return, the Protestants were to be at his disposal against France and the Turks, though in France he was securing a companion in arms against them. All these events were only separated by a few months, and the great error of the Schmalkald party was that they put faith in the Emperor's sincerity. They forgot that he only reluctantly conceded the peace of Nuremberg in 1532, that ten years later he was only compelled by necessity to confirm it, and that they ought to be continually on their guard against him. They were so elated by the progress of their cause, and the increase of their power, that they put aside every thought of fresh danger, aided the Emperor bravely against France and the Turks, and thus helped to forge the chains that were intended for themselves.

By 1544 the Emperor had resolved upon war, and the outbreak of it was only a question of time. The following year passed away in fruitless efforts on both sides to come to terms, but animosity increased until a breach was inevitable. Then the catastrophe happened to Henry of Brunswick.

By the campaign of 1542 he had been deprived of his territory. With at least the apparent concurrence of the Emperor it had been sequestered by the League of Schmalkald. Meanwhile the exile had procured money and troops in order to make an attack in the latter part of the year. But his defeat at Kahlfeld, near Nordheim, on October 21, 1545, put an end to all his hopes, and made him a prisoner in the hands of the victors.

Besides many ominous signs and disquieting rumours, it was significant, that at the new Diet at Worms, May, 1545, there was no talk of carrying out the concessions of Spire, though the Council of Trent was urgently recommended. The Landgrave Philip said it seemed to him like tantalizing a child with an apple. A fresh discussion of religion was arranged for the next year; meanwhile the position of affairs become day by day more critical. The meeting took place without any sincere desire to come to an understanding, and separated with noisy altercation.

In the summer of 1546, a convention of the League of Schmalkald took place at Frankfort, and it was found that its power had been overrated. The Landgrave's worst



fears were realised. As early as in 1539 he had said to Bucer, "In the campaign in Würtemberg all were led by him, but now several wanted to lead. Too many cooks spoil the broth. The Protestant League must not be made an idol of. The Christian ranks did not always hold Christian sentiments—a great deal that was worldly was mixed up with them. Many neglected the duty of contributing, and, when it came to the point, still more would draw back who were now complaining of the peace."

All this was verified even before it came to an engagement. The cities disputed with the princes; an important neighbour, Prince Maurice of Saxony, equivocated; the Elector John Frederic, the extent of whose dominions entitled him to command, was troublesome; and alarm at the imperial preparations prevented some of the allies from making any attempt at assembling their forces. The Landgrave's attempt to get an explanation of some ominous proceedings of the imperial party were answered by Granvella with smooth speeches; and at the last meeting at Spire, March, 1546, at which Charles and his ministers were present, although the discussions were carried on with an unmistakable object in a peaceable tone, they produced a disquieting effect upon the Landgrave. The negotiations mainly related to three points: whether there should be a Council of Trent or a National Council, to the affairs of Cologne, and the fulfilment of the concessions of Spire. On all three points, in spite of outward complaisance, the imperial party kept inexorably to its own policy.

Meanwhile, on the 18th of February, 1546, Luther had died. We must suppose from his views that he would have counselled peace to the last, and with his death one obstacle to war was gone.

At the Diet at Ratisbon, thinly attended, and with a majority for the Emperor, the breach was still more obvious; the Emperor had formed his alliances, and no longer took any pains to conceal from the States that there would be war; only, indeed, against the disturbers of the peace who had been guilty of high treason. The foreign alliances of the Protestants had been partly dissolved by the Emperor, as in France and England; were partly worthless, as in Denmark; and in some cases any benefit had been prevented by discord among themselves, as in Switzerland.

For a long time Philip reckoned upon the husband of his eldest daughter, Agnes, but even that illusion at length vanished.

Thus as war became inevitable the prospects of the league grew darker. A league can never compare in fighting power with a single state, and particularly when, as in this case, it was composed of members of unequal strength. The most powerful was the Elector of Saxony, but he was not competent to command; the Landgrave, who was less powerful, would have been competent, but then a Landgrave must not command an Elector. In 1532 Luther had said to Philip, who was dissatisfied with the imperfect peace, that an imperfect peace without bloodshed should always be thankfully accepted. "Do not deceive yourself; they are all ready enough with brave speeches when danger is distant, but when trouble comes it will be quite another thing." It was only too probable that in time of danger the chaff would separate from the wheat among the Protestant ranks.

Still, the league might have accomplished much more than it did accomplish; it certainly could have prevented the assembling of an imperial army in Germany, and it entirely neglected to do so.

The Emperor was under the restrictions of the election bond; he could not bring any foreign troops into Germany without the consent of the States. There was, therefore, a legal pretext against him; besides, the assembling of an imperial army could have been rendered practically impossible. There were but two ways by which the Emperor could bring in his troops—one through the Netherlands, the other by way of Italy—and in both it would have been very easy to embarrass him.

The entrance from Italy was the easiest to prevent; nature had taken care to make the passage into Germany difficult by lofty mountains and narrow passes. Had the Protestants occupied the Brenner and the valley of the Upper Inn betimes, the imperial troops could not have entered from Italy. If, for example, the states and cities of Upper Germany—perhaps even if only Augsburg and Ulm had held together, they would have been able to occupy the passes. They had money enough to hire soldiers, and their general, Schertlin, had repeatedly written to them: "Give me a little troop to occupy the passes in the

Lechthal, and not one imperial soldier shall enter Germany." It was partly the honourable scruple against acting on the defensive which stood in the way, and partly a dread of the conflict. Schertlin stood for months at the entrance of the Lechthal; it would have been easy to have occupied the Tyrol, and to have taken possession of the two mountain passes by which the imperial troops must advance. This done, all the rest of the troops of the league might have gone westwards towards the Netherlands, and by a rapid advance they might have closed the entrance into the empire at this point also, and have dispersed the assembling troops. But these splendid opportunities of preventing the advance of, or annihilating, the Imperial troops were utterly neglected.

The Emperor, on the contrary, carried on his manœuvres with great dexterity. His peaceful declarations still led the Protestants to believe that it would not come to a war. In 1546 he first threw off the mask. With the same skill with which he had lulled the Protestants into security, he now set to work to divide them. He was never tired of repeating that the enterprise was not directed against the Protestant religion—on the contrary, he was abiding by all his concessions—but against a political league which formed an empire within the empire, and which was rebelling against the imperial authority. This distinction, and the decided assurance that it was not a question of religion, gave the less decided a pretext for joining the Emperor's side, or at any rate for not opposing him. To the timid princes, like the Elector of the Palatinate and the Duke of Brandenburg, it was a welcome excuse for doing nothing, and it attached the shrewd and politic Maurice of Saxony entirely to the Emperor's side.

With this personage an entirely new element enters into the affairs of Germany; the fate of German Protestantism was in great measure dependent on his character and policy, and we are therefore justified in making closer acquaintance with him.

#### DUKE MAURICE OF SAXONY.\* HIS CHARACTER AND POLICY. THE LEAGUE WITH THE EMPEROR, 1546.

Albert the Courageous had been followed by George the Bearded in the government of Meissen, while Albert's

\* Langenu: Kurfürst Moritz von Sachsen. 1840.

younger son, Duke Henry, was to have the possessions in Friesland, but in case he could not defend them, the towns and castles of Freiberg and Wolkenstein, and a share of the revenues of the country. Various difficulties induced him to make Friesland over to his brother, and to content himself with the other possessions and the income assigned to him. While George was burying one after another of his children, Henry was living at Freiberg, taking little heed of public affairs and enjoying life, so far as his often empty exchequer permitted—enjoyed his glass, gave good dinners, and lived merrily enough; while his wife, Catherine of Mecklenburg, was occupied with higher things, and was far superior to her husband in energy and firmness.

Of this union Maurice was born on the 21st of March, 1521; only one, Augustus, of two younger sons grew up. But little is known of Maurice's youth and education; he did not receive a very learned education, but his energetic mother may have exercised great influence upon him. As a boy and youth he spent a good deal of time with Albert of Mayence and his uncle, Duke George, who, as his own race had died out, might wish to secure an heir and successor. There was at first, until about 1538, a tolerable understanding between them, but then an estrangement took place. The Church question was doubtless the chief cause of it. George was a zealous adherent of the old Church, and the Lutheran tendencies of the court at Freiberg, which were mainly dependent on the Duchess, must have been hateful to him. Of course Maurice often exchanged the residence of his uncle for that of John Frederic.

Thus the talented young prince was for years surrounded by contending influences. On the one hand, George, having seen all his sons die, fixed his eyes upon his clever and aspiring nephew. On the other, Maurice's parents and their advisers, among whom was Philip of Hesse, were desirous of keeping on friendly terms with George, but wished to keep Maurice a Lutheran. George, however, was entertaining the idea of hazardous schemes, such as that of making Austria his successor, to which his advisers and states did not conceal their aversion.

In the midst of these contradictory tendencies, on the 17th of April, 1539, Duke George died. Duke Henry

assumed the reins of government, George's ministers were dismissed, and Lutheranism introduced. It was worthy of remark that Maurice maintained some relations with the fallen ministers, thereby showing his independence.

This was still more evident in another matter. Maurice married Agnes, daughter of the Landgrave Philip, against his parents' will; this gave rise to bitter and open dissensions, increased by the fact of Philip's double marriage, and it was with difficulty that Maurice succeeded in reconciling his parents to it. But various causes of irritation remained, and there was growing discontent in the country at the weak Henry's misrule. He died a few days after a stormy scene between him and the chief men in the country, in August, 1541.

Thus Maurice's youth had been a school of much experience. The contests by which he was surrounded from the first, in and around his native country, had fostered his self-will and tendency to selfish and independent action. The insight which he had gained into the temporal and ecclesiastical policy of the Protestant and Catholic courts had early deprived him of illusions, both favourable and unfavourable, about persons and things, and when he began to take an independent part in German politics his judgment and energy were far beyond his years.

The first steps taken by the new government indicated an independent course. Maurice summoned new ministers to his councils, partly those by whom Duke George had been surrounded. The Landgrave Philip especially was consulted, and was very ready to give his advice. But it must be observed that he was not on the best terms with the Elector John Frederic, and that, therefore, an approach to Hesse widened the distance from the Ernestine faction. It was regarded in that light by the Elector and his ministers, and petty sources of irritation were not wanting. This state of things was not improved when Maurice gave up his father's very cool relations with the League of Schmalkald, and proclaimed in 1542 that he and his country would be faithful to the Protestant doctrines, and would render aid if the Protestants were in danger, but that he would not belong to the league.

The discord with the Elector John Frederic increased so much, that it was with difficulty that Philip prevented open war. Melancthon afterwards said that it was now that

the seeds of the discord were sown which sprung up into the great tragedy the close of which we have not yet seen.

In proportion as Maurice became estranged from the league, the imperial party endeavoured to enter into closer relations with him and his ministers, particularly with George, and Christopher von Carlowitz laboured in the same direction. He himself was brought over by his relations with the Ernestine party; his affection for Protestantism and connection with Philip were at any rate no obstacle.

During the negotiations which now took place at the Emperor's instigation, the character of his policy, which was a novel one among the Protestant princes, was brought to light. Maurice affected concern about John Frederic's projects respecting Magdeburg and Halberstadt; he therefore desired that the Emperor would place the bishoprics under his protection. "The bishops and canons should accept him as a guardian appointed by the Emperor." The expense was to be borne by the bishoprics, which were therefore to be mortgaged to him. He spoke still more plainly about Meissen and Merseburg; Carlowitz was to endeavour "to induce the Emperor to assign both bishoprics to the Duke as a hereditary possession." He had introduced reform because the country wished it; even Duke George, with all his zeal, had not been able permanently to prevent it. It was just the same at Meissen and Merseburg; the bishops could not restrain the people. He would have preferred it if the two bishops had carried out reforms according to the divine word, and rightly exercised their episcopal office; but it had not been so, and therefore it was needful to avert that any disaster should happen which Maurice as their guardian might prevent.

At Nuremberg lively intercourse was kept up between Christopher von Carlowitz and Granvella. Granvella spoke of the high opinion entertained of Maurice by the Emperor, and prophesied a brilliant future for him: "The Emperor entertained great hopes of Maurice, and was very graciously disposed towards him." His vanity was flattered; the part he had taken in the Turkish war praised; his aid was courted in the war with France.

Granvella, wrote Carlowitz, was particularly desirous to



introduce the Duke to the Emperor's acquaintance, that the Protestants might see that the Emperor was as favourable to them as to the others. Overtures were also made to the Landgrave, but he did not like it. He wanted to see clearly. "It is our custom in these things to know for certain, not to imagine." He did not altogether trust them; he thought they were going to throw him a bone in the shape of a bishopric for his brother, Duke Augustus, who spent his whole time at Ferdinand's court.

It was only by means of theologians and not by counsellors that Maurice was represented at the convention which the League of Schmalkald held at Frankfort; he was willing to share their creed, but not their policy, and therefore declined to take any part. Late in the year 1543 he set out to join the Emperor's army, which indeed only undertook the fruitless siege of Landrecies.

Meanwhile, in 1544 the diplomatic game of lulling the Protestants to sleep was successfully played, and their help secured for the war, so that the campaign could be carried on with greater activity. On this occasion Maurice had an opportunity at Vitry of displaying his prowess and his skill as a commander. The peace of Crespy only hastened the catastrophe. But amidst these complications Maurice found leisure to pursue his schemes about the bishoprics; and as the bishopric of Merseburg fell vacant by death, to accomplish the election of his brother as administrator. Military precautions were also taken: Pirna, Dresden, and Leipzig were made more secure.

His political attitude, which was independent, but somewhat ambiguous, was clearly brought to light in the feud in Brunswick in 1545. He was bound by an inherited treaty to help his father-in-law, Philip, and he fulfilled the duty, though not over willingly; but, at the same time, he maintained an understanding with the Duke of Brunswick and his friends, was the medium of proposals of reconciliation, which he carried on without success until war broke out and the Duke was taken prisoner. It was characteristic that the league was not pleased with, and the Emperor was suspicious of him.

Meanwhile, everything tended towards a decision: the Emperor was at liberty, he had concluded peace with France and a truce with the Turks, and come to an understanding with the Pope; and the negotiations of 1545-6



show how great the difficulty was of coming to any peaceful agreement. It was necessary for Maurice also to come to a decision. Landgrave Philip proposed to support the Protestant cause by a closer understanding between Hesse and the two Saxonys. Maurice made counter-propositions, which referred to doctrines. The Elector John Frederic would have it that the saying, "Ein Meissner, ein Gleissner,"—a Meissner, a doubledealer—was applicable to Maurice and his minister Carlowitz, and Philip said that "he wanted peace and quiet, and was ready to give way in things in which a man could give way; but really religion could not be treated as we treat our worldly affairs, our property, estates, fields, meadows, &c., about which, if any one say, 'Let me have this,' we may say, 'Thou mayest have it.'"

Maurice did not comprehend that sort of thing. If he was ever sincere, it was when he told the Emperor that the Reformation was no fault of his; that it had been forced upon the rulers by the people, and they could not prevent it if they would. He had gone with the stream; he had never experienced any deep religious convictions; policy induced him to adhere to the new faith, for in the first place it could not be reversed, and in the next, it gave his new government a strong support against the Emperor.

His latest biographer calls him a disciple of Erasmus: and he might have added, of the new Spanish Burgundian school of statesmen, of which the Emperor himself was master. Like the Emperor, he looked at the affairs of the Church solely from a political point of view, and regarded the great complications which were at hand as an excellent opportunity of making his fortune as an ambitious secular prince. His little duchy was too small for his lofty schemes, and at the Emperor's side there was a sure prospect of richer booty. A somewhat frivolous exterior concealed far-seeing political views and great shrewdness; the light and chivalrous features of his character were calculated rather to conceal his earnestness than to give rise to the idea that he had none. Undoubtedly, the new generation of German princes and politicians, of whom he was the first, was headed by a by no means commonplace individual.

During the first few months of 1546, when everything was tending to an open conflict, Maurice's commissioner, Carlowitz, scarcely ever left the imperial ministers, and

when he occasionally did so, always returned to them again, even when he could not do so without exciting attention; as, for instance, when he attended the conference of the League of Schmalkald at Frankfort, and after informing himself of the course things were taking, returned straight to the imperial court.

In March, 1546, he was at Maestricht. During the negotiations there, Granvella observed that ever since he had recognised the Duke, the Emperor had been graciously pleased to place great confidence in him, and to entertain the hope that he would accomplish much good in the cause of religion and other things, and would serve as a good mediator or commissioner; the Emperor therefore would have the more pleasure in helping him in his position in the council of the empire. It was a question of votes, and, so far as it lay with the Emperor, Maurice should be placed higher up rather than lower down. Other friendly things were said, and Carlowitz took care to foster the good feeling, and to bring about a still closer understanding. He succeeded so well, that the Emperor wrote a gracious letter to Maurice, assuring him of his continued hearty good will, and giving him a pressing invitation to come to Ratisbon.

From the end of April Carlowitz was at Ratisbon. His official commission related to the Saxon bishoprics, particularly Magdeburg and Halberstadt; but his real business was the negotiation of a league between the Emperor and the Duke. Of the three paths which were open to Maurice—to join the League of Schmalkald, to enter into a league with the Emperor, or to do neither—he could have had no doubt which to take. Ever since May, Carlowitz had been negotiating with Granvella about “a special agreement.” Granvella assured him that “there was no prince towards whom the Emperor entertained so friendly a feeling, or in whom he placed so much confidence;” he was quite ready to enter into a special agreement, only the Duke must come himself.

It appears that the question of religion was soon settled, and Granvella set aside the difficulty about Electoral Saxony with the remark that “marked prosperity would result to the countries and people from the special league, and Maurice need not then be afraid of the Elector of Saxony, nor of any of his other neighbours.” But he must

go ; he would find not only a gracious Emperor, but a father and friend, in Charles.

Just at the same time the Landgrave Philip was trying, at a conference at Naumburg, to induce the Elector and the Duke to be reconciled to each other, and to make amends for their faults.

Naumburg or Ratisbon, then ?—this was the question.

Maurice did not entirely confide in the imperial diplomacy ; still, in June he went to Ratisbon, the negotiations were begun at once, and by the 19th they were concluded. The Duke's wishes concerning Magdeburg and Halberstadt were acceded to : the Emperor appointed him conservator, executor, and guardian of the bishoprics. The real objects in view were only vaguely stated in the treaty concluded on the same day ; but Maurice promised friendship and assistance, contributions to the exchequer, and submission to the council, so far as the other princes were subject to it. In religious matters no further innovations were to take place in his country, all further reforms were to be referred to a council, and in return the Emperor and Ferdinand promised assistance to the Duke.

On the 20th of June a conference took place between the three princes, in presence of their ministers. "The guilty," it was said, "would be punished ; the Emperor had not yet decided what he should do ; the price of corn would be learnt at market. If it should come to that, Maurice would not have far to go to the Emperor ; the mandates would give notice of the Emperor's intentions. If an interdict, or anything of the kind, should be proclaimed, every man must look to himself ; those who catch it will find it no joke." As to the religious question, it was once more repeated, that in case it was not entirely adjusted, and some points remained still unsettled, neither Maurice nor his subjects should be compromised, and they need be under no anxiety till a settlement took place. Further than this Maurice was not initiated. There was something purposely mysterious in the whole speech, and it was not calculated to inspire confidence. It revealed enough to make him stand by the Emperor, but not to set him at ease as to the consequences.

Their relations to each other are obvious. If Maurice had no affection for Protestantism, neither had he any for the Emperor ; the new doctrine was to him a means to an

end, and so was his relation to the Emperor. There is not a trace in him of that warm and chivalrous attachment which the older generation, and even the Protestant princes, felt towards the head of the German nation. The modern race of politicians who had outgrown all the mediæval traditions of the empire, whose last offshoots were some of the adventurers in the Thirty Years' War, begins with the striking figure of Maurice.

Charles, with this mixture of confiding openness and mysterious reserve, behaved like the master of his hopeful pupil. One can imagine how he looked into the soul of the young prince with a certain fatherly pride. Here was a man after his own heart, who hated theological squabbles and the fanaticism of little minds—who, like himself, cared for nothing but the moving springs of substantial power and obvious political calculations. It was, however, a singular mistake to suppose that devotion and trust could grow up in such a soul. He knew nothing of these things himself, except where some advantage was to be derived from them, and he should not have expected in the pupil what was wanting in the master. The honourable race of German princes of the old school, like John, Philip, and John Frederic, who, when their consciences were not concerned, were heartily devoted to the Emperor, was dying out; the men who were in earnest about their faith, and who in the sharp struggle of conflicting duties only refused with heavy hearts the allegiance they had never refused against the Turks or the French, were indeed a different race from those who came after them; for them, they themselves were the centre of the empire, and by German liberty they understood the aggrandisement of their own power, and the absolute despotism of rulers both great and small. We must bring out this contrast, for party spirit in its blindness has confounded the former princes with those who made merely a policy of religion.

The Emperor's tactics were very favourable to the plans of a character like Maurice. He did not himself consider that it would be possible for Maurice openly to take part against Lutheranism, and he afterwards had good reason to know the truth of this. But when he said that it was not a religious but a political question, it gave a different colour to it, and Maurice was inclined to take but little part, like men without character, who remain neutral and choose

their party after the issue of the struggle. He knew the weakness of and dissensions in the league; he knew that if he decisively joined the Emperor's cause, he was secure of his spoils, and took up his position accordingly.

*Thurs. 2/10*  
**THE WAR\* FROM THE SUMMER OF 1546 TILL THE SPRING OF 1547.—PITIFUL WARFARE OF THE ALLIES ON THE DANUBE.—MAURICE INVADES ELECTORAL SAXONY.—BATTLE OF MUHLBERG, 24TH APRIL, 1547.**

If we compare the firmness of purpose which was displayed by the imperial party in preparing for the contest with the divisions in the Schmalkald camp, we cannot fail to fear for the cause which was attacked by so mighty a force and so inefficiently defended; and yet the Emperor's position was by no means a secure one. His only ally in Germany was an ambitious prince, who was probably already calculating how he should settle accounts with the Emperor after the victory; then he was reckoning on France, whom he had laid under obligations by his magnanimity, but who was not any the more trustworthy on that account; upon Rome, where the wind was always shifting, and upon his Spanish troops, who certainly were curious weapons wherewith to re-constitute the unity of the German empire and the German Church. He was declaring war against a nation about a cause which had stirred it to its very depths, as no universal impulse had ever stirred it before, and his allies were Spain, France, Rome, and Duke Maurice. However skilfully the beginning had been managed, the whole scheme was a game of chance—the first that the Emperor hazarded, and he was not successful in it.

The war was preceded by a song of triumph at Rome, that heresy would soon be put down; but that was a most unwelcome revelation of the Emperor's tactics. He and his friend Maurice were saying that it was not a religious war, and here was Rome, before a blow had been struck, rejoicing that the miscreants would be punished.

On the 20th of July, the Emperor sent the ban against the Protestant princes of Germany as a declaration of war,

\* Avila y Zuniga, Geschichte des Schmalkald. Krieges. Uebers. Berlin, 1853. Herberger, Schertlins Briefe. Augsb., 1852. Schönhuth, Schertlin von Burtenbach Leben und Thaten von ihm selbst beschrieben. Münster, 1858.

while his troops were advancing from Italy and the Netherlands. They found no obstacle either on the Rhine or on the Tyrol.

The forces which the league assembled at Donauwörth after the Saxon and Hessian troops had been joined by the South German contingents, were reckoned at 47,000 men ; but they neglected to attack the Emperor, who was then weak, were unable to come to any decisive resolution before Ingolstadt, allowed the Emperor time to assemble his troops, wasted their strength in fruitless skirmishes, and their time in camp near Giengen, till money ran short, the soldiers grew discontented, and some divisions began to move off. The Landgrave Philip exerted himself to explain the situation and the project to the Elector John Frederic ; but in vain—he could not even effect the suppression of the notorious challenge of Ingolstadt of 2nd September, “to Charles, King of Spain, who calls himself the fifth Roman Emperor.”

The passes in the Tyrol had been occupied in the latter part of the summer by Schertlin, but again by an unaccountable order vacated ; and, while the Schmalkald party were entrenching themselves at Giengen, Alba led the first onslaught on the imperial cities of Ulm and Augsburg, which were least in a position to resist. In their rear were Württemberg and the Palatinate, very doubtful allies. As the imperial cities were unprotected, the conquest of Württemberg and the Palatinate was decided on ; Southern Germany was at the feet of the Emperor and his Spaniards. The restoration began at Cologne and Strasburg. Meanwhile, what between lack of money, desertion, and sickness, the camp at Giengen was melting away. When the news came that Duke Maurice had invaded the territory of the Elector John Frederic, all hope was at an end. By the end of November, the party of the league had evacuated the seat of war in South Germany ; not that they were vanquished on the battle-field, for the Emperor had not hazarded any decisive engagement, but politically they were entirely beaten.

On the 1st of August, Duke Maurice had been entrusted by Charles with the execution of the interdict on his Schmalkald neighbour, but the cautious prince was in no hurry, less because he hoped anything from negotiation with the princes of the league, than because, like his cousin the



Duchess Elizabeth, he was of opinion that "the house of Austria has sharp eyes and a large mouth, and wants to devour whatever it sees." While the Emperor was continually urging him on, Carlowitz advised his master to take no steps until he saw to whom God would give the victory, or at any rate until King Ferdinand, who was also commissioned to carry out the sentence, should attack the interdicted countries. The most that he could advise was, that he should take possession of the mountain cities and the fiefs of the crown of Bohemia, but in such a manner, that *in case events should take a turn, the Duke might represent that he had done it to avert any hostile attack, and for the good of the Elector and his subjects.*

Still, it would not do to excite the suspicions of the Emperor and his brother, and the longer it remained undecided "to whom God would give the victory," the more difficult it became to temporise. In this embarrassment the Duke entered into direct negotiations with Ferdinand, while he was still carrying them on with the princes of the league. He was still telling the Duchess Elizabeth that when the temporal affairs were settled, if the Emperor persisted in his severity, "he would give an opportunity of conferring, and himself give notice of what it would become him to do." Even in his own country suspicion was excited that religion would at last be endangered. Even from Bohemia it was reported that if John Frederic came, the cities would open their gates to him. It is certain that they were reluctant to march against Saxony. The Utraquists saw that they were involved in the dangers that threatened Lutheranism. These doubts explained the tentatives put forth on every side, the leaning on Brandenburg, the correspondence with Pomerania and Poland. They also make the discontinuance of negotiations with Ferdinand intelligible. In October they were resumed; Maurice himself went to Prague, took counsel with the States, which had been repeatedly convened, and on the 11th of October once more assured the princes of the league that it was not a question of religion: "he did not want the territories, he was only seeking their honour and prosperity; he had not been sitting idle hitherto, but he could not permit Saxony to come into foreign hands." Three days afterwards he entered into an agreement with Ferdinand at Prague.

Maurice had frustrated the design of the Hapsburgs at



once to divide the territory of the interdicted prince. For the rest, Ferdinand was to take possession of the districts held by the Elector as fiefs of the crown of Bohemia; Maurice was to occupy all that were fiefs of the Holy Roman Empire, or ecclesiastical fiefs. Six days after Ferdinand had reached the frontier, the Duke was to begin his attack. Ferdinand promised the subjects who came under his rule that they should not be compelled to renounce their religion. On the 27th of October the dignity of Elector was transferred to Maurice of Saxony from the imperial camp at Nordheim.

It is difficult to say what Maurice could now expect from making proposals to the league; that he considered it necessary to put forth a justification of his policy is more intelligible. Carlowitz was right in urging the vacillating prince to take one side or the other. Distrust of him did not vanish from the imperial camp, especially as he delayed to assume the title of Elector. Meanwhile, Saxony was quickly occupied.

John Frederic's plain speaking contributed not a little to effect that this dubious state of things should assume a more decided character. He left the South German camp to defend his country against this disturber of the peace. His manifesto spoke of treacherous Judas money by which the invasion had been effected; it was by these means that "the beastly, tyrannical, unchristian Turkish hussars" had been brought into the country; he threatened vengeance, and that he would "pay him with his own coin."

John Frederic proceeded from Eisenach to Halle and Leipzig, which, together with Dresden, was the centre of the Albertine territory. Maurice had taken precautionary measures, and encouraged the troops and inhabitants; still he was not without anxiety when, on the 9th of June, 1547, the Elector arrived, less perhaps on account of his army, than because of the doubtful sentiments of the people. Of course many of them joined the Elector; they saw in Maurice the enemy of the faith, in Carlowitz "the old Papist." This occasioned Maurice to appeal for help to Ferdinand, to Brandenburg, and to Albert of Culmbach. In the imperial camp the danger was underrated, because the popular excitement was not taken into account.

In the conduct of the war, Maurice as usual showed himself superior to his adversary; in spite of his difficulties, he

displayed great energy, insight, and coolness, while John Frederic proceeded without any plan, at the end of January had to raise the siege of Leipzig, and lost time until the enemy received his first reinforcements. Still, for some time it looked as if he was suffering the confusion in the country to increase until a general rising should compel Maurice to withdraw. The excitement was so great in Saxony and Bohemia that it foreboded evil, and if Maurice was not to be vanquished, it would not do for the Hapsburgs to delay much longer.

The Emperor therefore appeared at Eger, and on the 11th of April Maurice crossed the Saxon frontier with the Spaniards, the vanguard of the imperial army. John Frederic turned towards Dresden. The Emperor led a splendid army by way of Adorf, Plauen, and Reichenbach, to Weida and the neighbourhood. The united armies then proceeded by way of Jerisau, Geithain, Kolditz, Leisnig, and Lommatzsch to the Elbe. John Frederic, who had retired from Dresden to Meissen, allowed the bridge over the Elbe to be broken down, and went to Mühlberg.

On the 24th of April he was attending service, when cavalry appeared on the opposite side of the river. He had only ten companies of soldiers and seven squadrons of cavalry; the favourable moment had been lost. When the Emperor learnt that the Elector was at Mühlberg, he ordered balls to be thrown into it, and the Elector resolved to retreat to Wittenberg. Maurice then offered to pursue the enemy by a ford over the Elbe. He did so, the imperial army followed, and thus gained an easy victory over the weak and surprised adversary. This was on the 24th of April, 1547.

The Emperor received the prisoner with harshness and severity. "Am I the gracious Emperor now?" he said to him. And the request that his prison might be in accordance with his princely rank was answered with, "I will keep you as you deserve; begone!"

On the 19th of May followed the capitulation at Wittenberg. By this John Frederic renounced all right to the electorate, engaged to give up the fortresses of Wittenberg and Gotha, to surrender himself to the Emperor, to acknowledge the Imperial Chamber, and the future decrees of the Emperor and the States. Maurice and Ferdinand received his "confiscated" property. Maurice engaged to allow his

children fifty thousand florins a year, for which several places and offices were allotted to them. Of these the principal were Gotha, Weimar, and the territory of Saalfeld; Eisenach, also, and the Wartburg remained in possession of the Ernestine family. John Frederic's brother, John Ernest, received Coburg. The fiefs of the crown of Bohemia were reserved for Ferdinand. John Frederic gave up Magdeburg and Halberstadt.

Four weeks later, the blow was struck at Philip of Hesse. Being unable to stand against the Emperor alone, he resolved for the first time to try his fortune at diplomacy; and he met with very ill success. It is clear that we have not full information about the course of the negotiations. The well-known story that he was promised that he should not be imprisoned, which was afterwards said to have been that he should not be permanently imprisoned—"nicht einiges Gefängnis," or "nicht ewiges Gefängnis"—is not proven, but it is clear that he was grossly deceived.

The first conditions imposed upon him by Ferdinand and Maurice were lenient enough. But it soon appeared that the Emperor required him to surrender at discretion, though assurances were given him which precluded any idea of lasting imprisonment; as, for instance, the promise in writing, that "he should suffer neither in person nor property, nor be punished with imprisonment nor diminution of territory."\*

The Landgrave, therefore, prostrated himself before the Emperor; and when he was about to retire, he was arrested and thrown into prison. Such things are done by subordinates, who can afterwards be disowned; and such was the case in this instance.

• Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*.

## CHAPTER XVI.

**Interim and Restoration, 1548.**—The Council of Trent from 13th of December, 1545, and the Diet of Augsburg from September, 1547.

### INTERIM AND RESTORATION, 1548.

**T**HUS the Emperor was speedily victorious in Germany. The league had suffered a humiliating defeat. The Protestant princes were divided: one eminent prince of this party had openly become his ally; the Palatinate and Würtemberg had come to terms; only Philip and John Frederic remained, and they were both in his hands. He was master in Germany, as no imperial ruler had been for a long time. He had his weapons in his hands, and no others were lifted up against him. Germany was occupied to the Elbe, and in all the south and west seemed only to be awaiting his nod as to the decision of the Church question. The Emperor's schemes now began to be unveiled, and the illusion soon vanished that he had been merely fighting against political rebels, and to enforce his political authority.

The Emperor had a confession of faith drawn up—the Interim of Augsburg, of 1548—which was to be a combination of the old and new faith, and to unite Protestants and Catholics. This attempt on the part of the victor of Mühlberg indicates the extraordinary ignorance of the great diplomatist, with all his knowledge of men, of the religious question of the age.

Protestantism had been developed in Germany quite independently, without the aid—indeed, in opposition to the ruling powers. It was the act of the nation's conscience. The eminent theologians, thinkers, and learned men whom it had produced, arose from an inward impulse, and not in compliance with any command from above. Parties and

differences of opinion had also arisen independently. How Luther had striven to solve some particular question, and how much labour was afterwards fruitlessly spent in trying to reconcile other phases of Protestant thought with his doctrines! All this had been done without any external authority, and it could not therefore be overturned by any imperial decree. These are not questions which can be settled around the green table, or in the cabinets of diplomatists; they are vital problems of the gravest kind. And now came the Emperor, a stranger to all that was agitating Germany, who had never comprehended more than the outward aspects of the struggle—to whom the Catholic faith was only something that he had been taught, and the Protestant faith entirely unintelligible—and amalgamated portions of both to form a third, and ordained—"This is now to be your creed!"

This shows how shrewd a man may be in political matters, and how astonishingly short-sighted on religious questions. The people, neither of one party nor the other, suffered what was proposed in his Interim to be forced upon them. Each had its own creed, and rejected his. Although concessions were made to the Protestants on the doctrine of justification, and some other points, differences about Church constitutions, the hierarchy, and episcopal authority, could no longer be settled by a stroke of the pen.

When these difficulties appeared, recourse was had to force. At Augsburg, Ulm, Constance, Strasburg, Ratisbon, and all the cities of Upper Germany, the refractory inhabitants were treated with military executions; the Emperor's Spanish soldiers disturbed the peace of towns and families, and hundreds of faithful preachers in Southern Germany wandered about homeless with their wives and families. The Emperor would gladly have been content with gentle compulsion, threats, and intimidation; but these did not produce the desired effect. If the people had so readily adopted another creed, their former one must have been a lie. They had mostly to be driven to mass by soldiers, and all kinds of severity were practised.

Except in the helpless cities of Upper Germany, the Interim simply fell to the ground. The Catholics were not required to adopt it, and the Protestant rulers either rejected or refused to enforce it, and in both cases the result was the same.

When it was proclaimed by some prudent princes, as in the Palatinate and Würtemberg, their subjects crossed themselves, and simply kept to their old creed. Maurice proclaimed it, and had it weakened a little to make it more palatable; but he soon saw that it could not be seriously enforced, and contented himself with the appearance of good intentions. This displeased the Emperor, who had not expected such contumacy from his faithful ally. Further northward the Interim was met with open resistance. Magdeburg declared its intention of opposing it to the utmost, and it was the same in all the northern districts beyond the reach of the Emperor's arm. In short, the attempt to restore the unity of the German Church by the Interim, and by Spanish soldiers, was found to present great difficulties. A bitter feeling prevailed throughout Germany that all men had been grossly deceived, and that the rulers, who had said it was not a question of religion, had themselves been deluded. The fugitive press of those days teemed with bitter ill-will, and we still possess some prints in which it is said of Maurice, with true presentiment, that as he had, like Judas, betrayed his fellow-professors, so he would also betray the Emperor.

The news of the events which had transpired in the cities of Upper Germany spread rapidly throughout the empire. The hateful scenes which had been enacted, the violence towards governments and individuals, the exile of eminent citizens and faithful ministers, excited loud indignation everywhere. Such things showed the real significance of the Emperor's victory; and the greater the confidence before, the greater the exasperation now. The Emperor's Spanish policy was seen through, and it was known that the worst was to be expected from it.

In any case, if the Emperor could rely on his agents, a serious conflict was at hand. If the subjection of a few imperial cities, and the fall of the Palatinate and Würtemberg, had made such a noise, how would it be should the Emperor collect his forces to subjugate the North?

But, just when he thought to enjoy the fruits of the labour of years, he experienced the bitterest disappointment, for all the supports failed him on which he had hitherto relied—Rome, France, the ruling princes, and, above all, Maurice. This favourite pupil of his policy played off his masterpiece upon his master by so contriving that, by the most motley

of all coalitions, the Pope, the Turks, Rome and the German rulers, the Protestants and France, should combine to upset the Emperor's power.

**THE COUNCIL OF TRENT FROM DECEMBER, 1545, AND  
THE DIET OF AUGSBURG FROM SEPTEMBER, 1547.**

The Emperor's successes were regarded with mixed feelings at Rome. It was satisfactory that schism seemed to be put an end to; but it was not exactly agreeable that the Emperor's arm should rule from Rome to the Alps. It created great uneasiness when he began to meddle in ecclesiastical affairs, in which he was neither versed nor disposed to pay exclusive regard to the interests of the Curia. Ever since 1529 it had been Charles's idea to settle the ecclesiastical differences at a council. The document in which this plan was first proposed has already been given.\* He had inviolably maintained his intention of making the Protestants submit to a council; they were to return to the old church, and when that had been effected, he would influence the council to bring about a reconciliation which would satisfy all parties. If a basis of union were only attained, it was all one to him whether concessions were made on one side or the other, as to the doctrine of the supper, justification, &c.

Rome from the first only fell in with this plan reluctantly. She had no confidence in the imperial council, whether it was called, as at first, a general ecclesiastical, a free national council, or a national assembly, without the Pope. This was far too ambiguous for the views of the Curia. The convocation of the council was therefore continually opposed, and it was not till 1537 that the idea arose of stopping the increasing defection by this means. If the rulers continued exclusively to cultivate the private interests of their own houses, it was clear that half the world would turn apostate. The programme for a council was then drawn up; but years passed before it was called, and years more before it met, in 1545, at the time when Charles had nearly completed his preparations for a conflict with the heretics. The council depended on the proceedings of the Emperor against the heretics, and his proceedings

\* See pages 110 and 186.



on the Pope's concessions in the matter of the council. The Protestants were now subjugated, and, so far as they had accepted the Interim, must also acknowledge the council.

The Emperor would have preferred to have the council in Germany instead of, as the Pope demanded, in Italy. A place on the borders of Italy and Germany was finally fixed on—the bishopric of Trent, which still belonged to the German empire.

The first proceedings in the council indicated that there was a great dread of a repetition of the scenes of Constance and Basle. There was an evident desire to avoid everything which might awaken the lust of power which then prevailed, and to confirm as decidedly as possible the inviolability of papal authority. The assembly consisted of Spanish and Italian monks in overwhelming majority, and this was decisive as to its character.

When consulted as to the course of business, the Emperor had expressed a wish that those questions on which agreement between the parties was possible should first be discussed. There were a number of questions on which they were agreed, as, for example, Greek Christianity. Even now there are a number of points on which Protestants and Catholics are agreed, and differ from the Eastern Church.

If these questions were considered first, the attendance of the Protestants would be rendered very much easier; it would open the door as widely as possible, they would probably come in considerable numbers, and might in time take a part which at least might not be distasteful to the Emperor, and might influence his ideas on Church reform. The thought that they were heretics was half concealed. But Rome was determined to pursue the opposite course, and at once to agitate those questions on which there was the most essential disagreement, and to declare all who would not submit to be incorrigible heretics. It was considered of less importance to gain a few hundred thousand souls, more or less, than to maintain the infallibility of the ancient church, and not to offer a dangerous example of weakness and compliance.

The first subjects of discussion were, the authority of the Scriptures in the text of the Vulgate, ecclesiastical tradition, the right of interpretation, the doctrine of justification. These

were the questions on which the old and new doctrines were irreconcilably at variance; all other differences were insignificant in comparison.

And these questions were decided in the old Roman Catholic sense; not precisely as they had been officially treated in 1517—for the stream of time had produced some little effect—but in the main the old statutes were adhered to, and everything rejected which departed from them. This conduct was decisive. The Emperor had intended to attract the Protestants by smooth words of peace and reconciliation, and to render their first steps towards a return to unity as easy as possible; if they were once present at the council they would perhaps be of use to him in counterbalancing the overweening claims of the Curia; the idea of turning them to account to oppose the hierarchy itself was perhaps not far from his thoughts, but the attempt was not made. The Emperor had taken so much pains and made so many sacrifices to smooth the way for the council, had so often solemnly assured the Protestants that reforms should be made when once the council was secured, if they would not obstinately oppose it: but now the council was sitting, and the first word that sounded forth from Trent was *anathema sit!* From this time the Emperor and the Pope were at variance, and it was plain from the correspondence which took place between them that they could no longer agree.

The Pope thought proper to transfer the council to another place in order to lessen the Emperor's influence. He had already recalled the auxiliary troops from the imperial camp. On account of some deaths which had taken place at Trent, although they had diminished rather than increased, it was decided that a longer tarriance in the neighbourhood would endanger the health of the prelates, and in March, 1547, the greater part of the assembly migrated to Bologna.

In January, 1548, a solemn embassy from the Emperor arrived at Bologna, made a decided protest on the threshold of the assembly, and declared that the Council of Trent having been forcibly interrupted, everything debated and decreed at Bologna was null and void.

Thus, just as the Emperor was beginning to enforce his Interim in Germany, and to make his soldiers drive the Protestants to mass, he was met by the tremendous mis-

fortune of an open breach with Rome, and was compelled to enter a solemn protest against her proceedings. In such a state of things it was impossible that a great ecclesiastical contest should be carried on. In the conflict with the greater part of the German nation and rulers, it would never do to be at enmity with Rome; he must have one party or the other on his side. And just then, in opposition to the usual caution and coolness of his character, the Emperor had extensive projects which it would have been difficult to carry out under any circumstances, and under the present they were doubly audacious.

The Diet had assembled in 1547 under the impression of the Emperor's victories. He could there decree whatever he chose. The princes who had had the courage to oppose him were in prison, others stayed away; these exceptional circumstances occasioned a great preponderance in his favour.

He proclaimed the Pragmatic Sanction for the Netherlands, whereby his old Burgundian inheritance was declared by his own law to be indivisible, the succession settled on the house of Hapsburg, it was attached to the German empire as a tenth district, had to pay certain contributions, but was not to be subject to the Imperial Chamber or the Imperial Court of Judicature. He thus secured the personal union of these territories with his house, and made it the duty of the empire to defend them, while at the same time he withdrew them from the jurisdiction of the empire; it was a union by which the private interests of the house of Hapsburg had everything to gain, but which was of no advantage to the empire.

The other decrees which the Emperor had passed amounted almost to a formal revolution in Germany.

The seizure of ecclesiastical property, the spoliation of churches and monasteries and interference with ecclesiastical jurisdiction, were for the first time declared to be breaches of the peace. The Imperial Court of Judicature, the comparative independence of which had long been a thorn in the Emperor's side, was reconstituted, and the appointment to seats in it was assigned to him.

An imperial military treasury was established which would enable the Emperor, out of the resources of the empire, to maintain his Spanish troops in readiness, and to repress any insurrection.

The opposition to this proposal was almost universal, but the Emperor prevailed, at least at the Diet. He was master in Germany as no Emperor had been for centuries, but he was challenging the ruling aristocracy by a revolution which, whether beneficial or not, could not be carried out if those by whose means he had obtained his last great victory refused to accept it. It would never do for him, when he was at war both with Rome and with Protestantism, to challenge the high nobility of the German nation to a single combat. "One thing at a time," Luther used to say. Either of these three tasks would have been sufficient for the life work of one ruler, and to undertake them all at once was most presumptuous; but the Emperor's successes had got into his head, and he regarded nothing as impossible. Of course among the German princes the question, "Protestantism or Catholicism?" began to retreat into the background, and instead of doing anything to stifle this growing opposition, Charles rather aggravated it.

His treatment of the two imprisoned princes was quite unworthy of him. It was an absurd anachronism to act as no German Emperor had ever acted before, on account of their feuds with him, to pass hasty judgment upon them as if they had been common criminals, to deprive them of their territories and dignities, then to sentence them to death, and have them dragged from one prison to another.

It was all very well for Charlemagne, amidst immense successes, to depose the powerful Thassilo, who had twice betrayed him. When Conrad II. displaced his stepson as an incorrigible rebel, there were some disapproving voices, but the majority approved for the sake of order in the empire. But it was five hundred years since an Emperor had passed sentence of death on a prince of the empire within its bounds. Even Frederic I., after citing Henry the Lion five times to appear before him, only dispossessed him of his lands, and part of these were afterwards restored to him. The cause of John Frederic was the cause of all the German rulers. The good-natured Elector, who, though not a great, was a truly honourable man, possessed the confidence of all parties, and it was a shame to treat him like a common criminal. If the Emperor meant the sentence of death in earnest, it was a needless cruelty to keep it, like the sword of Damocles, hanging over his head; and

if not, it was making unpardonable sport with judicial murder.

Philip of Hesse was the most beloved of all the ruling princes of his time, and deservedly so; for, with all his weaknesses and passions, his faith and patriotism were matters of holy earnestness with him. The Emperor himself had had many proofs of this, and his troops all knew him as a brave soldier. To drag him from prison to prison, and to allow him to languish in loathsome dungeons till he nearly lost his reason, was not only barbarity, it was madness.

The complaints of the wretched prince were heart-rending, but were of no avail; and in vain did his eldest son offer to take his place in prison. Alba and Granvella neglected his petitions with coarse brutality, and the Emperor had no inclination to read them. The Landgrave reminded him of his word and promises so shamefully broken. He was kept in filthy holes, guarded by Spanish soldiers; and the stench and their brutality nearly drove him to despair. He says that instead of the four who were appointed, ten or twelve always came into his room; when he slept, they drew up the blinds to see that he did not escape through a mouse-hole, or a chink in the wall. From Augsburg he was removed to Nordlingen, to a public-house, where the landlord had lately died of the plague. On account of an uncivil answer, the Emperor deprived him of his physician, his secretary, and his other attendants, and writing materials were forbidden him. When he was taken down the shores of the Rhine in 1548, he was followed by a mob who called after him, "There goes the rebel and villain;" and it was plain that they were employed to do it. All the disputes that were pending between Hesse and its neighbours and vassals were decided meanwhile by the Emperor, and the country was oppressed in every way. The Landgrave was taken to a prison in Oudenarde, and made to enter into an ignominious treaty with the master of Germany.

When for his health's sake he wished to have meat in Passion week, the Spanish captain flung it to him on the ground. The Landgravine, who had fallen at the Emperor's feet in vain, was lying dangerously ill. Not long before her death, she addressed a touching petition to the Emperor, pointing out that all the conditions of the treaty had been fulfilled, and imploring him, for the sake of her father's

services, to restore her husband to her. In 1549 she died, without obtaining the least favour. The Landgrave was subjected to still stricter imprisonment at Malines, and placed under a brutal and bigoted Spanish gaoler. And after the failure of an attempt to escape in 1550, two of his faithful Hessians were hung before his eyes. He was deprived of all his German servants, and fell into a gloomy stupor which made it appear that his reason was in danger.

Men were learning every day in Germany what German liberty had to expect from the Spanish Emperor, whose Spanish soldiers were treating the princes as he treated the nation. The imperial troops were behaving everywhere as if they were in a conquered country; and the complaints that were uttered in fugitive papers and pamphlets indicate a national exasperation like that which prevailed in the worst times of Napoleon's rule, occasioned by the ignominy of the Confederation of the Rhine.

One paper said: "Germany shall not be subject to Spaniards and priests." In another: "It is come to this with the German nation; it is mocked at. God help us."

The feeling was this: "Are we the great nation on purpose that the Emperor may impose a brutal foreign yoke upon us?" The Emperor had no one on his side but his soldiers and his cabinet—all the great factors of the age were against him; Catholicism, Protestantism, the princes and people of Germany. We seek in vain for any voice which said, "Let us endure it all as a trial, so that we may but preserve the unity of the empire." We may make these reflections at our desks in the nineteenth century, but at that time they were impossible.

One German prince must have felt these expressions of open ill-will as so many pricks of conscience; for had it not been for the defection of Maurice of Saxony, the Protestant League would scarcely have been vanquished, and his honour was involved in the assurances given to Philip. It was long before he appeared to be amenable to these feelings, though his father-in-law, Philip, did not spare him admonitions, entreaties, and reproaches. He once wrote to him: "If he had been a poor vassal, and had given him such a verbal promise, he would go to the Emperor and say, 'Sire, we gave him this promise, and if you will not set him free, let me go to prison in his place.' If you act in

this way to avoid a little anger or displeasure, your reproach will never be extinguished, but will live in history."

In July, 1547, Maurice addressed himself to King Ferdinand, and represented to him that this conduct was making a fatal impression in the empire ; but it was of no avail. A personal appeal to the Emperor met with the same fate. The Emperor was blinded and supercilious, and even told Maurice that he would grant nothing of the kind ; he would have the Landgrave's body cut in two, and send half to each of the two securities. The intoxication of supreme power had caused even this cool calculator to lose his head. He was now ready to become a sacrifice to a masterly intrigue.



## CHAPTER XVII.

Maurice and the Conspiracy of the German Princes.—Isolation of the Elector among both Catholics and Protestants.—The Negotiations with France.—The Coalition against the Emperor.—Treaty with France, and Surprise of the Emperor, 1551-2.—Treaty of Chambord, January, 1552.—March of the Allies, March, 1552.—Security and Defiance of the Emperor.—Taking of the Ehrenberger Klause, May, 1552.—Charles's Flight.—The Treaty of Passau and the Peace of Augsburg, August, 1552—September, 1555.—Charles's Retreat and Last Days.—General Results of the Reformation in Germany.

### MAURICE AND THE CONSPIRACY OF THE GERMAN PRINCES, 1550-51.

MAURICE saw more and more plainly that his game could not be carried on very long. He was regarded with fearful hatred. All John Frederic's sufferings were ascribed to him, his faithless relative, and he was reproached with the ill-treatment of his father-in-law, the Landgrave, to whom he had given his word of honour. Nothing could be more hideous than the colours in which he was painted. In his own country, it was said that it was ruled by a twofold and threefold traitor, and a literature of pamphlets arose around him, in which the subject of Judas Iscariot was treated in a hundred different ways. Hatred and distrust encompassed him on every side, and then there was the position of affairs in general; the increasing oppression of a foreign yoke, the growing agitation in the nation, the Emperor's conflict with Rome, and the latest results of his political supremacy. It was suspected that the clever and cautious diplomatist had not yet spoken his last word, nor played his last card; still, if he did not make haste, the favourable moment would be frittered away. Otherwise, the captive Landgrave would be justified in saying, when told of the Elector's secret plans, "I can't understand how a

sparrow can conquer a vulture, when he drives away, and even disperses, the best birds."

All this occasioned Maurice to think—"I must try to regain my position in my country, and with the Protestant party, which will counterbalance the threatened supremacy of the Emperor."

His first idea was to incline the Emperor to clemency towards the Landgrave, and he made sure that his advice would be followed; but in this he was mistaken. By his protraction of the siege of Magdeburg, and keeping back his troops, it was plain that he wanted to reserve his forces. His first open defection was his refusal to appear at the Diet of Augsburg in 1550. He said that he and the Duke of Brandenburg could not honourably attend, unless the Emperor would set the Landgrave free. Besides, he had given the Landgrave's sons an express promise that he would not accept the Emperor's invitation.

He next turned a listening ear to France, to discover whether there were any intention in that quarter of preparing a diversion for her ancient foe, and France had already an inkling of the rising storm.

So Maurice did not go to Augsburg. He instructed his ambassador in reference to the council; again promised to urge that Protestants must be invited to it; that it must be conducted in a godly and Christian manner, according to the Scriptures; that false doctrines and abuses must be abolished: but these things must not be decided by discussions on the papal supremacy, but by reference to holy Scripture. To such a council he would send brave, learned, and peaceable men. But they were not to consent to the articles already decided on at Trent and Bologna. The Diet already showed the Emperor's isolation, and while the Elector once more received from it a mark of the Emperor's confidence, he was making advances to France behind his back, and this without any scruples of conscience. His conduct with regard to Magdeburg was remarkable. He delayed to execute the interdict which, immediately after the battle of Mühlberg, was pronounced against the city. He entered into negotiations with the subjects of it, but contrived to keep the management entirely in his own hands; it would be enough to have nothing to do with the interdicted persons, to break off all intercourse with the city; he had great scruples against a general war. This

was in December, 1548. Meanwhile, Denmark and the sea-port towns were preparing for war, as was supposed for Magdeburg; but this did not induce Maurice to take more decided measures, because it would only strengthen the cause of the city. The troops were slowly put in motion; the Diet of 1550 charged him with the execution of the interdict, but the position of affairs remained essentially the same.

Meanwhile strange rumours came from the imperial camp. Expressions were reported from Brussels, to the effect that things would not go on well in Germany unless the Emperor took the affairs of the German princes into his own hands; that all would go well when Prince Philip was settled on the throne. It would be better for Germany to have one master than so many tyrants.

And when Maurice did not appear at Augsburg, the Spaniards said that, as Maurice had shown himself so disobedient after the Emperor's victories, and as he and his subjects were all Lutherans, the Emperor was of opinion that he could not expect better things of him than of John Frederic. The ambassadors could not say enough of the arrogance of the Spaniards, their contempt of the Germans and wild fanaticism.

Maurice now made a show of more zeal against Magdeburg; took the Neustadt, November, 1550, and marched against Verden; all that he might have an excuse for not obeying the Emperor's summons to Augsburg, to help forward the Infanté Philip's election. The Austrian party among his ministers, and Carlowitz himself, complained that he did not do the town much harm. Nevertheless, the march against Verden pacified the imperial court. Duca Mauritio was, in the eyes of the Spaniards, the best and most useful servant. Maurice could, therefore, the better work undisturbed against the claims of the Infanté Philip; political interest and personal friendship with Maximilian, Ferdinand's son, concurred in inducing this. He went a step further, and looked earnestly about him for allies, as any prospect that the Emperor would yield grew less and less.

In February, 1551, he conferred with the Margrave John of Brandenburg as to the best means of releasing John Frederic and Philip of Hesse from prison. The Princes of Weimar, the Landgraves of Hesse, and other powers were

to be asked to join. But Maurice was still cautious, reminded the Margrave that he was the Emperor's servant, and asked if he knew what a difficult bird to hit they were aiming at. However, they at length agreed that the enterprise should be begun in the cause of liberty and religion, and for the release of the captive princes. They reckoned upon aid from Prussia, Pomerania, and Mecklenburg, and upon subsidies from France; an attack was afterwards to be made upon the Netherlands. England was even reckoned among the probable allies, and it was thought not impossible that the Turks might keep Ferdinand at home. With such a force, it was supposed that priests and monks might be driven out of Germany.

Very opportunely, a threatening despatch arrived from the Emperor, expressing his displeasure at Maurice's absence; he would show himself under another aspect in future, and the Landgrave's sons deserved severe punishment for their conduct. Added to this, Philip's complaints grew more grievous, for he feared that he was to be dragged away to Spain.

The greatest difficulty was to overcome the excessive distrust of Maurice. No one would believe that he was in earnest. The Margrave of Brandenburg had therefore to undertake to gain over the family of the captive prince, and to persuade them that this time Maurice would not play the traitor; but he had great difficulty in doing so. In May, 1551, John of Brandenburg, Maurice, William of Hesse, and Albert of Mecklenburg, met at Torgau. But, as is shown by a despatch of July, Maurice still held back from counsels that would lead to war. William of Hesse was right in saying that negotiations would be as useless as heretofore.

Once more Maurice and John of Brandenburg sent to Ferdinand, to represent to him more urgently than ever how ill their services had been requited. They referred to the negotiations at Halle, and to the fact that the treaty in all points presupposed a reigning, and not a captive Landgrave. All this was as unavailing as before, and Magdeburg became more and more a convenient pretext for warlike preparations.

THE TREATY WITH FRANCE, AND SURPRISE OF THE  
EMPEROR, 1551-2.

All these preparations were carried on with the greatest secrecy—the Emperor was to be taken entirely by surprise. To make quite sure of success, a conspiracy of the German princes was not enough. Maurice never doubted that they must secure the help of France, and was not to be deterred by some hesitation on the subject. The others did not think it quite so easy or so safe, and it took some time to convince them, John of Brandenburg especially, that this help would be desirable. By the beginning of 1551 they had, however, at length come to an agreement; and in May negotiations were set on foot by means of an embassy, sent by Maurice, John of Brandenburg, William of Hesse, and John Albert of Mecklenburg, to Henry II. He was to grant subsidies and make a diversion against the Emperor. In return, a prospect of the imperial crown was held out to him; and in case the election should fall on any other house, they promised not to stand by the imperial chief without the King's consent.

Henry's tactics were slow and cautious; still, a commissioner received his instructions in July. In October, Maurice, his brother, the Margrave of Brandenburg, and John Albert of Mecklenburg, met at Lochau, and discussed the mode of attack when France should have made up her mind. Hesse was to begin hostilities; Maurice was to come to an understanding with Magdeburg; at the same time the Treaty of Friedewald was concluded with France, and confirmed by Henry II. at Chambord on January 15th, 1552.

In consideration of a considerable sum of money granted to the allies, the King was to be empowered to occupy as Vicar of the Empire, reserving the imperial sovereignty, the imperial cities where German was not spoken, as Cambray, Metz, Toul, and Verdun. The allies also promised, when an Emperor was elected, to choose the King himself, or some prince agreeable to him. All the other States of the empire were to be asked to join, especially the sons of John Frederic.

In December, 1551, Saxony and Brandenburg, in connection with Denmark, the Palatinate, Zweibrücken, Bavaria, Baden, Würtemberg, and Mecklenburg, took the final step of sending an embassy to Innsbruck; but it was

as fruitless as before. The Emperor wished that Maurice should come to him at Innsbruck, and Maurice pretended that he meant to comply, but he came in a very different way from what the Emperor expected.

The siege of Magdeburg was now raised, and the city surrendered to Maurice. He promised to induce the Emperor to allow it to retain its privileges and liberties. There was also in all probability some secret arrangement, for Magdeburg was to be a refuge for him in case the enterprise against the Emperor failed.

Thus the storm gathered over the Emperor. He had warnings enough, but he no longer had any friends to do anything for him. A bitter feeling prevailed against him on all sides, and there was ill-humour and dissension even in his own camp and his own family. His brother Ferdinand was King of Germany, and had become so accustomed to the dignity that he had no other idea than that the imperial throne was destined for him and his son Maximilian. But at the Diet at Augsburg Charles made every effort to secure the crown for his son Philip, and his brother was deeply offended.

The isolation and desertion of the Emperor was complete, yet it is striking to observe how blind and unsuspecting, notwithstanding all his knowledge of men, he was as to the danger. The repeated reports of what was going on did not disturb his peace; "the upright and downright Germans," he said carelessly, "are not clever enough for such cunning intrigues." He attributed no hostile intentions to Maurice, and if the worst came to the worst, he thought he was in his power. Yet the difficulties of the enterprise were by no means overcome, and a timely effort might still have frustrated it. The increasing demands of France became burdensome to the allies. In Saxony the States shrank from war, theologians like Melancthon had scruples, zealous Lutherans circulated all sorts of reports against Maurice, which could not fail to expose him. In fact, suspicion was getting more and more confirmed, and Ferdinand secretly conveyed warning hints to Maurice; but the Emperor remained quiet. Happen what might, he considered that he had a chained bear in John Frederic, whom he had only to let loose to strangle Maurice. But he did not seriously suspect anything, and continued to give fair but empty promises.



In March, 1552, the revolt broke out, and the three armies were united.

Maurice marched by way of Weissenfels, Naumburg, Weimar, and Erfurt, collecting his forces by the way, and on the 23rd of March he joined William of Hesse at Bischofsheim. Before setting out, he had sent a despatch to Ferdinand, indicating what was coming. The manifesto followed containing the grievances on the subject of religion, complaints of the Emperor's attempt to assert his own dominion, authority, and power, "the infamy and unreasonableness" of Philip's imprisonment, the dominion of foreign troops, and the "bestly hereditary servitude" which it had been attempted to impose upon the Germans.

By way of Schweinfurt and Kitzingen Maurice advanced to Rothenburg in Franconia, where he was joined by Albert of Brandenburg, and their united forces then marched to Augsburg, "the watch-tower of the imperial power," where the Protestant restoration began at once, after the imperial garrison had hastily evacuated the city. The princes and cities of Upper Germany now joined the electors; the French also advanced; the aspect of affairs in Italy was portentous. Then the Turks were again threatening an attack, which hampered Ferdinand. It was now too late to propose negotiations; it could only serve as a means to gain time. On the 6th of April the Emperor resolved to leave Innsbruck and go to Flanders. He only got as far as Leermos, and received news on all sides of the advance of the enemy.

At this juncture Ferdinand succeeded in obtaining a conference with Maurice at Linz. He thought that he could not refuse it, though the French did not conceal their disapproval. The Saxon ministers and States, on the contrary, zealously promoted it, and perhaps Maurice was the more induced to go by the arrogant tone of the French allies. But Charles even then could not come to a decision, and wasted the precious time in empty talk.

Maurice and Ferdinand met on the 18th of April. The latter was disposed for a peaceful settlement. He promised the release of the Landgrave; that no one should suffer for his faith, but that the differences should be arranged at a Diet; the grievances in the Government should be redressed, and peace negotiated with France. Ferdinand would recommend his brother to make these concessions,



and they should be definitively arranged at a second meeting, at Passau. Maurice declined an armistice until then, the 26th of May; but he strongly represented to the French the advantages of a peaceful settlement. France, however, had other schemes in view, and the Emperor was still hesitating, which gave the French good reason to complain of the Elector's credulity.

From the camp, and especially from William of Hesse, urgent advice came to settle the question speedily by an appeal to arms. If an armistice was to begin on the 26th of May, when the negotiations were to take place, they considered it all the more necessary to end the campaign by that time, and so take advantage of the situation. Maurice thought them hot-headed; still it was to be considered that the Emperor would strengthen the Tyrol. There were but a few marches up the Lech from Augsburg to the entrance of the Tyrol, to the pass which Schertlin had desired to close, to prevent the entrance of the imperial troops into Germany. During the second week in May, therefore, they advanced towards the Tyrol.

The Emperor was now first undeceived, but he was helpless. When he roused himself up to offer some opposition to the enemy, he only reached North Tyrol to find his pass near Füssen occupied. He was shut in in the pass called the "Ehrenberger Klause."

The taking of the fortress of Ehrenberg by Maurice, by a single blow, was in those days considered an exploit of the first class, and by it he possessed himself of the key of the Tyrol. The Emperor was compelled to fly, and had it not been that some of the troops of the allies mutinied after the taking of the pass, they would probably have succeeded in overtaking and capturing the Emperor by a forced march. It has been supposed that it was not Maurice's wish to do this, but this is a mistake. He was no friend of half measures, and had a great desire to catch the "old fox" in his den.

The Emperor escaped to Steiermark—a general without an army, a king without a country. His inheritance, and the mountain fortresses of which he had scornfully boasted, were in the hands of the enemy. John Frederic and Philip were released; the edifice which he had reared after the battle of Mülberg was in ruins; he was crushed by the blow. He had had the reputation of remaining firm and

undaunted even after great reverses, and up to 1547 this had been so; up to that time he had taken good and ill fortune with calmness. But the successes of that year had intoxicated him; he had done what the most powerful cannot venture to do, and the sudden reverse which now occurred seemed all the more disastrous.\*

In explanation of how all this came about, a few words of Lazarus Schwendi's may be useful. He says: "The Emperor gave the preference to strangers, and many grievous and suspicious things took place under the highest of the foreign ministers; the grievances in the empire were not redressed, and no settled peace was concluded on the subject of religion; thus the Emperor could not regain the good-will of the Germans and attach them to himself, which is evident from the fact that, at the time of Maurice's advance, almost every one in the empire was on his side, and no one would offer the Emperor any help or succour. The complaints had been welcomed and approved by everybody."

THE TREATY OF PASSAU, AND THE RELIGIOUS PEACE OF AUGSBURG, 1552—SEPTEMBER, 1555.—CHARLES V.'S LAST DAYS.—GENERAL RESULTS OF THE GERMAN REFORMATION.

The Emperor left the negotiations to his brother Ferdinand, who entered into a treaty at Passau, by which it was agreed that the imprisoned princes should be released, and the religious question settled on the basis of liberty of conscience.

He felt the successes of the French on the other side of the Rhine even more keenly than these extorted concessions. He had been at war with them from 1521 to 1544; had always beaten them; had repulsed their repeated attacks upon Milan and Naples; he had acted with magnanimity towards them, and now, after the death of his able rival, Francis I., Henry II., a prince by no means his equal, and without personal merit, had succeeded, solely through fortuitous circumstances, the elastic conscience of Maurice, and to some extent by underhand dealings, in detaching

\* This representation does not altogether agree with his opposition to the Treaty of Passau—E.D.

three territories from the empire, which were of more value than all which the Emperor had obtained by treaty from the French.

The saying, "If Strasburg and Vienna are threatened at one time, I will go to Strasburg," would not perhaps have been carried out in practice, but it showed a true instinct. The Turks might be regarded as a waning, the French as a rising power, and, with their compactness as a nation, they obtained lasting and increasing strength from every success. Metz, an important fortress, was now in the hands of the French, and the fate of their latest acquisitions depended on their maintaining it. The Emperor's last enterprise was an attempt to regain this valuable possession, but the French had done everything to secure it; it was so skilfully defended by Francis of Guise, external circumstances, weather and health were so decidedly unfavourable to the attacking party, that the Emperor's hurried campaign was a complete failure, and in January, 1553, the attempt was given up as hopeless. It was his last enterprise and last failure in the empire.

He now began to entertain the idea of resigning the business of government. Originally weakly in constitution, and having pursued a course not likely to strengthen it, he was prematurely old and feeble, and had lost the courage to take up his work again. He had formerly formed various vast projects all at once, but now all inclination for them, and all his elasticity of will, had deserted him. Not that he wished to renounce politics altogether, for to do that would have been to him not to live at all; but he resolved to share the business, to lay down the responsibility, to exchange the burden of the immediate conduct of it for the less thankless office of secret oversight, and above all to leave the scenes of his keenly felt defeats. The consideration might also have had some weight that, in order to ensure the continuance of his policy, it would be advisable to introduce his young son into business, and to aid him with his paternal advice. This might have been his idea of the part he would take in politics when, in the autumn of 1555, he entrusted his son Philip with the government of the Netherlands, and soon after with that of the Spanish and Italian territories also. After 1556 he resigned the control of the affairs of the empire; in the autumn of the same year the formal abdication took place, and the Em-

peror withdrew to the monastery of St. Just.\* Here he continued to take a share in politics, but selected what gave him pleasure and no trouble ; he even had a numerous retinue, was still styled Emperor, and more couriers and messengers came and went than at many courts. He was occasionally overcome by the tendency to melancholy, which he inherited from his mother, but he never had more than passing paroxysms of it. He received information of everything, and upon every important question issued instructions to his son ; he reigned jointly with him, but without exactly sharing the burdens of government. But even in the peaceful seclusion of the cloister, into which he had, as he thought, withdrawn from the turmoil of the world, the controversy was forced upon him which had shaped his life. Hitherto Catholicism had been more vigorous in Spain than anywhere else, and he probably consoled himself with the thought that here he would never be disturbed by the defection from the faith which had occasioned his retirement ; but Protestantism began to spring up even here, and in some of the villages near the imperial retreat. It seemed as if he was never to have a respite from what had been pursuing him all his life, for it followed him with demon-like footsteps even here.

#### RETREAT OF CHARLES V., AND GENERAL RESULTS OF THE REFORMATION IN GERMANY.

The acknowledged defeat of Charles V. before the great reform question of the sixteenth century, was a plain indication of the course destiny was taking. The imperial power had entered into the contest with greater resources than had ever been possessed before ; it had had a splendid vision of regeneration, yet all had resulted in a great collapse. While imperialism outwardly adhered to the great traditions of the Middle Ages, it was in reality as much a stranger to them as to the modern movements which it aimed to suppress. Entirely destitute of the great moral levers of the Middle Ages, the devotion of vassals and religious enthusiasm ; even at enmity with the most potent sources of mediæval development, it entered into a conflict with the

\* Stirling's *Cloister Life of Charles V.*, 1853. Gachard, *Retraite et mort de Charles V.*, Brux., 1854. Pichot, *Charles V.*, Paris, 1854. Mignet, *Charles V., son abdication, &c.*, 1854.

national idea, and the spirit of religious liberty which was then making way; and its only weapon, the heartless modern policy of cabinets, which takes cognizance of outward factors only, showed in glaring colours its absolute impotence and absolute isolation.

This being the inevitable fate of a policy which had enormous resources at its disposal, and which, when it undertook to restore mediæval uniformity, secular and ecclesiastical, was not in unskilful hands, it was plain that the attempt was an absurdity, that the time for it was gone by for ever, that even the greatest personages were not equal to the task.

Recent events, therefore, were a great victory for those opposition tendencies which were labouring to subdue the mediæval spirit and institutions. The weapon of the Middle Ages, the imperial power, had once again obtained the ascendancy, but it had now sunk lower than ever. The unity of the faith, which an attempt had been made to enforce by external means, was broken up, and a dualism established in the Western Church, which it was henceforth impossible to prevent; the nations were become independent, having burst the bonds of cabinet policy. With the help of the people, the reigning princes had just obtained a complete victory for the cause of religion. Thus, all that was opposed to mediævalism was completely in the ascendant. It was this which gave a historical significance to recent events, and to the retreat of the Emperor.

Late in the autumn of 1555, the peace which had been promised, and the preliminaries of which had been settled at Passau, was concluded at Augsburg.

It was based upon all that had been considered as merely temporary concession ever since 1532. "A peace shall be established and concluded," it was said, "which shall be permanent, absolute, and unconditional, and which shall last for ever."

In accordance with this, it was ordained by the decree of the Diet, on the 25th of September, 1555, that neither his imperial majesty, nor electors, nor princes, nor States, shall offer violence to any State on account of the Augsburg Confession, or of its religion or faith, nor in any way molest them on account of this confession, or ecclesiastical usages and ordinances, but leave them quietly alone in possession of their property, and religious differences shall only be

adjusted by peaceful Christian methods. But the new doctrines which were not in accordance with the Augsburg Confession were not included in this settlement. This was specially aimed at the Reformed party, the followers of Zwingli and Calvin, whose doctrines were now agitating a great part of the world.

Altogether, there was a good deal in the Peace which made it burdensome to both parties; the right to retain their faith was granted to the electors, princes, and states of the empire, but it was to them only, not to their subjects. The principle of 1526, *cuius regio, eius religio*, was again adopted and permanently established. It was not liberty of conscience that was granted in our sense of the term, but liberty for the governments to choose their creed. This principle involved both parties in difficulty. The Protestants thought, if this is strictly carried out we shall have no security that Protestant subjects of Catholic ecclesiastical princes will not be molested and suffer violence. They therefore sought protection in a clause by which it was provided that cities, nobles, and districts which were subject to ecclesiastics, but had long adhered to the Augsburg Confession, should not be compelled to renounce it, but should be left unmolested until a final settlement was arrived at.

But there was also a difficulty for the Catholic princes. If the bishops took it into their heads to turn Protestants, and to secularise their bishoprics, the result would be the same as in the case of Cologne. To obviate this, Ferdinand put in the clause relating to "ecclesiastical reservation" (*reservatio ecclesiastica*), which provided that if an ecclesiastical State leaves the ancient Church, its dignity and honours remain undiminished (*honore et fama illibatis*), but it is to be deprived of its livings and bishoprics.

The Peace of Augsburg conceded the legal right of the two Churches to exist side by side, and thus broke through the mediæval Church system.

A violent convulsion had taken place in this and all other countries, and there was a general impression that a new era was at hand.

It is always difficult to trace the permanent results of a process of development. During such transition periods all things are in a state of growth, and they are anything but times of peaceful enjoyment of the advantages gained, or of objective contemplation of the changes taking place.



Nevertheless, certain great outlines were traced at this time to which it took men a long time to become accustomed, but which undoubtedly indicated the essential and lasting form of a new order of things.

Besides this, the temporal power had at length obtained its rights. Political life had freed itself from the unnatural bondage of ecclesiastical fetters, from the unconditional subjection of the laity to ecclesiastical authority, and its exclusive supremacy in matters of faith. Education and domestic life was at an end. The State regained its natural sovereignty, was in a position to pursue its moral objects undisturbed, and within its own sphere to reject all ecclesiastical interference. The modern state, which is utterly different from that of the Middle Ages, and, in that it has aims of its own to pursue, and is not the tool of a power external to it, is more like the states of antiquity, was in embryo, and thus a mighty creation was preparing for future times.

Further, learning and intellectual life altogether had outgrown the restrictions of ecclesiastical authority, and had begun to take a course of its own. It need not be said that a comparatively large intellectual development was possible even within the old limits. No one, with the imperishable monuments of mediæval art and poetry before him, will assert that intellectual life was slumbering in the Middle Ages. But its development was one-sided, and those spheres which required a freedom unknown at that period received but little or no attention. Mediæval philosophy was but the handmaid of theology, calculated to cultivate that formal way of thinking which was not only subject to the dogmatic teaching of the Church, but consented to verify it from its own immutable principles. Whoever passed these limits was a heretic. Speculative thought, which is subject to its own laws, and acknowledges no others, was incompatible with this; the impulse to look a newly-discovered truth in the face, and to investigate it unrestrained by outward prohibitions, was now first allowed full play. And with this the first impulse to true learning was given.

Free scope was now for the first time given to historical research into the life of nations, to the investigation of men and things as they really were, without having a programme prescribed beforehand; and it was the same with the study of the natural world. It was quite in the mediæval spirit



that the earth had been hitherto regarded, as in the Old Testament, as a disc, the heavens as a shade, so to speak, placed over it, and the sun and stars as the moving fire-balls of this stationary world; and it was quite in the modern spirit that these theories were no longer heeded, and conclusions drawn from the discoveries of Columbus and Copernicus entirely irrespective of them.

It is this research in accordance with the laws of experience and observation, in the world of nature and the world of mind, that distinguishes the modern from the mediæval spirit, and the first world-wide impulse to it begins with the Reformation.

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## PART IV.

### CALVINISM, AND THE BEGINNING OF CATHOLIC RESTORATION.\*

#### CHAPTER XVIII.

**Calvin's Youth.**—Characteristics of the Man and his System.—The "Institutio Religionis Christianæ," 1536.—Calvin's Ecclesiastical State in Geneva.—The Attempt, 1536-8.—Success, 1541-64.—The Organization of January, 1542.—Ecclesiastical and Moral Discipline of Calvinism, and its Historical Importance.

#### CALVIN'S YOUTH.—CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS SYSTEM.

**A**s the German Reformation is connected with Martin Luther, and the Swiss with Ulrich Zwingli, that of the Romanic and Western European nations is connected with John Calvin, the most remarkable personage of the time. He was not equal either to Luther or Zwingli in general talent, mental vigour, or tranquillity of soul; but in logical acuteness and talent for organization he was at least equal, if not superior, to either. He settled the basis for the development of many states and churches.

He stamped the form of the Reformation in countries to which he was a stranger. The French date the beginnings of their literary development from him, and his influence was not restricted to the sphere of religion, but embraced their intellectual life in general; no one else has so permanently influenced the spirit and form of their written language as he.

\* Joh. Calvini Opera. Amstelod, 1667. Johann Calvins Leben, von P. Henry. Hamburg, 1835. Weber, Geschichte des Calvinismus, 1836. Bungener, Calvin, sa vie, son œuvre et ses écrits, 1862. Merle d'Aubigné, Histoire de la Reformation au temps de Calvin, I.—II., 1864-63.

Calvin was younger than Luther and Zwingli by almost the term of human life, and was a child when the first reform movements began in Germany and Switzerland. He was not the originator of the idea of breaking away from the ancient Church, and of founding a new Christianity on the basis of the Scriptures. The German and Swiss Reformers had the priority in this respect. The revolutionary element especially, which was combined with the Reformation, could not have originated with him; he belongs almost to the second generation of its representatives.

Calvin was a pupil of the German Reformation, which originated and pursued its course independently. But this is no reason for undervaluing his labours; and we shall find such an individuality stamped upon his acts, that we shall recognise in them not only their distinguishing features, but a peculiar greatness and significance. *JAC. Franck*

John Calvin was born on the 11th of July, 1509, at Noyon, in Picardy, a province which has produced several of those rugged and sharply-defined characters which we are not accustomed to look for in France, where we expect to find more pliant and flexible natures.

The circumstances of his parental home could not be called unfavourable. His father was procurator fiscal at Noyon, and gave his son a good and learned education, and it was his wish that he should study secular jurisprudence. He knew nothing of the suffering during childhood by which Luther was schooled and hardened, and was likewise a stranger to the bitter spiritual conflicts through which he passed in his youth. Calvin made acquaintance with the modern classical culture at the best French schools, received excellent instruction in Greek and Latin, and was well prepared for the technical study of jurisprudence. He was in possession of a scholarship from his fourteenth year, had pursued a variety of studies at Paris and Bourges, and was to complete them at Orleans. But here, as with Luther at Erfurt, a change took place within him.

At Orleans the lawyer became a theologian. Here he met with a few men—there was a German among them, and others came afterwards—who acquainted him with the Wittenberg doctrines, and incited him to investigate them. He began to study the Scriptures and the German reformers, and in a few years the transformation was complete, for he never did anything by halves.

He never disowned this German influence. While he regarded Zwingli with a certain contempt, he always had the greatest esteem for Luther. His depth of character, his affection for the ancient Church, and reluctant defection from it, made a deep impression upon him.

A brilliant future would have been before him in the ancient Church. Even in this youthful circle he was considered to possess great talent. He was early distinguished for the precision of his ideas, the acuteness of his words, the true French art of terse and striking expression—in short, for his dialectic power—and it is not surprising that his friends should imagine that he would be a great lawyer or statesman. But with the cool determination which characterized him all his life, he renounced all these prospects. When he devoted himself to theology an important living was conferred upon him, though he was only eighteen. But after embracing the new doctrines, he renounced all, and at once began to preach his heretical convictions.

The case was very different in France from what it was in Germany. There, various influences were at work; though the Emperor was opposed to the new doctrines, the nation was for the most part in favour of them, and their spread was increased by this schism. Heretical tendencies did exist in France, but the temporal power, in close alliance with Rome, did all in its power to stifle them in the bud. Calvin very soon had to fly from France, for even the protection afforded him by some influential people could not be permanent. He saw that those around him who professed the same doctrines were burnt. On the advice of his friends, therefore, he went abroad, visited Italy and Germany, and passed some time at Strasburg and Basle. Here he produced his first great work, and a most remarkable work it is, one of the ripest products of the age, though written at a time when the first foundations of the Reformation were already laid. It was the "Institutio Christianæ Religionis," which appeared in 1536.\*

The book was afterwards translated into French. It was the first important archive in French prose in the sixteenth century, and it has had an immense influence upon the literature of the nation. Calvin's prose formed a real epoch in France. The fundamental idea of the work,

which first appeared in Latin, may be discovered from the plan of it.

The "Institutio" consists of four books, of which the first, "De Cognitione Dei Creatoris," treats of man's relation to God and of original sin; the second, "De Cognitione Dei Redemptoris," of Christology and the doctrines of the New Testament; the third, "De Modo Recipiendæ Christi Gratia;" the fourth, "De Externis Mediis," of the outward means of revelation, the Church, the sacraments, and the *politica administratio*.

This is the structure of this admirable work. It begins with a profound discussion of all the religious questions which had been cleared of the dogmatic and scholastic rubbish of the Middle Ages, and concludes with the consideration of outward means, the Christian congregation, and the worship of God.

If we grant the great dialectician his premisses, we are compelled to accept his conclusions. It is generally the premisses which are called in question. The systematic construction of the doctrines of the faith in the first three books is perhaps less interesting than the contents of the fourth, in which he refers to the original form of the Church, demonstrates that the hierarchy has oppressed and overborne the true Church, that it must be restored on its original basis, that of the congregation, and therefore everything must be renounced which even savours of the later hierarchical superstructure.

Not less remarkable is the way in which he handles the sacraments.

As is well known, the doctrines of Calvin still take a very high place in theological research. He is far more logical than Luther, in whom the first fermenting processes of the Reformation may be traced; and he is far removed from the moderate interpretations of Zwingli. His conception of baptism and the supper is deeper than Zwingli's, whose symbolical makeshifts he could not accept, and more logical than Luther's, for he rejects transubstantiation. There was a touch of mystical speculation in it which places him on a level with the greatest theological thinkers. Zwingli's doctrine was too superficial and prosaic for him, and on these points Calvin's views were more like those of the mediæval mystics.

His relation to the ancient Church was as peculiar as

that to the new faith. He was more bitterly opposed to it than any one else. Passionate and cutting things had indeed been said of Rome, but nothing so crushing had been urged against the Curia in the whole range of polemics as the attempt to prove that the Church of Rome, in its origin and growth, was utterly opposed to the true Church of Christ. Never had the hierarchical principle of the mediæval Romish Church been the subject of a fiercer attack than by Calvin's unimpassioned and cold-blooded assertion, that it was utterly opposed to the original idea of the constitution of the Church, and he was therefore regarded by Rome as a more dangerous and implacable enemy than Luther. But, on the other hand, he was adhering to the old Catholic principle in maintaining that Church and State should grow together into one, each permeated by the other. The hierarchical principle, which he rejected, nevertheless exercised an immense influence over him, with this great difference, that his hierarchy, instead of growing out of the papal Church system, grew out of the congregation; the tree, as it were, grew up from seed instead of being planted. The hierarchical tendency, love of dominion in the name of convictions which he held to be the only right ones, was very strongly marked in him; his ecclesiastical state was intended to interfere in all the relations of life, in the family and education; it was to rule public morals with undisputed sway, though it was based upon the democracy of the congregation.

Calvin's historical significance lay in this, that to the compact system of ancient dogmatic doctrine he opposed a new system of religion, far more compact and logical than that of any other Reformer; also, that in the matter of Church authority he more decidedly freed himself from Romish tradition than any one else. It was his wish to see every sphere of life under the sway of an ecclesiastical State; only the sovereignty was to be exercised by the congregation, instead of by the Pope.

#### CALVIN'S ECCLESIASTICAL STATE IN GENEVA, 1536-8 AND 1541-64.

Humanly speaking, it was a mere accident which caused Calvin to yield to the entreaties of his friends to remain in the city where he was to begin his renowned efforts in the

cause of reform. Geneva had been from ancient times one of the most flourishing imperial cities of the Burgundian territory ; it was situated on the frontiers of several countries where the cross roads of various nationalities met. The city, which in itself was remarkable, belonged originally to the German empire ; the language of its inhabitants was Romanic ; it was bounded on one side by Burgundy, on the other by German Switzerland ; was the seat of a bishopric ; and it had in its rear the secular power of the ambitious dukes of Savoy.

Geneva was apparently in a state of political, ecclesiastical, and moral decay. With the puritanical strictness of Geneva, as it afterwards became, before the mind's eye, it is difficult to picture the Geneva of that day. An unbridled love of pleasure, a reckless wantonness, a licentious frivolity had taken possession of Genevan life, while the State was the plaything of intestine and foreign feuds. The influence of the bishop generally predominated in the State, while the Duke of Savoy extended the arm of his temporal power over the city, and took pleasure in fomenting the quarrels between it and the bishop, in order that he might in the end exchange the part of a wily mediator for that of ruler over both. Geneva had well-nigh perished in its luxury, pleasure, and riches. In the language of strict moralists, it was a sort of "Sodom"—a commonwealth torn in pieces by party-spirit, the independence of which was endangered.

Reformers had already appeared in the city : Vinet, Farel, Theodore Beza ; they were Frenchmen, Farel a near neighbour of Geneva. These French Reformers are of quite a different stamp from our Germans, who, according as Luther or Melancthon is taken as their type, have either a plebeian popular, or learned theological character. They are either popular orators of great power and little polish, or they belong to the learned circles, and keep strictly to this character.

In France they were mostly men belonging not to the lower, but to the middle and higher ranks of society, refined and cultivated ; and in this fact lay the weakness of Calvinism, which knew well how to *rule* the masses, but never to gain their affection. It was more obvious that the Bezas, the Farel, and Vinets were men of refined and polished culture than that they were learned theologians, and there was nothing whatever of the tribune about them ;



they belonged to aristocratic society, were elegant and polished speakers, and so masterly was their power of expression that they were the greatest parliamentary orators of France.

Calvin, though he despised ornament, possessed this power also, and he was the first writer of that keen, logical precision, that pleasing simplicity and unadorned terseness, which we justly admire in the masters of modern French prose.

His greatness, however, was shown in the fanatical zeal with which he entered the city, ready to stake his life for his cause. He began to teach, to found a school, to labour on the structure which was the idea of his life, to introduce reforms in doctrine, worship, the constitution and discipline of the Church, and he preached with that powerful eloquence only possessed by those in whom character and teaching are in unison. The purified worship was to take place within bare, unadorned walls; no picture of Christ, nor pomp of any kind, was to disturb the aspirations of the soul. Life outside the temple was also to be a service of God; games, swearing, dancing, singing, worldly amusements, and pleasure were regarded by him as sins, as much as real vice and crime. He began to form little congregations, like those in the early ages of the Church, and it need scarcely be said that even in this worldly and pleasure-loving city the apparition of this man, in the full vigour of life, all conviction and determination, half prophet and half tribune, produced a powerful impression.

The number of his outward followers increased, but they were outward followers only. Most of them thought it would be well to make use of the bold Reformer to oppose the bishop, and that he would find means of establishing a new and independent Church, but they seemed to regard freedom as libertinism. Calvin therefore regarded the course things were taking with profound dissatisfaction; he was quite indifferent to the increasing number of his followers, if they continued as worldly as before, if his strict discipline did not take root, and if, in spite of well-filled churches, things went on as before, as though his teaching concerned only the outward man.

So he delivered some extremely severe sermons, which half frightened and half estranged his hearers; and at Easter, 1538, when the congregation came to partake of the Lord's

Supper, he took the unheard-of step of sending them all back from the altar, saying, "You are not worthy to partake of the Lord's body; you are just what you were before; your sentiments, your morals, and your conduct are unchanged."

This was more than could be hazarded without peril to his life. The effect was indescribable; his own friends disapproved of the step. But that did not dismay him. He had barely time to flee for his life, and he had to leave Geneva in a state of transition--a chaos which justified a saying of his own, that defection from one Church is not renovation by another.

He was now once more an exile. He wandered about on the frontiers of his country, in the German cities of Strasburg, Basle, &c., and we several times meet with him in the religious discussions between 1540 and 1550. Many important works date from this period ("De Cœna," and the second edition of the "Institutio"). It is evident that he was carrying on the culture of his mind, but this second repulse perhaps left a bitterness in his spirit which he never overcame. Life did not present itself to him under a cheerful aspect; the understanding and logic were to him all in all; the idea that the great mission wherewith he was entrusted had been frustrated by the frivolity of the masses embittered his soul.

But a time came when they wished him back at Geneva. With the beginnings of the Calvinistic transformation the foundations were laid of greater liberty in municipal life, but this was again endangered; it seemed as if morality and liberty would perish together. There was for three years a tumult of party strife, and it was plain that Geneva would be lost if, having forsaken the old Church, she refused to belong to the new. These were years of bitter trial. Calvin compared them to the time when the Lord's people were in the wilderness. But a great triumph was in store for him, for the people were soon saying with one voice, "Let us recall the man who wished to renovate our faith, our morals, and our liberties." An urgent request was preferred to him to return and to become lawgiver of the city.

In September, 1541, he returned, and began his celebrated labours. Endowed with supreme power, like Lycurgus at Sparta, he set to work to make Geneva a city of the Lord—

to found an ecclesiastical state in which religion, public life, government, and the worship of God were to be all of a piece, and an extraordinary task it was. Calvinistic Geneva became the school of reform for western Europe, and scattered far and wide the germs of similar institutions. In times when Protestantism elsewhere had become cool, this school carried on the conflict with the mediæval Church.

Calvin was implacable in his determination to purify the worship of God of all needless adjuncts. All that was calculated to charm and affect the senses was abolished; spiritual worship should be independent of all earthly things, and should consist of edification by the word, and simple spiritual songs. All the traditional externals that Luther had retained—altars, pictures, ceremonials, and decorations of every kind—were dispensed with. It was one of the characteristics of the Middle Ages that the Church thought as much of exciting the senses of the faithful as of promoting edification and religious feeling, and in course of time it might almost be said without injustice that the sensuous had gained the victory over the spiritual. Calvin laboured consistently in the contrary direction. When we look at average human nature, it is quite open to doubt whether this principle in all its stringency can be permanently carried out; but it was a grand idea to restore the almost extinguished spiritual element in religion to its original supremacy. It may be objected that it expects too much of human nature, but not that it is opposed to the spirit of Christianity.

Calvin next established a system of Church discipline which controlled the individual in every relation of life, and ruled him from the cradle to the grave. He retained all the means by which ecclesiastical authority enforced obedience on the faithful in the Middle Ages—baptism, education up to confirmation, penance, penal discipline, and excommunication. There was, of course, no consecration of priests, and he reduced the number of sacraments to a minimum; but no other reformer so far demanded the sacrifice of personal freedom; and indeed on this point he far surpassed the ancient Church, for her theoretical strictness was modified by indulgences and other latitudinarian practices, whereas Calvin's theories were carried out with the utmost rigour. There was, however, one mitigation: they were not im-

posed by the sovereignty of an individual, but by a minister and administrator chosen by a self-governing community. It was a great idea to enforce the strictest discipline and entire subjection, but to enforce it in the name of the community instead of by sovereign power.

There is no more interesting spectacle in history than Calvinism—this curious combination of the reformed and mediæval Church system, of modern monarchical and ancient republican government.

Calvin began his labours late in the autumn of 1541, and he acquired and maintained more power than was ever exercised by the most powerful popes. He was indeed only the "preacher of the word," but through his great influence he was the lawgiver, the administrator, the dictator of the State of Geneva. There was nothing in the commonwealth that had not been ordained by him, and this indicates a remarkable aspect of his character.

3/ The organization of the State of Geneva began with the ordinances of the 2nd of January, 1542. There were four orders of officials—pastors, teachers, elders, and deacons. The Consistory was formed of the pastors and elders. The pastors were to preach, teach, and distribute the sacraments. Every candidate for the office underwent an examination as to whether he had a sound knowledge of Scripture, whether he had the capacity for instructing the people in it, whether he was a man of good conduct and had lived a blameless life. Only those who had passed this triple test were eligible by the community. The duties of pastors were precisely defined. They were to celebrate the Lord's Supper four times a year; psalms were to be sung before and after the sermon. They were to conduct the education of youth, visit the families to see that no one came to the Lord's table ignorantly or unprepared, and they were regularly to visit prisoners and the sick.

It was the special duty of the Consistory, which was composed of the clergy and twelve laymen, to see that the ordinances were duly observed, and it was the supreme tribunal of morals. The twelve laymen were elected for a year, by the council of two hundred, on the nomination by the clergy. The Consistory met every Thursday to see that everything in the church was in order. They had the power of excommunication, but this only consisted in exclusion from the community of the faithful, and the loss of

the privilege of partaking of the Lord's Supper. It also decided questions relating to marriage. The deacons had the care of the poor and of almsgiving.

Calvin himself was the soul of the whole organization. But he was a cold, stiff, almost gloomy being, and his character produces a very different impression from the genial warmth of Luther, who could be cheerful and merry with his family. Half Old Testament prophet, half republican demagogue, Calvin could do anything in his State, but it was by means of his personal influence, the authority of his words, "the majesty of his character," as was said by a magistrate of Geneva after his death. He was to the last the simple minister, whose frugal mode of life appeared to his enemies like niggardliness. After a reign of twenty-three years, he left behind him the possessions of a mendicant monk. His poverty was his pride. The poor could tell of his kindness and generosity, and the city became immensely rich under his rule; he lived and cared to live only for the good of all, and it was this that made him appear so majestic, so dignified, to his State. He was not only a dictator in his republic, but a power in Europe. His influence may be seen by his correspondence.\* He wrote to Margaret of Valois; wrote opinions in detail for the young King Edward VI. of England; corresponded with Bullinger, Melancthon, Knox; gave counsel to Coligny, Condé, Jeanne D'Albret, the Duchess of Ferrara. In Geneva he was like a Samuel, before whom all prostrated themselves; in his letters we observe the modest tone of the simple clergyman, and yet the conscious pride of the man who had been true to his convictions. His position was a regal and commanding one.

Still he had something of the passion and excitability which characterize his countrymen. Though he possessed great self-control, and was generally calm and cold, yet when opposite opinions were broached to those which ruled his life, his rage vented itself in fearful storms; the hierarch, the reformed pope, the Old Testament prophet, in him broke out, crushing all that came in his way; mostly, however, he was temperate, and even conciliatory, to his opponents.

His treatment of Servetus is a case in point. Servetus

honestly held an opposite theological opinion, and defended it with the zeal of a martyr, and Calvin had him burnt as heretics were burnt in the Middle Ages. This is the darkest spot in his life, and nothing can efface it.

To explain his power we must view his character as a whole. The republic which he governed had, before his time, been frivolous and dissolute; it now became a pattern of gloomy puritanical strictness. He ruled by his irreproachable life, by the majesty of his unselfishness, but also by the crushing weight of his irresistible will, and, in case of need, by the terrors of fanaticism. His Christian republic was a theocracy after the pattern of the Old Testament; he did not want the Church to rule the State nor the State the Church; the State was so entirely to comprehend the Church that the boundary line between them should disappear. It is plain that a system like this could only be carried out, even in a small State, by the moral power of an exceptionally energetic individual will. Calvin solved this great problem in the period between 1541-61, and at the end of nearly three centuries the system remained in the same grooves—the stamp which he impressed upon the people was uneffaced, and more than a century after his death the features of the Geneva school were plainly distinguishable.

No other reformer established so rigid a church discipline. He wished that it should effect a transformation in every sphere of life, and he was in no way influenced by the more liberal views which Luther and Zwingli took of these things.

Even as early as 1536 he appeared as a reformer of morals,\* with a novel view of crime, and enforcing exemplary strictness in punishment. It has already been mentioned that all noisy games, games of chance, dancing, singing of profane songs, cursing and swearing, were forbidden, and that church-going and Sabbath-keeping were strictly enjoined. The moral police took account of everything. Every citizen had to be at home by nine o'clock, under heavy penalties. Adultery, which had previously been punished by a few days' imprisonment and a small fine, was now punished by death; an adulteress was actually drowned in the Rhone, and two adulterers beheaded. It was forbidden to swear even at animals. A

\* Schenkel, *Wesen des Protestantismus*.



child that had abused its mother was put upon bread and water; another that had thrown stones at its mother, publicly whipped and hung up to the gallows by its arms; and one that had struck its parents was executed. Sensual sins were generally punished by drowning; singing profane songs, by banishment; a woman was publicly whipped for singing a worldly song to a psalm tune, and an educated man who was caught reading Poggio's licentious tales, imprisoned; any one found playing cards was condemned to stand in the pillory with the cards round his neck. The ancient festivities at weddings were entirely done away with; no drums or music were allowed in the processions, no dancing at the feast. The theatre was interdicted except when Biblical scenes were represented; novel reading was entirely forbidden, and if any one wrote anything objectionable he was sent to prison.

Thus the Reformed Church discipline was carried out with the same consistency and rigidity as in the old monastic life, and the consequences of so unnatural a state of things were not unknown in this case.

#### CALVINISTIC DISCIPLINE AND ITS HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE.

Man was not placed in the world to torment himself with penances and flagellations; though not intended to be an abode of pleasure, pleasure ought not to be banished from it. Luther saw this plainly, and did not despise cheerful recreation, but considered it a part of Christian life. The world was not intended to be made a prayer-meeting, and he who tries to make it so is in danger of sowing the seeds of mere outward sanctity—in other words, of hypocrisy. Extreme views of this sort—a certain Methodistical piety which takes a pride in renouncing every innocent enjoyment, and in gloomy views of life—have always been united with Calvinism.

Still it is undeniable that it was of great importance, especially for that period.

This mode of treating the world and men was not so much Christian, as Spartan or ancient Roman. No one will maintain that all mankind can be ruled and trained by these means; but it cannot be denied that within certain limits it produced vigorous characters, men of self-denying devotion



and heroic courage, and in this fact lay the importance of Calvin's pattern State.

A school of men was to be trained, who, temperate and vigorous, despising both the pleasures and temptations of life, should be prepared to make great sacrifices and to perform great deeds for the sake of an idea of world-wide significance; and the effect produced by this school, both at home and abroad, was really astounding. Life in Geneva was entirely transformed; the previous bustling activity was replaced by solemn, priestly earnestness; the old frivolity disappeared; magnificence in attire was no longer thought of; nothing was heard of dances or masquerades; the taverns and theatre were empty, the churches crowded: a tone of devout piety pervaded the city.

And this school extended itself as a mighty propaganda; we find its influence among the French and Dutch Calvinists, and especially among the Scotch Presbyterians and English Puritans, who are offshoots of the Genevan parental tree.

At a time when Europe had no solid results of reform to show, this little State of Geneva stood up as a great power; year by year it sent forth apostles into the world, who preached its doctrines everywhere, and it became the most dreaded counterpoise to Rome, when Rome no longer had any bulwark to defend her.

The missionaries from this little community displayed the lofty and dauntless spirit which results from a stoical education and training; they bore the stamp of a self-renouncing heroism which was elsewhere swallowed up in theological narrowness. They were a race with vigorous bones and sinews, for whom nothing was too daring, and who gave a new direction to Protestantism by causing it to separate itself from the old traditional monarchical authority, and to adopt the gospel of democracy as part of its creed.

It formed a weighty counterpoise to the desperate efforts which the ancient Church and monarchical power were making to crush the spirit of the Reformation.

It was impossible to oppose Caraffa, Philip II., and the Stuarts, with Luther's passive resistance; men were wanted who were ready to wage war to the knife, and such was the Calvinistic school. It everywhere accepted the challenge; throughout all the conflicts for political and religious liberty, up to the time of the first emigration to America, in France,

the Netherlands, England, and Scotland, we recognise the Genevan school. A little bit of the world's history was enacted in Geneva, which forms the proudest portion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. A number of the most distinguished men in France, the Netherlands, and Great Britain professed her creed; they are sturdy, gloomy souls, iron characters cast in one mould, in which there was an interfusion of Romanic, Germanic, mediæval, and modern elements; and the national and political consequences of the new faith were carried out by them with the utmost rigour and consistency.

## CHAPTER XLV.

**Reformation and Restoration in Italy.**—Division of Opinion among the People.—Vacillation of the Curia.—Opinion of the Cardinals on Reform in 1537.—Conciliatory Attitude till 1541.—The Council of Trent and the Catholic Restoration.—First Meeting of the Council, December, 1545-7.—Rudeness of the Curia to the Emperor and Protestants.—Second Meeting, May, 1551.—Pope Paul IV. (Caraffa), 1555-9. Third Meeting, January, 1562, to the end of 1563.—Pope Pius IV., 1559-65.—Progress and Results of the Negotiation.—Increased Consolidation of the Ecclesiastical Power.—Precautions against Sectarianism.—Reconstruction of the Shattered Religious System.—Improvement in the Intellectual and Moral Training of the Clergy.

### ITALY AND THE REFORMATION.\*

THE conflict with the hierarchy did not take the same form in Italy as elsewhere; there were two opposite opinions on the subject. According to one, the national and historical existence of Italy was closely bound up with the hierarchy; according to the other, which was held by Machiavelli, the hierarchy was fatal to Italian liberties. The former opinion was far the most widely prevalent. It was nothing to the Italians that foreign nations complained of the oppression of the hierarchy. There is no doubt that the masses saw no cause for discontent under it. We have proof that the hierarchy was popular—that among the people, down to the lowest grades, the undiminished splendour of the Papacy was looked upon as a pledge of the power of Italy.

But this did not prevent reform movements from taking place. The Humanistic school had its home here; its opposition tendencies had not spared the Church any more than Scholasticism; it had everywhere been the precursor and ally of the intellectual revolt, and not the least in Italy. There were from the first eminent individuals at Venice,

\* Ranke, Fürsten und Völker. 3 Auflage. 1854.

Modena, Ferrara, Florence, even in the States of the Church themselves, who were more or less followers of Luther.

The cardinals Contarini and Morone, Bembo and Sadolet, distinguished preachers like Peter Martyr, Johann Valdez, and Bernardino Occhino, and from among the princely families an intellectual lady, Renata of Ferrara, were inclined to the new doctrines. But they were leaders without followers; the number of their adherents among the masses was surprisingly small.\*

The Roman Curia, under the Pontificate of Paul III., 1534-49, vacillated in its policy for a time; between 1537-41, the prevailing sentiments were friendly and conciliatory towards Reform. It was at this time that the famous book appeared, "Del Beneficio di Giesu Cristo Crocifisso" (The Benefit of Christ's Death), which acquainted the Italians with the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith, and obtained an unexampled success among the reading world, 1540.†

They were, in fact, gravely entertaining the question at Rome, whether it would not be better to come to terms with Reform, to adopt the practicable part of its programme, and so put an end to the schism which was spreading so fast in the Church. It was at this time that the short episode in the papal policy occurred to which the opinion pronounced by the cardinals of 1537 affords lasting testimony.

As a confession by the Church of its need of reform, this document must engage a moment's attention.

It was openly acknowledged that the Popes had often selected servants, not that they might learn from the Popes the duties required of them, but that the Popes might have things which they lusted after proclaimed as allowable. Out of the adulation which followed upon the heels of every princely appointment, the doctrine had been established that the Pope was lord of all things in the Church, and that the reproach of simony could not be applied to him. A vast number of abuses had arisen from this source.

The cardinals acknowledged in general terms that the

\* "Reform without schism" may be called the ideal of the Italian Reformers of that age; it is shown by A. Bonnet, in the life of Aonio Paleario, that they had more followers among the people than is generally supposed.—ED.

† It is perfectly clear to me that Paleario could not be the author of this work, from comparing the style with his mode of expression in his Discourses.

causes of schism did not lie so much in any opposition to the Church, as in the state of the Church itself, from the disastrous abuses connected with the doctrine of the papal supremacy. This was indeed a striking confirmation of what the great Reform party beyond Italy had been saying and writing for years about the disease and cure of the Church.

And they really desired reform. The mode of granting benefices, plurality of spiritual offices, simony, reversions and commendams, the system of dispensations, the demoralisation in monasteries, the financial system of the Curia, the degraded lives of the clergy;—all these were enumerated as spots which required cleansing, and it amounted to very much the same as what had been demanded in the early days of the Reformation. The effect of this document may be traced for some years, especially in the conciliatory tone which was adopted by the Curia at the religious discussions in Germany, in 1540-41. An honest desire then still prevailed to effect a reconciliation. Contarini was in favour of it with his whole soul. But it proceeded no farther than the attempt; for once the differences seemed likely to be adjusted, so far as this was possible; but in 1542, the revulsion took place, which was never again reversed.

Only one result remained. The Pope could no longer refuse to summon a council. The Emperor had been urging it year after year; the Pope had acceded to it further than any of his predecessors had done; and, considering the retreat which now took place, this concession was the least that could be demanded.

At length, therefore, three years after it was convened, in May, 1542, the council assembled at Trent in December, 1545.

#### THE COUNCIL OF TRENT\* AND THE CATHOLIC RESTORATION.

It was the Emperor's great desire that a council should be held in Germany, that thus the confidence of the Germans in the supreme tribunal in the great controversy might

\* *Historia del Concilio Tridentino* di Pietro Soave Polano (Paolo Sarpi), 1619—often translated into Latin, French, and German. On the other side: *Storia del Concilio di Trento*, scritta dal Padre Sforza Pallavicini, 1656. J. H. von Wessenberg, *Die grossen Kirchenversammlungen des 15 und 16 Centurie* 1840.

be gained; but the selection of Trent, which nominally belonged to Germany, was the utmost concession that could be obtained.

The intentions of the Emperor and the Pope with regard to the council were entirely opposed to each other. The Pope was determined to stifle all opposition in the bud, while the Emperor was very desirous of having a counterpoise to the Pope's supremacy in council, provided always that it concurred in the imperial programme.

The very commencement of the proceedings of the council was indicative of the position taken by the Papal Chair. The council was opened on 13th of December, 1545, by Marcellus Cervinus, Johann del Monte, and Reginald Pole, as Papal legates. Their first step was an attempt to set aside the declaration, *Quod concilium potestatem immediate a Christo habeat*, &c., in which they were in the main successful. To the astonishment of the assembly, it was then stated that the legates could not decide on any resolution without the consent of the Pope. The plan of voting according to nations was also set aside, and it was expressly stated that they were not at Constance or Basle, and that the Pope, as represented by his legates, had the pre-eminence.

All the proceedings were so arranged that the entire conduct of them was in the hands of the Curia. As before stated,\* the Emperor's wish that those questions might be first considered on which Catholics and Protestants were agreed, was entirely set aside, and Rome insisted that the very questions on which they most differed should be first brought forward, and they were handled in a spirit which made any understanding as difficult as possible.

It was only on one point that the assembly could be said to be in any way influenced by the new doctrines, namely, on the subject of justification. The doctrine was not again put forth in accordance with the principle of Tetzels bare-faced sale of indulgences; it was quietly essentially altered. Not that Luther's doctrine was adopted, but an intelligible compromise was sought between Pelagianism and Augustinian one-sidedness, and a middle course was adopted which gave some scope for justification by faith, but in which the doctrine of good works was also retained in a way which Luther would never have approved.

This occupied a considerable time. The Emperor had hoped that reforms would have been introduced calculated to put an end to schism, instead of which modern errors were met by the dogmatic assertion of the absolute correctness of the old doctrines. "Ours is the true teaching," it was said; "your pretended interpretations are nothing to us."

Nevertheless some reforms were carried out. Between the time of meeting and adjournment, December, 1545, to the spring of 1547, the following were the main points decided on:—

1. The bishops were to provide better teachers and better schools.

2. The bishops should themselves expound the word of God.

3. Penalties were to be enforced for the neglect of their duties, and various rules were laid down as to the necessary qualifications for the office of a bishop. Dispensations, licenses, and privileges were abolished.

The Church was therefore to be subjected to a reform which abolished sundry abuses, without conceding any change in her teaching.

The course the council was taking excited the Emperor's extreme displeasure. He considered that this agitation of disputed points was a challenge to him and his plans, and that there was not much sincerity in the plans for reform. They were too much bent on condemning the heretics, and too little on improving the Church.

The consequence was that the Emperor began to make his influence felt in the council. He organized a sort of opposition to Rome; his commissaries kept up a good understanding with the Protestants, and it was evident that he meant to make use of them for an attack on the Pope. This made Rome eager to withdraw the assembly from the influence of German bishops and imperial agents as soon as possible. A fever which had broken out at Trent, but had soon disappeared, was made a pretext for transferring the council to Bologna in the spring of 1547. The imperial commissioners protested that the decrees of such a hole-and-corner council would be null and void.

The contest remained undecided for years. Paul III. died in the midst of it, in November, 1549, and was succeeded by Cardinal del Monte, one of the papal legates at the council, as Pope Julius III. The Emperor at length



came to an understanding with him, and in May, 1551, the council was again opened at Trent. The Emperor's position in Germany made it necessary for him to be at peace with the Pope, and peace was restored just as the heaviest storm of all broke over him in Germany, by the ecclesiastical and political rebellion organized against him by Prince Maurice; and but little help in withstanding this could be looked for from the assembly at Trent. The assembly remained Catholic; the Protestant elements, which were represented at first, all disappeared after the turn of affairs in 1552. After that there was no further thought of an understanding with the heretics. The results for reform were very small indeed. The proceedings were dragging wearily on when a fresh adjournment was announced in 1552. Pope Julius III. died in March, 1555. His successor, the noble Cardinal Cervin, elected as Marcellus II., died after only twenty-two days, and was succeeded by Cardinal Caraffa as Paul IV., 1555-9.

Just when all hope was given up in Germany of bringing the heretics peaceably back, this new Pope was elected from the house of Caraffa. The idea now was to reorganize the ancient Church, to establish it on a firmer foundation, and to surround it by a more secure fence, even if within narrower limits, before any fresh attempt was made to convert the heretics. Paul IV. was the impersonation of this idea. He was the Pope of the restoration. The warm Neapolitan blood flowed in his veins, and he was a fiery, energetic character. He was not in favour of any concessions or abatement, but for a complete breach with the new doctrines, and a thorough exclusiveness for the ancient Church.

He was one of the ablest men of the time. As early as in 1542 he had advised that no further concessions should be made, but that the Inquisition, of which indeed he was the creator, should be restored. It was he who decidedly initiated the great Catholic reaction. He established the Spanish Inquisition in Italy, instituted the first Index, and gave the Jesuits his powerful support in the interests of the restoration.

This turn of affairs was the answer to the German religious Peace. Since the Protestants no longer concerned themselves about Rome, Rome was about to set her house in order without them, and as a matter of course the council stood still.

Paul IV. openly said that the reforms which he had promised could be made without a council, and, if possible, it was his intention to ward them off altogether. But there were difficulties in the way of this. The temporal Catholic princes themselves, whose orthodoxy was beyond question, the kings of France and Spain, King Ferdinand, and the Duke of Bavaria, had made definite demands for reform, respecting the rights of the national Churches, the election of bishops, protection against the fiscal arts of Rome, and even on such points as the celibacy of the clergy. These demands gave rise to all sorts of contests, and the result was that the council was convened afresh by the next Pope, Pius IV. (1559-65), in November, 1560, and so the Council of Trent was opened for the third time in January, 1562.

Then began the important period of the council, during which the legislation to which it has given a name was enacted. When it first met it might have been thought that the Protestants might have been won over by one concession or another, but there was no thought of this now; the sole idea was to endow the ancient Church with fresh power, to surround her with more impenetrable and permanent bulwarks. No counteracting influence, such as had once been exercised by Charles V., could be looked for from any temporal prince. The Curia reigned supreme, and, in spite of the remonstrances of the Emperor and of France, decided that the council should be considered a continuation of the previous ones, which meant—"All the decrees aimed against the Protestants are in full force; we have no further idea of coming to terms with them." The next proceeding was to interdict books and arrange an Index.

Distinguished and gifted ecclesiastics contended with great energy for the divine origin and consequent inviolability of ecclesiastical authority as opposed to the demands of the temporal rulers, which at first gave rise to stormy scenes. The most eminent among them was Jacob Lainez, the second general and special organizer of the order of the Jesuits.

He was the leader of the ultra-Romanising party, and the most earnest representative of the view that it was of the first moment to strengthen anew the foundations of the rock of St. Peter, the unity of the authority of the Church as instituted by God. The Church, he said, is eternal; she is based upon divine, not human laws, while States are the

creations of man, transitory and variable according to his fancy. "The Church did not make herself, neither did she institute her own government; but Christ, her ruler and monarch, first gave her laws. States, on the contrary, founded their governments on liberty; all power was originally in the hands of the commonalties, who entrusted it to their rulers, without, however, depriving themselves of power." \* In their zeal to establish the essential differences between Church and State, these Romanists adopt the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. Bellarmini is in agreement with Lainez when he says, "It is obvious that it depends upon the multitude whether they have a king, consuls, or other officials as rulers, and if they have a legitimate reason they can change a monarchical for an aristocratic government, as was the case in the history of ancient Rome."

And the views of the Romanists prevailed. The restoration of the indisputable authority of the Pope was the ruling principle of all the decrees; what was done for the cause of Reform was as nothing compared with what was required, and was overruled by the reservation in favour of the papal authority, to which all decisions as to the abolition of abuses were referred. Paul IV. was right when he said that "the fathers in the council had been so moderate in the matter of reform, and so considerate of him, that reform would have been carried much further if he had undertaken it himself."

The great achievement of the council for the unity of the Catholic Church was this: it formed into a code of laws, on one consistent principle, that which in ancient times had been variable and uncertain, and which had been almost lost sight of in the last great revolution. Controverted questions were replaced by dogmas, doubtful traditions by definite doctrines; a uniformity was established in matters of faith and discipline which had never existed before, and an impregnable bulwark was thus erected against the sectarian spirit and the tendency to innovation.†

Still when this unity was established upon a solid basis, the universal Church of former times was torn asunder, for a portion of the West had escaped from the fold, including some of those who had been formerly some of the most faithful sons of the Catholic Church. It was

\* Ranke, *Zeitschrift*.

† Wessenberg. Ranke.

only the Spanish and Italian peninsulas which were still unconditionally subject to her, for even France was only partially so, but within this circumscribed area the papal dominion was more firmly established than ever: its independence of councils was more unequivocally declared than it had ever been in the Middle Ages. It was settled for ever that demands like those made at Constance and Basle, attempts at national reform, like the mighty efforts lately made, were illegal.

What the Church gained by these means in solidity and compactness was almost enough to indemnify her for her losses. Her foundations were now laid in a rigid organization, to depart from which would be to alter her essential character. The variety, the manifold forms of culture, the free development of differences to which the new doctrines afforded free scope, were incompatible with the vital principles of this Church. A clear, indisputable legal foundation was thus for the first time created for the Catholic Church, her authority, her laws, and their administration. Canon law had hitherto developed itself historically, and there could not fail to be contradictions arising out of the various periods at which its statutes had originated, and obscurities which gave rise to doubts. It was these weaknesses which had furnished the innovators with so many points of attack; want of coherence and consistency was the weakest point of a Church which expressly boasted of possessing these advantages. At Trent she received a consistent and elaborate code of laws, which when possible, put an end to the contradictions or skilfully concealed them, and thus the number of exposed points was not only lessened, but a secure armour created to defend them.

Neither were the reforms quite an empty name; it was no small gain for Catholic countries that the advantages gained by the Protestants were in some degree secured to them also; seminaries were to be provided for the better education of priests, and there was to be strict supervision to ensure their better conduct; divine service was to be better regulated, the sacraments administered, and edification provided for by means of preaching; but the chief point was, and continued to be, the establishment of the unimpeachable legitimacy of the Papal Chair as the main pillar of the newly-won uniformity.

## CHAPTER XX.

### THE JESUITS AND THE INQUISITION.

Ignatius Loyola and the Society of Jesus.—Spanish Catholicism.—Loyola's Spiritual Knighthood, from 1521.—Organization of the Order, from the time of its Authorisation, 1540.—Its Constitution, Principles, Discipline, and Tactics.—The Inquisition.—The Instructions of Cardinal Caraffa.—Censorship of the Press.

#### IGNATIUS LOYOLA AND THE SOCIETY OF JESUS.\*

EXPERIENCE had shown that the old monastic orders were no longer sufficient. Catholics and Protestants united in lamenting their decline. Some orders—the Augustinians, for example—had become a source of apostasy; others were no longer so efficient as before, at a time when humanistic culture was required in the representatives of the Church's cause; the Dominican order, part of whose vocation it had been to enforce the Inquisition, had become powerless; in the trial of Reuchlin they had done more harm than good, and succeeding times had shown that they were totally unable to prevent the spread of heresy.

About 1540, therefore, an idea began to be entertained at Rome that a new order was needed; the plan was not to abolish the old ones, but to found new ones which should better answer the required ends. The most important of them was the Society of Jesus. But in this case the moving cause did not proceed from Rome.

Among the wars of Charles V. we must recur to the first contest at Navarra, in 1521. It was on this occasion, in

\* *Historia Societatis Jesu*, by Orlandini and other Members of the Order, 1615-1715. *Maffei de Vita et Moribus Ign. Loyolæ*, 1685. *Corpus Institutorum Soc. Jesu*. Antwerp, 1702. *Institutum Soc. Jesu*. Prag, 1752. Kortüm, *Entstehungsgeschichte des Jesuitenordens*. 1843.

defending Pamplona against the French, that Loyola received the wound which was to cause the monkish tendency to prevail over the chivalrous element in his nature.

A kind of Catholicism still prevailed in Spain which no longer existed anywhere else. Its vigour may be traced to the fact that during the whole of the Middle Ages it was always in hostile contact with Islam, with the Mohammedan infidels. The crusades here had never come to an end; the perpetual contest with the Moors and Moriscos was a national as well as religious enthusiasm; the *ecclesia militans* had never laid down her arms, and thus she had retained all those manly and chivalrous qualities which she had elsewhere lost during the protracted peace. Abuses were not wanting in the Church here; but they were partly overlooked, and they were really less important. Face to face with a common enemy, Christianity had not time to fall into the outward formalism which disfigured it elsewhere. The enthusiastic spirit of mediæval Catholicism still existed here; the whole nation was filled with zeal to convert the heretics. Our previous retrospect has shown us how little there was of it in the rest of the world.

As yet untainted by heresy, and suffering from no decline, in Spain, Catholicism was as eager for conquest as it had been in all the West in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It was from the nation possessing this temperament that the founder of the order of the Jesuits sprang.

Ignatius Loyola (born 1491) was a Spanish knight, possessing the twofold tendencies which distinguish the knighthood of the Middle Ages. He was a gallant swordsman, delighting in martial feats and romantic love adventures; but he was at the same time animated by a glowing enthusiasm for the Church and her supremacy, even during the early period of his life. These two tendencies were striving together in his character, until the event took place which threw him upon a bed of suffering. No sooner was he compelled to renounce his worldly knighthood, than he was sure that he was called upon to found a new order of spiritual knighthood, like that of which he had read in the chivalrous romance, "Amadis." Entirely unaffected by the Reformation, what he understood by this was a spiritual brotherhood in the true mediæval sense, which should convert the heathen in the newly-discovered countries of the world.



With all the zeal of a Spaniard he decided to live to the Catholic Church alone; he chastised his body with penances and all kinds of privations, made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and, in order to complete his defective education, he visited the university of Paris; it was among his comrades there that he formed the first associations out of which the order was afterwards formed. Among these was Jacob Lainez; he was Loyola's fellow-countryman, the organizing head who was to stamp his impress upon the order. What Loyola would have founded himself would have been of a different character; it would have been an enthusiastic fraternity in the faith, ascetically cut off from all worldly affairs, who would have spread the gospel in the New World. An impulse to Christian conquest was Loyola's ruling idea.

He formed a little company of congenial spirits, whom he had thoroughly examined and conscientiously selected; but their efforts might have been called somewhat aimless, and, however earnest, might, from their entire independence, not have been wholly free from suspicion of heresy.

Then came the spread of the new doctrines, the mighty progress of Protestantism. No one who was heartily attached to the old Church could doubt that there was work for such an association, for the object now in hand was not to make Christians of the aboriginal inhabitants of Central America, but to reconquer the apostate members of the Romish Church.

About 1539, Loyola came with his fraternity to Rome. He did not find favour in all circles; the old orders regarded the new one with jealousy and mistrust; but Pope Paul III. (1534-49) did not allow himself to be misled, and in 1540 gave the fraternity his confirmation, thus constituting Loyola's followers an order, which, on its part, engaged "to obey in all things the reigning Pope—to go into any country, to Turks, heathen, or heretics, or to whomsoever he might send them, at once, unconditionally, without question or reward."

It is from this time that the special history of the order begins. During the next year Loyola was chosen the first general of the order, an office which he held until his death (1541-56). He was succeeded by Lainez. He was less enthusiastic than his predecessor, had a cooler head, and was more reasonable; he was the man for diplomatic projects and complete and systematic organization.

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## ORGANIZATION OF THE ORDER.

The new order differed in several respects from any previously existing one, but it entirely corresponded to the new era which had begun for the Romish Church. It has been well said that every period of Catholic Christianity had a special order which represented the prevailing spirit of the age. To the age of chivalry, its poetry and art, the contemporary order of Benedictines corresponded, with its soaring flights in the same realm, its intellectual culture, its mighty influence over the aristocracy of the age, and its ardour for all great ideas.

When heresy was budding in the thirteenth century, the Papacy created the standing army of Mendicant Friars, who were intended to influence the masses, and they succeeded wonderfully in their object. The Jesuits, at the time of absolute papal supremacy, furnished a chivalrous order, prepared to render unconditional obedience to the commands of the Church, and with their strict organization they completely distanced all predecessors and rivals.

The construction of the new order was based and carried out on a monarchical-military system. The territories of the Church were divided into provinces; at the head of each of these was a provincial; over the provincials, and chosen by them, the general, who commanded the soldiers of Christ, and was entrusted with dictatorial power, limited only by the opinions of three judges, assistants or admonitors. The general has no superior but the Pope, with whom he communicates directly; he appoints and dismisses all officials, issues orders as to the administration of the order, and rules with undisputed sway. The absolute monarchy which was assigned to the Pope by the Council of Trent, was conferred by him on the general of the Jesuits.

Among the four vows of poverty, chastity, obedience, and subjection to the Pope, obedience was the soul of all. To learn and practise this physically and mentally, up to the point where, according to the Jesuit expression, a man becomes "*tanquam lignum et cadaver*," was the ruling principle of the institution.

The recruits or novices were at once daily and hourly subjected to this discipline of body and soul. "As," so they teach, "among the heavenly bodies the inner circle

follows the course of the outer circle by an eternal law, so must the serving members be dependent on the wink of their superior:—"baculus, qui ubicunque et quacunque in re velit eo uti, qui eum manu tenet, ei inserviat." Entire renunciation of the will and judgment in relation to everything commanded by the superior, blind obedience, unconditional subjection, constitute their ideal.

There was but one exception, but even in this there was a reservation. It was expressly stated that there can be no obligation "*ad peccatum mortale vel veniale*," to sinful acts of greater or less importance, "except when enjoined by the superior, in the name of Jesus Christ," "*vel in virtute obedientiæ*,"—an elastic doctrine which may well be summed up in the dictum that "the end justifies the means."

Of course, all the members of this order had to renounce all ties of family, home, and country, and it was expressly enjoined. Loyola himself threw letters from his family, after long absence, into the fire unread, to show that he no longer had any family, and his disciples were expected to efface from their hearts the memory of parents, brothers, and sisters, and whatever else they might have on earth; dead to the world and to all personal affection, they were to live to their Lord and Saviour alone, and to consider Him as the substitute for parents, brethren, and all earthly things.

Of the vow of poverty it is said, in the "*Summarium*" of the constitution of the order, that it must be maintained as a "*muris religionis*." No one shall have any property; every one must be content with the meanest furniture and fare, and, if necessity or command require it, he must be ready to beg his bread from door to door ("*ostiatim mendicare*"). The external aspect of members of the order, their speech and silence, gestures, gait, garb, and bearing shall indicate the prescribed purity of soul.

In accordance with the "*rules of modesty*," the disciple of Jesus was to bend his head slightly forward, to cast down his eyes, to maintain a calm and kindly mien, to walk deliberately and with dignity, to exhibit modesty and edifying unction in looks, words, and movements; in short, in all respects to maintain a priestly sanctity.

On all these and many other points, the new order only laid greater stress on the precepts which were to be found among the rules of other orders, though in the universal

demoralisation of the monastic life they had fallen into disuse. But it decidedly differed from all the others in the manner in which it aimed at obtaining sway in every sphere and every aspect of life.

Himself without home or country, and not holding the doctrines of any political party, the disciple of Jesus renounced everything which might alienate him among varying nationalities, pursuing various political aims. Then he did not confine his labours to the pulpit and the confessional; he gained an influence over the rising generation by a systematic attention to education, which had been shamefully neglected by the other orders. He devoted himself to education from the national schools up to the academic chair, and by no means confined himself to the sphere of theology.

This was a principle of immense importance.

The coarseness, ignorance, idleness, and low vices of the old orders had brought them into disrepute. The members of the new were moral and polished; they cultivated science and learning; and as the Church was just then being renovated from above, and required to be more firmly rooted among the people, they were specially adapted for instructors and educators within her borders.

It is a true saying, that "he who gains the youth, possesses the future;" and by devoting themselves to the education of youth, the Jesuits secured a future to the Church more surely than by any other scheme that could have been devised. What the schoolmasters were for the youth, the confessors were for those of riper years; what the clerical teachers were for the common people, the spiritual directors and confidants were for great lords and rulers—for the Jesuits aspired to a place at the side of the great, and at gaining the confidence of kings. It was not long before they could boast of astonishing success. "How manifold," says the history of the society, "are the traces of our educational labours! Our former pupils, when grown up, accustom their children to the fear of God, and they often rise into the highest offices and circles of society. The priests educated by us often attain to the highest honours in the Church; directors, bishops, counsellors, and popes are found among them. Many are robed in the purple of the cardinals, or hold places of command as senators, who not long before were sitting on the benches in our schools."

In the interests of these various labours in the Church and the world, the Jesuit was permitted to throw off the clerical garb, and to take part in political and diplomatic affairs, and in business of a purely secular character.

The gifts and qualifications of all those who entered the order were minutely studied, and they were subjected to training calculated to make them adepts in the use of their special powers. In this respect, Loyola was the founder of the order in the truest sense of the word; for, from the moment when he founded his little society, he determined to search the hearts and reins of men, and to trust no one whom he had not, as he thought, thoroughly seen through. This continued to be the principle of the order, and by his successors it was carried out still more systematically and imperiously than by himself. The words, acts, talents, and performances of every member of the order were closely watched. The provincial received reports of the students from the superintendents of the colleges, and he communicated them to the general. The superintendents, again, had their confidential novices, charged with the observation and espionage of their colleagues. An inimitable system of espionage was established, in the fine meshes of which everything worth knowing was caught, and the conduct and progress of every individual, from the lowest upward, was carefully noted down.

In the culture of science and learning, special regard was had to the objects prescribed to the order at home and abroad.

Profane learning was cultivated only as a weapon against the heresy of modern culture, and the selection of subjects, and the extent to which they were pursued, was therefore determined on polemical grounds. Philological and mathematical studies, dialectics and rhetoric, were diligently pursued; but everything that would not serve the order was neglected. Greek was strikingly neglected compared with Latin, because it was not of much use in polemics, and the spirit of the ancient Hellenes was not congenial to the spirit of the order. The main point aimed at in all their studies was dexterity in argument. Disputation and dialectic fencing were therefore much practised, and they were early schooled in the methods of these arts.

History was written from their own point of view, philosophy cultivated in the spirit of ancient scholasticism; thus,

no true representation of history, nor independent research into the nature of things, was possible. In both fields, therefore, the order has been quite unproductive. It has produced good Latin scholars, skilful translators and grammarians, great dialecticians and eminent orators ; but beyond this it has not attained distinction.

At a period when all the other orders were idle or asleep, the services of such an one as this, which pressed talent, learning, and fanaticism into its service, to the greatest possible extent, and under a thousand forms, were an incalculable assistance to the papal policy. It may well be said that it was by means of this order that the labours of the Council of Trent first acquired any historical importance. But for everything beyond the sphere of this policy, the order was a tremendous danger. To oppose to the Jesuit doctrine of the right of the masses arbitrarily to choose this or that form of government, one to-day, another to-morrow, there was, speaking generally, no law in the secular state of unconditional validity ; that is, a secular state no longer had any existence. And this doctrine was jealously defended by an order whose members were independent of civic associations, were not permitted to have either family or country, and whose one article of morality was blind obedience to their superiors. In every State of Europe they attacked now this form of government, and now that. In Holland and France they incited the people against the existing order of things just as it suited their purpose ; and the manifold forms under which they presented themselves, rendered them incomprehensible to their adversaries.

There was a contradiction in this to the Roman Catholic world itself. The doctrine of the Council of Trent, of the absolute authority of the Pope, of which the Jesuits were the most zealous representatives, imposed upon Catholicism itself a law of immobility, which had never before been practically acted upon. Thus the Jesuits were the mortal enemies of whatever tendencies to freedom and progress still existed in the Roman Catholic Church. There was therefore early a party of very faithful Roman Catholics, not like the illuminati of the eighteenth century, which was opposed to them.

Besides, the position taken up by the Jesuits with regard to the secular power threatened the existence not only of the Protestant States, but of the Catholic States also. The here

tical doctrine that the State was something accidental, and its form variable, that the Church as the supreme power alone was eternal, called forth opposition from the most zealous Catholic governments; and when, in the eighteenth century, this idea began to make way, and its roots were met with everywhere among the order of Jesuits, the order fell a sacrifice, not to the Church, but to the modern idea of the State.

### THE INQUISITION, FROM 1542.

During the same year in which the order of Jesuits received the Pope's confirmation, the Spanish Inquisition was introduced into Italy, and Cardinal Caraffa was commissioned with the establishment of the institution. In the instructions of 1542, we have an authentic document relating to the principles on which the Inquisition was to proceed to extirpate heresy, first in Italy, and then in the world in general. 1. The Inquisition was not to delay, but to act with the greatest rigour on the least suspicion. 2. To have no respect either to princes or prelates, however high their rank may be. 3. Rather to be especially strict with those who screen themselves under the protection of a ruler. 4. In dealing with heretics, and especially Calvinists, it is not to degrade itself by any kind of false toleration.\* The new Inquisition acted on these principles with fearful severity. By dint of dungeons and stakes, persecution and exile, in the course of a few years there was no more heresy in Italy, and then this pattern institution was to be established in the other States. But everywhere it met with the greatest opposition, and they could not succeed in introducing it even into purely Catholic countries.

But wherever Caraffa's idea was carried out, and a union formed between the temporal and ecclesiastical powers, by which the former lent all its aid to carry out the mandates of the Church, and in return the Church branded as heresy and exterminated everything that was displeasing to the State, the State itself received a wound which was not healed for centuries.

Spain, above all other countries, has had experience of this, for there the Inquisition has destroyed the very roots of political liberty, and the State has sacrificed everything

\* Ranke.



for the sake of maintaining the unity of the faith in its most rigid form; the fraternal bond between temporal and spiritual despotism pursued its ends with great success : but it was not heresy only which disappeared—the life of the nation, the spirit of the people was fatally crushed, and this fact, which no one denies, is chiefly insisted on by Spaniards themselves.\*

This explains the prompt resistance to it in countries where the national spirit was strong, as in France and Germany; it explains the fact that the attempt to introduce the Inquisition into the Netherlands was one of the sparks that ignited the Revolt.

One part of the apparatus of the Inquisition was the censorship of the press and book-police.

Before the invention of printing it was not, of course, very difficult to keep a watch on dangerous works; it is equally obvious that now, when there came to be a widely-extended literature, the comfortable old orders would be totally unable to keep up the previous book-police. Nowadays any such censorship would appear totally impracticable. The attempt was made by one of the greatest men of the age when he had reached the summit of his power, and ruled from the Ebro to the Niemen; and how absurd it proved to be!

But at that time, when intellectual activity was not to be compared with that of our days, when the power of the See of Rome had been reorganized, when its influence was completely dominant in the southern monarchies, and extended northwards to a considerable distance, and when defection from Rome was far less general, the case was different. We have some striking examples of the power of the book-police. Hundreds of thousands of copies of the little work called "Of the Benefit of Christ's Death," had been circulated, which was an attempt to popularise the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith in Italy, and it had been translated into many languages; but at the time of which we speak it was so utterly expunged from literature by the modern censorship that when Ranke wrote his History of the Popes, in 1834, he could say that no trace of the work existed. During the course of the last few years a copy was found; and, not long after this was made known, two more came to light, and not only have thousands of

\* Written about 1859.—FR.



copies been published again, but the English Bible Society is taking steps to circulate it in Italy again.\*

The influence of the Inquisition on the sale of books was therefore not without importance. This is proved by another example Paolo Sarpi, a Venetian monk, who, although a zealous Catholic, held the views of Reform put forth at Constance and Basle—namely, a Papacy limited by bishops and councils, and a thorough reform of the Church, both head and members—undertook a history of the Council of Trent, in order to show how the original objects for which it had been convened, the abolition of abuses, purification of doctrine, and improvement of the constitution of the Church, had been frustrated, and the supremacy of the Pope over Church and State only confirmed.

The work appeared in the deepest secrecy, and under a feigned name, but its authorship was at once surmised; and it was not thought enough to bring out an answer, which Pallavicini was ordered to write—the book was inserted in the Index, and the author persecuted; and from the dangers Sarpi passed through, we may learn the fate that awaited an eminent author who, from within the Church, ventured to oppose the restoration of the papal supremacy.

An Index in my possession shows how systematically the heretical literature of that day was attacked. The literary productions of fifteen years are comprised within five sheets, and everything of importance that had appeared in theology, philosophy, history, antiquarian researches, and natural history, is condemned. Thus almost all literature was forbidden, with the exception of that which had arisen in the Roman Catholic Church or among her orders.

Since Rome now had the power to carry out this censorship of the press with the help of Philip II. and the German Hapsburgs, a large portion of Europe was as good as closed against all literary progress.

• Qy. Tract Society.—Ta.

3-13

## PART V.

### PHILIP II. IN SPAIN, AND THE REVOLT IN THE NETHERLANDS.

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#### CHAPTER XXI.

##### SPAIN UNDER CHARLES V. AND PHILIP II.

The Ecclesiastical-political Plans of Philip, 1565-98. — The Absolute Monarchy in Spain under Charles V. — Philip's Inheritance. — His Character. — Amalgamation of Spiritual and Temporal Despotism in Spain.\*

##### SPAIN UNDER CHARLES V. AND PHILIP II.

THE heir of Charles V. in Spain, Burgundy, Italy, and the New World was also the inheritor of his policy. In the second half of the sixteenth century, Philip II. once more undertook to accomplish what had failed in the first half, and on still more rigid principles and with less divided forces than his father had either attempted or had had in his power.

He undertook to enforce, without limit and unconditionally, the temporal and spiritual despotism at which the restored papal power was aiming with all its might. It was

\* See, besides the works already cited in reference to Charles V., *Collecion de Documentos Ineditos*. Madrid, 1842. Maldonado, *Hist. de las Comunidades de Castilla*. Madrid, 1840. Sepulveda, *Hist. Philippi II.*, 1556-64. Herrera, *Hist. del Rey Philippe II.*, 1613. 3 vols. Ranke, *Fürsten und völker Von Sud. Europa*. Vol. I. Havemann, *Darstellungen aus der Span. Geschichte*. 1850. Prescott, *The Reign of Philip II.* 2 vols. London, 1858. Salvador Bermudes de Castro, Antonio Perez, 1842. *Relations des Ambassadeurs de Venise*. Paris, 1838. 2 vols. Alberi *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti*. Vols. I.—IX. 1855.

the most daring project of the age, to enforce in every part of the empire the absolute monarchy which existed in Spain, in spite of national and religious insurrections, and, so far as the empire of this prince and his spiritual allies extended, in alliance with them to raise the Church in its restored unity to supreme power. No other European prince personally devoted himself to this cause and expended his every effort upon it as Philip did; and the question whether or not he would succeed, kept nearly half a century—for nearly over this period did his reign extend—in anxious suspense.

It was not only over his own immediate territories—Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands—that his policy extended, but over the whole of western Europe. The boldest attempt to restore the supremacy of the ancient Church in England was supported by him, and it was just the same in France, where, after the extinction of the line of Valois, the idea arose of founding another legitimate monarchy, and then the still bolder one of making the kingdom an appanage of Spain.

But the result brought disgrace upon this magnificent scheme. Philip suffered defeat after defeat. In Spain the flower of the country perished by the Inquisition, and under the rule of the priests; in the Netherlands there was a great revolt, which ended in the defection and dismemberment of the provinces; in England, after a colossal expenditure of strength, he could not succeed in subduing the power of Queen Elizabeth; his attempt to make France a Spanish province was utterly frustrated by Henry IV.; and the last act of his life was that Peace of Vervins, in which he was compelled to acknowledge the superiority of the French power.

It may be supposed that these defeats could not take place without fearful throes. A State staked on such a venture could not, if it failed, but be involved in the general ruin. This most comprehensive attempt to enforce at once the form of the Spanish Government and the restoration of the Roman Church failed everywhere with one exception, and it has made the only country where it succeeded perpetually wretched.

When King Charles V. began to reign in Spain, the country was by no means the compactly united territory that it afterwards, politically, though not nationally, be-

came ; for the last half century has shown that the ancient differences of race are not entirely obliterated. At that time it was still fresh in recollection that there had been a kingdom of Aragon and a kingdom of Castile, and that they had maintained an independent existence side by side. Then there was the countless multitude of provincial rights and privileges, in which no country speaking a Romanic language was so rich as Spain : the old national opposition in the south, where the Moors had long held sway, and which had given to the inhabitants an oriental hue, while in the north they were unmixed ancient Basque and Iberian.

Charles's idea was here especially to establish a certain uniformity ; and if he expected anywhere to found a well-consolidated domestic power for his family, it was in Spain, where only he looked to the establishment of a lasting monarchical power, while to Germany and the Netherlands he left their own form of government.

There was no lack of opposition. Among all the Spanish territories, none possessed so many valuable privileges as the kingdom of Aragon. It had the most liberal mediæval constitution, in which the idea of a contract between the governors and the governed, of the right of resistance to arbitrary power, was more sharply defined than in any other. Freedom there was not a mere antiquated feudal privilege, which had still a phantom-like existence in the brains of a few noble families. No ; it still lived in the nation, and was a blessing still prized above everything in communities and flourishing cities. Valencia, Saragossa, and Barcelona had not forgotten their proud, peculiar privileges, and their chivalrous inhabitants knew how to maintain them.

This gave rise to the conflict in 1520 and 1521, in which Charles proved victorious.

Charles had from the first assumed absolute power. When he was involved in the struggle with France, the opportunity seemed to be come to rise up in arms against him. Democratic insurrections broke out ; but Charles was in a position to defend himself successfully on both sides : opposition was put down, and the provinces humbled. Conflicting local interests began to clash, and thus increased their helplessness, as opposed to the compact power of the Crown.

Ancient privileges and liberties were compressed within

the narrowest limits—the royal supremacy enforced to the utmost. The decrees of the conqueror of Villalar were to be accepted as the legal foundation of a new administration; and in the Inquisition Charles had already discovered a weapon for quelling political opposition.

In the autumn of 1555 Charles gave over this thoroughly consolidated power to his son Philip, into whose hands the most splendid empire in the world now came—Spain and the American colonies, Milan and both the Sicilies, the Netherlands and Burgundy, and, besides all this, the hereditary family alliance of the German and Spanish Hapsburg interests. On the whole, the empire was given over to Philip in a flourishing condition.

Spain was still a rising power, and if it had lost something of the splendour of the time of Ferdinand and Isabella, compared with what it is at present, it was a truly imposing State.

We have a brilliant picture of the state of the Netherlands from both Philip's foes and friends. It was only Italy that showed signs of approaching decay. It had begun to suffer under an administration which rather preyed upon the country than ruled it; it was a government which it is no exaggeration to say strongly resembled the oriental pashalics.

The colonies were also suffering under this system. On its entry into the New World, Spain settled the principles of its colonisation; conquest and military rule, provision for distinguished families, and reckless conversion of the aborigines—these were the leading ideas. The fact that a colony in order to be profitable must prosper, and that in order to prosper it must have a rational and conscientious government, that in a foreign country a political and social life best suited to it must be fostered, was utterly ignored in this policy. Brutal military government, grasping at the country's riches, absence of all law and justice for the inhabitants, and of any training of them to self-dependence, division of power between priests and soldiers—all these abuses clung to this colonisation for centuries. The profit of them was therefore for a long time not in proportion to their wealth, for a great part of the proceeds was squandered in bad government. The industries of the Netherlands alone brought into the treasury four times as much as the gold and silver mines of Mexico and Peru.

Besides, all these countries possessed unusually rich resources for a great policy.

Spain had the best army and the most skilful generals of the age. Her military school was proverbial in the sixteenth century. The chivalrous Spaniard was especially adapted to a military life, not only because he was endowed with the natural gifts of courage and taste for aggressive warfare, but in the wars which had been waged for centuries he had been inured to danger, deprivation, and difficulty.

The most prominent names among the generals of the sixteenth century, Alba, Don Juan, Requesens, Spinola, all belong to Spanish tradition. Spain had also a fleet such as no other nation possessed ; she had the finest harbours and seaports, vast colonial possessions of inexhaustible wealth, while all the States which were soon to be her rivals and afterwards her adversaries were still only in the infancy of their power ; in short, Spain could throw a weight into the scale for the policy of her ruler which was without example in that age.

It is one of the most instructive spectacles of history to watch how this immense power was reduced to beggary in the course of one long life ; to see how the monarch who had begun life on a more magnificent scale than any other, was in his latter days destitute even of the means for his personal support, and was compelled to have a collection made from house to house in the impoverished country to keep him from starvation. This government in the colonies and at home, the enormous wars which ceased only with his life, and which were all unsuccessful—desperate undertakings, which involved the country in ruin—gave the final blow, but the foundations of this power were undermined when all this took place.

Philip II. was a singular character. He possessed the same phlegmatic repose and caution, the fatalistic passivity as his father, but he was wanting in the counterpoise which Charles had in the restless mental activity and great energy of will that were peculiar to his rather uncommon character.

Philip had more than his father of the dull heavy Spanish blood which tended to melancholy or extraordinary lethargy and apathy.

In talent Philip was by no means equal to his father. He had no grasp of mind, but was one of those characters who grow up with one idea, to which they adhere as an

article of faith with extraordinary constancy, and are proof against everything which might shake them in it; neither are they capable of learning anything from the most fearful chastisements or the most striking lessons of destiny.

It was this that gave rise to his despotic tendencies, his obstinate intolerance of any contradiction, to say nothing of opposition; this was also fostered by the consciousness of his great power, and still more so by a character unnerved by sensual excesses. His will had lost its equilibrium; he obstinately held fast to his one idea, but was languid and undecided in action; often when it was necessary to act, he remained passive, and when he should have given way, exhibited an unhappy obstinacy.

Still he was not idle, but his energies were spent in the busy meddling of a common-place character who has but a very imperfect idea of the human organism. Philip II. wrote, administered, gave orders, day by day, and from one year's end to another; if the regularity with which he spent a great part of his life at the desk can be called industry, he must be considered one of the most industrious and conscientious of rulers.

But the cabinet government conducted by all this writing was almost an entire stranger to the springs of real life. Everything was entered and arranged under separate heads; almost every person of any importance among his subjects had a division to himself in the enormous lists; the King boasted of an immense personal acquaintance, which was kept up by a well-organized system of espionage. Philip's government went on like clockwork with untiring regularity for forty years.

And the entire administration of the Spanish Government threatened to become as monotonous, spiritless, and suspiciously one-sided as the personal doings of the ruler; absolute monarchy was exalted to be the religion of the State, and no amelioration in practice was to be looked for. The impression that this prince always produced was as little favourable as possible. We have concurrent testimony to this from the time when his father, who had already conceived the idea of abdicating in his favour, introduced him to the Northern provinces during his first journey in 1548; it is stated in a diplomatic report that "he had found but little favour with the Italians, was quite repulsive to the Flemings, and hateful to the Germans."



His behaviour then and afterwards was a mixture of shyness and haughtiness which repelled every one ; he was so timid and embarrassed that he hardly dared to raise his eyes, but at the same time he exhibited the Spanish pride, and treated every one with a repulsive coldness and offensive severity which his father, in spite of all his diplomatic coldness, had never shown. Charles was to the last beloved in Flanders, so lively was the impression of his popularity in his best days ; but Philip never won the hearts of the people, and was at last regarded with hatred and disgust. In conversation he was generally blunt, gloomy, and concise ; he seldom granted any requests, and his refusals were harsh and arrogant ; in short, there was not a single amiable or winning trait in his character.

Such a personage as absolute monarch of a great empire, not supported by great statesmen, nor guided by wise and experienced advisers, suspicious of every one, relying upon himself alone, and yet from his limited abilities quite incompetent to his task, could not fail to give rise to great anxiety.

Philip II. began his government with two simple ideas, with which his whole soul was filled ; one was to enforce the absolutism which he had inherited in Spain throughout the whole empire, and then unconditionally to restore the undivided sway of the Catholic Church.

He was not deterred from this project by his father's ill success ; on the contrary, it rather incited him to attempt it anew, with operations on a wider scale, and with more utter disregard of circumstances. His father was fond of proclaiming himself a native of Flanders, and spared the sensitiveness of the inhabitants with respect to liberty, as he did that of the Germans ; but it was Philip's intention to weld everything into Spanish form, and to crush mercilessly all that would not yield. He felt and gave himself out to be exclusively a Spaniard, and especially a Castilian ; Aragon he looked upon almost as a conquered country, and all the other provinces as bound to render silent obedience. In Spain itself his father had achieved a good deal before him ; the power of the Cortes was gone, the liberties of the cities since the last unsuccessful insurrection greatly lessened ; some of the nobles were so impoverished as to be in the service of the Crown ; there was a numerous aristocracy, but few of its members were wealthy enough to be independent

of the Crown; for those who disdained this position there was, according to Alba's view, no resource but emigration.

In no other empire in the world was the alliance between spiritual and temporal despotism so consistently carried out as it was in Spain, and nowhere else was the Inquisition so vigorously used as a fearful weapon in the hands of both.

Things had gone so far in Spain that whenever the Crown was alarmed by any opposition, the spiritual tribunal was used as an unfailing lever. The last privileges of the States that were opposed to the despotism of the Crown were encumbered and destroyed by the Inquisition. Antonio Perez, formerly a favourite of the King, afterwards the victim of all sorts of intrigues at court, had taken refuge in Aragon, which with its great privileges and powerful Cortes was a sort of free State in the absolute monarchy, and he had there appealed to the protection of the law, according to which he could only be tried by his equals. The Inquisition was then called in and lent its aid, not only against Perez, but against the inconvenient liberties of the Aragonians, which were put an end to by the king's priests and soldiers.

In return for this, the Church in Spain was more favoured than in any other country in the world. It was not that the spiritual power held sway over the Government—that is, over the will of the ruler; for Philip II. was the despot still more than the bigoted Catholic. When Paul IV. sided with his enemies, he did not disdain to send his Spaniards into the States of the Church, and to contend earnestly for his rights at the Council of Trent. But the Church had enormous dotations, a multitude of ecclesiastical institutions, and a power over men's consciences, their lives and persons, such as was equalled nowhere else.

The country possessed 58 archbishoprics, 684 bishoprics, 11,400 monasteries, 23,000 brotherhoods, 46,000 monks, 13,800 nuns, 312,000 secular priests, and more than 400,000 ecclesiastics, while there were 80,000 civil servants, and 367,000 other officials.

These figures describe a State composed of spiritual and temporal officials, in which society appears to exist for them, not they for society. They also indicate an enormous amount of property held in mortmain, and fatal consequences to the nation from clerical idleness. Even in

clerical circles the danger of this unnatural state of things was not altogether ignored. In the time of Philip III. the primate of the Spanish Church advised the Crown not to go on founding monasteries. There was a fear that they would be smothered in their own riches.

The result of this disproportion was that prosperity among the people, to say nothing of intellectual life, was checked. The accumulation of landed property in mortmain made the existence of a prosperous race of agriculturists impossible. This was the fatal result of this ecclesiastical government in a domestic point of view. The Inquisition produced the same effect upon foreign relations. Spain, where trade and commerce formerly flourished, was as much shut up from all foreign intercourse as an inhospitable desert island. It went so far, that Spain was compelled to export one of her most important products to be manufactured abroad, because all spirit of enterprise was wanting at home. Commerce languished so completely under Philip II. that most of the harbours were empty, the markets unfrequented, there was no commercial enterprise, and beggary frightfully increased. That this was the consequence of making the Government the instrument of ecclesiastical despotism, the Spaniards themselves have placed beyond doubt by the publication during the last fifty years of irrefragable evidence and convincing dates.

## CHAPTER XXII.

### THE REVOLT OF THE NETHERLANDS.\*

**H**ISTORY, GOVERNMENT, COUNTRY, AND PEOPLE OF THE SEVENTEEN PROVINCES before Philip II.—Philip's Policy in the Netherlands after November, 1555.—The Regency and the Aristocracy: Orange, Egmont, Margaret of Parma, Bishop Perrenot (Granvella).—The Spanish Troops.—The Increase of Bishoprics.—The Inquisition in the Netherlands.—Tactics of Charles V.—The Renewal of the Edict of 1550.—Granvella's Removal, 1564.—Egmont's Journey and the Compromise, January, 1565.—Spring of 1566.—The Beggars' League.—The Field-preaching and Attack upon Images, April to August, 1566.—Defeat of the Volunteer Army of the Beggars at Anstruveel, March, 1567.—The Departure of William of Orange from the Netherlands, April, 1567.

### HISTORY, GOVERNMENT, COUNTRY, AND PEOPLE OF THE SEVENTEEN PROVINCES BEFORE THE TIME OF PHILIP II.

**T**HE first revolt against this system was not to occur in Spain, but in the Netherlands, or Burgundy.

There were seventeen provinces which Charles V. had left to his son, and which had become united in the following manner:—

The French Crown departed from its principle of not conferring large duchies on princes of the royal family,

\* Wagenaar, *Vaderlandsche Historie*. C. Meteeren, *Niederländ Historien*, 1612. Strada de *Bello Belgico*, 1640. Hoofts, *Nederlandsche Historien*, 1703. Van der Vynct, *Hist. des Troubles des Pays-Bas*. Brux., 1824. Van Kampen, *Geschichte der Niederlanden*, 1831. J. L. Motley, *Revolt of the Netherlands*. *Papiers d'état du Card. Granvella*. Paris, 1842. Groen van Prinsterer, *Correspond. Inédite*, 1835. Gachard, *Corresp. de Philippe II.* The same, *Corresp. du Duc d'Albe, sur l'Invasion de Louis de Nassau*, 1850. The same, *Corresp. de Phil. II. et de Marguerite d'Autriche*. The same, *Corresp. de Guillaume le Taciturne*, 1850. Klose, *Wilhelm von Oranien*, Herausgegeben von Wuttke. Holzwarth, *der Abfall der Niederlande*, 1867. Roch, *Untersuchungen über den Abfall der Niederlande*, 1860.

when King John gave Burgundy to his son, Philip the Bold, and thus himself renewed the contest between the high aristocracy and the Crown. King John's posterity\* soon forgot that the blood of the Capets flowed in their veins, and felt themselves to be rather Dukes of Burgundy than vassals of the King of France; and this was coincident with the time when the kingdom was weak and with the wars with England.

17 Out of this Duchy of Burgundy there gradually grew, by dint of purchase, conquest, inheritance, and not seldom legacy-hunting, combined with force, a territory which, in comparison with its original nucleus, might be pronounced splendid. Philip the Bold acquired Flanders, Artois, and the free Earldom by marriage; Philip the Good, Nassau by exchange (1428), by inheritance, Brabant and Limburg (1430), by a sort of compulsory exchange with Jacoba of Bavaria, Remagen, Holland, Seeland, and West Friesland (1433), and Luxemburg by exchange (1443). Charles V. acquired Friesland, Ober-yssel, Utrecht, Gelders, and Zutphen. It was thus that this remarkable empire was formed. It had begun with a portion of the old principality of Burgundy, and extended itself by means of Luxemburg to the frontier of Lorraine. The whole of the present Belgium belonged to it, part of the Flanders and Artois of our times, and the present kingdom of Holland.

It was Charles V. who first possessed this territory in its entirety, and at the Diet of Augsburg, in 1548, he carried the Pragmatic Sanction, whereby it was declared to be a compact imperial territory, was to have its own list and special privileges in the Diet, but was to be free from the obligations of membership of the empire. It was the duty of the empire to protect it from attack; but it had no right of jurisdiction, nor right to hold conventions, nor to demand obedience on things usually obligatory on imperial territories.

On the whole, Charles's government in these seventeen provinces was skilful and moderate; but on one point he was inexorable; this was the question of the ancient faith. He took every means in his power to avert the spread of

\* Genealogy of the House of Burgundy: John, King of France; his son, Philip the Bold, 1363-1404; his son, John the Good, 1419; his son, Philip the Good, 1467; his son, Charles the Bold, 1477.

the new doctrines, and did not shrink from the most cruel and sanguinary measures if he could but maintain the ancient Church intact. Otherwise he managed tolerably well with the complicated laws of the country. Of course the republican atmosphere did not suit the Spanish autocrat, and, so far as he could do so without exciting too much notice, he was fond of interfering with the multitudinous local, civic, corporative, and provincial privileges; but he showed his political tact in generally trying to obtain his ends by circuitous means. Thus, though not without a struggle, he succeeded in obtaining more influence over the appointment of Government officials, the legal administration and taxation of the wealthy provinces, than any prince of Burgundy had exercised before. That he did act in his difficult position with tact and success is proved by the affection with which he was regarded. On the last day of his government, the 25th of October, 1555, when, as a gouty old man leaning upon his crutches, he announced his abdication at Brussels, and presented his son as his successor, the universal emotion bore witness to his popularity.

The Netherlanders were proud to call him their countryman, and it pleased him to hear it. He really had a certain personal preference for this part of his dominions, and had made himself so much at home there that he was looked upon as the hereditary ruler.

The country was unusually rich in resources. It contained within itself abundant sources of prosperity, and the products and modes of life of the different parts were very various. Flanders, Hennegau, Artois, and Namur were rich corn-bearing districts, whose harvests could support the whole empire; at Ghent, Bruges, Antwerp, Brussels, and other cities, trade flourished as it did nowhere else in Europe; the arts of weaving, cloth-making, dyeing, and other branches of industry, were carried to great perfection. Antwerp was a cosmopolitan city, rivalled by no other in the world; at the same time a great portion of the country was washed by the sea, which was the great highway between north and south, and, as Guicciardini says, it was "the great harbour and emporium for the trade of the European world."

All the northern part of the country was a maritime district, partly gained from the sea by artificial means; part

of it had more sea-coast than habitable land, and it was inhabited by a hardy and enduring race of old Frisian blood, who, with admirable perseverance, had made a home for themselves, in spite of perpetual conflict with wind and wave. These characteristics remain to the present day. The Dutch have still been draining lakes and turning them into fruitful soil; it is the ancient Frisian patience, the Germanic toughness, which has never belied itself even under the most difficult circumstances. From Rotterdam to the most northerly part of the coast of Friesland, there was a number of places, larger and smaller, which had acquired importance as natural harbours. The habit of living on the sea, of familiarity with its perils, the taste for a seafaring life and for making voyages of discovery, and for emigration—all this existed in embryo before the fishing villages had become great harbours and centres of commerce.

The mental condition of the people was not behind their outward prosperity. It is expressly stated in histories of the country that, notwithstanding its prosaic devotion to trade and commerce, learning, the arts, and earnest endeavours after improvement, were equally cherished; that, besides the universities, there were everywhere excellent schools, which had more thoroughly imbibed the modern humanistic spirit than any others, and that culture extended even among the people. "There was no country," says a contemporary historian, "where learning and culture prevailed so widely as among us; even in the Frisian fishermen's huts you might find people who could not only read and write, but discussed scriptural interpretations as if they were scholars." Even if this is an exaggeration, it is well known that amidst their material prosperity a real desire for mental culture had spread among the lowest classes of the people. Friends and foes bear witness that in these countries the conditions of material and mental prosperity were combined to a rare extent.

The seventeen provinces differed from each other both in their constitutions and mode of life.

In Flanders, Brabant, and Hennegau there was a landed nobility, whose estates were measured by the square mile, and many of them were like German princes. In the cities, there was a proud and independent class of citizens, who, like the inhabitants of Ghent not only pursued their



peaceful crafts, but when necessary could also wage war; the citizens of Ghent had especially signalised themselves in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and had carried on a successful contest with the nobility. The ancient Frisian district was in the north. The Frisians are the only German race which has developed a democracy in which nobles and royalty found no place; the mode of life of this fishing and seafaring people was not adapted to the development of an aristocracy of any kind.

Thus there were wide differences, social and political, throughout the country. The seaport towns of the north were more powerful than the German Hanse Towns; there were neither great lords nor a powerful Church, and both in town and country the pride of democratic independence and self-government prevailed; there were no elements likely to develope into a monarchical form of government.

Each of the seventeen provinces had its own constitution; the character of each was determined by the preponderance of classes among the people: in Flanders and Brabant it was more aristocratic, in the north democratic, but in no case monarchical; it was a motley confusion of forms of every kind with provincial, civic, and local privileges, and every gradation between feudalism and democracy, but the prevailing character was a motley conglomerate of small republics, not unlike that of ancient Switzerland, merely bound together by a monarchy. In some parts of the north that constitution of the civic aristocracies had begun to develope itself which afterwards became the prevailing one in Holland.

The government of a world so constituted was both easy and difficult; easy, because the variety of rights and interests rendered any united resistance very difficult. Unless these distinct elements united under some one banner, great commotions would be sure to take place which would be fatal to all particular interests; the most convenient policy was to rule all by means of their divisions. It was difficult, because it was necessary, for a policy which aimed not only at ruling, but at reaping advantage from the country, to keep the people in good humour by allowing them their privileges, and consulting their feelings and prejudices; for this motley community was entirely one in deeply-rooted devotion to the ancient rights which were the palladium of their liberties, and to which they regarded all

attempts at levelling and reducing them to uniformity as fatal.

They would not have sold them to a prince of their own lineage, far less for the sake of a unity which the will of a despotic foreigner would have imposed upon them.

On the whole, Charles V. formed a just estimate of these forces ; he contrived never to excite any general opposition ; he now and then ventured on a little despotic interference, but he renounced from the first the idea of establishing any uniform system of administration.

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POLICY OF PHILIP II. IN THE NETHERLANDS, FROM  
NOVEMBER, 1555.—THE REGENCY AND THE ARISTOC-  
RACY.

It was under these circumstances that Philip entered on his Burgundian inheritance. His first appearance in the country had not made a favourable impression. When he was introduced, in October, 1555, his stiff and gloomy aspect, his awkward and ungenial Spanish manners, had produced an unpleasant effect, and it was very unpromising that when the States freely laid their grievances before him, he rose from the throne with unconcealed displeasure and angrily left the hall. In proportion as Charles had been beloved for his affability, his son was disliked for his repelling coldness. But these were only impressions or gloomy presentiments which might pass away ; they did not as yet contain any germ of revolt.

Misunderstandings indeed could not be prevented from the first, but they were caused by the young monarch's practical measures rather than by the impression he produced.

The King could not govern the country himself, and had therefore to choose a Stadtholder, who should govern in his name.

Had the opinion of the country been consulted, especially that of the spokesmen of the numerous aristocracy, the answer would have been unanimous that one from among themselves should be chosen, whose name, wealth, and influence rendered him suitable for the office of regent.

There was no lack of candidates ; there were Count Egmont, and William of Orange, and a number of eminent and influential men, who considered themselves princes of

the German empire, and to whom it did not appear audacious to aspire to the office.

Philip had well considered the question, for this wish had been so plainly expressed to him that he could not fail to understand it, but he was determined not to accede to it. He distrusted this aristocracy and feared its power. He had already had reports sent him concerning the leaders among the nobles, and observations of this sort are found about Egmont: "Nutat in religione: whatever he may say to-day, he will act contrary to it to-morrow: this is the gentleman of whom we hear the most at present, and whom the others put forward to say things that they have not courage to say themselves." Of William: "He goes to work with more finesse, and is altogether in better credit than the other; if he could be gained over, the others might be got into our power."

Both these men were therefore early marked in the black book as suspicious, yet their previous conduct had given no cause for it. On the contrary, the position of both had been such that they might be regarded as the King's most zealous servants, and as executants of the royal will. Egmont had just led a part of the Spanish army against the French, and had brought the war to a successful issue by his victories at St. Quentin and Gravelingen. It was not easy to see why he excited the King's suspicion; he was not a character likely to excite it; he was a distinguished soldier, the pride of his master, Charles V., who had taken him with him to Tunis at the age of seventeen, as soon as he was capable of bearing arms. Then he was one of the greatest lords in Flanders and Brabant, nearly related to some of the princely houses of Germany, himself something of a German prince, but sincerely devoted to the royal house.

It cannot be denied that he was vain, and liable to arrogant and violent outbursts of passion; but he had the noble ambition to earn his sovereign's favour by substantial services, and every one knew him to be guileless and unsuspecting. He now and then betrayed the wounded pride of the great noble, was fond of receiving homage, and was displeased when it was refused him. But these failings were on the surface; his words were worse than his thoughts. He had no talent for machinations or intrigues; he was open-hearted and unsuspecting; utterly destitute of qualities likely to make him dangerous.

Prince William of Orange (born 1533) had already entered into the imperial service in the Netherlands with his father. He had grown up as a page at the Emperor's court, and as his avowed favourite had been entrusted with important missions, even in his twentieth year. The world then knew nothing of the great qualifications which he afterwards displayed under the pressure of a mighty task ; he appeared merely as a clever, luxurious, pomp-loving cavalier, in whom there was not the slightest trace of the ambition of his later days.

His ancestors of Nassau had filled military and political posts of importance in the Netherlands ; his cousin Renatus had bequeathed to him the important heritage of Orange ; and it was in this that the power of the Duke of Nassau, which he also was, lay. His character as a statesman will evolve itself in the course of the history to which he belongs. When Charles laid aside the imperial crown, William was employed to convey it to his brother Ferdinand ; and when he came to the Netherlands to abdicate, and introduce his son, he appeared with one arm leaning on his crutch, the other on William's shoulder.

There was nothing in such precedents to indicate hostility to the Crown—at any rate, not more than belonged to every privileged position in the State. Both men had performed willing service for the Emperor ; they were equally devoted to him. Both were born and brought up as Catholics—Egmont rigidly so ; Orange as a man of the world, by whom religion was regarded as something incidental, which must conform to circumstances. There could be no idea of religious fanaticism in his case, or even of hearty sympathy with any creed ; and in this he was uncommonly like his patron, Charles V.

Egmont and Orange considered themselves equally adapted for the office of regent. Whether the expectations of the nobles should be justified or not was a question on both sides of which there was something to be said. It was true that it would attach them to the Crown, if they were in the service of the Government ; but it was also true that there was some danger in giving them so much power ; for they were almost all deeply in debt, and would therefore be predisposed to innovation ; and with the suspicious Philip this consideration prevailed.

The aristocracy had reckoned that if no one from among

themselves were chosen, it would be some person agreeable to them, whom they would be able to influence. They had in view a relative of the Emperor; the Duchess Christina of Lorraine was the candidate favoured by Orange. But Philip again disappointed them; for instead of this popular princess, Margaret of Parma was chosen. Charles's eldest child was an illegitimate daughter, whom it was easy for him in his imperial position to pronounce legitimate, and by means of a princely marriage to introduce to the dynastic circles. She was brought up by the Emperor's sister, Mary of Hungary, and married, when twelve years old, to a miserable debauchee, Alexander of Medici, and after his death to Octavio Farnese, afterwards Duke of Parma and Piacenza. Alexander Farnese, one of the most distinguished men of the age, was the issue of this marriage.

Margaret of Parma had many masculine qualities. She was of commanding appearance, an enthusiastic Catholic, and deeply versed in the arts of Spanish dissimulation.

This appointment did not make a very favourable impression. The lady's character was not known, as we now know it from authentic documents; but although her mother was a native of the Netherlands, she had become a stranger to the country, and it was surmised that she would govern in the Spanish spirit, and that was enough.

We have in her correspondence, edited by Reiffenberg in 1842 (not published), the most complete disclosures as to her position, and the spirit in which she entered upon her office. Philip selected her because she was entirely dependent upon him. He could at any moment dismiss her into her previous obscurity, for she had no property of her own, and this he afterwards did. It appears plainly from her letters that she justly estimated this fact, and in her delicate position she was as subservient to every suggestion of her brother as circumstances rendered desirable.

She systematically encouraged Philip's distrust of the aristocracy of the country. From the first she brought accusations against Egmont and Orange, and was continually casting oil upon the flames. Instead of conciliating the already aggrieved nobles, she rudely repulsed them.

With all its complicated conditions, the country was in itself difficult to govern, and she was certainly not equal to the task. Under any circumstances, it would have surpassed a woman's powers, especially one possessed of so

little loyalty of character as the Regent ; for her official reports, compared with her letters, appear like one great lie. She was a stranger to the country ; she did not even understand its language. Even if she had not been so disposed, she would have been obliged, therefore, to submit to the influence of others ; and her advisers were chosen in accordance with her brother's will.

Among these there was one in particular at whom the arrows of party spirit were soon aimed. This was Cardinal Granvella, as he had been called since 1561. The family had come into notice under Charles V. who was skilled in discovering talent. Nicolas Perrenot was an obscure advocate in Burgundy, when the Emperor advanced him, and made him his most confidential minister. One of his children, Antony (born 1517), early displayed great talents and energy, rapidly rose step by step in ecclesiastical rank, and was soon distinguished by the Emperor's favour.

About 1540 we already find him as Bishop of Arras, in the Emperor's train ; and being a prelate of an energetic and not very pastoral turn of mind, he took part in all the Emperor's journeys and battles like a general, and as on other occasions he took a pleasure in not playing the part of a demure priest.

Very different opinions were formerly entertained of his position. We have now the means of forming a precise estimate of it.

He was an adroit, clever, well-informed man, undoubtedly the most capable person whom the Regent had about her, a native of the country, well acquainted with its circumstances, an energetic worker, of colossal endurance, and his talent is proved by the number of well-written documents that we possess by his hand. The whole weight of the Government rested on his shoulders, and he carried it on in blind devotion to the dictates and interests of Philip. He might well say, "I am not a Fleming: I belong to Philip II."

Now that we are in possession of these letters, many reproaches that have been cast upon him may be contradicted, but many of his less known weaknesses are brought to light. All are agreed as to the extent and character of his ambition. These letters also show that he obsequiously entered into every humour and idea of his master, whose character he had well studied ; and besides



being a clever statesman, he was well skilled in flattery. But it is proved by these documents that he perhaps actually opposed the increase of bishoprics, the introduction of the Inquisition, and the execution of Egmont, which have been ascribed to him. He was far from being an independent character, who would undertake anything on his own responsibility. He was rather slippery, as a parvenu whose patent of nobility is his master's favour—ready to do anything, or leave it undone, according to order. He was essentially an accommodating character, not in the least like such men as Alba.

As is usual in such cases, he was abundantly hated. He was the first man in the Government; everything passed through his hands; and he was, in fact, the responsible agent of the Government, even if he was more or less innocent of many things of which he was accused.

He was not likely to disarm prejudice; he had all the characteristics of a parvenu; he was obsequious to those above him, arrogant and assuming to those beneath him; he boasted of his ecclesiastical honours, first as bishop, then as archbishop, finally as cardinal, and he made all who entered his presence—even the first men in the land—offensively feel that he was master. There were reasons for which much might be said for not making either Egmont or Orange, Stadtholder; but to place over men of princely rank a coarse plebeian, the son of an advocate, was not wise; it was to avoid one evil by committing another, and it was one of Philip's most serious mistakes.

Granvella did not understand how to treat these great lords; every one of them brought the same complaints against him—not only the impetuous Egmont, but Horn and Orange also, who at first tried to maintain a friendly understanding with him. They considered him responsible for every bad measure, and they were right; he was the soul of a Government which had sworn death to the liberties of the Netherlands, and he let the princes feel that they were under his feet.

The form of the Government was as follows. Besides the Regent, there were three councillors who nominally shared the business of the country between them, but who really were only tools of a cabinet from which the Regent had secret orders to receive all instructions. This consisted of Granvella; the learned Viglius Van Aytta, a vacillating,



untrustworthy character, of whom even his own party said that he was to be had for money, and that his credit was doubtful; and Barlaymont, who was one of the nobility, but who was therefore regarded as all the more inexcusable for holding his head in his pride of office above the great nobles.

FIRST DIFFERENCES.—THE SPANISH SOLDIERY.—THE INCREASE OF BISHOPRICS, 1560-61.

This was the position of the new Government in 1559. It was an administration by strangers and upstarts, whose creed, political and religious, was directly at enmity with the sentiments of the nation, and who, however able they might otherwise be, could but increase the variance which was beginning to appear.

The aristocracy were as yet far from any thought of revolt, but they thought themselves entitled to certain privileges and favours. Under Charles V. they had been employed in all important posts; it had perhaps been Charles's intention thereby to connect their interests with his own, but perhaps also to ruin them financially; at all events, he effected that they should spend extravagantly in his service.

Historians all agree that the nobles of the Netherlands took service under Charles's pompous government at enormous expense to themselves; that they rivalled each other in a magnificence which ruined families of great wealth, and involved nearly all in debt. The Emperor's commissions and the places he bestowed were very honourable and splendid; but they brought nothing in, and involved the expenditure of private property. The debts of William of Orange were said to amount to 900,000 florins, of which a considerable part was incurred by the cost of imperial embassies. The great lords could not forget this. Then they had hoped to effect a successful issue of the war with France, and for this also they had made sacrifices. Besides this, there had been a famine in the Netherlands, and the largest demands had been made on the largest landowners. For these services the aristocracy claimed the gift of offices and dignities; but their claims were partly unwisely refused, and partly met by insignificant requital.

Still, this would not have been enough to excite the

Netherlands to revolt ; it would have taken a long time, for the fact that the Government had not conciliated even so influential a portion of the population, to have acquired so much importance. It was only to a partial extent that the people made the cause of the disappointed nobles their own, though they would rather have seen an Egmont or Orange at their head, instead of a Spanish Camarilla. But of the national aversion of the Netherlands to the Spaniards there was no doubt ; they hated each other as two distinct nations under the same sceptre always have done ; and the new Government was assiduous in exaggerating rather than in lessening these relations.

Philip II. began by garrisoning the country with his troops. After the conclusion of the war with France, there was no reason for delaying to disband the army. But a portion of the Spanish troops were quartered in the Netherlands, perhaps at first with the idea that they should be supported at the expense of the country, but with an obvious afterthought that they might be required against an enemy who, after the peace, could only be found within it. The quartering of foreign troops was opposed to the spirit of the privileges of all the provinces ; besides which, after the famine, from which, during the previous year, every class had suffered, it was an intolerable burden. No one could see why they should support a few thousand brutal, famishing Spanish soldiers, for whose perpetual presence no good reason could be given. The burden affected all, and the grievance was therefore general and popular ; the bitter feeling excited by it in some places was so great that in Zeeland they declared that they would all rather, men, women, and children, be drowned in the waves than put up with the shameful treatment of the Spanish soldiery any longer.

The impossibility of retaining these soldiers, whom Philip required for his Inquisition, became so obvious, that even Granvella and the Regent doubted whether it would do to exasperate the people any longer. They represented to the King that if the troops were not removed, not a penny more would come into the treasury from these rich provinces ; and Granvella wrote : " It cuts me to the heart to see the Spanish troops depart, but if the imminent danger of a revolt in the provinces is to be avoided, it must be." They almost dismissed them on their own responsibility at

the beginning of 1561, and just then a sufficient pretext occurred for employing them abroad.

But the King, who wrote very angry despatches about it, was certain that nothing was to be done in this case by concessions; whenever it was possible, sharp and decisive measures must be taken, and if it did cost a few heads, that was of no moment. He himself defended Granvella from the reproach of having advised him to cut off half-a-dozen heads; he had done no such thing, though if he had "it would not have been so much amiss." And this at a time when as yet not a finger was raised in revolt!

To this exasperation about the soldiers another was added. A plan was conceived of increasing the number of bishoprics, and of making the new ones organs of the Inquisition.

In this wealthy country, with a population of three million souls, there were only four bishoprics—Arras, Cambray, Tournay in the southern, and Utrecht in the northern provinces. This appeared to Philip very disproportionate when he compared it with Spain, so thickly sown with spiritual shepherds. He proposed to multiply the number fourfold. Pope Paul IV. zealously entered into the project; in the bull confirmed by his successor, Pius II., January, 1560, it was stated that it was urgently necessary to plant new bishoprics in these blessed pastures. "The enemy of mankind was working in such manifold forms, the Netherlands were so encompassed by heretical and schismatical nations, that everything was to be feared for its spiritual safety. The harvest was plenteous, but the labourers were few," &c. But the clergy of the Netherlands thought otherwise; they were not only strongly leavened with the philosophy of Erasmus, but they feared that this multiplication of bishoprics would diminish their incomes—a reason which at first caused Granvella, as Bishop of Arras, to be against it. The people would not hear of it. If the object were only to increase the pomp and luxury of the Catholic Church, it would only furnish this sober, commercial people with an expensive luxury. They had been good Catholics for centuries with only four bishoprics; what did they want with more? But if, as was to be feared, the object were to multiply the tribunals for heretics, tremendous danger was bound up with it. Besides, the charters of Holland and Brabant, especially the "*Joyeuse Entrée*" of the latter, expressly required the consent of the States to every increase

of the clergy. It was one of the conditions which the ruler had sworn to abide by, and must keep to, unless the subjects were to be released from the obligations imposed by treaty upon them. At the same time, it was everywhere reported that there was an intention to introduce the Spanish Inquisition.\* At all events, it was expressly stated in the bull that each of the new bishops was to nominate a number of prebendaries, to support him in the Inquisition; and Granvella himself received the title of Grand Inquisitor.

### THE INQUISITION IN THE NETHERLANDS.

Even Charles V. had been nearly as severe against the new doctrines in the Netherlands as in Spain, and this had given great dissatisfaction. But between 1520 and 1530, the spread of heresy had not been very great. The first measure which had been taken against the Reformation was the promulgation of the Edict of Worms, and the placing of all books, teaching, teachers, and confessors of the new gospel under an interdict, and this law was carried out with sanguinary severity. In 1522 some Reform movements had taken place among the Augustine Order at Brussels, and the culprits were at once seized and burnt. For years the most cruel sentences had been pronounced upon apostates, and at the close of Charles's reign the number of those who, often on frivolous charges, had been strangled, burnt, beheaded, or buried alive, was by some, among them Hugo Grotius, set down as one hundred thousand; and by none at less than fifty thousand. The spirit of the imperial sentences, the notorious "edicts," is best seen from that of the 25th of November, 1550, which Charles proclaimed in the elation of his triumph at Augsburg, and in which all the previous ones were summed up.

The next step was to repeat an edict of 24th October, 1529, in which it was forbidden to print, copy, multiply, keep, conceal, buy, sell, or give away any work of Martin Luther, Ecolampadius, Zwingli, Bucer, Calvin, or any other heretic. It was forbidden to destroy, or in any way injure, any image of the Virgin Mary or any canonised saint; to

\* Whether the introduction of the "Spanish" Inquisition, or the increase of the severity of the Inquisition of the Netherlands was intended, it is all one. The latter was undoubtedly Philip's intention, according to his open declaration even before he returned to Spain.

hold or attend any heretical conventicle ; and the laity were admonished that they were neither to read the Scriptures nor to take part in any discussions or controversies respecting them, under pain of a variety of barbarous punishments. Such miscreants were to be put to death as disturbers of the public peace and order by the following methods : the men by the sword, the women to be buried alive—if they recanted ; but if they are obstinate, they are all to be burnt : in either case, all their property was to be confiscated. He who omitted to accuse persons suspected of heresy, gave them shelter, food, fuel, or clothing, was to be regarded as a heretic himself. People who had not been convicted of heresy, but were suspected of it, and required by the ecclesiastical judges to abjure such heresy, if they rendered themselves suspicious again, were to be treated without mercy, and punished with loss of life and property. An informer, in case of conviction of the accused, was to receive the half of his property when it did not exceed one hundred Flemish florins ; when more, ten per cent. of the excess. He who attended at a conventicle, and afterwards informed against the others, was exempted from punishment.

And all these ordinances were meant in fearful seriousness, for at the end it says, " In order that the judges and officials may not suppose, under pretext that these penalties are too heavy, and are only meant to intimidate, that the culprits may be treated with less severity, it is ordained that the guilty shall be punished without fail ; and the judges are forbidden to change or modify the sentences in any way." No one might intercede for a heretic, or give in any petition for one, under pain of forfeiting his rights as a citizen, and other arbitrary punishments.

Queen Mary of Hungary, the Emperor's sister, was so shocked at the edict that she went herself to Augsburg to petition that it might be mitigated ; but all that the Emperor conceded was the substitution of the words " ecclesiastical judges " for " inquisitors." Philip II. was right when he once said, " What do we want with a new Inquisition there ? the present one is bad enough."

As early as 1521, Charles V. appointed a general inquisitor, with adjutants, to carry out his decrees. In 1525, these were replaced by three superior inquisitors, and thus the institution from time to time made progress, and it was not merely independent of the clergy of the Netherlands—they

were entirely subjected to it ; so that every ecclesiastic, even up to the bishops, was as devoid of rights before the Inquisition as any layman ; and in April, 1550, all provisions in the charters, which were opposed to these edicts concerning heresy, were declared null and void.

In accordance with his father's solemn and repeated instructions, Philip had fully confirmed and renewed all this in the first month of his government, November, 1555, but meanwhile the aspect of religion in the Netherlands had entirely altered.

Charles V.'s Inquisition had effected almost nothing for the maintenance of the old faith. Every year a number of cruel executions had taken place, and a certain Titelmans\* had administered the dreadful laws with all the fanaticism of an unscrupulous renegade. But in this case, as in others, the blood of the martyrs was the seed of the Church. The most sanguinary strictness did not in the least prevent the spread of the new doctrines, which at the time of the first measures against them numbered very few followers, but by the time of the Edict of 1550 they had increased tenfold. Ten thousand fugitives were already living abroad on account of their faith ; but as only the wealthy could afford this, these figures imply a very considerable number of converts who were not intimidated by the barbarous Inquisition.

The complaints against Philip, who was only carrying out his father's laws, and who during the war with France had somewhat relaxed the persecution of the heretics, were therefore only so far justified, in that it was believed from some of his expressions that he would outdo his father, and that since heresy had spread so widely he would double or treble the old severity. Complaint after complaint reached the Regent, and through her the King, from Egmont and Orange, of Granvella and the Spanish policy. This convinced Philip that Granvella was just the man for the Netherlands, and that these two lords must be regarded as the most dangerous enemies of the country. He conceived a violent hatred of Egmont, although he found it prudent to conceal it for a time, and forgot all the services that he had rendered to the kingdom.

The years 1562-3-4 passed away amidst irritation and

• See Motley.



excitement. The Inquisition pursued its fearful course; bitter hatred raged in the country; the aristocracy warned and protested, and adopted the not unskilful plan of sparing the Regent and attacking Granvella, accusing him of being her guilty and responsible adviser.

The Regent at first watched the storm with displeasure, and then with malicious satisfaction. The wily Italian said to herself that if any one must fall it had better be Granvella than herself; she therefore suddenly changed her tactics. Having first defended Granvella, she now accused him of being the cause of all the discontent; but Granvella did not alter his course.

Philip II. seemed soon disposed to make a concession. He told his sister that he saw that it would be difficult to retain Granvella, and that his dismissal was perhaps inevitable. At the same time he wrote a confidential letter to Granvella, in which he proposed to him to withdraw into his native Burgundy for a time, until the ill-will against him had blown over; it should not be any disadvantage to him, and he had nothing to fear for his person or position: "for I regard your interest and honour as my own."

Thus we find duplicity on every side. This is the most repulsive feature in all these complications, and it is therefore unreasonable to ascribe all the blame to any one person. The great nobles were not sincere, for they mixed up their private affairs with the complaints as to the public grievances; the Regent was not sincere, for she sacrificed the man whose system she had long regarded as her own, and which was unchanged; but the most insincere of all was Philip, for he removed his tool in apparent displeasure, and yet was resolved to carry out his system to the utmost.

So in 1564 Granvella was removed, with the ostensible object of reconciling his opponents to the Crown, but really to withdraw him from the universal hatred. The institution of the new bishoprics proceeded at a rapid pace; the Inquisition was reorganized with fresh energy and severity, though on the basis of the old Edicts. Tribunals were established in every province, the express purpose of which was to enforce to the utmost the imperial Edicts. One execution followed quickly upon another, judicial murders with most revolting details; every preacher of the new doctrines, every one even suspected of heresy, was condemned and executed. A former Carmelite monk, Fabricius,



who was much followed as a preacher at Antwerp, was seized, placed upon the rack, and executed. A great popular outbreak had followed, which plainly showed the feeling of the masses. But no warning was taken, the religious terrorism increased, and if any proof was needed that Granvella's recall was no sign of a return to better paths it was furnished by this.

Before Granvella was recalled the nobles had refused to attend the Council of State any longer. They had effected his fall and had returned, but now they were made responsible for things that they abhorred. They felt that they had been ill used, and that the man whom they hated had only been sacrificed in order ruthlessly to carry on his still more hateful system. When the King was about to have the decrees of the Council of Trent proclaimed they were roused to resistance; Orange made a powerful speech in the Council, which occasioned the President Viglius an attack of apoplexy which nearly proved fatal, and it was determined to send Egmont to Madrid, in order to open the eyes of the ill-informed King, to represent to him that the hour of the Government, as it had been, was come, and that the system of bishops and executioners, Edicts and Inquisitions, was no longer tenable. Count Egmont seemed to be specially adapted for the mission; he was a zealous Catholic, a distinguished general, and as loyal a subject as any Spaniard. Orange did not anticipate much good from this step, for he was convinced that the King was playing a double game, but it appeared at the moment to be the only thing to be done.

### 320 EGMONT'S JOURNEY AND THE COMPROMISE, 1565-6.

Egmont set out for Spain in 1565. The King looked forward to his arrival with deep dissatisfaction, but his reception was all that could be desired. He was fêted as the victor of St. Quentin and Gravelingen, and treated with the greatest distinction; the design was to intoxicate the vain man with flattery and honour, and it succeeded perfectly. He had interviews with the King, who appeared to the guileless count utterly different from the system in the Netherlands; he was good-will and cordiality itself. He seemed willing to put an end to some of the grievances, and even in matters of faith to yield as far as his conscience

would permit. Egmont himself did not want any favour shown to the new doctrines; he only wished that the perpetual executions should be put an end to, for they promoted heresy more than anything else. The King did not seem disinclined to meet his wishes. The count was not disturbed by the snares and reservations in his answers; he thought everything had been attained when the King declared his willingness to submit the matter to another trial, and departed, as he himself wrote, "the happiest man in the world."

Overjoyed at having accomplished so much, Egmont returned home, and reported that the King was the best man in the world; it was only his counsellors who were executioners; he had gone into everything in the most friendly manner, had graciously promised that all the evils should be mitigated, that the nuisance of the executions should cease, yet that the unity of the Church should not suffer.

Very different were the instructions received by the Regent soon after Egmont's return; they enjoined that the old edicts should be strictly enforced; there was nothing about reforms, nothing about concessions, and this was soon publicly known.

Orange saw that his friend had been utterly deceived; the people shook their heads at the discrepancy, and Egmont was beside himself with rage and scorn.

The King had played the part of a cowardly despot, who had not the courage to declare his sentiments to the count; while he was so friendly to his face, he was taking care that not the least concession should be made.

Some fruitless negotiations took place with the bishops and doctors of theology, and then, at the King's express command, it was decreed in the council that the decrees of the Council of Trent, the Edicts, and the Inquisition, should be promulgated in every city and village every six months.

As this decree was being passed, Orange whispered to his neighbour that before long the most extraordinary tragedy would begin that had ever been played on earth, and during the next few days the worst forebodings were rife. The effect of the new proclamations was indescribable; they were received with the horror that forebodes a national catastrophe; it was as if the blood had been suddenly

congealed in the nation's veins. Trade was at an end, foreign merchants fled, the manufactories were idle, the stillness of death fell over Antwerp, the capital of this flourishing mercantile State, and the universal exasperation burst forth in a flood of passionate pamphlets and appeals which no Inquisition could stem.

In a public letter to the King, the independent and manly spirit of those who were threatened with loss of liberty of conscience was strikingly expressed: "We are ready to die for the Gospel, but we read therein, 'Render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's.' We thank God that even our enemies are constrained to bear witness to our piety and innocence, for it is a common saying, 'He does not swear, for he is a Protestant.' 'He is not an immoral man or a drunkard, for he belongs to the new sect;' and yet we are subjected to every kind of punishment that can be invented to torment us."

The position of the aristocracy, in relation to the King's policy, gradually became clearer. Their undecided bearing had often laid them open to the charge of selfishness, but this was the case no longer; the time had come when they had to choose between being hammer or anvil. They were justified in complaining of grievances so bitter, and would have lost all the people's confidence if they had not now taken an independent part.

The idea began to prevail among the party of the young and passionate nobles, not altogether consisting of pure elements, that they must put an end to half measures, and boldly take the initiative.

Count Louis of Nassau, more fiery than his brother William, and more inclined to radical views, took great pains to bring about an understanding among the nobles; he was a distinguished soldier, and a man of the greatest moral courage. He was supported as adviser and diplomatic ally by the learned St. Aldegonde, surpassed by few as a theologian, soldier, author, and orator, and a thorough patriot. There were others of less blameless character, such as Count Brederode, a man of adventurous courage, but strongly tainted with the libertinism of the nobles. He was deeply involved in pecuniary difficulties, and therefore not above suspicion that he was speculating on a revolution which might place him personally in a better position.

It was a mixed company of sincere enthusiasts, secret Protestants, discontented nobles, and selfish schemers, who during the first half of 1566 united in a Compromise, in order energetically to oppose the King's system, at first by legal methods.

About five hundred nobles, who were afterwards joined by many of the burgher class, bound themselves by this Compromise to unite in opposing Spanish tyranny and the Inquisition, which were ruining the country, and any violence which should be offered to any of them. They had no thought of revolt or insurrection; they wished rather to defend the rights of the monarch and to put down disturbances.

The former leaders of the aristocracy, Egmont, Orange, and Horn, took no part in it; they saw that most serious consequences must result from such measures, and that the strength of the League was altogether insufficient to avert them. Orange especially stood aloof, although by repeated remonstrances he had removed all doubt as to his opinion on the main question, the Inquisition. He knew the mixed character of the League, and what must come of a conspiracy the members of which gave vent to their zeal in wild speeches, amidst the clashing of glasses at banquets; but he could do nothing to prevent it; they had begun to play their part, and the passions of the young nobles would have play.

A great demonstration was decided on for the spring of 1566; the cavaliers of the League were to go in solemn procession to the Regent, and hand in a petition, praying for mitigation of the Edicts and the abolition of the Inquisition.

#### THE BEGGARS, THE FIELD PREACHERS, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF IMAGES.

The procession took place on the 5th April, 1566. The flower of the young nobility appeared, two or three hundred strong, in splendid attire, before the Regent's palace at Brussels, and Brederode read the address in a solemn assembly of the Council. The petitioners therein renewed their assurances of loyalty, and protested against the calumnies of those who accused them of planning revolt; but, although in a tolerably respectful tone, they depicted

the distress of the provinces in lively colours, and requested that until a special ambassador should have procured the abolition of the Edicts from the King, the Regent should at least suspend them.

When the Duchess, who during this scene had hardly been able to master her excitement, summoned the Council at once to consider the subject, Barlaymont endeavoured to pacify her, representing that she need not fear "this troop of beggars;" if the answer depended upon him alone, it should be given in blows, and they should go down the palace stairs faster than they had come up.

Barlaymont's words have become immortal; as soon as it went round that these noble cavaliers had been insulted by an upstart, the nickname became a title of honour.

The Duchess gave a well-meaning but evasive answer. The three hundred petitioners met at a banquet on the 8th of April. Barlaymont's words were discussed, and when they were consulting as to a suitable name for the League, Brederode rose and said, "They call us Beggars; let us adopt the name. We will resist the Inquisition, but we will remain true to the King and to the Beggars' wallet." Then he called for a leathern pouch, such as was worn by vagrant beggars, drank off a wooden bowl of wine at one draught, and set it down with the words: "Vivent les gueux." Amidst cheers and laughter the pouch and bowl went round the table: the League had been christened.

The party had a symbol, and a token was given for the masses. Up to this time the contest had been confined to the upper grades of society, the secrecy of cabinets, and diplomatic transactions. Now that the great lords had to a certain extent formed a league of brotherhood with the common people, the exasperated populace said among themselves, "These shall be our leaders," and more resulted from it than the carousers at the banquet, or the great 'Beggar,' Brederode, expected or wished. The Beggars' symbol spread throughout the country; noblemen were seen in the grey garb of mendicant monks. A new coin, the 'Beggars' Penny,' with the image of the King on one side, and two hands holding a beggar's wallet on the other, served as a medal. And now the masses began to move.

While the Privy Council was endeavouring to obtain a "Moderation" of the Edicts, and, with the aid of the sharp-sighted Viglius, effected that the heretics should be

no longer burnt but hung, and that the Inquisition should proceed "prudently, and with circumspection," a movement broke out among the people which mocked at all the Edicts. The open country was suddenly covered with thousands of armed noblemen, citizens, and peasants, who assembled in large crowds in the open air to listen to some heretical preacher, Lutheran, Calvinist, or even an Anabaptist, and to hold forbidden services, with prayers and hymns, in the mother tongue. They sallied forth with pistols, arquebuses, flails, and pitchforks; the place of meeting was marked out like a camp, and surrounded by guards; from ten to twenty thousand assembled, the armed men outside, the women and children within. After the immense choir had sung a psalm, one of the excommunicated preachers appeared between two pikes (according to the "Moderation," a price was set upon the head of every one of them), and expounded the new doctrine from the Scriptures; the assembly listened in devout silence, and when the service was ended separated quietly, but defiantly. This was repeated day after day throughout the country, and nobody dared to attack the armed field preachers.

The Regent was in a painful situation; she was always having it proclaimed that the Edicts were in force, but nobody cared; and when she demanded of the authorities of Antwerp that the city militia should be called out, she was told it was impossible, and so it was. It was all in vain unless foreign troops came to enforce obedience, and these she had neither power nor funds to procure. The King hesitated in his usual fashion, and left the Regent to the torments of powerlessness and uncertainty.

Meanwhile the universal excitement bore fatal fruit. Instead of the dignified preachings and peaceful assemblies of May, in June and July there were wild excesses and furious mobs.

Orange had just persuaded the Regent to permit the field preaching in the open country, if they avoided the towns, when the first great outbreak occurred in Antwerp.

Two days after a great procession, on the 18th of August, 1566, at which the Catholic clergy of Antwerp had made a pompous display to the annoyance of the numerous Protestants, the beautiful cathedral was invaded by a furious mob, who destroyed without mercy all the images, pictures,



and objects of art that it contained. This demolition of images, the stripping of churches, desecration of chapels, and destruction of all symbols of the ancient faith, spread from Antwerp to other places, Tournay, Valenciennes, &c. It was done with a certain moderation, for neither personal violence nor theft took place anywhere, though innumerable costly articles were lying about. Still, these fanatical scenes not only excited the ire of Catholics, but of every religious man; in Antwerp, especially, the seafaring mob had rushed upon everything that had been held sacred for centuries. +

In her distress the Regent wished to flee from Brussels, but Orange, Egmont, and Horn compelled her to remain, and induced her to proclaim the Act of the 25th of August, by which an armistice was decided on between Spain and the Beggars. In this the Government conceded the abolition of the Inquisition and the toleration of the new doctrines, and the Beggars declared that for so long as this promise was kept their league was dissolved.

In consideration of this, the first men in the country agreed to quell the disturbances in Flanders, Antwerp, Tournay, and Malines, and to restore peace. Orange effected this in Antwerp like a true statesman, who knew how to keep himself above party spirit; but in Flanders, Egmont, on the contrary, went to work like a brutal soldier; he stormed against the heretics like Philip's Spanish executioners, and the scales fell from the eyes of the bitterly disappointed people.

Meanwhile a decision had been come to at Madrid. At the time of the crisis in the early summer, Philip had not been able to arrive at any. The Regent was waiting in vain for an answer to her pressing questions about the events of April, while the armed assemblies were spreading over the country; and when at length the irresolute King had determined to proclaim an amnesty, though it was really rather a proscription, and to promise indulgence, while he was assuring the Pope by protocol before notaries that he never would grant any, the news came of the image riots of August, and a report from the Duchess in which she humbly begged the King's pardon for having allowed a kind of religious peace to be extorted from her, but she was entirely innocent; they had forced it from her as a prisoner in her palace, and there was one comfort, that the King was not bound by a promise made only in her name.



Philip's rage was boundless, and yet it was a sort of satisfaction to him that he had been right. He could say, "This is what we are come to with the false system of indulgence; do not talk any more to me of forbearance and conciliation." He was resolved upon fearful revenge, even when he was writing that he should know how to restore order in his provinces by means of grace and mercy. His instructions to the Regent were not dubious, while she, in her letters to Orange, Egmont, and Horn, first hinted, and then more and more plainly indicated a return to the old policy. Well-informed as Orange was, he understood the whole situation perfectly; he knew that while the Regent was heaping flattery upon him, she and Philip were compassing his destruction; that her only object could be to keep the peace until the Spanish preparations were complete, and meanwhile, if possible, to compromise him with the people.

He wrote to Egmont, and laid the dangers of their situation before him, and communicated his resolve either to escape Philip's revenge by flight, or to join with his friends in armed resistance to the expected attack of the Spanish army. But Egmont in his unhappy blindness had resolved to side with the Government which was more than ever determined on his destruction, and the meeting at Dendermonde, October, 1566, when Orange consulted him, Louis of Nassau, and Hogstraaten, as to a plan of united action, was entirely fruitless.

Egmont felt secure in the consciousness of his innocence, and the recent proofs he had given of his loyalty, and he was resolved to give new proofs of it in proceeding against the heretics. Admiral Horn, who had staked large property in the service of the Emperor and King, and had never received the least return in answer to his just demands, gave up his office, and, like a weary philosopher, retired into solitude. Left entirely alone, Orange thought of emigrating; in short, the upper circle of the previous party of opposition no longer existed.

But it was not so with the mad leaders of the Beggars.

While the zealous inhabitants of Valenciennes, incited by two of the most dauntless Calvinistic preachers, undertook to defend themselves against the royal troops with desperate bravery, Count Brederode went about the country with a clang of sabres, exciting disturbances in order to give the

heretics at Valenciennes breathing-time by a happy diversion. An attempt upon the island of Walcheren, part of the Stadtholdership of Orange, failed, but at the village of Anstruweel, near Antwerp, large numbers of armed men assembled, and they were continually reinforced by malcontents from all the surrounding country. Egmont lost no time in proceeding against them. On the 12th of May, 1567, an army of his old troops fell upon the insurgents and completely subdued them.

The fatal struggles of the volunteers of the Beggars' League could be seen from the walls of Antwerp. The thousands of Calvinists within the walls longed to go to the help of their brethren. As there was no longer any hope, at the peril of his life William of Orange intercepted them, and, with a circumspection and wisdom which betrayed the truly great man, he calmed the passions which threatened to break out into a fearful civil war.

All that Philip wanted to enable him to gain the day was an unsuccessful attempt at revolt. The attack upon images and the Beggars' volunteer march did more for the Government than all Granvella's system; the blind passions of the iconoclasts, and the appearance of the nobles in the late revolt, drove every one who favoured the Catholics and loved peace into the arms of the Government.

The reaction set in with the sanguinary defeat of the rebels at Valenciennes, who never again even made an attempt at resistance.

Orange gave up the liberties of his country for lost. It was his conviction that the King could now do whatever he pleased; and he feared the worst, for he had long had no doubt as to the sentiments of the wily monarch. Stating that he could never take the new oath of fealty which was required, because it would oblige him to become the executioner of his Protestant countrymen, he renounced his offices and dignities, and made a last attempt to save his friend Egmont, to whom he was heartily attached. At a meeting they had at Willebroeck, Orange represented to him that judgment had already been passed upon them at the Escorial, and that Philip's revenge was implacable; he advised him therefore to save himself for better times, and like him to leave the country.

Egmont was not to be convinced; he was magnanimous and loyal to infatuation; he is said at last to have said

almost in a tone of mockery that his friend showed more fear than became a knight, and to have exclaimed at parting, "Adieu, mon prince sans cœur!" to which Orange answered,\* "Adieu, mon comte sans tête!"

The friends were not to meet again. Before his departure, Orange wrote parting letters to Egmont and Horn, and retired to Dillenburg, the ancient property of the family.

He wished to be spared for better times; he saw the storm coming, and was too cool-headed to offer himself as the first sacrifice. In fact, just when he was travelling towards Germany, Duke Alba, the hangman of the Netherlands, was on his way to his destination.

\* Against this tradition see the remarks in Motley.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

**The Duke of Alba in the Netherlands.**—His Entry into the Country.—Alba's Characteristics.—Disappointment of the Regent.—Guilelessness of Egmont and Horn.—Their imprisonment, 9th of September.—The Council of Disturbances.—Executions, and the First War of Independence, 1567-8.—Members, System, and Proceedings of the Council of Blood.—Louis of Nassau in Friesland, April—July, 1568.—Success at Heiliger Lee in May.—Death of Egmont and Horn, 5th of June.—Alba's Victory, July.—Advance of Orange and Dissolution of his Army, October.—Highest Point and Decline of Alba's System, 1569-73.—The "10th Penny," March, 1569.—The "Amnesty," 14th July, 1570.—The Sea-Beggars at Brill, 1st April, 1572.—Louis of Nassau at Mons, May.—The Rising in Holland and Zealand.—Second Campaign of William of Orange frustrated by the Massacre of St. Bartholomew.—Alba's Retreat, December, 1573.

### ALBA'S APPEARANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS.

**T**HE Regent had latterly been writing calming letters to Madrid, and had, on the whole, correctly described the situation. Now that the outrage of the image breakers, and the revolutionary madness had been put down, the real leaders captured, fallen, or fled, it was desirable to proceed energetically indeed, but with moderation, in order that the people might be pacified, and the sending of a man like Alba must at all events be prevented, for the people would regard him with horror as their executioner. This opinion was not without advocates at Madrid; the King's most eminent councillors, men like Ruy Gomez and Perez, were of opinion that this favourable moment should be seized, by a wise combination of moderation and energy, of permanently attaching these valuable provinces, after bitter estrangement, to Spain; the privy council was quite divided, the King would hear nothing of moderation, held his sister's govern-

ment responsible for the revolt, and adhered to his intention of sending Alba into the provinces with an army.

According to Margaret's views, and those of several of the King's advisers, this was to re-ignite a spark which was nearly extinct—to renew a fermentation which was nearly at an end. In short, it was the fatal turning-point for the fate of the Spanish rule.

Up to the spring of 1567, the King's best support had been the errors of his enemies; now that he resolved to give up all moderation, and to send Alba to conquer a nation that was almost pacified already, it must bend or break, and the seeds of a desperate revolution were sown. But from the first, Philip II. had no other idea than that of cruel revenge and conversion at the point of the sword, and this Orange had correctly foreseen.

In accordance with the King's arbitrary will, Alba came. The Regent declined to have anything to do with him, and retired into the background before she was recalled, as she foresaw that she must sooner or later do. The army which suddenly appeared in the Netherlands was the finest which had for a long time been led by a Spanish commander.

Alba was considered to be a most distinguished general, and in the judgment of friends and foes he was the greatest military genius that Spain had produced in that age. This opinion was afterwards modified, for it proved that he was more capable of leading a small force than of conducting a great operation. Great importance was attached to the opinion of Charles V. Alba had grown up and earned his laurels under him, the chief of which he gained during the campaign of 1546-7 in Germany, and especially at the victory at Mühlberg. But that was the acme of his generalship, and it was afterwards remembered how easy these successes were made for him. He was contending with unskilful generals, troops hastily summoned, and an unprepared and surprised army. At the siege of Metz he had failed utterly, which seems to have brought him into disfavour with Charles, and, as Charles foretold, he was not successful in Italy.

These failures had latterly considerably tarnished his fame, while that of Egmont, after the victories of St. Quentin and Gravelingen, was in its prime. Still, in proportion as Charles's opinion of Alba was lessening, he increased in

favour with Philip. The reasons of this, however, were rather political than military.

His character was congenial to Philip, partly from similarity, partly as complement to his own.

Like Philip, he was harsh and severe to an extreme ; he was a fanatical Castilian, who looked down with supreme contempt upon everything not Castilian. Like Philip, he was filled with a passionate zeal for conversion, and fully agreed with him in the opinion that "it was better to have a kingdom ruined by war, if it remained true to God and the King, than to keep it unspoiled by war for the benefit of Satan and his followers, the heretics." Then he was blindly subservient to the will of his monarch, and possessed the shrewd cunning, the talent for wily intrigues, and relentless energy, which combined to form Philip's idea of a useful servant. These were the qualities which attached him to the King ; there was nothing else to place him so far above others who had claims to be employed in this mission to the Netherlands. Margaret and Don John of Austria were both more eminent than he was, and all the generals who succeeded him in the Netherlands have cast him, both in a military and political point of view, into the shade.

In a political aspect he was the most insignificant person that could be found ; narrow, limited in the whole scope of his ideas, he never comprehended how a State should be governed ; all his administration was like pouring water into the bowl of the Danaïdes. When we observe the subsequent conduct of Requesens and Alexander of Parma, that of Alba appears not only like the greatest cruelty and tyranny, but like pitiful incompetence and stupidity. Just at the last he began to see it, when he demanded his dismissal ; he was anxious to retire at once before the storm broke over his head. He was as narrow-minded and empty-headed as Philip himself ; in fact, he was his counterpart.

This judgment is mainly derived from documents only lately made public. It is usual to describe him as more able, but that estimate does not agree with these witnesses, according to whom neither his political nor military measures gave evidence of any talent. He was born to ruin everything—army, property, and country—in rigid obedience to the will of his King, in the interests of sincere fanaticism, and he was quite incapable of projecting or effecting any

salutary measures. This was the man who, in the spring of 1567, received orders to set out with an army which was to embark at Carthagená, land at Genoa, and proceed through Savoy, Burgundy, and Lorraine, to the Netherlands. They embarked on the 10th of May, and, after a long and weary march, reached Luxemburg in August.

The habit of wily double-facedness had become a second nature to Philip; it was the characteristic also of his enemies as well as of his tools, but they none of them equalled him. In order to mask his displeasure with Margaret, he deceived her with a story which seemed to have had no other object; he told her that he intended coming himself, in order to quell opposition, and by his personal influence, to effect what could never be done by the most faithful servant of any monarch.

This was quite in accordance with Margaret's wishes; she thought, indeed, that she was mistress of the situation, but it was perfectly agreeable to her that the King should come and smooth down the final difficulties if it would only prevent Alba's coming. She was still putting faith in the King's visit when Alba arrived in Luxemburg.

Alba came. One of his first speeches was—"I, who have tamed people of iron, shall soon manage these people of butter." A confidential letter given him by the King, with the contents of which no one else was acquainted, contained his instructions.\* He was, above all things, to secure the most eminent men who had made themselves suspicious during the disturbances, and to render them incapable of mischief; then to imprison and punish the guilty among the people, and extort the wealth of the country for the treasury and the support of the troops. Alba used to talk of a "stream fathoms deep" of wealth which he would conduct from the Netherlands to Madrid. Finally, he was to carry out the Edicts against heresy with unswerving severity, to finish the organization of the new bishoprics, and to chastise the rebellious cities, partly by means of the Inquisition, and partly by draining the wealth into the treasury. This, therefore, amounted to—Execution of high and low, annihilation of all old constitutions, privileges, and liberties, especially abolition of the right of consent to the levy of taxes, and sanguinary execution of the measures

\* Juste.



which had for years been giving rise to all this discontent.

It was necessary to secure the most powerful leaders of the aristocracy before a word of this became known. When the dreaded man appeared, they were partly alarmed, partly embittered, but as loyal subjects they thought he must not be slighted, and came with numerous retinues to meet him, Egmont at their head, and later Horn also. It was just for these two that Alba was watching. He was deeply grieved to find that Orange was gone, for if he were not taken it would be thought that nothing had been done. A most unworthy game now began to be played. These two men might have made mistakes, but they had done nothing illegal. Their many complaints, and Egmont's journey to Spain—when he had been so graciously received at Madrid—were the worst accusations against them. What was now done showed that Egmont was, in fact, known to be innocent.

In order to disarm all suspicion he was received in the most friendly manner, and, although he was assailed by warnings of every sort, it perfectly succeeded. Horn was less eager than Egmont; he was still sulking in retirement, and Alba took all manner of pains to entice him to Brussels. One flattering letter after another informed Horn that his Majesty entertained the highest opinion of him and his services, that he would doubtless be amply indemnified for the pecuniary losses he had sustained in the service of the State, and that the Duke was desirous of entrusting him with the most flattering commissions on the part of the King. Horn excused himself; could not come immediately; must at least first go and see his brother-in-law, who was dangerously ill. He went, and hastened from his death-bed to Brussels in order not to be too late. The lies by which both these men were entrapped show plainly that it was known that they were not guilty.

It was on the 22nd of August that Alba made his entry into Brussels. If anybody was alarmed at the visitor, it was the Regent. On the one hand, as a cautious Italian, she shuddered at the idea of cruel and sanguinary measures, and on the other she was proud of having been so far successful that force was no longer necessary; finally, she knew that if Alba were there he would in reality be over her, and her pride would not suffer her to serve under him. She had

done all she could to keep him away ; she had represented to the King that his coming was enough of itself to excite rebellion ; he was so hated that she sent an embassy to him herself to entreat him not to come, and she would be answerable that peace should not be disturbed. But Alba appealed to the King's orders. She had latterly displayed the triumphant security of one who had gained a complete victory ; she was conciliating and magnanimous ; and now the very man was sent to her who would undo all her work. In the belief that the King was coming himself she had been making preparations to give him a festive reception, and now it was not the King but his executioner who was coming.

Unpleasant scenes immediately took place, but Alba had been ordered to detain her ; it was not desired that she should go at once ; of course everything went on quite independently of her. After Alba's arrival she no longer considered herself Regent.

Alba's first act of importance was the imprisonment of Egmont and Horn on the 9th of September.

The Duke called a Council of War, as he called it, to decide upon a plan of fortifying Antwerp. He ordered plans and sketches to be made, and invited a distinguished company. Before the Council, the Grand Prior, Ferdinand of Toledo, Alba's natural son, gave a great banquet at which Egmont, Horn, and many of the nobility were present. Egmont was once more warned, even by the host himself, who had conceived a chivalrous affection for him, to flee on the swiftest horse before the banquet was ended. This alarmed even Egmont, and he consulted his countryman Noircarmes, who allayed his fears, and he went with Horn and the rest into the Duke's house. Both busied themselves in studying the plans, while their dwellings were searched, their papers sealed, their secretaries and confidential servants secured. When they were about to return home in the evening they were seized and imprisoned. This came unexpectedly to every one, and most of all to Egmont and Horn themselves. Up to this time they had been treated with marked attention. On that very morning Alba had been riding one of the horses presented to him by Egmont, and thus lulled into false security they became the victims of unparalleled treachery.

This was the beginning of a long course of horrors : the great tragedy in the Netherlands had begun.

THE COUNCIL OF BLOOD, THE EXECUTIONS, AND THE  
FIRST WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.

Immediately after the imprisonment of the two noblemen, the organization of terrorism began, the Council of State was set aside, and a Council of Disturbances, or "Council of Blood," as the inhabitants called it, was instituted with full powers. Viglius continued to be the servile president of the now insignificant Council, and was not a member of the Council of Blood, but conscientiously performed the office of executioner. He selected, chiefly from among his countrymen, those best adapted for the new court. Noircarnes and Barlaymont were the most noteworthy, but the soul of the crew was the lowest Spaniard who could be found, a creature named Vargas, who, as his enemies said, had been obliged to leave Spain because he had violated a girl whose guardian he was, and the story is probable; for Alba once wrote to the King that he had better suspend the criminal process against Vargas until the affairs of the Netherlands were settled. This shameless subject, who dared not show his face in Spain, was the prominent person in a tribunal which had power over the lives and properties of the flower of the nation—a man who well knew how to play the part of a judicial murderer with incredible cynicism. He used to say, in his notorious Latin, "*Hæretici fraxerunt templa, boni nihil faxerunt contra, ergo debent omnes patibulare,*" and, in answer to protests, "*Non curamus vestros privilegios.*"

The Council of Blood began its sittings on the 20th of September. Alba devoted nearly all his time to it. For days together he was not to be seen either with the troops or in the Council of State. He sat in the Council of Blood for seven, eight, nine hours at a time. He never was more diligent than when at his favourite work. Every sentence passed through his hands, for he could not trust the lawyers always to pass sentence of death. "The lawyers," he wrote to the King, "were only accustomed to pass sentence on crime being proved, but that would never do here."

All the ordinary administration of justice was suspended; all charters, all the existing laws, all provincial and civic privileges, were repealed by a stroke of the pen; the public weal was subjected altogether to a revolutionary tribunal.

Alba's mission was to exterminate treason; and who was the arch-traitor?

Whoever had taken part in the petitions from the States and cities against the new bishoprics and the Inquisition, or in favour of the relaxation of the edicts, was accused of conspiring against God and the Church. Every nobleman who had given in such a petition, or had approved of it, was guilty of high treason. All the nobles and officials who, under pretext of the pressure of circumstances, had tolerated the field preaching; all nobles, judges, and officials who had not opposed the first petition; every one who had attended the field preaching, and had not opposed the image breaking; finally, all who had expressed the opinion that the King had no right to deprive the provinces of their liberties, or that the present tribunal was bound by any laws or privileges whatever, were also declared guilty of high treason.

The last idea was also once put forth during the French revolution.

According to the sixteen Articles, the crime of high treason had a thousand forms. The processes and punishment were all the more simple and summary—death and forfeiture of property. This explains the fact that in the course of three months the Council of Blood sent eighteen hundred people to the scaffold.

There were prosecutions of people for singing one of the "Beggars'" songs, or for having years before attended a Calvinistic funeral, or for saying that the new doctrines would spread to Spain, or for having uttered the traitorous sentiment that we ought to obey God rather than man. Whoever was rich was sure to be executed; for Alba had promised his needy master an income of half a million ducats from the confiscations. But neither did heretical cobblers find any more mercy; and when bread was dear, because of the depression of agriculture and trade, the bakers were told that if they did not make cheaper bread they should be hung up before their shops; and such threats were meant in bitter earnest.

It soon took too much time to take individuals: a great catch was therefore projected. On Shrove Tuesday, 1568, a great net was thrown, which enclosed the trifling number of five hundred innocent people. It often happened that people were executed without being tried, the machine did

its work in such feverish haste. It was really only an empty form when, on the 16th February, 1568, all the inhabitants of the Netherlands were sentenced to death as heretics, with a very few exceptions mentioned by name; for in fact the whole nation stood upon the proscription list.

This kind of government went on for years. The feelings it gave rise to need not be described. The hatred and despair were boundless. But there is a long step from embitterment and exasperation to the heroic resolve to stake everything; these are two different things, which must not be confounded. A comrade of Bonaparte's said that there was no knowing what a nation would endure; and there is a profound truth in the brutal speech. It was illustrated in this case. But when the long-pent-up fire did burst forth, it was certain that it would take generations to extinguish it.

When this old Frisian blood was once up for the sake of liberty, when this Low German phlegm was once roused, and the resolution taken, "better a drowned country than a lost country," a struggle might be expected which no other nation can parallel. But the country was not yet come to this; and William of Orange was mistaken in thinking that the time had come for revolting against Alba's yoke.

The "Wild Beggars," who roamed the country in troops as highwaymen, robbing churches and convents, and mutilating Catholic priests, were a fearful symptom of the state of things occasioned by the universal misery; but they were not to be relied upon in a resolute defensive struggle. They only furnished a fresh pretext for the system of the Council of Blood.

Prince William of Orange had been at once invited to Brussels, and as he did not appear, was publicly summoned to surrender himself. In several proclamations from Dillenburg he had energetically defended himself; but in all he still made a distinction between the King and his servants and their measures. He had then no idea that he, the little lord of Dillenburg, would one day wrest from the haughty Spaniard his fairest possession. He did not yet think that there was sufficient pretext for a lawful revolt. The words "Pro lege, rege, grege," were still upon his banner.

Egmont and Horn were still in prison, and the game of their trial was not played out when William made the first

attempt at revolt. His brother, Louis of Nassau, entered Friesland with an army from Emden in the latter half of April, 1568, and turned swamps and marshes to account against the Spaniards with the same skill as the Germanic tribes had once done against the Romans, and near the convent of Heileger Lee, near Gröningen, they suffered an entire defeat.

Alba now set out. In order to secure the capital in his rear, he had the nobles beheaded, who, if he were not successful, would place themselves at the head of a general insurrection, and join cause with the victorious party in the east. The executions began early in June. First eighteen or twenty nobles fell whose trials were in progress, and on the 5th, Egmont and Horn. Alba then advanced against Louis's army in Friesland, defeated it twice, till it was entirely routed, returned to fresh executions at Brussels, and late in the autumn marched against Orange's army. He was advancing at the head of thirty thousand German soldiers, and opened the campaign on the 5th October by successfully crossing the Meuse. Alba had ten thousand men less than Orange; a lost battle in Brabant would have been a misfortune for which nothing could compensate. Alba did not venture on the perilous attempt, and resolved to end the war without a battle, which was the safest thing he could do. The resources of the country were at his disposal; he had money to feed and pay his troops, and therefore he could wait. Orange had German and other soldiers, who would be likely to mutiny if their pay were in arrears. Besides, his troops were in a foreign country, were in want of the means of living, and there was no one to support them. The sympathies of the people were with them; but they were paralyzed by the terror that preceded Alba. William's troops longed for a decisive engagement; but Alba always avoided it. His own troops became impatient at the fatiguing marches they had to undergo without meeting the enemy; but with his iron discipline he kept them together.

Thus William was manœuvred out of the country. His soldiers mutinied. In a single engagement which one of Alba's generals undertook on the 20th October, without the aid of the main army, the rebels suffered a sad defeat; and when a troop of French Huguenots arrived, the German soldiers, who had only been hired against Alba, refused to follow their leader to France. So Orange was compelled



to retire ; and after selling his plate to appease the mutineers, he had to disband his army near Strasburg.

Thus the first campaign failed. Alba's rule was more firmly established than ever, and the only positive result of the attempt was the death of the two nobles whom it was intended to rescue.

### SUMMIT AND DECLINE OF ALBA'S SYSTEM.

The very worst times for the Netherlands now began. The executions by fire, water, and sword, and the confiscation of property, were recklessly continued. The victims numbered many thousands. The number of emigrants increased in the same proportion, and the product of confiscations reached by degrees the sum of thirty million dollars.

The ancient privileges of the country were already annihilated ; the population was fearfully diminished ; agricultural prosperity was threatened with ruin ; commerce was at an end ; the harbours were empty ; the shops and warehouses lying waste ; numberless industrious hands were idle ; the great businesses were at a standstill ; the wealthy trading cities impoverished ; in short, everything that had contributed to commercial and industrial prosperity began to decay.

Alba had no eye for this fearful retrogression ; he was merely his master's soldier, inaccessible to any idea of political economy. The treasury at Madrid must have its millions ; the soldier must live ; it was nothing to him that the country at length would be so impoverished that there would be nothing left for the treasury or the soldier.

It appeared to him that the mine of wealth in the rich provinces had not yet been fully worked, and he projected a general bleeding, which would cause millions to flow at one blow, and for ever put an end to the perpetual pecuniary embarrassment. He had early thought of introducing a tax which existed in Spain, and which has conducted to that country's ruin ; it commended itself by its simplicity, and promised a rich result.

He was dissuaded from this project on all sides ; his absurd financial experiments were laughed at at Madrid ; even Viglius found the courage to oppose him, for he knew that Philip II. was beginning to doubt his great general's abilities. But Alba persisted ; the alcabala yielded him, in



his own city of Alba, a yearly income of 50,000 ducats, what might not be expected from it in the wealthy Netherlands?

According to the investigations of a commission appointed for that purpose, the provinces derived an income from their manufactures of forty-five million gulden;\* they therefore could well bear a heavy tax.

The new tax was proposed to the States at Brussels on the 21st of March, 1569.

It provided that one per cent. should be levied on all property, movable and immovable, as an extraordinary tax; this was called the hundredth penny. That a permanent tax of a twentieth penny, or five per cent., should be levied on every sale of landed property, and ten per cent., or the tenth penny, on all sales of goods. Thus it was a progressive tax of three different rates, and all three exorbitant.

This decree excited universal alarm. The folly of the scheme, economically speaking, was only equalled by its barbarity. To subject a commercial country, which was in great distress, to a tax of ten per cent. on all its industrial products, was in fact a fatal blow to commerce. It excited a storm of bitter exasperation in all the provincial assemblies, such as had not been produced by the edicts and executions. The province of Utrecht gave the signal for general resistance; in spite of threats and coercive measures, it proved impracticable to collect the tax, and Alba had to consent to the compromise that it should be postponed for two years.

In the summer of the following year, a so-called "amnesty" was proclaimed, which was really a mockery of the name, but it betrayed a slight vacillation in the Government, and the beginning of dissatisfaction with Alba.

The King's confidence in him was beginning to fail. The Duke's enemies, Gomez, Perez, and Granvella at their head, were striving to effect his recall. Viglius, who knew all about it, importuned the King for an act of clemency, and on the 14th of July, 1570, a solemn amnesty was proclaimed at Antwerp; it retained all the old punitive Edicts, and granted no other favour than that *those who were not accused of anything should not be punished, in case, within an appointed time, they penitently prayed for mercy, and obtained the absolution of the Church.*

\* Motley.

These were the last drops in the already overflowing cup; nothing remained for the Netherlands but to grasp the sword, if this absolute lawlessness was not to be perpetuated.

There were armed revolts during the whole period of Alba's government; it was chiefly by the emigrants that these attempts were made; there were many thousands of them on the frontier, and, as is generally the case with political refugees, they formed their judgments on events as they appeared from a distance, and thought it far easier to overthrow such a power than it really was.

The last acts had excited a state of feeling among the people which disposed them to a desperate resistance. They were not easily inflamed; neither the Catholic Flemings and Brabanters, nor the Protestant Frieslanders of the north, were of sanguinary temperament, and a policy which wished to discover how much a nation will bear had a comparatively favourable field for the experiment. It might be long before a commercial people would resolve upon a desperate resistance. It was on this point that the emigrants were continually deceived, and Orange failed in his premature rising in 1568 chiefly because not a single city opened its gates to him.

But now, under the impression of the continued terrorism, of the mockery of the amnesty, of the prospect of a fatal system of taxation which threatened ruin to every household, of the obvious symptoms of incompetence in the Government, a spirit of desperate resolve had spread among the people, and they preferred to hasten the end by terrorism to seeing terrorism without end.

Alba himself had begun to entertain doubts, if not of his system, of his power to carry it out. His want of money was becoming hopeless. The tenth penny was postponed for two years; when the sums were wanted he brought forward his scheme again, but he was met in the Council by open defiance, and by an animosity among the people that made an impression even upon him. He had scarcely given orders definitively to levy the tenth and twentieth pennies on the 31st of July, 1571, than all shops were closed, and the bearing of the people in all the provinces was so threatening, that the Duke, who had never yielded before, took a step in retreat, and exempted the necessities of life, corn, meat, wine, and beer, from the senseless tax.

But this alleviation did not avail. Industry and trade were at a standstill. A contemporary writer says, "The brewers would not brew, the bakers would not bake, the tavern-keepers would not tap their beer." Alba was enraged, and would have gone on hanging and strangling, when his attention was drawn off by the news that the dreaded Sea-Beggars had taken Brill on the 1st of April, 1572.

All that was done by William and his chivalrous brothers, Louis, John, and Henry, against Alba by land, was but little in comparison with what was effected by the Sea-Beggars on the sea and the sea-coast. By land, hundreds and thousands had to be spent in collecting the headless rabble together; when they entered any place, the mercenary hordes plundered friends and foes alike; and if it came to a battle, or to what was worse, to tedious manoeuvres without a battle, the unpaid hirelings mutinied and spoiled everything. It was different with the naval warfare which was carried on by the filibusters of Holland and Seeland against the "viceroy" Alba. They were no hirelings seeking to make a gain of war, but fugitives from all the States, who had been driven from house and home by Alba's executions, and who wanted to re-conquer their country from the sea; they were real Beggars, men who had lost all, who had to battle with distress and privation of every sort, but who gladly braved danger and death to satiate their revenge. They were formerly a peaceful, seafaring people, dwelling on the coasts, but were now transformed into the fiercest warriors. William had furnished them with a well-meant organization, but distress and rage had turned them into cruel corsairs. They watched for Spanish ships; made daring attacks upon harbours and coasting towns. When victorious, they plundered, robbed, and murdered, and were soon as much dreaded by their countrymen as the Spaniards. Eminent men, who had gained renown in naval affairs, were at their head; their admiral was the wild William von der Mark.

Under his leadership twenty-four of their ships had taken Brill, by a successful stratagem, on the 1st of April, and thereby secured a point on the coast from which all the North, Holland, and Zealand might be wrested from the Spaniards.

From that day the Spaniards were never really masters of the Netherlands; the ablest of their generals, Alexander

of Parma, did not succeed in permanently subjugating the northern provinces; even the southern part wavered, and at one time it appeared as if the whole of Burgundy would be lost to the Spanish Crown. While all the more important cities of the Island of Walcheren, Holland and Zealand, Vlissingen Haarlem, Leyden, Alkmaar, had declared for the Stadtholder, William of Orange, his brother, Count Louis, had in May succeeded in capturing the important town of Mons, in Hennegau. William had at the same time formed another army, with which he at once advanced to the heart of the Netherlands.

Before all hope had been lost of a diversion against Alba in the west, by the defeat of Coligny at Moncontour on the 3rd October, 1569, the prince, disguised as a peasant, had hastened through the enemy's ranks to Germany, to seek aid for the liberation of the Netherlands. More helpless than ever—Granvella mocked at the *vana sine viribus ira*—destitute of means, forsaken by his allies, supposed by many to be dead, entreated by well-meaning friends at last "to sit still," burdened with a great debt for arrears of pay, with unshaken confidence he entered upon the unequal contest. He had lost his lands, his retainers, and his property, but not his faith in the good cause. He addressed a circular letter to the princes and people of the German empire, put a heart-stirring appeal to his countrymen in circulation,\* entreated them to stake a last venture for the holy cause of freedom, as he had done himself. And it was not quite in vain; for Alba's terrorism, and his mad persistence in the tenth penny, had done their best to gain entrance for William's words.

A new levy of troops was proceeding successfully, when Holland and Zeeland threw off Alba's yoke, and gave themselves a new constitution under William's instructions. The States of Holland met at Dortrecht on the 15th of July, and, fired by a spirited address from St. Aldegonde, they voted to the prince, "as the King's legal Stadtholder in Holland, Zealand, Friesland, and Utrecht," the necessary sums for a fresh campaign, to be raised by taxes, loans, voluntary contributions, and the alienation of needless church ornaments. He shortly afterwards appeared with an army in the field, on the 23rd July took the fortress of

Roermonde, crossed the Meuse, found ready entrance into many towns and villages, and, full of hope, advanced to Brussels; his brother was in possession of Mons; he had received solemn assurances from the King of France that, as Coligny had also written to him, he would come to the aid of himself and his brother with 12,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. "The Netherlanders are free; Alba is in my hands!" he triumphantly exclaimed. Then, like a flash of lightning out of a clear sky, came the news of the massacre of St. Bartholomew, and all was over.

Mons had to be sacrificed; a retreat must be made, and the army disbanded.

But Alba had no longer any pleasure in the Netherlands; the triumph over the night of St. Bartholomew, scenes of fearful bloodshed at Mons, Malines, Tergoes, Naarden, and Haarlem, were his last satisfaction. He was weary of his fruitless labours as executioner, and asked for his dismissal. He had prided himself on the icy coldness with which he braved men's opinions; still, what he now experienced was enough to dismay even him. He was no longer greeted in the streets; his former accomplices bade him defiance; he was met by looks of detestation wherever he went; and when Philip's ambassador in France came to visit the Netherlands, it seemed to him that he heard but one cry among the people: "Away with Alba! Away with Alba!" He himself wrote to the King: "The hatred of the people towards me, on account of the chastisements which, though with all possible forbearance, I have been compelled to inflict on them, makes all my efforts of no avail. A successor will find more sympathy than I, and will be able to do more good."

Thus he demanded and received his dismissal; not changed, for he advised his successor to burn all the towns except those in which he could put a Spanish garrison, but with the feeling that he was spent—that his part was played out. On the 18th December, 1573, he left the Netherlands for ever.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### ALBA'S SUCCESSORS IN THE NETHERLANDS.

Character of the War which now began.—Requesens y Zuniga, 1573-76.—Defeat and Death of Louis of Nassau on the Mooker Haide, 14th of April, 1574.—Siege and Succour of Leyden, 26th of May to 3rd of October, 1574.—Separation between the Northern and Southern Provinces.—The Interregnum.—The Great Mutiny of the Soldiers.—The Pacification of Ghent, 8th of November, 1576-78.—Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma, 1587-89.—The Union of Utrecht, January, 1579, and Declaration of Independence of the Seven Northern Provinces, July, 1581.—Murder of William, July 10, 1584.

### CHARACTER OF THE WAR WHICH NOW BEGAN.

THE success of the Sea-Beggars at the Brill, although unimportant in itself, gave the impetus not only to one of the most fearful wars, but also to one of the most important revolutions known in history; and in that little fleet of daring pirates who lived on the plunder of Spanish merchant vessels, and treated their enemies with barbarity for barbarity, the germ lay concealed of that great maritime colonial State which, up to the time of the Navigation Act, was the most powerful in the world; and though it now only possesses a shadow of its former greatness, it still belongs to the naval powers. With this development of a free political life in a country wrested from the sea, and which was soon to conquer the finest part of the New World, the decay of the greatest power of the sixteenth century goes hand in hand. The revolt of the Netherlands was the open wound of Spain, which bled and festered to the end of the century; this was the abyss into which Spain gradually cast her armies, her wealth, and her fleets, and, in the end, the despised rebel became free rich, and powerful, and mighty Spain was ruined.

This fact confirms the idea that, had it not been for Alba, the provinces might with but moderate prudence have been preserved to the Spanish Crown. It was reserved for Alba to exasperate a peaceful people to the utmost, to call forth heroes from a nation of fishermen and shopkeepers, and to take care that after five years of fearful work as executioner, no people in the world should be less in a condition to fight for freedom.

Thus, in 1572, a conflict began to which modern history offers no parallel. A little nation averse to war entered into an unequal contest with the well-organized, if diminished, forces of the greatest military power of the age, and pursued it with unexampled bitterness and determination. From the first, the struggle was entered into on both sides as a struggle for life or death; each party looked to celebrating its victory with the death of its opponent. The character of the war cannot be better described than in the words of the letter which William of Orange circulated throughout Christendom, in order to justify the revolt of his people to the King and to Europe.\* He says of Alba, "The tyrant will dye every river and stream with our blood, and hang the corpse of a Dutchman on every tree in the country, before he ceases to slake his revenge and to gloat over our miseries. We have, therefore, taken up arms against him to snatch our wives and children from his hands. If he is too strong for us, we are ready rather to die an honourable death and leave a glorious name behind us, than to bow our necks to the yoke, and to give up our beloved country to slavery. It is for this that our cities have given their word to stand any siege—to do their very utmost, to bear what it is possible for men to bear—even, if need be, to set fire to their own houses and to perish in the flames, rather than ever submit to the mandates of this bloodthirsty hangman."

The contest which followed, in 1572-3, bore completely the stamp of the whole war. There was boundless fanaticism and devotion on both sides, and a self-sacrificing and desperate resolve, combined with a fierce hatred, for which this phlegmatic people had not before been given credit. Cities and provinces were sacrificed, fruitful plains were submerged, if only the enemy perished with them. The people to whom



William, in the former helpless days, had so often exclaimed, "Where is your spirit of liberty? Where is your former bravery?" could now say with pride, "We have shown that we are worthy of our fathers, and that the old Friesland blood still flows in our veins." Such traditions as these keep a nation upright for centuries. This nation has passed through times of trouble from within and from without, but it has held up its head through all the storms and vicissitudes of time; and this is the result of the great traditions which have continually kept in view the price at which independence has been purchased.

It was amidst this state of things that Alba retired. The Spaniards and the Netherlands had never been fond of each other, and now, it was the harvest of the seed which Alba had sown that the people were enraged with everything Spanish. The thousands whom since 1568 he had sent to the scaffold could not rise up again, but another nation had arisen over their graves. Alba's cruelty and insane administration had called forth a spirit which ruined him and his successors, and with them the kingdom of Spain. Events in France, and the destruction of the Armada, conducted to it, but it was the war with the Netherlands, which lasted till the beginning of the seventeenth century, which drained the life-blood of this splendid empire.

REQUESENS Y ZUNIGA.—END OF 1573 TILL MARCH, 1576.  
—THE BATTLE OF MOOKER HAIDE. — THE SIEGE OF  
LEYDEN.

Alba's successor was a distinguished general from among the higher Spanish nobility—at least equal to Alba in military prowess, but, what was more, he viewed things in an entirely different light, and, so far as it was possible in such a war, was a magnanimous soldier, who could act with the needful energy without forgetting clemency, and he was likely to gain far more victories with his conciliatory measures than Alba with all his slaughter. So far as a Spaniard could do so, he perceived that arms and money were not all that were needed in this war. He wrote to the King, "Before my arrival, I could not comprehend how the rebels contrived to maintain fleets so considerable, while your Majesty could not maintain one; now I see that men who are fighting for their lives, their families, their

property, and their false religion, in short for their own cause, are content if they only receive rations, without pay." Even, however, by reason of these views and qualities, Requesens and Alexander of Parma were the most dangerous enemies of the revolt. As Requesens discontinued the system of blind terror, and acted with a wise moderation which still did not look like weakness, he was likely enough to detach the advocates of a half peace and delusive reconciliation from the common cause, and thus to make breaches in the ranks of the rebels. It was this that gave rise to the great anxiety of William of Orange as to the lulling effect of an amnesty, of which there were now rumours.

Meanwhile the war with all its horrors continued, by land and sea, in the open country and before besieged town, and the new commander began to apprehend the immense difficulties of his task.

In the early spring of 1574, William and Louis again appeared at the head of an army of German hirelings, whose numbers were diminished by desertion at every step. General Avila advanced to meet them, also mostly with German troops,\* and on the 14th of April a murderous battle took place on the Mooker Haide, on the Meuse, in which the army of the patriots was utterly routed. All was already lost when Count Louis, his brother Henry, and the Count Palatine, Christopher, rushed into the fray and met their death in the chivalrous combat. Encouraged by the fact that the Spaniards had evacuated Walcheren—that the Beggars were masters of the island, the coast, and the sea, William had entertained great hopes of this third expedition. He had thought to overthrow the power of the new Stadtholder by one blow, and now he had lost his army and his gallant brothers in one day.

The Spaniards had hitherto always been victorious in the open country, and now they had gained a victory more brilliant than any since the revolt began. But it was different with the fortified places; the incredible obstinacy with which they were defended, frustrated all the skill of the generals and quenched the ardour of the soldiers; and yet they were by no means imposing fortresses, and the

\* The army of the Spaniards in the Netherlands numbered 62,000 men, who, with the exception of 8,000 Spaniards, were partly Germans and partly Walloons.

Spaniards, ever since the times of the Romans, had been masters of the art of taking and defending cities.

There is nothing more glorious than the attitude of the city of Leyden, under the severest trial to which a city was ever subjected. It had been relieved from the first siege by a diversion of Louis of Nassau; but after his death it was besieged for the second time by the Spaniards on the 26th May, 1574.

Orange, whose head-quarters were at Delft and Rotterdam, could not, with his troops, encounter the Spaniards under Valdez in the open country, and he could see no other hope of holding the faithful city than by inundating the plain, which must infallibly drive the besiegers away. Leyden lay in the midst of fruitful gardens, villages, and country-houses; the harvest was standing in the fields; to open the dams which protected all this wealth from the ocean was a tremendous sacrifice, but it was the only possible means of relief. Orange proposed it, and the heroic inhabitants at once consented. The Spaniards attempted to gain them by an amnesty. On the 6th June, Valdez proclaimed, in the name of the King and the Pope, a pardon for all heretics who would return in penitence to the Roman Catholic Church. The inhabitants of Leyden, together with those of all the northern provinces, rejected the proposal with disdain. The citizens declared, "We will fight for God and our liberties to the last man." The inundations began, the city was ill-provisioned, but with rigid economy and strict distribution of rations, it would be possible to hold out till relief was brought from the advancing sea.

The city had held out three months, and succour had not come. From a sick bed the prince directed the work of inundation, and the movements of the Beggars' fleet, which was to advance to the city with the sea, but contrary winds and a host of unforeseen obstacles retarded the advance of the flood. From the towers of Leyden, the waves were seen slowly coming in—too slowly for the starving citizens; the provisions were all but exhausted; dogs, cats, and rats were delicacies; famine and pestilence raged among the unhappy people; thousands died, but their courage did not fail; as long as a man was left upon his legs, they would not surrender. At length, on the morning of the 3rd of October, after more than four months

of indescribable suffering, the sea reached the city walls, the Spaniards fled in terror, and the martial forms of the Sea-Beggars, with the device, "Sooner Turkish than Popish," made their entry amidst indescribable rejoicings into the half-famished city. They went with the rescued people to the Cathedral to offer their joint prayers and praises to God; but the singing suddenly came to an end—the vast congregation had burst into tears.

At the suggestion of William of Orange, the University of Leyden was founded as a memorial of the heroic courage and constancy of the citizens.

Requesens could not prevent that, meanwhile, the outline of a new Protestant State, with Orange for Stadtholder, was beginning to assume shape. It was connected by a very slight bond with the Crown of Spain, to which, however, allegiance was still outwardly owned. Military onslaughts failed, and negotiations proved fruitless. Orange and his States insisted on liberty of conscience, and the most Spain would grant to the heretics was liberty to emigrate; the patriots demanded the removal of the Spanish troops, and Spain replied, "Then first disband yours;" the rebels demanded that the States-General should be convoked and their ancient rights acknowledged, and Spain persisted in absolutism. Finally, it was impossible to come to any understanding with an opponent of such well-known cunning and faithlessness; they had experienced and could but expect the most shameful breaches of promise. "We have not forgotten the words 'Agreed,' and 'Eternal,'" Orange once wrote; and at another time he said, "If I have your word for it, who will answer for it that the King will not deny it, and be absolved for his breach of faith by the Pope?"

No reconciliation was therefore to be hoped for in the north, but in the south the Stadtholder succeeded in inspiring confidence and gaining adherents, which Alba never could do. The population there was more inclined to Spain, politically and religiously, and would have been still more decidedly so had it not been for Alba. In Holland, Zealand, Friesland, and Utrecht, Protestantism reigned supreme, and since the revolt, the last traces of Catholicism had disappeared. But in the south, heresy had existed only in isolated cases, and, as it were as an episode, it had taken no root among the people. The adherents of the old and

new creeds were here, as everywhere, intolerant and impatient of each other, and in nothing is the greatness of Orange as a statesman more evident than in the decision with which from the first he opposed this intolerant spirit on both sides.

The Walloons, too, were nationally less opposed to the Spaniards than the Frisians, in whom the Germanic element predominated, and the southern provinces had been longer connected with Burgundy and the house of Hapsburg, while the northern States had been mostly acquired by Charles V. To them the connection with Spain was something new. There had not been time for any attachment to the Government to grow up; the Spaniard was hated as an ambitious alien, since the Reformation as a bigoted Catholic, and since the accession of Philip II. as a revolutionist, who wanted to overturn their ancient constitutions and laws. It was not the Spanish rule that was ancient, but the privileges of the country, and the only connection they would acknowledge was that with the German empire.

This explains the fact that Requesens, who was not only a soldier, but enough of a statesman to take account of these factors, contrived to gain a certain number of adherents in the south. Since he had abolished the "Council of Blood," and the Government had become more tolerable, a marked change had taken place in the sentiments of this deeply depressed people.

But this rendered it only still more difficult to see what would be the result of the struggle for the future of the Netherlands.

The position of a skilful general in the prime of life, with a most efficient force, and the resources of the friendly provinces at his disposal, supported by the as yet unexhausted means of the Spanish monarchy, was certainly by no means a hopeless one, confronted by two rebel provinces which were masters of the sea and the coast, the fortresses and brave inhabitants of their cities, but which had no army at their command and not a single foreign ally. But at this juncture Requesens died quite suddenly on the 5th March, 1576, and this unexpected circumstance gave events a new turn.

The Spanish military tactics and policy were deprived of the man who had given a consistent aim to their undertaking; it was months before a successor was

found, and during this interregnum everything was out of joint.

THE INTERREGNUM.—MUTINY OF THE TROOPS.—THE  
PACIFICATION OF GHENT.

Requesens' greatest difficulty—and even in the provinces that were true to him he had never entirely overcome it—was the burden of the Spanish, Walloon, and German troops; if not kept in good humour, they were a real scourge to the peaceable inhabitants. In perpetual pecuniary embarrassment, Requesens had great difficulty in keeping the troops together. Long absence from home had made them disorderly; their task as hangmen in Alba's service had made them brutal, and accustomed to commit every kind of barbarity unpunished. The army had latterly shown most portentous symptoms. Since the sudden death of the Commander-in-Chief, the executive power was in the greatest confusion; means were wanting either to feed the troops or to pay them off. It would have been difficult for a man of the greatest ability to manage them under such circumstances, but there was no one to do it, and a fearful commotion took place among them. "Ready money or a city!" the soldiers cried out to the officers who tried to appease them. Neither could be granted, and so the disbanded hosts rushed upon cities in Flanders and Brabant, took them by storm, cut down the armed men, ill-treated the defenceless, and robbed and plundered wherever they could.

The mischief began at Aalst, in Flanders. All the garisons of the numerous citadels which Charles and Philip had built, joined in it; disgraceful scenes of rapine, murder, and plunder occurred everywhere, and worst of all at Antwerp, which, with its immense wealth, fell into the hands of German, Walloon, and Spanish mutineers, and was plundered by them during three terrible November days, amidst scenes of brutality enough to make one's hair stand on end.

This mutiny was a stupendous event; it showed the southern provinces what the Spanish dominion was, and what was the value of the peace which had been lulling them into false security. In the cities in which, following the example of Brussels, the citizens, with energetic presence of mind, had taken up arms to defend the domestic hearth, those same Spaniards were outlawed who had been sum-



moned to guard the unity of the faith against the rebels. The north enjoyed some precious months of peace and time for reflection. The south, which had considered itself happy in being spared the devastation which the north had suffered, now experienced all the horrors of a wild banditti warfare, and envied the adherents of the new States in Holland and Zeeland, with whom it had again at least one hatred in common.

Thus it came to pass that the nobles of Flanders and Brabant met together and sought help, not at Madrid, but in the northern provinces; they begged William to help them to save the country from the outrages of their own protectors. On the 8th November the pacification of Ghent was concluded, which first united the Netherlands in a common bond against the Spanish dominion.

The treaty was signed on the one side by the Prince of Orange, in the name of the States of Holland and Zeeland; on the other by the representatives of Brabant, Flanders, Artois, Hennegau, Valenciennes, Lille, Douay, Orchies, Namur, Tournay, Utrecht, and Mechlin. It was agreed—

1. That there be an amnesty for the past, and a close alliance for the future.
2. That the Spaniards should be sent out of the Netherlands.
3. That the States-General, as they existed at the time of the Emperor's abdication, be convoked, to regulate the religious affairs of Holland and Zeeland, and the surrender of the fortified places.
4. That complete freedom of trade and commerce shall exist between the two parties.
5. That the placards and edicts against the heretics be suspended until the decision of the States-General.
6. That the Roman Catholic religion shall not be molested where it exists.
7. That the Prince of Orange remain Stadtholder of Holland and Zeeland until the States-General decide otherwise, after the expulsion of the Spaniards.

From this treaty, so soon as they were in earnest in expelling the Spaniards, there was but a step to complete independence. The whole of Burgundy, the growth of which Charles V. had regarded with so much affection, seemed to be on the point of being lost to Spain. An unheard-of event was taking place: two territories, whose faith, man-



ners, nationality, and political antecedents were entirely different, had joined together in a common programme, and the Prince of Orange was ruling, not the north only, but the south also.

The danger appeared greater to Spain than it really was. The differences between the two districts were not to disappear all at once. During the calamity of the mutiny in the summer and autumn of 1576, they might be forgotten, and the help of William of Orange was readily accepted in distress; but the Catholics of the south still regarded the Calvinists and Lutherans of the north as heretics and image-breakers, and the numerous and proud aristocrats of Flanders and Brabant were not pleased to see the little Prince of Orange, who had openly seceded from the ancient faith, in the place they would fain have occupied themselves. In short, the Pacification of Ghent was not a lasting achievement, nor yet a complete solution of the questions at issue. Just about the time when the treaty was concluded, the new Stadtholder appeared in the Netherlands.

#### DON JOHN OF AUSTRIA, 1576-8.

The victor of Lepanto, Don John of Austria, Philip's half-brother, a brilliant warrior, in the zenith of his fame and flower of his strength, was possessed of far more ability than the little-minded monarch; he alone of all the members of the imperial family inherited the vigour of mind and chivalrous energy which had made Charles V. in his best days so popular in the Netherlands, and which the melancholy Philip was so entirely without.

With his heroic form, his manly beauty and attractive grace, and a heart full of bold and enthusiastic dreams, he was well adapted to eclipse his jealous master, though less so than if he had brought with him any other means of solving the complicated problem before him. He did not approve of Alba's system. He intended to try his fortune with clemency and conciliation, but it was evident that he was not magnanimous by nature, but from calculation; there was a trace of duplicity in his character, of a tendency to play a double part, which was portentous. He was soon condemned in the provinces as a doubtful, untrustworthy character, and in Spain his half measures suggested the idea

that he might be thinking of establishing an independent kingdom for himself. It is well known that his sudden and tragic end was attributed to suspicions against him at the Escorial.

He was somewhat to blame himself. He took a pleasure in playing with fire ; for a time it answered tolerably well, and then both parties made it impossible. His conduct in the Netherlands was circumspect, but by no means calculated to awaken confidence.

Before the States acknowledged him as Stadtholder, they demanded the expulsion of the Spaniards and the acceptance of the Treaty of Ghent, which, according to their representations, interfered neither with the authority of the King nor that of the Roman Catholic Church.

Don John gave an evasive answer, and so the States made an imposing demonstration ; they confirmed the Pacification of Ghent by the Union of Brussels, January, 1517, and this document was accepted with acclamation by the people of all the provinces, Luxemburg excepted, by the nobles, clergy, and citizens ; it received thousands of signatures ; there could no longer be any doubt as to the sentiments of the people.

This produced the desired effect. In February the Stadtholder published the celebrated *edictum perpetuum*, which granted all the demands of the States, the expulsion of the troops, the toleration of the heretics, the convocation of the States-General.

There was great rejoicing in the southern provinces ; but in the north they were suspicious, and Orange refused to join in it. He was convinced that it was a trap for causing division and snaring the unwary. Tedious negotiations supervened, during which the nobles of Flanders and Brabant played a most equivocal part, summoned the Archduke Matthias of Austria into the country as a counterpoise to Orange, now adhered to and now forsook him, and the negotiations resulted in a fresh war. The battle of Gemblours (January, 1578) showed the superiority of the Spaniards in the open country ; but Don John despaired of further success. Broken down in body and mind, distressed at the evident displeasure of the King, in want of funds, and forsaken by his troops and allies, on 1st October, 1578, he died.

Suspitions were afloat that he did not die a natural

death. It was said that he had himself devised suspicious schemes against the King, in which Philip's favourite and adviser, Antonio Perez, was implicated. Perez was given over to the Inquisition, escaped to Aragon, appealed in vain to the privileges of the country, and fled to France and England, where in his memoirs he gave vent to his fierce hatred of the King. His life has recently been compiled from these materials, and various things brought to light which must be laid to the King's charge.

#### ALEXANDER OF PARMA, 1578-9.

Don John's successor, Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma, the son of the former Stadtholder, Margaret of Parma, was superior as a general to all his predecessors, and was at least equal to Requesens in political skill, cool determination, and self-possessed tact in the management of men. He was the last great general whom Spain possessed in the sixteenth century; indeed, he was the last great man whom Spain produced for a long period. He might fairly be called a Spaniard, although Italian blood flowed in his veins; for he had grown up in Spain as the playfellow of Don Carlos and Don John, who was about the same age; his education and training were entirely Spanish; and the only qualities he had inherited from Italy were the mental vigour, the combination of the supple activity and resolute will by which the house of Farnese were distinguished.

When Alexander Farnese stepped into the place which had been filled by the friend of his childhood, the position of affairs was not very brilliant in Spain, and in the provinces still less so. The Treaty of Ghent was everywhere disregarded, parties were broken up, the Catholic south was again at open variance with the Protestant north, and misery and distress everywhere prevailed.

A phase of the contest began with him which made all that had previously taken place appear fruitless, and all the successes of the rebels doubtful. A great general with a new army, a man sure to awaken all the sympathies of the south, who kept the troops in order, and who, up to the point of the unity of the faith, was ready to make certain reasonable concessions, without Alba's severity or Don John's duplicity, was likely to increase the difficulties of the northern provinces, which alone were animated by the genuine love of liberty in this war.

It had become clear that no reliance was to be placed upon their southern allies, for the nobles in Flanders and Brabant now followed one leader and now another, and a resolution had therefore been taken that, if it were not possible to unite the whole of the Netherlands, the best and most trustworthy parts should be joined in a close alliance.

Accordingly, in 1579, Holland and Zealand, Guelders, Zutphen, Utrecht, Overijssel, and Groningen laid together in the so-called Union of Utrecht, the foundations of the first federal constitution which existed in this part of the world, and which, in spite of its imperfections, lasted a surprisingly long time.

The seven provinces bound themselves by a perpetual alliance to mutual protection against the enemy, and therefore to contribute to a common military treasury, to levy and support an army by general taxation, to establish a common Diet, and to renounce the right of making separate treaties, as if they were really but one State; but the internal affairs of every province, city, and corporation, their ancient rights and privileges, customs and laws, and especially religious matters, were to be left under the control of each separate State.

These were the simple provisions rather of an offensive and defensive alliance than of a constitution; and yet it was out of this union that the constitution of the subsequent Dutch republic grew.

With a true instinct, the distinction is made between special and internal and external or general interests, which has been from this time the great characteristic of every federal constitution.

The Union of Utrecht was the final step, which could but be followed by finally throwing off the Spanish yoke. But this was not yet done. On the contrary, in accordance with the fiction which had been adopted, this union was entered into "in the name of the King." But two years later the bridge was broken down behind them.

In June, 1580, Philip had proclaimed William of Orange to be an outlaw and rebel, and had given him up to any assassin as "an enemy of the human race;" had forbidden all his subjects to give him food, drink, or fire; and promised twenty-five thousand crowns, immunity from punishment for any crime, and a patent of nobility, to any one who would deliver him up alive or dead. In July, 1581, fol.

lowed the revolt of the provinces of Holland and Zealand from Spain, and after long resistance Orange accepted the election to the sovereignty of the country.

The brave Frisians were the first to avail themselves of the right of nations to choose their own form of government, proclaimed by the Jesuits at the Council of Trent. In the records of it, it says, among other things, "Every one knows that a ruler is ordained by God to protect his subjects, as a shepherd protects his flock. If, therefore, the ruler do not do his duty, if he oppress his subjects, destroy their ancient liberties, and treat them like slaves, he is no longer to be considered as a ruler, but as a tyrant. As such the country may justly and reasonably depose him, and elect another in his place."

The Treaty of Utrecht was the result of urgent distress; it bore the stamp of an exceptional period; its originators had no idea of providing for two hundred years, but for relief from present tyranny; and this explains the imperfections of the scheme. It also explains the monarchical form which this confederation of republics assumed, and which was theoretically in contradiction to the constitution. It was necessary to have a man at the head of the Government who did not merely share the power of every burgomaster, but who had the army and fleet and everything else at his command. No one had any doubt about it, and no one knew anything of theories about distribution of power. They were involved in a gigantic struggle with the greatest monarchy in the world, and with the south probably against them. In this situation, if every little State acted for itself, the ruin of all was inevitable.

But the relations of the sovereign to his federal republic were curious and contradictory in the extreme. So long as William of Orange lived there was no irritation, because with his composure, cool sagacity, and moderation he disarmed all opposition; and this I consider to be his greatest glory. He is not, according to my view, the demi-god that the Dutch historians make of him. I consider him to be thoroughly human—possessed of great talents, but also of great ambition and love of power. His greatest merit is that he knew how to control these passions, and during the whole of his administration to appear only as the defender of his country, without aiming to be the ruler. To a man of moderate abilities it would be easier to play such a part;

but a man of rank, talent, and love of power is easily tempted to overstep the narrow boundary line. If he does not do so because he exercises self-control, he withstands the strongest temptation.

The contradiction could but become more glaring afterwards. There were two constitutions in the country—a hereditary monarchical dignity on the one hand, and a commercial democracy on the other. There, a military dictator, who had the command of the army and fleet, appointed all the officers, carried on wars, and guided the most important parts of foreign policy; here, a parliamentary sovereignty, which was always clashing with the military one. This could not fail to be a perpetual source of difficulty, and it gave rise to many a scene of bloodshed in the country. The contest continued on and off during the seventeenth century, and lasted till the overthrow of the republic out of which the Orange monarchy arose.

The Union of Utrecht was the signal for the greater part of the south to come to an understanding with Parma. This increased the difficulty of the struggle, especially against such a general. It went on without any decisive result, until a Roman Catholic fanatic named Gerard, who had been aspiring to the honour for seven years, contrived, on 10th July, 1584, to murder William.

Six persons had made the attempt before him, in order to obtain the reward: only one of them had succeeded in wounding him. The last obtained access to him under pretence of being a Calvinistic fugitive, lurked about William's apartments at Delft, and seized a favourable moment to shoot him. We are assured from Dutch sources that the Prince's last words were, "O God! have mercy upon my poor people."

The Dutch writers delight in bringing out every great feature of William's character, and his actions latterly had certainly shown more devotion to the cause of the provinces than regard for his own supremacy. It did not yet appear how a crown was to be established in his family.

In Gachard, the record of tedious negotiations is to be found between Gerard and Madrid about the Prince's assassination. Negotiations with the assassin's heirs, who claimed the reward, form the appropriate conclusion. It was at first refused to them, and then the amount of it diminished.

William did not die too soon, either for his country or his fame. The most difficult part of his task was over, and in his son he had trained a skilful general, who could fill his father's military office as skilfully as possible. In Spain the effect of his death was counteracted by the fact that just at that juncture a change took place in the position of affairs in Europe. A sort of coalition was formed against Spain, which gave the Netherlands more scope and breathing time. Philip was occupied principally with the affairs of France and England until his death. We now return to France.



## PART VI.

### THE RELIGIOUS WARS IN FRANCE, UNTIL THE RESTORATION OF THE KINGDOM BY HENRY IV.\*

#### CHAPTER XXV.

The last War with Spain and England, 1557-9.—Defeat at St. Quentin, 1557, and Gravelingen, 1558.—Taking of Calais, Peace of Cateau Cambrasis, 3rd April, 1559.—Catharine de Medici and the Government of the Guises.—French Protestantism in Conflict with the State.—The Clergy, Humanism, the Sorbonne and Parliament.—First Agitation of the New Doctrines.—Persecution of the Heretics after 1552.—The Aristocracy and the Princes of the Blood attacked by Calvinism.—The Conspiracy of Amboise, March, 1560.—Crisis and Change after the Death of King Francis II., 5th December, 1560.—Successes of Protestantism, 1559.—La Rénaudie's Project.—Condé's Trial.—Catharine de Medici as Regent.

#### SITUATION OF FRANCE UNDER HENRY II., 1547-59, AND FRANCIS II., 1559-60.

FRANCE now first experienced the throes occasioned by the Reformation and Revolution which all other States, far or near, had already passed through. A period of forty years of great internal disorder followed, which in many of its features resembled the Thirty Years' War in Germany, and chiefly differs from it in its final result.

Francis I. was succeeded by his son, Henry II., 1547-59, whose twelve years' reign was filled by the heritage of

\* S. Thuani, *Hist. sui Temporis*. London, 1733. Davila, *Storia delle Guerre Civili di Francia*. 1644. Die *Memoiren von Vieilleville*, Castelnau, Brantome, Tavannes, Nevers, Villeroi, Mornay, La Tour d'Auvergne Sully. Michelet, *Hist. de France au 16ième Siècle*. 1855. Schmidt, *Gesch. von Frankreich*. Hamburg, 1839. Ranke, *Französische Geschichte*, 1852. G. Weber, *Geschichtliche Darstellung des Calvinismus*. 1836. Soldan, *Geschichte des Protestantismus in Frankreich*. 1855. Von Polenz, *Geschichte des Franz. Calvinismus*. 1859.

his father's foreign policy. First, there were the last wars against Charles V., in which, for the first time, thanks to the disorders in Germany, France was successful. In 1552 France succeeded in obtaining possession of the three bishoprics, and Charles did not regain them in the following campaign; then the less successful wars with Spain and England, 1557-9. But even in these, France did not go empty away. The battles of St. Quentin and Gravelingen were lost, but Calais, the last English possession on French soil, was conquered, and the Peace of Cateau Cambrisis, April, 1559, did not demand any essential sacrifices from France.

In the internal policy the tendency to strengthen the royal supremacy continued. There was the same repression of all representative and corporate elements; the same system of partly absorbing, partly lulling to sleep, all other seats of power; the same endeavour, which fortune favoured, to invest the King with supreme authority as under Francis I. Henry did not equal his father in talent, but, although much under female influence, he was an active and competent ruler. As fate would have it, he received a wound at a tournament which cost him his life, and then followed the crisis from which it took France forty years in some measure to recover.

Henry left four sons—a sufficient number, as it appeared, to secure the succession to the house of Valois for a long time to come—though they were all children. Nobody then knew how frail and weakly they all were, that disease would prey upon them, nor foresaw that what was not effected by natural means would be early completed by mental and moral degradation. There was a singular fatality in the family history of this last king of the house of Valois. He had been married from political motives to the niece of Clement VII., Catharine de Medici. This ambitious woman came to France conscious that the marriage was a political one, mentally a stranger to her husband; and such she always remained. This placed her from the first in a false position. The King was influenced by any one rather than by his wife; and a by no means charming mistress, Diana of Poitiers, played her part by the side of and above the Queen.

An ambitious, talented Italian, fond of power, who brought to the throne all the pride of the Medicis, and had something of the universal political ambition of her relatives

Leo X. and Clement VII., and who, as a true daughter of this house, was not only richly endowed with Italian cunning, but considered any means allowable if they conduced to the end, deeply imbued with the unscrupulousness of this Italian school, she saw herself kept for years in the background, and deprived of all legitimate influence in public affairs. She could never hope to make conquests by her feminine charms ; her forte was craft and cunning. Such a character was sure to be dangerous, especially in a country where she was looked upon as a stranger. She played an ignominious part at her husband's side, and did not even obtain the position in her own house which, as the mother of the princes, was her due.

This explains her restless, feverish ambition. Having been for many years restrained and irritated by contumely, she now broke out with all the more vehemence ; it also explains her feeling of strangeness, and the utter absence of a consciousness of responsibility for her actions. She had things on her conscience which it would have been madness in a native princess to commit. The Massacre of St. Bartholomew was the crime of a woman who forgot that she was thereby condemning the whole house of Valois. Her successful attempt to suffer her children to be ruined in debauchery, trifling, and childishness, in order to make them subservient to her, and her neglect to educate them to rule, were the acts of a princess who was a stranger upon the throne and in the country.

She was the curse of the house of Valois. She gave the reins to her demoniacal ambition at the most critical period for the family, and satiated her Italian revenge upon the noblest of the nation. Forgetting her duty as mother of the kings of France, she suffered the last scions of the house to wither away, and she and her race came to a miserable end.

Immediately after the death of her husband, in 1559, she greedily grasped at power. The young King, Francis II., was of age when he entered his fourteenth year. There could therefore be no legal regency, though there might be an actual one, for a weakly monarch of sixteen was still incompetent to govern. But she was thwarted in her first grasp at power.

Under Francis I., a family previously unknown in French history had begun to play a prominent part. A successful,

rich, distinguished nobleman had appeared in Lorraine, which was still looked upon by the French as a German territory—Claude de Guise, the son of René of Lorraine, a man who had distinguished himself at Marignano, and later against Charles V. The great men of France looked down with contempt upon the upstart house, which had no large estates, and was not thought much of even in Lorraine. The Bourbons and Montmorencys especially looked upon the Guises as a race of insolent upstarts, who had come from a foreign country to seek at court a position which they did not find elsewhere, and to thrust aside the bearers of ancient and meritorious names.

Whatever, however, might be thought of the Guises, it was certain that they were not wanting in ability. Their nobility was very ancient, and when they aspired to the French crown there was no more ancient legitimate race than theirs. After Francis I. had carried on four unsuccessful wars, Francis of Guise, son of the above-mentioned Claude, had succeeded in occupying Lorraine, won the three bishoprics, and afterwards defended Metz against Charles V. with distinguished ability; and the only successful feat in the last campaign against Spain and England, the taking of Calais, was performed by him. He could proudly say to the great lords, "Tell me what you, with your ancient nobility, have done for France. I have done more for her than all of you put together." One of his brothers, Charles of Guise, was distinguished for his spirit and boundless ambition. He had entered the ecclesiastical order, and Rome had early recognised in him a convenient tool. The young Archbishop of Rheims became Cardinal of Lorraine, played a leading part at Trent, and was the spokesman and most able member of the papal party.

The brothers succeeded in bringing about a political marriage which promised to throw the King, who was mentally a child, entirely into their hands.

Their sister Mary had been married to James V. of Scotland, whose crown was then rather an insignificant one, but was now beginning to gain importance. The issue of this marriage was a charming girl, who was destined for the King's wife. She was betrothed to him without his consent when still a child. The young Queen was Mary Stuart. Her misfortunes, her beauty, and her connection with European history have made her a historical personage,

more conspicuous indeed for what she suffered than for what she did ; her real importance is not commensurate with the position she occupies.

This, then, was the position of the brothers Guise at court. The King was the husband of their niece ; both were children in age and mind, and therefore doubly required guidance. The brothers, Francis and Charles, had the government entirely in their hands ; the Duke managed the army, the Cardinal the finances and foreign affairs. Two such leaders were the mayors of the palace. The whole constitution of the court reminds us of the *rois fainéants* and the office of major-domo under the Carlovingians.

Thus, just when Catharine was about to take advantage of a favourable moment, she saw herself once more eclipsed and thrust aside, and that by insolent upstarts of whom one thing only was certain, that they possessed unusual talents, and that their consciences were elastic in the choice of means.

It was not only from Catharine that the supremacy of the Guises met with violent opposition, but also from Protestantism, the importance of which was greatly increasing in France.

#### FRENCH PROTESTANTISM IN CONFLICT WITH THE STATE.

France had not been unaffected by the violent storm which Luther's appearance had called forth, but the way in which the new teaching had to fight its way here was very different from the reception it had met with in Germany. The fact that the Franciscan monk, Michael Menot, who, in the same year and for the same reason as Luther, opposed the sale of indulgences, died almost unnoticed, proves that we are in a different world.

The ancient Church of France was not in less need of reform than the Church elsewhere. Impartial witnesses agree in stating that the clergy were fearfully demoralised.

At the time when, in accordance with the Pragmatic Sanction, the ecclesiastics elected the prelates, there were bitter complaints of the unscrupulousness of their choice, and the incredible dissoluteness of the bishops elected ; and when, after the Concordat of 1516, the King made the appointments to the hundred and six bishoprics, fourteen archbishoprics, and the abbacies and priories, outside ob-

servers were struck with the shameless traffic which the Crown made with these places, just as if they had been bargains about "pepper and cinnamon," with the gifts of benefices to diplomatists, learned men, deserving and undeserving, courtiers and soldiers, with all the inevitable demoralising consequences of such a distribution of the office of spiritual shepherd.

It was, as is well known, the Humanists who first pointed out the decline of the clergy. The Humanists were no strangers to France. It became almost a second home to them; and it is a singular fact that the same King, Francis I., who in his own country pitilessly burnt heretics in slow fires, gave his hand to the German heretics to oppose Charles V., and might be justly styled by his learned *protégés* "The father of learning."

From the beginning of his reign Francis I. had attracted learned men, both native and foreign, who inclined to the new tendencies, to his court, and attached them to his service by conferring on them temporal offices and spiritual benefices; a great "Collège des Trois Langues," with double professorships for Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, was to make Paris a centre of Humanistic learning as it had once been of mediæval scholasticism; and if the scheme was not carried out in its original magnificence, the school of heretical languages which was founded, and from which such men as Turnebus, Lambin, Du Chesne, and Petrus Ramus were to go forth, indicated a breach with the past, and kept up a perpetual irritation with the followers of the old system.

This old system was a unity; scholasticism and the mediæval Church hung together. The Sorbonne felt this, and looked askance at the brilliance of its Humanistic rival, as did also the Parliament, to the orthodox jurists of which the heretics appeared as political criminals.

These two old organs of France were more consistent than the King in jealously guarding the rights of ancient usage. The learned gentlemen of the Sorbonne spoke of Greek and Hebrew like the German monks, who talked of the newly-invented language of a so-called New Testament, and roundly asserted that whoever learnt Hebrew must become a Jew. The most zealous fanatics among them, therefore, such as Natalis Beda, summoned the professors before Parliament, and demanded that they should not be permitted to expound the Vulgate without passing a



theological examination, in order that no more might be heard of that heretical mode of speaking, "So says the Hebrew or Greek text;" and the faculty acted in this spirit when, their opinion being asked about the Lutheran controversy, they decided that Luther's teaching must be utterly exterminated, his writings publicly given to the flames, and the author be compelled by every lawful means solemnly to recant his heresies.

The Sorbonne repeatedly and urgently demanded a strict and relentless conscience police for all France, but Francis I. was at first quite indifferent about it. The appearance of a few isolated heretical preachers and authors, such as Lefevre, Berguin, Farel, Mazurier, Briçonnet, the establishment of a reformed congregation at Meaux under the leadership of an eloquent wool-comber, Leclerc (afterwards burnt with cruel torments at Metz), were not circumstances which seemed to him to justify exceptional measures.

But it was different after his return from the Spanish imprisonment which the lost battle of Pavia, in 1525, had inflicted on him.

Pope Clement VII. had taken care to explain to the humbled monarch that the heretics were political criminals who abolished all class distinctions, incited the lowest classes to rebellion, and would overturn royal authority itself. Parliament attributed his misfortunes to his lukewarmness against the heretics. Now, therefore, many executions followed, and in 1535 there was a bloody persecution; in 1543 he issued, in two edicts from Fontainebleau, the most stringent measures against the heretics as "disturbers of the public peace, rebels against the King and justice, conspirators against the prosperity of the State, which was specially dependent on the maintenance of the purity of the Catholic faith." This was followed by the proclamation of twenty-five articles of faith, drawn up by the Sorbonne, in order that every one of his Majesty's subjects might know what he was to believe and hold as true, unless he desired to come into contact with the avenging arm of Parliament.

The policy which rendered an occasional flirtation with the German Protestants, and active interference in the German troubles, desirable, did not, of course, alter this attitude. Henry II. proceeded exactly like Francis I., and the Guises kept him firmly to this course.

Henry went farther with the German Protestants than



Francis, but the persecutions and executions of the native heretics increased ; and now under Francis II., when the brothers Francis and Charles of Guise were all-powerful, France was under a system in religious matters which was really identical with that of Philip II. and Alba. But meanwhile French Protestantism, thanks to the folly of its persecutors, gained in the number and importance of its followers. The system of persecution had been submitted to as to inevitable destiny under Francis I. and Henry II., but it could not be so easily forgiven from foreign ministers, and the all-powerful favourites who had usurped the government ; from them it was felt to be a gross injustice, and the more so as the heresy was no longer confined to poor artisans at Meaux or Metz, or isolated learned sects, but was become a power which began to influence the best and most independent grades of society.

Since Calvin had built up the citadel of French Protestantism in the neighbouring Geneva, and year by year received his fugitive brethren in the faith, to send them back as well-instructed apostles, the Propaganda of the new teaching was organized. The strictly systematic character of Calvinism was well adapted to find acceptance with this nation. The democratic and republican tendencies also of this ecclesiastical commonwealth was attractive as a counterpoise to the all-devouring monarchical absolutism.

Thus Protestantism had become a party which did not, like Lutheranism in Germany, spring up from the depths, had its seat and main support among the masses, and then rose higher ; but it numbered its chief adherents among the middle and upper grades of society, spread its roots rather among the nobles than the citizens, and among learned men and families of distinction rather than among the people. A Calvinistic school had been developed of strict, serious, almost gloomy personages, in whom the light French character seemed to be almost extinguished, whose conduct was irreproachable, whose views of life were full of priestly exclusiveness, and who formed a moral opposition to the licentiousness of the luxurious court life which Francis I. had encouraged. Men like Coligny, D'Aubigné, and Sully, were distinguished characters, cut as it were from one block—men of unimpeachable morals, great earnestness, and unyielding energy.

Then there was another thing : some of the highest

aristocracy, who were discontented, and submitted unwillingly to the supremacy of the Guises, had joined the Calvinistic opposition—some undoubtedly from policy, others from conviction. The Turennes, the Rohans, and Soubises, pure nobles, who addressed the King as “mon cousin,” especially the Bourbons, the agnates of the royal house, had adopted the new faith.

A son of St. Louis had married Beatrice, the heiress of the earldom of Bourbon, and the Bourbon territory had devolved upon him. This branch had divided into two smaller branches, one of which had died out with the constable, the other was represented by Antoine and Louis. The elder brother had married the heiress of Bearn and Navarre, Jeanne d'Albret, an earnest, powerful, heroic woman, and from this marriage sprang Henry IV. The younger brother was of light French blood, a true French cavalier, with none too much of religious fervour. Jeanne was a zealous Calvinist, her husband from policy agreed with her, and Louis of Condé joined the same party, for it lent him a powerful weapon against the Guises.

After France had long been ruled by kings who really reigned and interfered personally with effect, she now had over her a weakly prince, influenced by powerful families, over the unhappy royal house a mother like Catharine de Medici, and for the first time for a long period there were powerful religious and political parties closely intermingled in opposition to the Throne. Protestantism united with the discontented elements among the highest nobles; the might and majesty of the kingdom were greatly decreased; vast debts had accumulated under the late governments; without the States, recovery was impossible. These elements in some degree explain the great convulsions which followed.

#### THE CONSPIRACY OF AMBOISE, MARCH, 1560.—CRISIS AND CHANGE AFTER THE DEATH OF THE KING.

In the time of Henry II., in spite of all the edicts and executions, Protestantism had made great progress. The Parisian Parliament was no longer the Inquisition of former days; the chambers were divided; the great chamber passed sentences of death, in accordance with the royal edicts, while the Tournelle, as it was called, first warned, and then, amidst heretical discussions, only passed sentence of banishment at the worst. One of the ministers, Anne du

Bourg, who afterwards paid for it with his life, zealously took the part of the heretics in the King's presence. He asked for proofs of the accusation that the heretics, in whose mouths the name of the King was never heard except to pray for and bless him, were traitors who wished to dethrone him, while all their guilt consisted in the courage with which they demanded the abolition of the crying abuses in the ancient Church. "Surely," he said in conclusion, "it is no light thing to condemn to death people who call upon Jesus in the midst of the flames."

About the same period, in the spring of 1559, interdicted Protestantism had secretly reviewed its congregations, and at the first national synod drawn up a confession of faith and a constitution for the new Church. Preachers and elders had appeared from every part of France, and their eighty articles of 28th May, 1559, have become the code of laws of French Protestantism. The Calvinistic principle of the Congregational Church, with choice of its own minister, deacons, and elders; a consistory which maintained strict discipline in matters of faith and morals, and in extreme cases inflicted excommunication—that is, exclusion from the sacraments—was established upon French soil, and was afterwards publicly accepted by the whole party.

The more adherents this party gained in the upper circles, the bolder was its attitude; there was, indeed, no end to the executions, or to the edicts against heresy, but a spirit of opposition, previously unknown, had gradually gained ground. Prisoners were set free, the condemned were rescued from the hands of the executioners on the way to the scaffold, and a plan was devised among the numerous fugitives in foreign lands for producing a turn in the course of events by violent means.

La Rénaudie, a reformed nobleman from Perigord, who had sworn vengeance on the Guises for the execution of his brother, had, with a number of other persons of his own way of thinking, formed a plan for attacking the Guises, carrying off the King, and placing him under the guardianship of the Bourbon agnates. If the King required a regent, the princes of the blood alone had a right to the office; with them there would be a native Government; the nobles and the new religion would obtain redress.

The project was betrayed; the Guises succeeded in placing the King in security in the Castle of Amboise;

a number of the conspirators were seized, another troop overpowered and dispersed on their attack upon the castle on the 17th of March, 1560; some were killed, some taken prisoners and at once executed.

It was then discovered, or pretended, that the youngest of the Bourbon princes, Louis of Condé, was implicated in the conspiracy. It is not known to this day how far this was true, but it is certain that had the project succeeded it would have been very agreeable to him, and that he was thoughtless enough to make it not improbable. The Guises now ventured, in contempt of French historical traditions, to imprison this prince of the blood, this agnate of the reigning house; to summon him before an arbitrary tribunal of partisans, and to condemn him to death, November, 1560. If the King had done this, if his guilt had been proved, it would not have been an unusual, nor, according to the notions of justice of that age, an illegal proceeding. But this was quite another thing; his guilt was not proved, and the trial itself, instituted by two foreigners against one of the princes of the blood, was in the highest degree informal.

This affair kept all France in suspense. All the nobles, although strongly infected with Huguenot ideas, were on Condé's side; even those who condemned his religious opinions made his cause their own. They justly thought that if he fell, none of them would be safe.

In the midst of this ferment, destiny interposed.

On the 5th of December, 1560, Francis II. died suddenly, and a complete change took place. His death put an end to a network of intrigues, which aimed at knocking the rebellion, political and religious, on the head. The States had been convoked at Orleans, in order to relieve the pecuniary embarrassments of the Crown. It was intended, also, with the aid of a numerous military force, to extirpate heresy, or at least to render harmless the most influential of its adherents. Every member was to swear allegiance to the articles drawn up by the Sorbonne in 1542, and whoever refused was to forfeit life and property. All this was in progress; the most suspicious representatives were secured when the King died.

During this confusion one individual had been watching the course of events with the eagerness of a beast ready to seize on its prey. Catharine of Medici was convinced

that the time of her dominion had at length arrived. Her life had been ruled by one idea—that of ruling herself; whatever stood in her way was hateful to her, and she was enough of an Italian to shrink from no means to give vent to her hatred. She hated the Guises because they had taken the government out of her hands; the Condés' party was compromised by the proceedings of Amboise and the trial, and between the contending parties she hoped to step in as the guiding power. She was thoroughly adapted to play the part which required an intriguing spirit, Italian cunning and cold blood, in the choice of means. But she was not equal to great political actions.

Francis II. was scarcely dead when she seized upon the person and the power of Charles IX. He was a boy of ten years old, not more promising than his eldest brother, sickly and weakly like all the sons of Henry II., more attached to his mother than the others, and he had been neglected by the Guises.

Immediately on the death of her eldest son, the mother stepped forward as the guardian and regent of her second, though both titles were carefully avoided. The sudden death of Francis had overthrown the dominion of the Guises.

But she would not have been able to possess herself of power without assistance from various quarters; she needed especially the support of the high aristocracy, of the princes of the blood, who hated the Guises, but still demanded that they should have a share in the government; she therefore came to an understanding with them, particularly with Antoine of Navarre, and she could not do this without making concessions.

One of her first acts was to liberate Condé; this was a decided step towards reconciliation with the Bourbons and the Protestants. The whole situation was all at once changed. The court was ruled by Catharine; her feverish thirst for power was satisfied. The Guises and their adherents were, indeed, permitted to remain in their offices and posts of honour, in order not fatally to offend them; but their supremacy was destroyed, and the new power was based upon the Queen's understanding with the heads of the Huguenot party.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

CHARLES IX., 1560-74, AND THE HUGUENOTS,  
UNTIL 1570.

**The First Compromise with the Reform Party.**—The States of the Empire at Orleans, 1560-61. — The Discussion on Religion at Poissy, Autumn, 1561. — The Edict of 17th January, 1562. — The Three First Religious Wars, 1562-70. — The Massacre at Vassy, March, 1562. — Character of the Civil War. — The First Religious War. — Battle of St. Dreux, December, 1562. — Edict of Amboise, March, 1563. — The Second Religious War, 1567-8. — The Edict of Longjumeaux, March, 1568. — The Third Religious War, 1569-70. — Victories of the Catholics at Jarnac and Moncontour. — Religious Peace of St. Germain-en-Laye, August, 1570. — Character of Charles IX.

**THE FIRST COMPROMISE WITH THE REFORM PARTY.**—  
THE STATES OF THE EMPIRE AT ORLEANS, 1560-61.  
—THE DISCUSSION ON RELIGION AT POISSY, AUTUMN,  
1561. — THE EDICT OF JANUARY, 1562.

**W**HILE this change was taking place, the States assembled at Orleans were discussing two important questions which had been left unsolved for the young King by his predecessors: the relief of the financial necessities of the Crown, which were so great that the Chancellor l'Hôpital, as he said publicly, could not speak of them without tears; and the deliverance of the Church from ruin and schism.

The clergy, the nobles, and the third estate were agreed that on this latter point something decisive must be done; but on the question, what? their views diverged. The clergy demanded the liberties of which the concordat had deprived them, and the extermination of heresy; the nobles were divided into the strictly orthodox party and the moderate reformers; while the third estate was just as decided in



demanding amelioration of the feudal laws, legal protection for and care of the common people, abolition of the persecutions for heresy, and the convocation of a General Council. In complaints about the decline of morality and education among the clergy, the third estate and the nobles were entirely agreed.

It was clear that the Government must adopt some attitude with regard to the great question, and that it could not return to the policy of the Guises at pleasure.

Protestantism had become a power which demanded the gravest consideration; it no longer numbered only a handful of obscure sectaries, but a large part of the nation, and some of the most highly educated and wealthy personages were among its ranks.

The number of the Huguenot congregations was already reckoned at two thousand. Protestantism prevailed in whole districts—in Normandy, the whole south-west of France, ancient Aquitaine, Guienne, the Cevennes, some parts on the Spanish frontier, Languedoc, Dauphiné; in large cities such as Orleans, Bordeaux, Lyons; in Paris itself it was producing a great ferment; and in Navarre, Jeanne D'Albret, the most zealous friend of Calvinism, was reigning. Many thousands among the nobles, of the citizens and the peasantry, had adopted the new faith.

A representation which was made to the Pope by the moderate party among the prelates, in the autumn of 1561, states that a fourth (the Reformers said half) of the whole population of the empire was estranged from the Church, and that this fourth consisted of nobles, learned men, wealthy citizens, and those among the lower classes who had seen the world and could bear arms. With so many noblemen, and old, well-disciplined troops, there was no lack of strength, judgment, or education—for three-fourths of the men of learning belonged to them; there was no lack of money among the nobles and merchants; and there was, besides, so much unity and determination, that there could be no hope of converting them by force, without inflicting a wound on the nation from which it would take it half a century to recover. Nothing, in fact, was accomplished against a party who possessed this moral and material power by burning books and men. Either a tremendous conflict must be encountered, which would perhaps turn to the advantage of some foreign power, or concessions



must be made. These they were now almost disposed to grant.

Catharine was certainly not influenced in this by religious opinions. There was never the least evidence that she leaned to one side or the other. She was a Catholic outwardly; as a Medici, a relation of two popes, she had never learned to be anything else. Protestantism, with its Calvinistic strictness, could be as little congenial to her frivolous views of life as its democratic tendencies to her ambition. But she knew how to wear the colours that were in vogue, and to change them when occasion arose. The same person who instigated the Massacre of St. Bartholomew could issue edicts of toleration, and soon after the massacre tolerate the Protestants again.

The first complaints of the Reformers were answered by an edict, by which all the imprisoned heretics were released, but warned to mend their ways. An attempt was then to be made to settle the controversy by a discussion on religion at Poissy. This took place in the autumn of 1561. Calvin's most talented pupil, Theodore Beza, measured his strength with the Cardinal of Lorraine, Charles of Guise, as the representative of the French prelates.

The brilliant eloquence of Beza, who, like most of the Calvinistic preachers, was not only a theologian but a polished man of the world, distinguished him greatly from the average theologians of the day. There was nothing of the ordinary sectary about him; he behaved with perfect courtesy; he made some impression on the court. It was seen that these were people with whom intercourse might be held, though no closer approach was to be thought of.

An edict had been issued in July, which pleased neither party, and gave so much dissatisfaction that it was not proclaimed in a single French town except Paris, while the services were openly continued and the communion celebrated. A moderate edict of toleration was then tried.

On the 17th of January, 1562, the Edict of St. Germain was issued, by which the policy which had been pursued for forty years, of supporting the Protestants abroad and persecuting them at home, was given up.

The Protestants were forbidden to possess any churches of their own; they were to give up those they had, and neither to buy nor build others. On the other hand, they were permitted, until further notice, to hold their services

outside the towns, unarmed, by day, and the police were to protect them. They were to observe the laws of the State and the festivals of the Romish Church; were not to hold any consistories or synods without consent of the higher powers; to make no statutes, to organize no troops either for offensive or defensive warfare, and to raise no taxes among themselves. All the Reformers were to take an oath to teach only in accordance with the Scriptures, and not to neglect the mass and similar institutions, &c.

It was but a very limited amount of toleration; still it was a great change when it was considered that in practice the edicts had not been carried out to the letter, and in very important respects all legal ground for persecution was removed. If Calvinism had made astonishing progress when it was proscribed, what might not be expected when it was permitted? "If," wrote Calvin, "the liberty promised us in the edicts lasts, the Papacy will fall to the ground of itself."

One thing was certain, that if the Reformers did not wish to lose everything, they must submit to the edict, even if it was in some respects harsh. Beza justly felt this, for he enjoined strict obedience on all the communities. But the disturbance of the peace came from the other side.

Catharine's wish to come to some terms with the heretics, without breaking with the Pope and Philip II., was not enough to put an end to the spirit of persecution which had been fostered by the traditions of forty years. The posts of authority in most of the cities, and especially in the Parisian Parliament, were occupied by Catholics; the people could not all at once accustom themselves to acknowledge as legal the services which they had hitherto scoffed at and molested, especially since it was said that the Queen was not in earnest, and had only made a sacrifice to policy.

Causes of irritation and disputes arose, and the Queen showed little disposition to interfere.

#### THE THREE FIRST RELIGIOUS WARS.—THE MASSACRE AT VASSY, MARCH, 1562, TO THE RELIGIOUS PEACE OF ST. GERMAIN, AUGUST, 1570.

Meanwhile an unheard-of violation of the January Edict took place. On Sunday morning, 1st of March, 1562, the brothers Guise, with a suite of two hundred armed nobles and

soldiers, entered the little town of Vassy as the Protestants were assembling for worship in a barn. The preaching had begun, when some of the Duke's followers rushed in, disturbed the worship, and made an uproar. Of course the congregation tried to defend themselves. The armed men then attacked them in ■ mass, and the defenceless people were shot or cut down with sabres, the rest dispersed, and their houses plundered.

The news of the massacre of Vassy flew through France. It was universally believed that it was a pre-meditated and most mischievous breach of the treaty, and there is nothing in history to refute it. The Duke said, in self-justification, that he sent two of his people into the barn to reprove the heretics for their disobedience; but this constituted a breach of the peace. The Guises wished for a conflict as a means of regaining their power, and they had their wish, for the massacre was the signal for the first civil war.

Thus began those fearful wars which lasted from this time to the reign of Henry IV., and they comprised everything that can make war horrible—religious and political fanaticism, interference from abroad, wild passions of every sort, and that fearful hatred by which two contending parties who are related are generally animated. In their horrors, in the European sympathy they elicited, in their course, these wars remind us of the great German war; only that in this case a man appeared who, supported by the monarchical inclinations of the nation, in a few years restored its ancient glory to the kingdom, its lost unity to the nation. But the conflict was terrible; the desolation of whole neighbourhoods, the massacre of whole populations, has given it a horrible immortality. It seems to me that there is a certain ferocity in the French nation, which, when the external polish is once rubbed off, breaks out with a boundless recklessness which is not found among other civilised nations. This was the case now, as well as in the great political Revolution of 1789. Other nations have experienced the horrors of religious and political wars, but history presents no other instance of the refinements of cruelty which were practised in France in 1793.

Hostilities began with the petty warfare of parties in cities and districts; at Paris, Sens, Toulouse, Rouen, and other places, the Catholics fell upon their Protestant fellow-

citizens, destroyed their houses of prayer, and murdered those who fell into their power. The Huguenots then threw themselves upon the Catholic churches, destroyed images, altars, and censers—in short, everything that belonged to Catholic worship. Thus image-breaking and bloodshed raged for weeks in the fairest districts of France before the hostile armies faced each other. When these at length—one under Guise, the other under Coligny—were set in motion, nothing but skirmishes and devastation of the enemy's country took place at first; no decisive action. But it became clearer and clearer that the Huguenots, who lost one town after another, and whose lack of money was ever increasing, were decidedly at a disadvantage in conflict with the growing power of the Guises. They lost the battle of St. Dreux, December, 1562; but, on the other hand, their adversary's most able general, the Duke of Guise, was assassinated by a Huguenot nobleman, 18th of February, 1563, and with him the greatest obstacle to the attempts at mediation which Catharine had been making was removed.

They had been tearing each other to pieces for months; the Protestant minority had not been able to vanquish the majority, which had foreign aid, but neither had the majority been able to exterminate the heretics. If the fanaticism of the Catholics demanded the sacrifice of thousands one day, it was balanced by the thousands that fell a sacrifice to the revenge of their adversaries the next. At length they desisted from this murderous work, not because they were reconciled, but exhausted, and saw that a truce was necessary. Precisely a year after the massacre of Vassy a new edict was issued at Amboise, which went a step farther than that of 1562.

The Reformers were granted liberty of conscience, an amnesty for the past, and were promised undisturbed enjoyment of their property, honours, and offices. The celebration of divine service was regulated as follows: to the barons and all the lords invested with superior jurisdiction, was granted the right to hold services at their chateaux for themselves and their retainers; to the inferior nobles, only for themselves; in every official district a town was appointed, in the suburbs of which Reformed service might be held; Paris always excepted.

The edict greatly favoured the superior nobility, but was very disadvantageous to the cities; for them, through the limitation of permission to hold service to one town in

a district, as Coligny said, more churches were annihilated by a stroke of the pen than had been destroyed by all the inimical powers at work for ten years before.

It was not long before this edict was infringed, for neither party was disposed to abide by it; the Catholic majority saw in it only a false peace concluded insincerely by the Crown, and the Calvinists would not give up the hope of some day attaining power in France. The number of their adherents was continually increasing, and their propaganda pursued its course.

It came to a second religious war, which ended, like the first, without any decision in 1567-8; and, as they again left off fighting from exhaustion, the Edict of Longjumeaux was issued, 23rd of March, 1568, which in essentials confirmed the previous one.

In 1569 the war began again. I will not relate the history of it in detail, but will confine myself to the decisive actions. Other things remained as they were; the Catholics maintained their supremacy, but the Protestants could not be exterminated.

It was one of Coligny's merits that though often beaten he never quitted the field, and always managed to secure an honourable position for the Protestants.

The third war, which was principally caused by the reaction of events in the Netherlands, and by the report that Alba had decided with the Queen Mother upon striking a blow at the Protestants in France, similar to the one he was aiming at the heretics in the Netherlands, was decided by the defeat of the Huguenots at Jarnac, where Condé and Moncontour fell, and ended by the Peace of St. Germain-en-Laye, August, 1570, which irrevocably confirmed the previous concessions, and added that in every district two places should be granted for the celebration of Protestant worship; but they were mostly small towns, and it was only in the suburbs of them; and that in all towns the Reformed service should remain as it had been up to the 1st of August. The Huguenots of every age were acknowledged as faithful subjects and servants, with a complete amnesty; their rights were acknowledged as equal to those of the Catholics, and a law of recusance was granted them, to defend them from the Catholic Parliament.

The four cities of La Rochelle, Montauban, Cognac, La Charité, were granted to the Reformers as places of refuge,

under an oath that after two years they should be restored to the King.

Eight years had passed in fearful conflicts, every one of which increased the need of toleration, and the stability of the nation had been greatly shaken by it. The court, the nobles, the people, were split up into parties; there was, as it were, a yawning chasm between the different parts of the nation; in some parts of the country it had become impossible for people of the two creeds to live together, so sharp had been the controversy, and so irreconcilably were men's minds divided. As may be imagined, France suffered severely from this; the great monarchy which had interposed with so much effect in European affairs, under Henry II., was sadly lamed. The kingdom was rent wide as the poles asunder. Edicts of toleration were issued in its name and violated, peace proclaimed and broken, cruelty practised and revenged.

All this could not fail to have a fearfully demoralising effect upon the mind of the nation; and, above all, on the character of a prince who had grown up from boyhood to youth amid such scenes, not gifted with talent or self-control, and but a plaything between his mother, the Guises, and the Huguenot leaders.

Charles IX., loaded with the curse of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, was afterwards regarded in France as the type of a degenerate king; and in the ninth decade of the last century, when the storm raged against monarchy, this inhuman prince was often alluded to, who himself fired at his fugitive subjects. Yet this picture is not precisely true.

This youth, now twenty years of age, was more to be pitied than blamed. It was a most tragic bit of human life which was played out within narrow limits, but he cannot be made alone or even chiefly responsible for it. Weakly from childhood, so brought up by his mother that he could never be independent, his mental growth was stunted—he grew up more coarse, uncultivated, and ignorant than any nobleman's son of his time. At this most critical period he received not the slightest training for his calling. He was addicted to childish sports, sat in the workshop and made locks, and these trivial tastes were purposely fostered by his mother, for a youth whose time was thus spent was not likely to be dangerous to her.

He had never had any more lofty aspirations. The



healthy influence of a happy family life was wanting to him ; there was not a single being about him who could raise him morally ; the merry games of real childhood or the pleasures of learning in advancing youth were unknown to him ; he had not even the salutary influence of knowledge of some one subject, which would at any rate have occupied his mind.

With all this, combined with a sickly body totally destitute of youthful vigour, he was not likely to feel any impulse to break these contemptible fetters and begin an independent life. He readily allowed himself to be seduced into excesses purposely placed in his way, in order that his remaining energies might be quenched ; he allowed himself to be persuaded into one act to-day, another to-morrow ; there was no one about him calculated to give him confidence in himself or others.

And it was upon this individual that enormous responsibility was thrown, in a situation of which a superior character would have found it difficult to solve the complications. He who takes all this into account will not be surprised at the result, and will be disposed to agree in my lenient estimate of his guilt.

The view which stamps him as a hardened wretch, and makes it appear that he himself instigated the horrid deed, is psychologically exaggerated. So weak a creature could not have been so early and so deeply debased. It is impossible to imagine him harbouring a consuming hatred for years, or possessing the unfathomable cunning and hypocrisy which circumvented the enemy till the day of reckoning came. This presupposes a degree of mental power which he did not possess ; we know him only as a vacillating weakling.



## CHAPTER XXVII.

### THE MASSACRE OF ST. BARTHOLOMEW.

Coligny at Court, and the War with Spain, September, 1571—July, 1572.—The Massacre, 24th August, 1572, and the Fourth Religious War, 1572-3.—End of Charles IX., 30th May, 1574.

#### COLIGNY AT COURT, AND THE WAR WITH SPAIN.

AFTER the Peace of 1570, it appeared as if a complete change of policy was about to take place. The Queen pretended to be friendly with the Protestants; her relations with the ambitious Guises were distant and cold, and the project of uniting the houses of Bourbon and Valois by marriage really looked as if she was in earnest.

The most distinguished leader of the Huguenot party was the Admiral Caspar de Coligny. It is quite refreshing at this doleful period to meet with such a character. He was a nobleman of the old French school and of the best stamp; lived upon his estates with his family, his little court, his retainers and subjects, in ancient patriarchal style, and on the best terms, and regularly went with them to the Protestant worship and the communion; a man of unblemished morality and strict Calvinistic views of life. Whatever this man said or did was the result of his inmost convictions; his life was the impersonation of his views and thoughts. In the late turbulent times he had become an important person as leader and organizer of the Protestant armies. At his call, thousands of noblemen and soldiers took up arms, and they submitted under his command to very strict discipline. He could not boast of having won many battles, but he was famous for having kept his resources together after repeated defeats, and for rising up stronger than before after every lost engagement.

At the same time, he was not too much of a Huguenot

to regard as supreme the welfare of the whole country, as a Frenchman and a nobleman. When, at the beginning of the war, his party looked round for foreign aid, and proposed to apply to the German Protestant princes for succour, he replied, "Let us regard them as mediators, but not take any troops from them. Let us rather die than merit the reproach that the Huguenots were the first to bring foreign troops on to French soil." He always kept in view that both parties, when they had attained their rights, should submit to an honourable peace and feel themselves to be Frenchmen. Now that peace was made, "why," he asked, "excite further dissensions for the benefit of our common enemies? Let us direct our undivided forces against the real enemy of France—against Spain, who stirs up intrigues in our civil wars. Let us crush this power, which condemns us to ignominious dependence."

The war against Spain was Coligny's project. It was the idea of a good Huguenot, for it was directed against the most blindly fanatical and dangerous foe of the new doctrines; but it was also that of a good Frenchman, for a victory over Spain would increase the power of France in the direction of Burgundy, and would round it off in the most advantageous manner on the eastern side from Besançon to Ostend. This was the germ of the subsequent policy of Louis XIV.

From September, 1571, Coligny was at court. On his first arrival he was heartily welcomed by the King, embraced by Catharine, and loaded with honours and favours by both. I am not of opinion that this was a deeply laid scheme to entrap the guileless hero, the more easily to ruin him. Catharine's ideas did not extend so far. Still less do I believe that the young King was trained to play the part of a hypocrite, and regarded Coligny as a victim to be cherished until the fête day. I think, rather, that Catharine, in her changeableness and hatred of the Guises, was now really disposed to make peace with the Protestants, and that the young King was for the time impressed by this superior personage.

No youthful mind is so degraded as to be entirely inaccessible to such influence. A man commanding the respect due to age, but still in the vigour of life, with great moral dignity, yet true French *bonhomie*, could not fail to make an irresistible impression upon youth.

I am of opinion that Charles IX. was under this impression. I believe that the first and only happy day in the life of this unfortunate monarch was when he met Coligny, who raised him above the degradation of vulgar life; and I believe further, that this relation was the main cause of the massacre of St. Bartholomew. A new influence was threatening to surround the King and to take deep root, which Catharine, her son Henry of Anjou, and the strict Catholic party, must do their utmost to avert; and it was quite in accordance with the King's weak character to allow the man to be murdered whom he had just called "Father." \*

Although we have but little light on the details of this catastrophe, we have sufficient information to form an opinion of the causes which led to it.

Since peace had been made, Coligny thought no more of a war of extermination between Catholics and Protestants, but—and in this he was considering the natural interests of the policy of France—of a national war, in which both parties should unite their forces against Spain.

This did not exclude, but rather made necessary, the support of foreign Protestants, of the Netherlands, the alliance with England, and the Protestant powers of Germany. In this he betrayed the Huguenot; still, it was not the only reason for his policy. In a struggle with Spain, it was not only liberty of conscience in and out of France that was at stake, the object also was to throw off an oppressive foreign yoke, and to get possession of the fine border country, which was afterwards the most valuable conquest of Louis XIV. The possession of the chain of fortresses from Luxemburg to Dunkirk was afterwards the chief aim of the foreign policy of France. It did not arise alone from blind hatred of the house of Hapsburg, it was a continuance of the path which Francis I. had opened up, and Henry II. had followed farther, and the moment had never been so favourable as now. Richelieu himself afterwards only imitated Coligny, but coldly and selfishly,—he was destitute of his enthusiasm.

Was it incredible that Charles IX. should be inspired with it?

\* These and the following views of these events entirely agree with the confessions of Henry of Anjou himself. See Soldan, II., and compare the essay on "Frankreich und die Bartholomäusnacht," in Raumer's *Hist. Taschenbuch*. 1854.

What was uttered by Coligny in tones of the deepest conviction, reminded the prince, for the first time, of the treatment he had received, and of the unworthy position he had held with respect to the Spanish policy and its agents, his mother and the Guises. He was just at the age when the royal blood could not fail to stir in him, and we know that just about this time, to the horror of his mother and brother, he repeatedly broke out into rash expressions.

During the first half of 1572 this turn of affairs was taking place.

Alba's system was on the decline; he had just adopted his final desperate measures, the stupid tax of the one hundredth, twentieth, and tenth pennies; an indescribable fury raged in the country, which might at any moment come to an outbreak, and the troops of Louis of Nassau and William of Orange had begun their operations. The situation, therefore, was favourable. If the Spanish power were to be lamed, no better opportunity could be expected.

It appears that about the middle of the year, the matter was as good as decided. The King willingly acceded to Coligny's plan. While the doubtful attitude of England, and the divided opinion of the Council, prevented any open interference, the King privately gave considerable sums for the support of the Flemish patriots, for the equipment of an army of four thousand men, composed of Catholics and Protestants, who marched towards Mons, to succour Louis of Nassau. When in July this army was beaten, and the majority of the Huguenots were in despair, Coligny succeeded in persuading the King to equip a fresh and still larger army; but the opposition then bestirred itself.

#### THE MASSACRE OF ST. BARTHOLOMEW, AUGUST 24TH, 1572.

The strict Catholic party had watched this turn of affairs with growing ill-will; they dreaded enmity with Spain, as the best ally of the unity of the faith, and rejected all idea of peace and reconciliation with the heretics, the fatal foes of the good cause. The Guises found every government which thrust them on one side unsupportable.

The Queen was by no means enthusiastically in favour of Spain, whose commanding influence she often found oppressive; but to venture on a war with her was quite

another thing, and in questions which concerned her dominion over the King, everything else was disregarded.

She had been absent with her married daughter in Lorraine, and on her return she found everything changed; the Guises without influence, herself thrust on one side.

Under the impression of the latest events in Flanders, which made it likely that the war with Spain would be ruinous, she hastened to the King, told him with floods of tears that it would be his ruin; that the Huguenots, through Coligny, had stolen the King's confidence, unfortunately for himself and the country. She made some impression upon him, but it did not last long, and thoughts of war gained the upper hand again.

The idea now (August, 1572) must have been matured in Catharine's mind of venturing on a desperate step, in order to save her supremacy and influence, for this consideration was always uppermost with her.

She had trifled with the friendship of the Huguenots, and now they had outwitted her; her power over the King, the fruit of the toil of a life-time, had slipped through her fingers, and through the Huguenots, whom she had dreaded least of all. She had never liked them, had never forgotten that they had formerly been inimical to her; all her fierce old hatred was stirred up when she saw her position threatened by these heretics.

She was a Medici; had passed a melancholy, joyless youth; had been brought as a stranger to the Court; had been neglected by her husband, and thrust on one side under her eldest son. After a long course of humiliation, she had at length attained the authority she desired, as the adviser of her second son, and now it appeared that she had only brought him up for the Calvinists, and had really been working for them. This was too much for a Medici.

As to ways and means in such a situation, she shared the views of her nation. The passionate Italians are disposed to choose the shortest and most sanguinary methods. Political assassination has always been judged more leniently by them than by other nations; unhappily, political complications, combined with the hasty temperament of the people, have often caused them to resort to poison or the dagger, while the northerners are still debating. In the sixteenth century this sort of political morality was in full bloom, had been theoretically developed by Machiavelli with artless

objectivity, and, as a passionate woman, Catharine was doubly disposed to resort to such means.

The idea ripened in her mind of getting rid of Coligny by assassination; she was convinced that it would serve her purpose, and all other considerations were disregarded.

Entirely of one mind with her son Henry, she turned to the Guises, with whom she was at enmity when they were in power, but friendly when they were of no more consequence than herself. They breathed vengeance against the Calvinists, and were ready at once to avenge the murder of Francis of Guise by a murderous attack upon Coligny.

An assassin was hired, and established in a house belonging to the Guises, near Coligny's dwelling, and as he came out of the palace, on the 22nd of August, a shot was fired at him, which wounded but did not kill him.

Had Coligny died of this wound, Catharine would have been content; her power would have been restored, the Huguenots intimidated and deprived of their leader, the game which she played with both parties, to render each harmless by means of the other, could have begun again. But Coligny did not die; the Huguenots defiantly demanded vengeance on the well-known instigator of the deed; their threats reached the Queen and Prince Henry of Anjou, and the personal fascination which Coligny had exercised over King Charles appeared rather to increase than to diminish.

Thus doubtless arose, during the anxious hours after the failure of the assassination, the idea of an act of violence on a large scale, which should strike a blow at Coligny and his friends before they had time for revenge. It certainly had not been in preparation for months, not even since the time that Coligny had been at Court; it was conceived in the agony of these hours. Not that so diabolical a scheme was impossible in such a circle, but Catharine's character was not equal to it. In the heat of passion she could venture on the most fearful deeds, but she had not sufficient elasticity to plan such a scheme and to allow it gradually to ripen.

The new faith had been proscribed in Paris from the first—all the Edicts of toleration expressly excepted it and the neighbourhood—and the inhabitants cherished a growing hatred of the Huguenots, which it was hard to restrain and very easy to let loose. If the King could be persuaded



to give the signal for an attack, a horrible massacre might be expected.

But the King was again in Coligny's hands, had seriously entered into the investigation of the attempt upon his life, dismissed the Guises with hard words from Court, sent a guard of fifty men to Coligny's house, and had had it proclaimed in Paris and the provinces that every part of the religious Peace should be conscientiously observed. On the afternoon of the 23rd of August the Queen made a final attempt with the King. She told him of a vast Huguenot conspiracy against throne and altar, which, with thousands of well-armed troops, was only awaiting the right moment, under Coligny's command, to attack him and all his house; the Catholics were asleep; unless the King roused himself, and under a leader chosen by himself resisted the Huguenots, he would stand alone, and all would be lost.\* This downright lie took effect; orders were given for the massacre, and it was organized on a large scale for the following night. A vast number of the Huguenots had come to Paris for the celebration of the marriage of Henry of Navarre with the King's sister; thousands had been attracted by this peaceful and conciliatory festival; the plan was, at a given signal, to fall upon the sleeping guests. The Guises sent for the *Prevôts des Marchands* and the superintendents of the various quarters, explained the plan to them, and gave them their commissions. To make sure that none of the more important persons should escape, individuals were commissioned to murder particular persons, and the Duke of Guise took care to undertake the murder of Coligny. These doings have a horrible similarity to those of 1792, when the superintendents of the sections were sent for to have the plan of the prison murders explained to them. The murderous orders had to be despatched to the provinces by couriers.

The horrors of the night of the 24th of August took place in this way. At a given signal the leaders left their posts, collected their comrades, fell upon the Huguenot quarter, and murdered the defenceless people. About 2,000 were

\* According to the confessions of Henry of Anjou, the Queen only wished for the head of Coligny and those of some of his friends, but Charles IX. said in a tremendous rage that, if the Admiral must die, not a single Huguenot should remain alive to reproach him with the deed. This, then, was the cause of the massacre, which was not at first intended by Catharine and Henry.—Soldan.



met with, very few of whom escaped. Similar signals were despatched to all the larger places, and very few of the superintendents had the courage to answer that they were not assassins. There were but isolated instances of mercy and conscience; in general the command was carried out as it was given, and it throws a ghastly light on the nation and its rulers. The King, dragged along like a powerless instrument, took part in these horrors, and was seized with the horrid ambition to assist in the project which was not his own invention.

Blind revenge and passion are bad counsellors. Not a single project of the house of Valois, which thought it was contending for its Crown, or of the mother of its last King, whose whole soul was engrossed in ambition, was accomplished by the deed. Their dynasty was ruined, but the Huguenots were not exterminated.

20,000, 25,000, even 100,000 victims are spoken of—the smallest number is the most probable! It was a tremendous blow for the party. Most of its leaders were cut off; the grey-headed Coligny was cut to pieces; but, though weaker by 20,000 men, it was strong enough to begin the war of revenge again. A fierce hatred had been excited in the remnants of the party, which perhaps was of greater value than the loss they had sustained. Charles IX. wrote on 26th of August to his ambassador in the Netherlands:—"This fire will extend to every city of my empire, and all the followers of the new religion will be made harmless." This opinion also prevailed at Rome and Madrid. The Pope had a solemn *Te Deum* celebrated, and Philip II. broke out into a coarse triumphal laugh at the news.

But in almost every other country of Europe, even in the zealous Catholic States, there was but one voice of horror and condemnation.

The Emperor Maximilian II. expressed the feeling of the world when he said that it pained him to reckon such a murderous crew among his relations, and he was father-in-law to Charles IX. The Pope and Philip II., however, lauded it as an act well pleasing to God, and one that did honour to the title of the "Most Christian King." Was it probable that, even among these fanatical assassins, such a monarchy should continue to exist? Was it possible that when passion had cooled, and the calm voice of the nation was heard again, a monarchy would be forgiven whose name was stained by

the most bloody deed that ever disgraced a royal house? In the eyes of the nation, no blessing could ever again rest on it. Just as Catharine thought she had attained dominion for ever, she was giving the most fatal blow to her authority.

Thus a fresh religious war arose. All that were not murdered of the Huguenot party took up arms. It was absolutely necessary for them to defend their rights, and it became evident how many remained. None of the wars were so feebly carried on by the royal party as this one; it seemed as if an evil conscience lamed their powers.

Among the Catholic population itself, a party split off from the fanatics, who were called, first in jest and then in earnest, "The Politicians." They condemned the war of extermination against religious creeds, and demanded immediate abolition of the misgovernment of the Court party, which was becoming more and more intolerable. Political opposition now assailed the helpless throne; and if we are ever justified in thinking we see the Nemesis following close upon a guilty act, we are so in this case. The murder scheme had failed; the Huguenots were not exterminated; the Catholic party was split into two camps; Catharine had to share her power with the Guises, and was helpless between the two parties; the King felt the burden of the night of the 24th of August press upon him more heavily than any one else.

The ghosts of those who had been slain by his orders were ever before his eyes; he often rose in the night, and rushed in despair through the dreary apartments of his palace, followed by bleeding forms and confused voices. He was not enough of a villain to get over it as others would have done; he was a weak child, who had been persuaded to vile deeds, and was racked to death by the stings of conscience.

Two years after the night of St. Bartholomew his feeble life came to an end; he pined away without any particular disease, consumed by a dissolute life, and the remembrance of an act which he was weak enough to permit, and not strong enough to overcome.

This was a heavy blow to Catharine; her tool was dead, the throne again vacant, and that at a moment when the Netherlands had risen, the Huguenots were in arms, and the Catholic party filled with discontent and in process of dissolution.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

### HENRY III., 1574-89, AND THE LEAGUE.

**Character of Henry.**—The Edict of May, 1576, and the Holy League of the Guises.—Protracted Vacillation.—Death of Francis of Anjou, June, 1584, and Contest about the Succession.—The War of the Three Henrys, 1588-9.—The Barricades of Paris, May, 1588.—The States at Blois, October, 1588, and the Murder of the Two Guises, 23rd and 24th December, 1588.—Flight and Murder of Henry III., August 2nd, 1589.

**C**ATHARINE'S third son, Henry III., now began to reign. It was said that he was the one most deeply imbued with her ideas, and that he yielded the most willingly to her advice. He had spent his youth among the Guises, adhered jealously to the strict Catholic party—not from religious sentiments, but from purely external motives. He had dutifully aided his mother in the arrangement of the Massacre of St. Bartholomew, and he himself relates after what vicissitudes she finally attained her end in her attacks upon the King's relations with Coligny, and with what anxious suspense she listened for the murderous signal of the alarm bell on the night of the 24th of August.

At this juncture a prospect had opened of providing for Henry, whom it was not easy to keep in France, by means of his election to the throne of Poland. By dint of great pecuniary sacrifices he had been elected King, and Poland thought the French kingdom would aid Polish weakness. Just as he ascended the throne, news came of his brother's death, and Henry laid aside the crown—did not even abdicate, but simply deserted the Polish throne in order to ascend the French one. In spite of his slender build and love of sensual pleasures, he was more vigorous than either of his brothers, produced more the impression of a French noble

than his predecessor, and was believed to have more mental power. He was certainly more deeply initiated into his mother's political morality. What in Charles IX. was contemptible weakness, was in him voluntary co-operation; what in the one case was extorted by lies and intimidation from a demoralised nature, was in the other the acquiescence of detestable frivolity which agreed to anything and shrunk from nothing. Still, there was nothing manly in this personage; though more gifted than his brothers, and not so easily treated as a minor, there was nothing of the King about him, and he was even more repulsive than they were.

The horrible corruption of Charles's Court, its foolery and frivolity, had no better representative than Henry of Anjou. He had gone through frightful excesses; his youth had nothing to show but dissolute feats, or even crimes. It is related of him that he went through the streets as a Merry-Andrew, or with wild beasts like a bear-leader, attired in such a fashion that his sex was indistinguishable; or broke into the houses of the peaceful citizens by night with a crew of dissolute companions. Neither was he wanting in the bigotry of which this Court could boast. One day he might be seen with the notorious "mignons," or seizing the wives and daughters of Parisian husbands and citizens; the next he went to church, joined in masses and processions to atone for the horrors of the previous night. As to honour, faith, honesty, and loyalty, he was truly worthy of his mother.

This was the Valois upon whose shoulders the burden was laid of healing the woes of a distracted country.

The religious contest was not adjusted; the Huguenots were deeply embittered; new leaders were at the head; the land groaned under misgovernment, which was worse than ever; the treasury was empty; there was no money to pay the officials, the troops, or the household; discontent was increasing among all classes; and there was a party of eminent men who were clamouring for political reforms.

And now the dangers of the situation were incorporated in an ominous League between the Huguenots and the Catholic politicians. Both renounced the idea of a unity of faith for all France; gave up the endless civil wars, and wished for peace on the principle of reciprocal toleration, and directed their forces against the Crown with a united demand for reforms, abolition of the great abuses, and convocation of the States of the empire.

In the presence of these complications, Henry III. had not the power, was too insignificant to go to work like a King, to put an end to factions by reigning supreme above them. He chose the dishonourable path of fostering intrigues, and for years played a deceitful game; but so clumsily, that the commonest understanding could see through it.

In May, 1576, he made peace with the politicians and Huguenots, revoked the policy of the massacre, put an end to the legal disabilities of its victims, granted the heretics, with the exception of Paris, unlimited religious liberty, equality in filling offices and dignities in every Parliament.; a chamber composed of an equal number of Catholics and Protestants, and eight fortresses, as a pledge that the treaty should be observed.

The Catholics did not fail to strike a counter-blow to this edict. With the help of Spain, Henry of Guise collected together all those who held to the preservation of the unity of the faith, at any price and by any means, in an alliance called the Holy League; it was formed in 1576, and found considerable support in the meeting of the States at Blois, in December of that year. Resistance to the utmost to the Huguenots, and to all who should join themselves to them, was the programme of this League.

At Blois, the King showed that he was not in earnest with his concessions to the Huguenots. The Holy League had not long been formed when the King joined it, and recalled all that he had previously granted. It came to a religious war. Royalty and the opposing parties once more met upon the battle-field, the former to play the forlorn part of being watched by the Catholics as partly, and by the Protestants as altogether a traitor. This war confirmed what had been granted to the Huguenots in 1576; but the seventh war, which quickly followed, deprived them of it again until the Edict of toleration was renewed at the Peace of Fleix. Things could not go on as they were; royalty sunk deeper every day in the estimation of all parties; alarming political projects were stirring, when in June, 1584, another death took place which hastened the crisis.

This was the death of the fourth son of Henry II. and Catharine, Francis of Alençon, who, after the accession of Henry III., had received the title of Duke of Anjou, and had been looked upon as Henry's successor. He had allowed himself to be made a tool of by all parties; had at

length appeared as a Pretender in the south of the Netherlands; had tried all sorts of schemes in order to cut a figure, but he had not talent enough for it. On the 10th of June, 1584, he died, and it was in fact the most important thing he had ever done.

He was the last of the Valois, and the Bourbons were now thought of as successors. The representative of the claims of this house was Henry, King of Navarre, who, compelled on the night of St. Bartholomew to abjure his faith, had afterwards escaped and placed himself at the head of his old party.

Spain and Rome laboured against his right of succession, against the elevation of the heretical Bourbons; and just as they were beginning to look round for a Catholic dynasty in France, the well-known work, "Stemmata," appeared in Lorraine, in which it was shown that the Guises were descended from the Carlovingians, and were thus the legitimate house; while the French kings were all usurpers. They forgot in their zeal that the Carlovingians themselves were arrant usurpers, and that they should have gone back to the Merovingians. An eighth religious war then began about the throne, which has been called the War of the Three Henrys. From the end of 1585 there was a melancholy campaign, the issue of which neither party could foresee, and in which the King and his mother played a most pitiful part. The King at first sought to maintain a position in the camp of the League, but vanished before Henry of Guise. He then tried to take an independent course; but every attempt led to more painful and ignominious defeats, until nothing availed but assassination, which overthrew the kingdom of the last of the Valois.

There could be no doubt with the masses who was the lawful King, the wretched Henry III. or the powerful Duke of Guise. It required a persistent idea of legitimacy to remain loyal to one about whom everything was despicable except his legal right to the throne. Henry of Guise could not be looked upon as other than a usurper, but he displayed unquestionable superiority in playing his part. He was not the great general which his father was considered to be, but in chivalrous personal bravery he equalled if he did not excel him. Then he was handsome, eloquent, winning, exercised quite a fascination over the masses, was without the weakness for women of Henry III., was distin-



guished in all manly exercises, was the best rider, fencer, swimmer in France, and was blameless in faithfulness to his convictions. The party which he led was in great measure the creation of his family; it was a party which knew no capitulation; he stood or fell with it. However worthless its programme may be considered, it must be granted that the Guises stood by it firmly, while the King and his mother, broken reeds as they were, inclined now to this side and now to the other.

At Rome and Madrid they were already designating the hero of the League as the legal Catholic King, and the book called the "Stemmata" was intended to mislead the legitimist conscience of the people. The pitiful bearing of the King towards the Duke of Guise was as if designed to make the Pretender popular, and to complete the bankruptcy of the lawful crown. The French sources relate with a certain humour the King's attempt in 1588 to rid himself of his inconvenient Mayor of the Palace, and how it ended in preparing a complete triumph for the latter.

Guise had entered Paris with several hundred knights, in order, as he said, to justify himself to the King against false accusations, but in truth to wring from him entire submission to the commands of the League. The people had received the Pretender with immense rejoicings, and the King was so enraged, that for a moment he thought of having him assassinated. To defend himself, he caused a troop of 6,000 men to enter the city, who would, properly made use of, have been quite sufficient to put down the Duke and all his followers; but the organization was so bad, that Guise succeeded, under the eyes of the King's soldiers, who stood like "iron pillars," in inciting the masses to rise and construct barricades, which put all Paris into his power, and compelled the King to fly. The Duke took possession of the city, the people did homage to him as their Lord, the wretched King entered into negotiations, and in July signed a programme which really made the Duke regent and supreme ruler, and reduced the King to a mere puppet.

Henry could not forget this, and resolved to get rid of the Duke by a secure method.

In October, 1588, the States were convoked at Blois, and it had to be shown who was master, the King or the Duke. Henry III. experienced one disappointment after another. Even in the opening speech, he had to listen to a coarse



attack on the ambition of the great, and then to confirm by oath the programme of the League.

But the spirit by which a large portion of the assembly was animated, indicated a new and tremendous danger, of which the King had no idea. Ideas of reform in the empire were expressed, as bold and radical as those of 1789; even more so, for they did not adhere to the one point to which all parties adhered then—the entire unity of the State—but suggested projects of decentralisation, with privileges for the nobles, the States and the provinces, which did not at all comport with the great work of the house of Valois. A monarchy limited by a standing committee of the States was proposed, and the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people preached, which, in spite of its ecclesiastical dress, was as revolutionary as possible. All the King's legal power is granted him by the States; if he surpasses it, it reverts to the States; questions of war, peace, taxes, &c., cannot be decided without them, &c. If we consider also the revolutionary organization of the city of Paris, divided into districts exactly as in 1792, governed by secret leaders which had already, on the day of the barricades, the 12th of May, made itself a fearful lever of democratic agitation, the similarity between this state of things and that of the great Revolution becomes very striking, and the distinction disappears that on the one occasion these things were demanded in the name of the Catholic Church, on the other were based upon the rights of man. This was the alarming situation in which Henry III. found himself when, as he saw no other mode of escape, he formed the desperate resolution of murdering the captains of the League, after he had tried in vain to conquer them.

The King had already discussed the plan of the murder with the most confidential members of his body guard, when Henry of Guise still felt quite secure, although he had been repeatedly warned. "He will not venture on it," he said, like Danton in a similar situation. He did not give the prince, whose insignificance no one knew better than himself, credit for power to carry out so heroic a plan. When, on the morning of the 23rd of December, 1588, he was going to the King, he was struck down in the same apartments where, sixteen years before, he had initiated the massacre. His brother Charles shared the same fate, and many of the most influential leaders of the party were imprisoned.

The King thought that with the leaders he had destroyed the party itself: this was a mistake. Civil war raged almost all over France, and in Paris there was complete anarchy. The Ligue des Seize—so the chief lodge of a number of clubs spread over France was called—seized the reins of government, put its creatures into every post, turned out all who opposed them, and tried the King by Parliament.

Helpless and forsaken, the King now fled to the camp of the Huguenots, sought protection from those whom he had been most consistent in opposing, and among whom there were many who hated him as the murderer of their nearest relations. Henry of Navarre suppressed all these feelings—a great proof of his power over the army. The King was greeted as a King. At the same time it was a perpetual embarrassment to the Huguenots to have this empty-headed, weak-minded creature in their camp. The fanaticism of the party of the Guises delivered them from it. One of the priests, who had daily heard it preached at Paris that it was meritorious to murder a tyrant—a Dominican, Jacob Clement—entered the camp and gave the King a fatal stab. A few hours after, Henry III. was a corpse, 2nd of August, 1589. The murder of the King, which had long been preached, was now put in practice. The new political doctrine of the Jesuits and the Council of Trent had passed through every stage, from producing mere demagogues and rebellion up to regicide; people knew now what might be expected from it.

## CHAPTER XXIX.

### HENRY IV., 1589-1610.

Character of Henry IV.—His Struggle for the Crown, 1789-93.—Dissolution of the Opposing Party.—Charles of Mayenne, the Parisian Demagogues, Plans of Philip II.—Henry's Conversion to Catholicism; Motives for and Consequences of this Step.—Henry's Administration, 1594-1610.—Peace of Vervins, May, 1598.—Edict of Nantes, 1598.—Sully's Administration.—Plan of a Great Protestant Alliance against Spanish Hapsburg.—Henry's Murder, by Ravaillac, May 14th, 1610.

### CHARACTER OF HENRY IV.

A NEW era now begins for France. According to law and usage, Henry of Navarre was undoubtedly king. The Bourbons were descended from the younger, the last of the Capets and the Valois from the elder sons of St. Louis; but the step from legal to acknowledged and actual possession was a long and difficult one.

Henry found confusion, dissolution, and civil war everywhere. At first he only possessed the smaller portion of his kingdom. His inheritance, Protestant Bearn, stood by him, as did also the Huguenot naval fortress of La Rochelle, the Cevennes, the faithful nobles in Dauphiné, Poitou, Saintonge, and the scattered Protestant communities in the south of France, and subsidies were granted him by the German Protestant princes. The country whose lawful ruler he was had to a great extent to be conquered, and when conquered would have to submit to an entirely new order of things, which would control disorder and license, and restore law and order.

Henry IV. was the child of this wild period of civil war, had grown up to manhood in camp, and amidst dangers and disputes.

His marriage had furnished the occasion for the massacre of St. Bartholomew. While his fellow-religionists were succumbing to the murderous accomplices of the Guises, he was compelled to abjure his faith in order to save his life. His heroic mother, Jeanne d'Albret, had died under suspicious circumstances; he had taken part in numerous conflicts, had been hardened by many reverses. At first he had only been tested as a brave soldier, and more than this he did not appear to be.

And yet he was the means of changing the aspect of France. The loyal sentiments of the nation were fixed upon him; a healthy patriotism, which had perished in the horrors of civil war and religious animosity, warmed up at the sight of him; and he was the man to bring about the needful change, and to give it the right direction. He was not one of those superior men who can call forth mighty creations out of chaos, and point out the course which shall be taken for a long time to come, and yet he was not far behind them.

He possessed to the full that happy talent of attracting all cognate elements to himself—of nullifying all that was inimical, of retaining the mastery in all the situations of life. This was a proof of unusual personal greatness, even if it cannot be said that he launched new and bold ideas into the world.

He was, above all things, a thorough soldier, as after his past history he could not fail to be. After the close of the great war two hundred actions were counted, besides the great battles in which he had been engaged, and almost always without receiving any injury. He had that happy and careless disregard of danger which is bred of the popular heroic spirit—which feels, and makes others feel, that he is under a propitious star. This always excites enthusiasm among a people so impressible as the French for military glory.

Still he was not only a soldier. Even while pursuing the bloody trade of war, he had retained a nobility of nature; the softer traits of a royal character had not been effaced by camp life. He not only knew how to plunge into the tumult of battle with his comrades and soldiers, or as a general to measure the distances over a wide expanse: he was also a simple, open-hearted, chivalrous man, who heartily enjoyed life, and had plenty of natural dexterity in

adapting himself to men—in detecting at a glance their strong and weak points.

The stories of the amiable private life of his youth are well known, so different from the coarse, selfish sensuality and bigotry of the last of the Valois. It was told how he caroused, joked, and laughed with his friends; one day gave himself up to love-making, the next kept up free, unrestrained intercourse with the people; greeted every one with royal and winning grace, sympathizingly inquired after the welfare of the humblest, gained men's favour more rapidly by a well-timed word and his ready wit than by the greatest victories on the battle-field.

Besides all this, he possessed a wonderful elasticity, could endure privations and fast with any one. Notwithstanding his sensuous temperament, he could rest upon the bare ground, share frost, heat, hunger, and thirst with the most insignificant of his soldiers, and yet be the first to face the enemy, the last to leave the field. He carried on the most various pursuits simultaneously and with equal zeal, and his perpetual love affairs and boundless excesses, which usually enfeeble the strongest, never crippled his energies. When he died, it was felt that a youthful, vigorous, richly-gifted life, teeming with health, was cut off in its midst. He knew nothing of weakness, illness, or those hypochondriacal fancies which were the curses of the last of the Valois. The only bitterness of which he was capable, now and then showed itself in transient humours, and a soldier-like contempt for human life. It may well be said that Henry IV. was a Frenchman *par excellence*; he exhibited the bright and dark sides of the national character completely; the frivolity and tendency to excess, the taste for martial glory, the indestructible light-mindedness and social virtuosity, the chivalry of sensuous life. It is obvious that such a personage was well adapted to revive the extinct loyalty of the nation.

Henry IV. also possessed grand royal traits of character. He may be called frivolous for being so entirely destitute of revenge, for forgiving and forgetting so easily, but it was an immense advantage to the people after a thirty years' civil war. How often it was suggested to him to revenge himself on a conquered foe, and how nobly he always rejected the proposal! The zealots of his own party, who could not forget the butchery of St. Bartholomew, and many

other things, might think it frivolous, but it was an unspeakable advantage for the restorer of the national kingdom. He came as the king of an ill-treated, betrayed, and fearfully irritated party; but, during his reign of twenty years he always appears as the king of the whole people, never as the successful leader of a party. The Bourbons of our days would have been on the throne still had they displayed these royal qualities.

He was a man of strong sensuality, but his mistresses never had any political influence over him, and amidst his countless love affairs he never forgot the duties imposed upon him by his proud and onerous calling; he was sufficiently well schooled in the grave business of life to give a higher place to men of merit than to women and their favour. The harsh and obstinate Sully often reproached him bitterly with his frivolity, and strenuously opposed him in great measures; the contest sometimes becomes so sharp that it would be no surprise if he dismissed his unamiable minister and devoted himself to women. But we know that no such purpose ever crossed his mind.

#### THE ELEVATION OF HENRY IV. TO THE THRONE.

The King's position was a very difficult one. His relations to the two parties who had been fighting for life or death were not yet clear. He was not a fanatic, like those about him. As the son of a zealous Calvinistic mother, he had been brought up as one of the Reformed party from childhood, but he had had to go through sundry metamorphoses. During the night of St. Bartholomew he was compelled to become a Catholic, and when free became again a Protestant. Thus he was able to look at things with a cooler head than the partisans around him. His interests were indeed connected with the Reformed party, but he was able to put its religious creed on and off like something external, which was afterwards of some importance to him.

Even before the helpless Henry III. had taken refuge in his camp, the leader of the Huguenots had put in a conciliatory word amidst the war of Catholic and Protestant Frenchmen.

Under date of 4th of March, 1589, he had issued an eloquent address to the States and all his countrymen, pro-

testing against the impatient spirit of the States at Blois, and he indicates peace between the creeds as the only method of healing the sick State. "Have pity, Frenchmen, on your fair country!" he had exclaimed; "cease to stain it with the blood of your own sons, to the scorn and malicious satisfaction of your enemies; desist from civil war and return to concord. I myself will give an example of conciliation. I will take under my protection all the party and persons of the Catholics, even their priests; for I know it is only by means of clemency, peace, and good example, that true piety can flourish, and distracted States can recover."

These views did honour to the patriot and the politician; but to cause them to take effect amidst fierce party spirit was a difficult and arduous task, as Henry experienced to the full. His first declaration, after the death of Henry III., was calculated to make both parties beholden to him. He declined to accept the suggestion that he should become a Catholic. A creed for which thousands of the lower classes had joyfully surrendered their lives, could not be lightly rejected by him who would be worthy of the crown of France. It might be done by a scoffer, one who had no religion at all, but such an one they did not wish for a king. On the other hand, he did not think that the creed in which he had been born and bred was free from errors; he would not close his ears against instruction on the subject, when the peers and office-bearers of the realm assembled around him, should they find an opportunity of discussing the question.

A compromise was then agreed on, according to which the King was to receive instruction in the Catholic religion, and was to protect the Catholics in their rights and dignities.

In thus giving the Catholics hopes that he was not inaccessible to capitulation, and showing the Protestants that he was not going lightly to abjure his faith, he wished to prevent the open outbreak of schism in his camp. Had he not done the first, the Catholic nobles would have at once forsaken him, and have probably strengthened the forces of the League. Nevertheless, his position was in the highest degree difficult. The strict Catholics did not conceal their mistrust; and the strict Huguenots, who regarded any approach to the Catholics as defection or treason, were deeply displeased. The fascination which he exercised



over them, the recollection of long companionship in arms, induced them to overlook it; but he could not prevent their uttering reproaches in his presence.

Thus there was a party for him whom he did not dare to offend, and had to treat with the greatest consideration; and another, more than half against him, who were only to be bought by concessions. There was at first no talk of royal authority, or of taxes, revenue, &c. He carried on the war with foreign heretical money, and strengthened his army with Swiss and German hirelings; in short, in spite of his undoubted legal claims to the throne, he was really only a pretender, who had, amidst a thousand dangers, to conquer his country and crown.

The great Powers of Europe, with the exception of England, only now becoming great, were against him; the Spanish Hapsburgs were against him; Philip II. declared at once that he did not acknowledge his rights; Rome, in a bull of September, 1585, declared him incompetent to reign; and the German Hapsburgs mostly went with their Spanish relations.

Not to despair in such a situation demanded the courage and elasticity of a man like Henry IV. His army was small, his means scanty; a great Power like Spain was opposed to him, whose most talented general, Alexander of Parma, was now entering France from the Netherlands; the League was in possession of Paris; only a very small part of the Catholic population was on his side; the adhesion of the Huguenots was but doubtful. It was a situation which no ordinary man could face without dismay.

But during these bitter days we never hear a word of despair or discouragement from Henry IV. On the contrary, he seems secure in the consciousness that he must conquer, and, in fact, so long as he reigned, his cause was not lost.

It was fortunate for him that his opponents were by no means united. Had Spain, the Guises, and the whole Catholic population united against him, a struggle must have ensued in which Henry IV. could not have been victorious.

In the first place, among the party of the Guises there was not a man to put in Henry's stead who would have ventured to aspire to the crown, and thereby to give the Revolution—for a revolution it was—a distinct programme.

The surviving brother of the Guises, Charles of Mayenne, was a brave soldier, but he wanted Henry's talents and adventurous ambition. He stood rather for the security of his brother's will, in order that the banner of the party of the League, whose born leader he was, should be upheld, than had courage to carry it out to its legitimate consequences; he did not venture to have himself proclaimed king, as his friends advised, so that king should stand face to face with king, but only took half measures, which turned to his adversary's advantage.

The legitimate right of Henry IV. was rejected; but as they wished to have an opposition king, if only a nominal one, they seized upon the only Catholic Bourbon, Henry's uncle, a man of sixty-seven years of age, who had never troubled himself about the government, and, as a cardinal, was quite unfit to play this part. He was proclaimed king as Charles X. The legitimacy which they wished to maintain was only apparent, and the hereditary right of the house whose next heirs were passed over was only confirmed.

The nephew took possession of the person of his uncle, and kept him in honourable imprisonment, but so that his adversaries could not get at him. The newly-proclaimed King was in the hands of his most dangerous rival. Then, within the party which had hitherto been united, divisions began to take place.

The frightful conspiracy of the Sixteen, who had now become all-powerful at Paris, had at first nothing in common with the League except its enemies; composed from the first of an undisciplined mob, and tending to general anarchy, the mobocracy, the terrorism of the demagogues, now prevailed to so unexampled an extent at Paris that it was no longer compatible with any tactics directed to great general ends. The Duke of Mayenne was a soldier, and felt the natural aversion of the camp to the wild doings of lawless crowds. He hated the barricading plan and the terrorism of the masses, and was soon of opinion, at the risk of incurring the deepest displeasure of the demagogues, that there was nothing for it but to hang up a few of the loudest of them to secure peace. Having subdued the mutineers in November, 1591, he put it in practice.

Thus in the midst of the party itself an opposition had arisen between the Legitimists of the camp and the Mo-

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narchists of the capital, and a variance had arisen among the heads of the coalition, which continually increased. Spain, Rome, and the Guises had hitherto held together; all three had expressed themselves strongly against Henry's right of succession; and since the book had appeared about the legitimacy of the Guises, it was supposed that the vacated throne was meant for them; but this appeared to be a mistake, so far as Philip II., the most powerful of the allies, was concerned.

Had it been the murdered Henry of Guise, perhaps Spain would have been accommodating, though she would not acknowledge Charles of Mayenne as king; but it was becoming continually more evident that she had an intention of reigning in France herself. Under the last of the Valois, Philip II. had exerted a powerful influence in French affairs. Spanish money and Spanish intrigues had constantly torn and kept open the wounds of the civil war. If France becomes Protestant, so said his spokesmen, the Netherlands and Spain itself will fall victims to heresy. Thus, after the death of Henry III., they justified increased interference in the internal affairs of France. Charles of Mayenne was advised with threats not to grasp at the crown. When Charles X. was proclaimed, it was said, the old cardinal cannot be king—let there be a regency; and the most natural regent would be Philip II. At length, in 1593, it was proposed to make Philip's daughter, the Infanta Clara Eugenia, regent. She was to marry an Austrian archduke, and France would be made an appanage of the house of Hapsburg.

This was with Philip the ambition of despair. He had failed in subduing the Netherlands; his attack upon England was defeated; his last shift was the crazy idea of gaining a firm footing in France—perhaps thence he could take up the other great schemes again.

With an almost bankrupt State, a shipwrecked fleet, and a decimated army, it was a desperate undertaking to try to make a Spanish province of a country whose people glowed with national feeling. Among all the forces which played a part in these complications, nothing helped Henry IV. so much as this Spanish attempt upon the independent existence of France. The simple consciousness that they were Frenchmen began to stir in the hearts of thousands, and overcame the dissensions of religious parties. Many an

honest man began to suspect the League, and perceived that their country was standing on the edge of a precipice. Among these was Villeroy, who began to vacillate, and whom Henry afterwards chose as his minister out of the very camp of the League. Even Charles of Mayenne began to listen to these considerations.

At Arques, 1589, and Ivry, 1590, Henry had obtained his first military successes over superior powers. But they had not helped him forward. On the 30th of August, 1590, he was obliged to raise the siege of Paris. The capital remained under the dominion of a mob, excited to madness by fanatical priests and unscrupulous demagogues; the greater part of his army, which he had with difficulty supported, escaped from him; the most important cities were in the hands of the enemy; the country was exhausted; and while the adversary received large sums from Spain, the small subsidies which he had received from England, Holland, and the little princes of Germany, were scarcely sufficient for the most necessary expenditure.

The dissensions which raged in the enemy's camp gave him time to breathe.

The attitude of the raging sect of the Sixteen in Paris soon amounted to open treason against the country. They already subscribed themselves to King Philip as "his Majesty's obedient servants;" but their terrorism became so fearful, that Mayenne himself had, at the end of 1591, to interfere with his military authority.

The King now received the first message from Mayenne, offering to come to terms on certain conditions. These could not be acceded to; but the attempt showed that the last of the Guises had had enough of the reign of madness in Paris, and the superciliousness of Spain had begun to make him anxious. The more wildly the terrorists behaved, the bolder was Philip with his projects. Individual defections followed; after 1591-2 one and another nobleman joined the King's cause; but with these isolated conquests it ended. All assured him that it had cost them great sacrifices, and the rest were not strong enough to make them so long as the King remained a heretic. The Diet, which met at Paris in January, 1593, and which the national Catholic party under Mayenne, and the Spanish party, hoped to turn to good account, led to nothing; or rather, the supercilious attitude of Feria, the Spanish ambassador, hastened the

breach between Mayenne and Philip, and confirmed the idea of entering into fresh negotiations.

These negotiations, which took place in April and May between the royalist and national Catholic party, convinced Henry that without becoming a Catholic he could not be King of France. He therefore gave the first definite promise on the subject.

Meanwhile, the negotiations between the Spanish commissioners and the Diet were openly carried on. Mayenne tried in vain to intrigue for himself; the Spaniards went abruptly to work at their purposes, tried to bring about the speedy election of a sovereign at any price, whether it were Philip, his daughter, or a prince of the house of Hapsburg. But the bolder they were, the stronger was the national disinclination to the Spaniards.

In July, 1593, Henry went over to Catholicism, and this upset all the machinations of the enemy.

The priests and the Papal Legate in vain declared that his conversion was a lie. Henry's adherents increased from day to day; the defection even reached the ranks of the zealous Leaguists; and when, in March, 1594, Henry surprised Paris, the power of the League was broken. In the course of the year, one city after another opened its gates to him; the Catholic nobility did homage to him in mass, and among them even Mayenne, Henry of Guise, Nevers, &c.

It was under these circumstances that the son of Jeanne d'Albret took a step which she would never have forgiven him.

It is not easy to excuse a man who changes his religion for external reasons; he can never be regarded as a model of strength of character who, for the sake of a crown, changes his creed like a garment. But it is certain that the crown was not to be had at any other price, that Henry had not the spirit of a martyr, and that his change of religion saved France from falling into an abyss.

It was not a time when a monarch whose creed was that of a minority could rule the land. Who can say how it would be to-day if a Calvinist tried to govern France! Few will say that it would be practicable even in our enlightened days, and no one that it was so in the sixteenth century. A frightful fratricidal war had been raging for thirty years, in which difference of creed caused men not to

shrink from the most cruel murders. In such a state of things there is no standpoint for a ruler so elevated that he can afford to overlook the creed of the majority, and ascend the throne as the representative of the minority. As a Huguenot, Henry could neither rule France then, nor ever. As a Catholic, three attempts to assassinate him had failed—the fourth succeeded, because the Catholic fanatics, the Jesuits, always regarded him as a secret heretic and an outlaw. What could he expect if he remained an avowed heretic?

There can be no doubt how a man whose convictions were all in all to him, ought to and would have acted; but such an one must not hanker after earthly crowns: he must remain within his sanctuary until his last breath. But Henry was not made for a martyr to his religious convictions; the lightness with which he regarded such things was connected with some noble qualities in which most of the uncompromising Huguenots were wanting. The magnanimous toleration which a monarch in such circumstances must consider as one of his most sacred duties, and which Henry IV. really did practise, belonged to them as little as to their adversaries. Even though it may be looked upon as frivolity, it will not be disputed that it was an unspeakable benefit to France, and saved her from an ignominious foreign rule and endless sanguinary convulsions.

There was no other means of securing to France the peace which she so urgently needed, if she was not to be torn in pieces; and this Henry clearly saw. It was not mere idle ambition—not the idea that, clothed in the purple, he could dispense with religion—but the consciousness of his mission to give the peace to France which all his predecessors had denied her. This appeared to him as his vocation. Before fortune had smiled upon him, he declared it to be his best title; and the reasonable critic must take this into account.

Thus, in the summer of 1593, as the Catholic party were unyielding, he resolved to take the step which he had hitherto declined.

His motives were certainly entirely political; and those who attempted his life were not altogether wrong in saying that he was secretly a heretic. Only priestly absurdity could expect him to give up affection for his old party, and devotion to their cause. But if steps like these are judged



by their results, no greater triumph than this can be imagined.

When he went over to Catholicism, the opposing party was broken up—France was conquered. It was now not only isolated renegade Catholic noblemen who came to him, not concealing how difficult the step was, but the whole nation: the cities, the leaders of the native aristocracy came also, and in a frame of mind which showed how joyfully they submitted to a king who was not the mortal enemy of their Church. During the following spring the capital was occupied almost in sport; Paris submitted to him almost without a blow.

How was it now with the Huguenots? They were his army and his party. Now that he had forsaken them, did they not also forsake him?

It is a striking testimony to the commanding character of the man, and his power of attracting men to himself, that this was not the case. There was indeed some vacillation; the party was discontented, and complained openly and secretly that the cause for which so much blood had been shed was lost. But none of them deserted him; he was still their Henry of Navarre, who had fought with them for twenty years; it was among them that he had grown up into a knight without fear and without reproach; he had shared with them distress, privation, danger, and victory; they could trust him as they could trust themselves when he said that he would be a King for Catholics and Protestants alike.

#### GOVERNMENT OF HENRY IV., 1594-1610.

The kingdom which Henry IV. now entered upon was in a state which it is difficult to describe; the task of closing the chasm which had been yawning in this country for a generation demanded unusual powers.

The diminution of population was reckoned, even in 1580, at 700,000 men, and since that time at double that number; the loss was of those in the prime of life, and was only equalled in the Napoleon wars. There was no longer anything like order, morality, or security; there was poverty and devastation everywhere, and most of all in the country; there was no longer any trace of taxation, law, order, or government; a wild banditti life, the scourge of such times.



flourished for years upon every highway ; and what sort of seed had been sown in the minds of the educated classes, by the civil war, was shown by the attempts to assassinate the King, which were avowedly the result of Jesuitical intrigues. The efficiency of the new government was shown by a variety of rapid results ; if the civil war was calculated to dissolve all the elements of political life, its bleeding wounds were now healed in an incredibly short time.

The first thing was to restore peace with foreign powers, and to settle accounts with Spain.

War was declared with her in January, 1595. It was inevitable, partly for honour's sake, partly because Spain still occupied large portions of the country, and the contumacious nobles were supported by the Spanish troops. When the superiority of Spain as a military power is considered, and the exhaustion of France, it must be allowed that Henry, who depended upon aid from England and the Netherlands, carried on the war pretty successfully. It was Philip's last war, and the result was the same as in all the others—he had to renounce all of which he thought himself secure, and, after enormous sacrifices, to acknowledge that his enemy was victor. The Peace, after he had been beaten at all points, put the seal upon Philip's reign ; he had lived in vain.

The Peace of Vervins, 2nd of May, 1598, confirmed that of Cateau Cambrasis : both parties gave up their conquests, and France regained those made by the Duke of Savoy. Peace was also made with the Pope.

Rome had, not without some shame, to retrace all the disgraceful steps which she had publicly taken. Any further explanation than that the King had returned to the Catholic Church was refused ; he could not even be prevented from promising to acknowledge both religions.

No French king had ever yet settled matters with Rome like the converted heretic whom Rome had repeatedly declared to be for ever disqualified from reigning.

France was at length freed from the foreign troops and foreign intrigues by which she had been tormented ever since 1562 ; the foundations were laid of an orderly internal administration.

The most important step in this direction was the Edict of Nantes, by which Henry made peace with the Hugue-

nots. This law granted greater toleration than any other in the sixteenth century. It conceded too much rather than too little, not of religious liberty, but of political privilege. Not that the Huguenots abused it, but it was a reproach to them; it gave a handle to the assertion that they formed a State within the State, were an obstacle to complete national unity; and it was this point in the Edict which was afterwards attacked.

During the last few years, the Reformers, who could not forget the King's defection, and thought that all their sacrifices were repaid with ingratitude, had been perpetually plying him with their grievances; various negotiations were entered into, until at last, on 13th of April, 1598, the celebrated Edict was signed at Nantes, in the secret articles of which, as well as in the Brevets, their religious and civil position was defined.\*

In religion, liberty of conscience was granted them. All nobles possessing superior jurisdiction were allowed to teach Calvinism, and every one might share their teaching. Nobles without this jurisdiction were granted the same privilege, and might admit a number of persons to their services, unless they lived in places where the jurisdiction belonged to Catholic nobles. In all towns and villages where Calvinistic service had been held up to August, 1597, it was permitted to be continued or restored. For all those whose dwellings were scattered, a place was appointed in a suburb or village where service might be held. Paris and a number of other cities were excepted; no Reformed service was allowed in them. In other places they were permitted to possess church bells, schools, &c., but the Catholic religion was supreme; the Reformers had to observe the fête days, and pay tithes to the Catholic clergy. But they might levy a church tax upon themselves to defray their own expenses, and receive an annual stipend of 45,000 dollars. 1597

As to civil rights, the obligations and privileges of the Protestants were the same as those of the Catholics, and they had equal claims to imperial offices and dignities. There was a Court of Justice in Paris (*Chambre de l'Edit*), for Normandy and Brittany; at Castres, for the district of Toulouse; at Bordeaux and Grenoble, *Chambres mi-parties*, before which Protestants from Provence and Burgundy

\* Weber, *Geschichte des Calvinismus*.

were summoned. There was also an inferior tribunal for recusancy ; the previous unjust sentences were reversed, the exiles recalled. They were to retain for eight years all the fortresses which had belonged to them before 1597, with all their military stores. They either had their own governors and administration like La Rochelle, Montauban, and Nismes, or were garrisoned, and the governors appointed by the Reformers.

This was a well-meant provision ; for eight years at least the Huguenots were secure against reverses. If the King was murdered, there was a pledge that they would still be tolerated. But this state of things continued beyond the appointed time ; it was, in fact, recognised as a perpetual right, and whatever may be thought of the principle, it was in the highest degree inimical to the tendency of the French nation to absolute unity and uniformity.

Richelieu afterwards reaped the consequences of this danger. With all this, a wise and energetic administration went hand in hand, the soul of which was Sully, Maximilian de Bethune, Marquis de Rosny.

A Huguenot nobleman, knocked about and hardened from his youth upwards in the wars of religion ; a genuine Calvinist, harsh, unapproachable, incorruptible, stiff and obstinate ; like Henry himself, a brave cavalier, but unlike him in his conscientiousness, and the puritanical strictness of his character, he was a type of the Genevan school, as it was found among the best of the French nobility.

His relations with the State and the King were those of a proud landed noble, who regarded himself as the ruler of his own domain. According to his ideas he conferred an honour on the State by serving it, and he did not serve it for gain. When he was once guilty of a breach of discipline, he defiantly addressed the King with the words, "I am neither your subject nor your vassal ;" and he wrote to Mary of Medici, that he did not court office ; France might be proud to have him for minister.

Distinguished as a soldier, statesman, and financier, he knew how to rule the State as well as his own house. He undertook the office of Minister of the Interior, of Justice, War, and Finance.

France has had administrations which were as able as that of Sully, but none so independent and irreproachable.

It was necessary to undertake a reorganization on a large

scale ; a new administration, from the lowest step upwards. It was for this reason that he kept a number of ministerial offices in his own hands ; with the exception of foreign affairs, he was chief of all the departments. From the laying out of new roads, and establishing security of intercourse in town and country, to the highest questions of administration and finance, the State had to be reconstructed and reformed, and Sully accomplished it all with the strict conscientiousness and untiring energy which were peculiar to him.

There were really no revenues. Enormous taxes, which were an oppressive burden almost up to the time of the revolution, were already the scourge of France ; they were ruinous, yet brought no money to the State, for it was all swallowed up in bad administration. All that the State had power over, had gone to ruin ; the crown lands were recklessly given away, or sold for ridiculous prices ; patents of nobility were already sold, immunity from taxes and other important privileges were connected with them, though they were sold so cheap. By this means the number of taxpayers was so decreased as to bring France to the verge of bankruptcy.

The finances were in indescribable confusion. The debt of France was enormous ; Sully reckoned it at 345,000,000 livres, which, taking into account the relative value of money and the revenues of the State, was more than it has ever been since. It did not appear how even the interest of this sum was to be obtained. The administration was as reckless as it was possible for it to be. The names of those to whom no crown lands could be given were inscribed in the great debtors' book of France ; they became the creditors of the State, the State their debtors.

It was impossible to help France but by severe measures, which were inimical to many personal interests. These could only be adopted by a man, the purity of whose character disarmed calumny, who had never been suspected of enriching himself at the expense of the State and its usufructuaries.

Sully could venture to plunge into the chaos of these finances, to lessen the burden of debt by searching into the legal claims of the creditors and mercilessly setting aside all that were illegal. He put a stop to the squandering of crown lands, demanded the restoration of those that had

been illegally appropriated, revised the patents of nobility and partially abolished them, and reformed the worst abuses of the system of tax-farming.

Many individuals suffered severely, but, on the whole, what was necessary was also just. Nine possessors of crown lands out of ten had no right to them; nine out of ten had long ago been compensated for the price paid for their patents of nobility, and were now in the comfortable enjoyment of rich, undeserved revenues.

In this manner Sully again created a treasury by regaining the crown lands; he diminished the debts and privileges to a surprising extent, and restored things to the state in which they were before the time of the last of the Valois.

A frightful abuse had crept into the Government itself. Francis I. had foolishly increased the evil which prevailed during the ancient monarchy, of causing a rapid accession of income by the sale of public offices; the evil was great enough of itself, and, as it was now carried on, it made a reasonable and just administration simply impossible. Offices became private property, the tenure of them a benefice, the officials themselves a caste with whom no one could interfere, and over whom there was no control. New places were always being created, because money was raised by it, so that a superfluity of offices arose which became a permanent burden on the people, and diminished the prosperity of the nation to two or three times the extent of the advantage.

Sully abolished a number of these places; it was a severe blow to many, but, on the whole, nothing was lost by it but the enjoyment of a great abuse.

All this occupied but a decade. It would only have been possible to a man like Sully, who could daily remind the King and country, in his proud, harsh manner, that it was he who was making the greatest sacrifices for the State, and that if he laid down his office that very day, the State would have more to complain of than he. When he afterwards found difficulties under the regency, he really did throw his portfolio at the feet of the Queen.

An administration like this is rare anywhere, but especially in France, where the idea early arose of looking upon the State as a provision for the nobles, clergy, and officials.

Henry's relation with Sully is one of the great traits of his character. He quite agreed in the leading ideas of Sully's policy; even adopted the rigid economy urged by his minister, which was so little in accordance with his taste, and he must often have heard himself blamed as miserly. Differences, however, were often apparent enough in the carrying out of his projects. Henry would not always yield to the rigid moralist, and we now and then see an attempt by the court to thwart his purposes, but when it came to a contest, Sully always prevailed.

France now began to flourish greatly.

Sully was not only the "Minister of Agriculture," whose only idea was the cultivation of the soil, he considered this branch of industry in its connection with the State, and was the first who expressed the idea that if agriculture was to have its rights, of which it was deprived till the revolution, and only obtained by its means, the notorious land tax must be abolished. The first rational encouragement of trade also dates from his labours, and of those branches of industry, such as silk culture, which afterwards flourished for centuries in France. When the time for the great progress of commerce and navigation came, the man also appeared who built upon the foundations so successfully laid by Sully.

The State now again possessed the elements necessary to internal and external prosperity: funds, a regular income, crown lands, law and justice, trade, commerce, work, and intercourse. The condition of the masses was better than it had been since the times of Francis I. Civil war had ceased; lasting peace was secured between the creeds; peace was made with Spain and Rome on honourable terms; every branch of peaceful industry flourished with an energy proportionate to the time during which it had been deprived of protection and security.

Such a government, continued from ten to twenty years, would have created a power for France such as she afterwards attained under Louis XIV., for even now no other ancient monarchy of the Continent, not even Spain nor Austria, could compete with her. But fate had decreed otherwise. Henry IV. and Sully were called away before their time; the former in the prime of manhood, the latter not long after him. Instead of a vigorous pursuance of the paths that had been entered upon came all the



weaknesses of a feminine regency; still, the previous government was not without result.

The threads of it were taken up by Richelieu, and he carried the formation of the absolute monarchy, begun by Sully, to the acme of its greatness.

As a Calvinist, Sully was not an adherent of this form of government, but circumstances made such a dictatorship inevitable. At first, notables and commissions were assembled, but such a chaos arose that it was a decided advantage when the dictatorship prevailed without taking account of individual opinion. Under Henry IV., States and notables gradually disappear.

The tendency of Henry's foreign policy was sharply defined. Various elements and opinions were found among his ministry. Besides Sully, there was Villeroy, who struggled for the party of the League to the last, and, with the rest of his party, maintained the opinion that France must enter into a Catholic alliance with Spain and Rome to ward off innovations. Henry and Sully, on the contrary, were decidedly for a great Protestant League, not because, as the Jesuits said, he was still a Huguenot at heart, but because he felt himself so completely the King of France.

Shortly before his fall, Coligny had advised Charles IX. to reconcile parties, and, with the united power of both, to inaugurate a national policy against Spain and the Hapsburgs. It was with this idea that the Huguenot had entered upon the inheritance of Francis I. It certainly was a national policy, and was followed up by Richelieu and Louis XIV., the Revolution and Napoleon I. The realisation of the "Christian European Republic" of Henry IV. would have made France, consolidated within her natural boundaries, the centre of European politics.

Richelieu did afterwards realise this, and he was not a converted Huguenot, but a cardinal of the Romish Church. He used the Protestant alliance as a lever to extend the boundaries of France, and this was precisely what was intended by Henry IV. when he entered into alliance with England and the Netherlands, the sworn enemies of Spain. These were allies who would not oppose him if he seized upon the duchy of Lorraine, and other valuable border lands. It appears to me that this was as truly a French policy as any other, and yet nothing excited so much enmity against him as this.



The negotiations and good understanding with the Reformers in the Palatinate, Hesse, England, and the Netherlands, the obvious scheme of isolating and then destroying the house of Hapsburg, the stronghold of the ancient faith, appeared to the Catholic zealots to be a convincing proof that Henry was still secretly a heretic; although he went to mass, and performed other external acts, still he must be at heart the enemy of their faith, for he was the enemy of both its bulwarks, Spain and Austria.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, things had taken such a course in Germany that a most favourable opportunity presented itself for an energetic policy, with command of men and money, for making conquests on the eastern frontier of France.

The intestine quarrels which were raging there were very favourable to foreign interference. The dispute about the succession in Juliers-Cleves furnished an excellent pretext for it, and Henry intended to take advantage of it to protect the right in Germany and to oppose the supremacy of the Hapsburgs. As things were, in 1609-10 the great conflagration seemed to be smouldering which afterwards broke out. Henry was preparing to crush the power of Spain and the Hapsburgs, when, just as he was about to join the army, he was struck by Ravaillac's fatal blow, on the 14th of May, 1610.

So far as we know, the assassin was an isolated fanatic, who, like many others, believed that Henry was still a heretic.

Much has been brought forward to prove that a deeply-laid plot existed; and it is remarkable that a report had been spread abroad in the world that Henry would die a violent death.

That they triumphed over the heretic's death at Rome and Madrid, only proves how low the political conscience there had sunk, not that they were in league with the assassin. The immediate consequences of the murder were most disastrous. It threw France back into confusion and convulsions for fifteen years, and lamed the arm of her foreign policy for half a lifetime, and until Richelieu gained a firm footing. But when this was over, the beginning made by Henry IV. was continued and completed. The murder effected nothing but delay.

## PART VII.

### THE GERMAN EMPIRE, FROM THE PEACE OF AUGSBURG TO THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR, 1555-1618.

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#### CHAPTER XXX.

##### GENERAL SITUATION OF GERMANY\* AFTER 1555.

Impotence of the Empire.—Continuance of the Contest of the Creeds.

GERMANY, of all the nations of the Continent, had passed through, most thoroughly, from its very beginning, that great mental, moral, vital process which we call the Reformation.

The breach with the ancient Church, in other lands the work of monarchical ambition and political calculation, was in Germany the act of the nation itself, and an act so decisive that even some of its adversaries were carried along with it, and Charles V. had to strike sail before it. The great political calculator learnt what he did not know before—the power in history of the moral idea, which is shown by the fact that even the greatest minds cannot set it at defiance. A far greater than he made the experiment once again, and was crushed in the attempt. The weakest man in the ranks of a party, for whose cause he is ready to die, has more weight than all these realistic great ones, who accomplish nothing, because they believe in nothing.

\* Besides the before-mentioned literature: Londorp, *Continuatio Sleidani*. Francof. 1619. Schard, *Epitome rer-gest.* in dessen op. hist. Buchholz, *Geschichte Ferdinands I.* Vienna, 1835. Anton, *Geschichte der Concordienformel*. 1779. Hurter, *Ferd. II.*, 1854-59. Hammer v. Klesel's *Leben*. 1851. Kluckhohn, *Briefwechsel des Kurfürsten Friedrichs III. des Frommen, von der Pfalz. I.* 1559-66-67.

The Reformation did not deprive Germany of its unity. We had, even then, none to lose; but that an opportunity was lost, never to recur, of securing national unity with the reform of the Church, was the fault of those who perhaps might have secured it, but did not comprehend the situation, and wearied themselves in fruitless struggles against the spirit of the age.

With the deep rent which took place in the nation, in consequence of the imperial attitude, a time of increasing national misery begins; but it was also a time of quiet preparation for those soaring mental flights upon which the pride of our modern culture rests, and which could not be attained at a lower price.

The nations which have not passed through this process of inward renovation, or which have been brought through it by force, have to lament it to this day; it almost seems as if some were for ever lamed by it.

The religious Peace of 1555 had at length given German Lutheranism a legal existence, but it had not created a lasting peace; indeed, it gave rise to almost as many new feuds as it healed old ones. The victory of the principalities over the imperial power was far more decisive, for, after Charles's last unsuccessful onslaught, it was completely subdued. The empire was more than ever destitute of an uniting centre, which was all the more unfortunate because, though it could not be said that things were much changed in Germany, they were all the more changed abroad.

The constitution of the German empire, or rather the union of States in Germany, whose relations it controlled, had long before, in fact, lost its monarchical unity, and yet the imperial territory had not experienced great or important losses in the course of the last century, for the neighbouring States were not in a position to extend themselves at its expense. It was this circumstance which saved Germany from great losses during the dismal period of the interregnum, and from Rudolph I. to Maximilian I., otherwise I know not what there was under Wenceslaus or Frederic III. to prevent the neighbours from plundering Germany.

But now all this was changed. If up to the time of the Reformation Germany had been surrounded by weak nations, now several powerful States were on her frontiers. A strong monarchical power had arisen in the Scandinavian States;

the same had begun to arise in France under Francis I., and, after thirty years of confusion, was completed under Henry IV. On the north and west the situation of Germany was different from what it had been for centuries. (No one had before imagined that Denmark or Sweden could be dangerous to the German countries on the Baltic, or that France might possess herself of the Western provinces. But all these dangers were now at hand, and the neighbours' temptation was great in proportion as Germany's power of resistance was small.

It was now that the first great losses of German territory occurred. Much of the kingdom of Arrelate had been lost before; but these were possessions which it was difficult to maintain. Now, however, important territories, Curland, Livonia, and Esthonia, were first lost, and the Burgundian provinces estranged. When Spain began the war against the religious and political liberties of the Netherlands, the empire was not in a position to enforce its old claims. How often did the Netherlands pray that the ancient imperial power might be asserted! how earnestly did the Orange party pray for protection against Spain! But the German Hapsburgs approved the policy of their Spanish relatives, and the German empire was thinking of nothing but the conversion of the heretics. All great political questions were obscured by those relating to religious creeds; the loss of the countries on the Baltic, of the Netherlands, even of the three bishoprics of Lorraine, occupied very little of the attention of the Diet. The disputes about the interpretation of the Peace of Augsburg, and the ecclesiastical reserves, took up nearly the whole of its time.

To these symptoms of increasing external weakness were added numerous causes of endless internal disputes which immediately conduced to the catastrophe.

The Peace of 1555 was incomplete. It contained dubious and obscure clauses enough; and had there been fewer, that peaceable, conciliatory spirit was wanting on both sides without which no union could be effectual. The Peace granted toleration to the adherents of the Augsburg Confession only, not to the other Reformers; and yet the number of them was considerable. It gave rulers, but not subjects, a claim to toleration, which was the occasion of great difficulties, and the great question about benefices and dignities,

and the subjects of converted ecclesiastics, was treated in a clause of secondary legal authority.

During the time when both parties should have been accommodating themselves to this imperfect Peace, occurred the restoration of the Catholic Church, the Council of Trent, the establishment of the order of Jesuits, the restoration of the Inquisition, and the censorship of the press. The party which was defeated at Passau and Augsburg saw a powerful support growing up for it on the other side of the Alps, and thus that which might have made the situation tolerable, the honest desire to agree as well as might be, was wanting. Neither party had given up the idea of upsetting the peace : the Protestants, of throwing overboard the ecclesiastical restrictions and the principle of exclusion ; the Catholics, of tearing up the whole treaty, in order to bring about a complete restoration.

During the third and fourth decades there had been no idea of any such schemes ; but now courage for them was restored. Popes like Paul IV., kings like Philip II., openly said that heresy must be extirpated from the face of the earth, and the unity of the Church in the old mediæval sense restored. Very little more is required to stir up a religious war than the fact that both parties chafe against union ; all that is wanted is a spark to ignite the flame. This idea gave rise to the singular proposition of 1648, that both parties were bound not to regard the peace with disfavour, lest they should experience another fearful civil war. It was the fault of both parties that the peace did not last.

An undisturbed peace was hardly to be looked for ; the odious conflict was still too fresh in the remembrance of both parties ; the idea of toleration, of the peaceful existence of differing creeds side by side, was essentially foreign to the age ; it did not even exist among the new sects for each other ; the passions evoked by the long strife were too fierce ; each side was too firmly convinced that it was its mission to convert the other ; the Catholics were too much engrossed with the idea of the supremacy of their Church, the adherents of the new doctrines too much possessed with that zeal for conversion which belongs to young creeds, for any opinion to gain ground that it was better to have an imperfect peace than open war.

Thus both parties vied with each other in preventing men's minds from settling down, partly because the irritation

of the barely reconciled dissensions was still too great, partly because actual interests suffered in this perpetual state of warfare, and the provisions of the treaty were not sufficient to solve complicated questions. The Protestants, split up into different churches and sects, could not proclaim this with so much emphasis as Roman Catholicism, as it was restored at Trent, whose apostles, the Jesuits, openly preached a crusade against the heretics; but the Protestants had as little conciliatory resignation as their adversaries.

Wars of religion were blazing up around Germany, and sparks flew over and ignited the smouldering flame. In France the conflict was raging between the Guises and the Huguenots; in the Netherlands the Protestants were struggling with Alba and his successors. German princes were in connection with both camps. Similar events afterwards took place in England; a reaction on the position of both parties in Germany was inevitable.

To add to this, it happened that during the sixth and seventh decades of the century the conflict of the two great floods, Reformation and Restoration, the Confession of Augsburg and the dogmas of Trent, found a theatre upon German soil. (Until then Protestantism was in the ascendant, inasmuch as it had done what the Catholic Church had so long neglected to do: it had, with surprising success, possessed itself of the whole of intellectual life, of literature, of the modern Humanistic culture, and of education.) The most distinguished names in every branch of learning and authorship were Protestant in greatly preponderating numbers; and their public was almost the whole intellectual aristocracy of the nation.

After the sixth and seventh decades a sort of reaction took place. Jesuitism, in accordance with its principles, began to employ modern weapons in a manner totally different from the monastic orders, who at last were ignorant of the world and of learning.

Jesuitism was not wanting in talent, learning, or skilful dialectics, and, thus equipped, it appeared upon the arena to defeat the adversary with its own weapons.

This contest was the prelude to the Thirty Years' War.

## CHAPTER XXXI.

### PROTESTANTISM IN AUSTRIA.

**Ferdinand I.**, 1558-64. — **Maximilian II.**, 1564-76. — **Rudolph II.**, 1576-1612. — The Bohemian Royal Charter (*Majestätsbrief*), 1609. — Duke Maximilian of Bavaria and the Imperial City of Donauwörth, 1606-7. — The Protestant Union, 1608, and the Catholic League, 1609. — Matthias, 1612-19.

**FERDINAND I.**, 1558-64. — **MAXIMILIAN II.**, 1564-76. — **RUDOLPH II.**, 1576-1612.

**M**EANWHILE a country had been attacked by Protestantism which had hitherto been free from it—the hereditary Austrian dominions—and within a short period it was embraced by a great majority of the inhabitants.

It came to pass in this way:—Since the time of Ferdinand I., the determined and energetic opposition to Protestantism had been discontinued. Deeply affected, as may be imagined, by the fate of his brother, Ferdinand began to entertain doubts of the wisdom of the attitude he had hitherto assumed. Formerly one of the hotspurs in persecuting the heretics, he had now almost broken with Rome, and expressed himself more emphatically than any of the German princes against the introduction of the decrees of the Council of Trent. The misunderstanding with Rome made him more lenient towards the heretics, the decided exclusion of the new doctrines from the country ceased, and so Protestantism began to make its way into Austria, and to unite itself with all the elements, national and political, of this diversified empire.

He was succeeded in 1564 by Maximilian II., elected King of Rome in 1562, who, in fact, was above party spirit, disapproved of the abuses of the ancient church, and considered the divisions of the Protestants about trifles highly absurd. He equally disapproved of the intolerance of both



parties, and was therefore looked upon by the Protestants as a Jesuit, by the Catholics as a secret heretic.

It was unfortunate for him that he lived at a time when there was no appreciation of his tolerant spirit and lofty views. His proceedings in Austria showed that he earnestly desired toleration; he allowed the landowning nobility to permit the preaching of both the new and old doctrines on their estates.

This was the first breach with the old system in Austria, a toleration of both forms. The Emperor's idea seemed to be, Fight out your quarrel with each other; both shall have light and space. For the planting of Protestantism it was really a great step. Between 1564 and 1576 the new doctrines spread over nearly the whole of Austria, not only in the great cities, but also in the country. Catholicism was renounced by the peasantry, and the German nobles, almost without exception, had embraced Protestantism. We know, from his own expressions, that in Styria Ferdinand II. celebrated the communion according to Catholic usage with but few others, and that in Grätz and the neighbourhood Protestantism was quite in the majority. In Bohemia it was based on old Hussite memories. Bohemian historians have told us how all forms of non-Catholicism were spread in Bohemia and Moravia. The Tyrol alone remained the unassailed fortress of Catholicism; the small number of towns, the want of contact with the outer world, the predominating peasant character of the population, with but few nobles or superior clergy, its being surrounded with ecclesiastical principalities, caused the Tyrol to remain almost exclusively true to the old faith.

Rudolph II.\* was entirely unlike the previous Hapsburgs. Brought up in Spain, and endowed with a strong tendency to the Spanish melancholy, which from this time ran in the blood of a part of the house of Hapsburg, and in his case, after 1600, led to attacks of real mental disease, he became the tool of women and Jesuits. His character was an unhappy mixture of self-will, passion, weakness, sensuality, and, when his rage was spent, abject subjection to others. He was incapable of doing any lasting good, and was just the man to occasion unspeakable confusion.

Under him, the Jesuits, who had hitherto been only

\* Gindely, Rudolph II. Also his *Geschichte des Böhmisches Majestätsbriefes*. 1858.

tolerated, came into power. They got possession of his ear and conscience, were his confessors, directors, and ministers.

During the greater part of his life Rudolph lived in retirement at Prague, mostly occupied with learned fancies. Now and then breaking out into unbridled excesses, then repenting like a child, and submitting to his Jesuit confessors; one day interfering with tyrannical temper, the next broken-spirited, dejected, and apathetic; his was a character well adapted to set a ferment going which should shake the empire to its depths. At first Protestantism made all the more progress during these contradictory tactics.

The Emperor's incompetence to rule soon led to real difficulties, which the States could only get over by formally entrusting the guidance of business to Matthias, Rudolph's brother, in April, 1606. To secure some support against the Emperor's revenge, the Regent felt himself obliged to make great concessions to the Austrian Protestants, and especially to grant liberty of religious worship to the burgher class.

This example spread. Even under the clement Maximilian the Bohemians had only enjoyed limited religious liberty. They now extorted from the weak Emperor the most liberal religious edict issued in the seventeenth century. This was the Bohemian Royal Charter (*Majestätsbrief*) of 11th July, 1609, which contained the following regulations:—

All adherents, *without exception*, of the Confession delivered to the Emperor Maximilian in 1575, the associated States, lords, nobles, the city of Prague, the mining and other towns, are granted complete liberty in the exercise of their religion in every place; they will not be interfered with in their faith, religion, priesthood, or Church order, until there is an entirely uniform religion in the Holy Empire. The government of the Protestant churches is to be in the hands of a special consistory at Prague; they are to be protected by their own advocates, to be nominated by the Protestants, as are also the officers in the universities; the appointments are merely to be confirmed by the Emperor, but no instructions are to be received from him. The erection of new churches and schools is freely permitted to every Protestant community in town and country, as well as to every one in the States. No one, not even the Emperor, has any right to interfere with these liberties; any proceedings against them are null and void. Disputes are to be

adjusted by a court of umpires, composed of parties from both sides, not of imperial officials.

In the following month a similar charter was granted to the Silesians, only that it was still more expressly stated that all and every inhabitant of the country, whether the subjects of temporal or spiritual rulers, should have free permission to enjoy their own religious worship.

The effect produced by the religious strife in a diversified imperial body was different from what it would have been in the simple relations of a national State. There was very little feeling of a united Austrian existence in the separate dependencies; the misgovernment of Rudolph II. was not calculated to produce it, and the religious discord re-awakened the slumbering national and political differences. In Bohemia the idea was never far distant of again electing a sovereign for itself; in Moravia and Silesia tendencies to separation were becoming evident. Hungary also was uneasy; even in the German hereditary dominions the Hapsburg dynasty never enjoyed so little popularity as during the last quarter of a century; the monarchy was altogether out of joint, and was threatened with dissolution.

Meanwhile parties had become more sharply opposed to each other. The race of the more clement German princes had died out; the sectarian spirit in both camps had greatly increased and had inflamed men's passions. The Jesuits had made two great conquests in Ferdinand of Styria and Maximilian of Bavaria, and this hastened the crisis.

But little more than the existing hatred and discontent was required to bring about a sanguinary conflict, and during the early years of the seventeenth century the cause was to arise in Germany as well as in the Austrian hereditary States.

**DUKE MAXIMILIAN OF BAVARIA AND THE IMPERIAL CITY OF DONAUWÖRTH,\* 1606-7.—THE UNION, 1608, AND THE LEAGUE, 1609.—DEATH OF RUDOLPH II.—MATTHIAS, 1612-19.**

Among the numerous infringements of the Peace of Augsburg, the most dangerous and malicious was that which occurred in the imperial city of Donauwörth in 1606-7.

\* Lossen, *Die Reichstadt Donauwörth und Herzog Maximilian*. Munich, 1866. Cornelius, *Zur Geschichte der Grundung der Liga*. *Historisches Jahrbuch*, 1865. Ritter, *Geschichte der Union*, 1868.

Donauwörth was a Lutheran imperial city, in which, after the end of the sixteenth century, no Roman Catholic was admitted as a citizen. It had a Catholic monastery, which was tolerated on the express condition that no procession with banners should be allowed within the city.

The abbot and his monks found this inconvenient, and disobeyed the order several times. The council warned them in vain, and when, in April, 1606, a solemn procession with banners again proceeded through the city, the rabble fell upon them with clubs and drove them back into the monastery.

Many scenes of this sort had happened in the empire, and some more glaring than this, but they resulted in nothing but a vast amount of scribbling, quarrelling, and complaining. But this time it was otherwise.

Duke Maximilian of Bavaria interfered in the matter, first on his own account, and then armed with an imperial execution. He was a fanatical pupil of the Jesuits, who at the beginning of his reign had taken vigorous proceedings against the heretics, and the Lutheran city had long been a thorn in his side. As his first interference produced no effect, he turned to the imperial court of Prague, where, according to credible testimony, everything was to be done with money; even the tardy imperial justice overcome.

With astonishing rapidity, in August, 1607, an imperial mandate of execution appeared, which Duke Maximilian was empowered to enforce.

With an army outnumbering the population of the city by two thousand, he feared intervention from the Protestant States, especially from the Elector Palatine—he advanced to the city, took it without a blow, and began, with those means so dear to religious reaction, to convert it to Catholicism. At first all that they desired was a place where the Catholic officials and soldiers might attend service; then to possess half the churches, then all of them, and when that was refused they quartered soldiers on the faithful inhabitants until they should be convinced of the truth of the Romish faith.

The blow struck by the Duke against the imperial Swabian city in the midst of peace, made an immense sensation. It was illegal to proceed with the execution of the imperial ban, for the electors had not been consulted; and it was an open offence to the Protestant States to com-

mit it to a prince who did not belong to Swabia, to say nothing of the military importance of the city as a pass of the Danube and a frontier town between Swabia, Bavaria, and Franconia.

The Protestant States of South Germany, the Electoral Palatinate, Würtemberg and Neuburg at their head, agreed to maintain a united attitude at the next Diet. There it came to a violent dispute and complete division. Duke Maximilian revealed continually more openly that he cared less about the affair at Donauwörth as a victory of the good cause, than as a conquest of the country and people. The violent acts of Ferdinand against the Protestants in Styria did all they could to increase the excitement; so on May 4th, 1608, a union of a number of Protestant princes took place for mutual protection against further infringements of the constitution.

The first to sign it were Frederic, Elector of the Palatinate, Philip Louis, Count Palatine of Neuburg; the Margraves Christian of Culmbach, Joachim of Anspach, John Frederic of Baden-Durlach, and John Frederic, Duke of Würtemberg. Only a part of the Protestant princes joined in it, and therein lay a foolish and fatal error. Not that grounds of complaint or incitements to opposition measures were wanting; but they should have thought twice whether it would not further the breach of the peace if their camp were openly divided into two parties, and they should not have formed a league which was, as it were, still-born—for so it was, since all Protestants did not join in it. Because the Electoral Palatinate was at the head, Saxony held aloof and stirred up enmity against it; even those who did join in it were not all agreed.

The answer to this was the Catholic League of July 10, 1609, formed by Duke Max, the Archduke Leopold of Austria, the Bishops of Würzburg, Ratisbon, Augsburg, Constance, Strasburg, Passau, and several abbots, for the protection of the imperial laws, but also—there was no mention of religion in the documents of the Union—for the protection of the Catholic religion and its adherents.

The League was a union only in name; it was in reality the creation and tool of an energetic and resolute prince, who knew how to make the ecclesiastical princes of South Germany understand that the question for them was to be or not to be, and that therefore they must put their hands

in their pockets. Duke Max created an excellent army out of the means of the League, of Bavarians commanded by Bavarian leaders. He had some tolerably extensive projects in view; we have memoirs from which it appears that he tried to obtain the co-operation of Spain and the Pope. It is noteworthy, on the contrary, that he systematically aimed to form the League without the help of Austria. He projected, as has been remarked even on the Catholic side, a little Catholic Germany under Bavarian hegemony, as a closer league in alliance with Austria.

The League had some significance. It had a head, and an army which could take up arms at the first moment of alarm. The Union had neither, and would probably fall to the ground from internal weakness.

Any accident might furnish the pretext for a tremendous war. This was the opportunity sagaciously chosen by Henry IV. to interfere in German affairs. His death postponed the struggle.

Meanwhile disorder was increasing in the hereditary Hapsburg dominions. Opposition to attempts at forcible conversions grew to open revolts. Rudolph was quite incompetent to allay the storm. His relatives met together, and in consequence of his "weakness of mind"—so it was said in a treaty with Hungary—appointed his brother Matthias his guardian. He was a man without character, pushed forward by vain ambition, who always succeeded in fomenting discontent, never in allaying it.

He played with fire, incited the people against his brother, entered into conspiracy with the malcontents in Hungary, Moravia, and German Austria against the Emperor, deprived him of his lands and crown, and yet was too weak to quell the revolt of the States.

Thus it was that the events took place which seemed to make the dissolution of the Imperial States probable. In the hereditary dominions Rudolph was deposed in Hungary. He had to delegate the administration to Matthias. He tried to keep a hold on the Bohemians by means of the Royal Charter, but even they revolted, and threw themselves into the arms of the leaders of the opposition, who promised them still more. On the 20th January, 1612, he died, a landless prince, worn out by madness and disease, deprived of all his crowns.

The seven years' reign of the Emperor Matthias (1612-19)

was the bitterest chastisement for himself. He had to learn that it is an easier task to ruin a weak ruler, amidst general revolt, than to master the spirits that he has called up. Rudolph just escaped from the crisis without bloodshed, but the flames of civil war were to close round the head of his successor. He also shared Rudolph's fate. The Archdukes appointed a guardian for him in the person of Ferdinand of Styria, and when he died Bohemia and Austria were in open rebellion.

Ferdinand began his government in Bohemia with a crying infringement of the Charter, by closing the churches at Braunau, and destroying those at Klostergrab. In May, 1618, the insurrection broke out at Prague. The hated imperial ministers, Martinitz and Slavata, were thrown out of window, "according to good old Bohemian custom," as was said by one of the nobles present; a sort of provisional government was established, and an army taken into pay.

This was the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, and on the same heights where an end was put to the winter kingdom, the contending parties afterwards exchanged their last shots.



## PART VIII.

**FIRST PHASE OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.—THE BOHEMIAN, PALATINATE, AND DANISH WARS, 1620-29.**

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### CHAPTER XXXII.\*

**First Acts of Ferdinand II., from March, 1619.—His Character and Education.—Beginning of his Reign in Revolutionary Austria.—Election of Emperor, August, 1619.—The Winter Kingdom of Frederick V., and the War in Bohemia.—The Battle of Weissenberg, near Prague, 8th November, 1620.—The Catholic Reaction in Bohemia and the Palatinate, 1621.**

**FIRST ACTS OF FERDINAND II.—CHARACTER AND EDUCATION.—BEGINNING OF HIS REIGN IN REVOLUTIONARY AUSTRIA.—ELECTION OF EMPEROR, AUGUST, 1619.**

**E**VER since the beginning of the seventeenth century, all those differences—national, political, and religious—had been stirred up in Austria on the suppression of which the ingenious construction of the empire depended.

• General literature. Besides that before mentioned, Khevenhiller's *Annales Ferdinandei*. Leipzig, 1716. *Theatrum Europaeum*. Frankfurt, 1632. Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato, *Historia di Ferdinando III.* T. I. Londorp, Acta publica. Menzel. Leon. Pappus ep. rer. germ. ed. Arndts. 1856. Senkenberg's Fortsetzung von Häberlin's *Reichsgeschichte*. Mailath, *Geschichte des Oesterreich. Kaiserstaats*, 1837. Mebold, *der dreisigjährige Krieg*. 1840. Söttl, *der Religionskrieg in Deutschland*. Hamburg, 1839.—Up to 1830, Wolf, *Geschichte der Kurfürsten Maximilian* Herausg. von Breyer, 1807. Von Aretin, *Geschichte Maximilians*, Passau. 1842. The same: *Baiern's Auswärtige Verhältnisse*, Passau. 1839. Von Rommel, *Geschichte von Hessen*. Häusser, *Geschichte der Pfalz*. Müller, K. A. fünf Bücher vom *Böhmischen Kriege*. Leipzig, 1841. Peschek, *Geschichte der Gegen Reformation in Böhmen*. Leipzig, 1844. V. d. Decken *Geo. v. Braunschweig und Lüneburg*. Villermont, *Comte de Tilly*, 1859. *Erdmannsdörfer*, C. E. v. Savoyen. 1861.

This unusual situation required unusual measures. In order to render Rudolph's weakness innocuous, the family council of the Archdukes met together and appointed Matthias regent; and as he also proved incompetent, similar measures were adopted in his case.

In going through the ranks of the Archdukes, Ferdinand of Styria was the most distinguished. He was the son of Duke Charles of Styria, and cousin to Matthias. He certainly had not the first claim; but of those who stood before him several were ecclesiastics, others childless, so that the family agreed to depute him as the most suitable to take upon himself the cares of empire.

Ferdinand was one of the first pupils of the Jesuits among the German princes, and grew up a thorough disciple of the society in his ideas and aims, was adapted rather for the pulpit or the confessional than the throne, and early bound by fanatical vows the fulfilment of which probably gave him more trouble than he anticipated. He had early vowed to use all possible means to exterminate heresy, and was resolved rather to reign over a desert than over a heretical country.

This was fearfully fulfilled, for he did indeed leave a desert behind him, in which, nevertheless, heresy was not quite extirpated.

He was one of those characters who in the hands of the priests are capable of terrible things; he was destitute of bold and original ideas, but was one of those quiet souls who hold to the creed of their adoption at the peril of their lives, and are ready to sacrifice for it all that has hitherto been dear to them. He was more fit for the pupil of a college of priests, than for the task of ruling this great crisis in a conciliatory spirit, and of closing the abyss of civil war.

Almost the whole of the empire was a prey to heresy and revolt. When in 1596 he began to reign in Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, it was with the determination to subjugate all enemies of the true faith and absolutism, and his country was the only monarchy where this plan succeeded. He declared that he would rather beg, or be cut in pieces, than submit to heresy any longer. Catholic priests were sent to the Protestant peasantry, and when they rebelled they were brought to submission by force. He who was not converted within a certain time was obliged to emigrate; schools and churches were razed to the ground; many thousands of Bibles and books of sermons

were burnt ; the rebellious people were treated with banishment, dragoonades, and the gallows ; and when the unhappy creatures appealed to the ordinances of Maximilian II., they were told that rulers were not bound by pernicious charters.

In his private life Ferdinand appears to have led a simple, strictly moral life. His character, though narrow and rigid, was not cruel—at least not from brutal lust of power.\* As to what is adduced by his defenders, that he shed tears at the execution of the cruelties he ordained, I believe that he considered these victims to be demanded by his faith—that he was a genuine fanatic, who would have given his life could he have reclaimed all heretics with one blow.

The broad views of a ruler who is above all parties, and gives every one his due in his own sphere, were in those days the privilege of a few superior men, like William of Orange and Henry IV. Ferdinand was utterly destitute of them, and his education had taught him to look upon all toleration of this sort as an attack upon religion.

The previous policy, therefore, first of toleration, and afterwards of weakness, was regarded by him as the greatest evil ; and the close connection which then existed in Austria between heresy and all tendencies to political liberty and national disintegration conduced to confirm the view that, as guardian of the unity of the empire, he must place himself in an attitude of defence against a dangerous revolt.†

The first person, therefore, to be deprived of all influence was Cardinal Klesel, in whom Ferdinand saw weakness and half measures personified.

\* From a manuscript of 800 pages, in the Bibl. Royale (Mss. fr. N. 964, St. Victor), containing notes by the Papal Nuncio of an eight years' sojourn in Germany, Häusser quotes the following passage about Ferdinand :—"Ferdinand II., en âge de cinquante et un an, de médiocre stature, de forte complexion, de poil tirant sur le roux, d'agréable présence, affable et civil envers tout le monde. Il boit peu, ne dort encore moins, ayant accoustumé de se coucher à dix heures et de se lever à quatre et quelquefois devant. Quant à sa piété envers notre religion on n'en saurait rien dire qui ne soit au dessous de la vérité. Toutes les fêtes solennelles et principalement celle des douze apôtres, il fréquente dans sa chapelle les cérémonies de confession et de communion. Le jeudi saint il reçoit la communion avec l'Impératrice son épouse et avec les princes ses fils, de la main du nonce de St. Siège, pour apprendre à ses sujets par son exemple à satisfaire à ce commandement de l'Eglise," &c.—ED.

† See the declaration made to the Court of Spain in Khevenhiller and the letter to Philip III., 7th September, 1609—Raumer, Vol. III.

Klesel was a parvenu of the lowest kind, with all the worst characteristics of such persons. He was a fawning courtier, yet had a strong inclination for absolute power; possessed more pliant talent than strongly marked character, and was therefore well adapted to serve a man like Matthias as adviser and tool. He maintained a policy of studied clemency and conciliation; advised every country to yield as much as possible, as this was in accordance with the views of Matthias, and appeared to be the only practicable plan. Then came the revolution in the palace; Klesel was carried off one morning as a state criminal and thrown into prison, because he had pursued a policy at his Emperor's side which was abhorrent to the archdukes.

After Klesel's disgrace, Ferdinand became the leading man, and on the death of Matthias, 20th of March, 1619, he was indisputably the next heir to the throne.

He came to Vienna and found things just as they had once been in Styria; the whole country filled with Protestantism; the citizens, the nobles, and peasants in the country, almost all openly addicted to heresy. Not far from Vienna was Count Thurn with his Bohemian soldiers. Bethlen Gabor was advancing from Hungary, and a large party in the capital were resolved to make common cause with them. The Emperor's life was scarcely secure; commotions took place like those at Prague; armed citizens forced an entry into the palace to demand religious liberty. The leaders shook him by the doublet, exclaiming: "Nandel, give in; thou must sign." It nearly came to establishing a provisional government over him, and had the rebels been daring enough they might have seized his person.

In these times of distress, Ferdinand comported himself like a man; a storm had to be braved before which many would have quailed. He did brave it, and, like many other people in history, he found it easier to bear misfortune than success.

A happy chance—the timely arrival of a regiment of cuirassiers—saved the Emperor from his rebellious people.

Now there was a great question to solve, on which depended the immediate future of the house of Hapsburg—the election of Emperor.

The imperial dignity no longer conferred absolute power; it brought neither an army nor a treasury. If, therefore, Ferdinand reckoned upon defeating the rebels in Prague

and Vienna with the power of the German imperial crown, he was mistaken.

It did nevertheless possess some significance. There are many things in life which seem worthless when we have them, but which it is an immense disadvantage to lose. This was the case with the imperial dignity. The loss of it at this juncture would have been a verdict pronounced upon the house of Hapsburg by the German empire. The Czecks, Magyars, Moravians, Silesians, the inhabitants of Vienna themselves, were shaking the tottering house, especially Ferdinand's authority. Germany was the last straw, the plank to which the sinking hopes of the Hapsburgs were clinging. Vienna was doubtful, Bohemia in open revolt, Moravia, Silesia, and Hungary not far from it. The Tyrol and Styria were not sufficient to support the throne; if Germany forsook it, it was lost.

If the Electors chose the Archduke, he would have something to hold by; the German empire at any rate would have shown that it did not renounce the Hapsburgs. Never, therefore, were they more desirous that the election should fall on their house. If it did not, the house must sink into the abyss of revolution.

For the German empire the situation was different. The interests of the two sides were at variance. If Ferdinand were elected, the empire must be engulfed in the whirlpool of revolution in South and East Germany. It would inherit a civil war which would suffice to ignite all the inflammable materials in Germany. The state of parties in the empire was just such as to give rise to fears of a dangerous outbreak; how would it be if the uncompromising fanatic of the extreme restoration were called to the head of affairs?

Undoubtedly had there been at that time a prince in Germany worthy of the dignity, and sufficiently unbiassed in religious matters to give both parties their due, his election would have been most desirable, and might perhaps have spared Germany the horrors of the Thirty Years' War. But there was not, and Germany was engulfed in a most fearful struggle.

Ferdinand's election was disputed from the first, for the Bohemians no longer acknowledged him; but this was of little use if they had no other candidate. The impotence of the Union came to light; the Protestants were divided

within and without: they abhorred the idea of a Jesuit Emperor, but had only empty ranks and impracticable proposals to oppose to him. In the meddling Palatinate, the candidateship to the imperial dignity was, as it were, hawked about the streets, and yet there were no bidders.

Scarcely escaped from the attack of the Bohemians, Ferdinand came to Frankfort through the enemy's country, to the election.

After six months of angry negotiation and correspondence, they had not even agreed in the Protestant camp upon a protest against Ferdinand as a candidate, though he had been declared to be disqualified by the Bohemians, so that when the day of election came, his victory was as good as decided. It was the first step out of the crisis by which Austria had so long been convulsed.

Had it been previously known that just when the electors were announcing Ferdinand's election, the Bohemians had gone a step further, had deposed King Ferdinand and proclaimed a new election, they would perhaps have reconsidered the subject, or at any rate have put off the election. But it was now too late; the electors had to submit to the logic of facts which they had themselves helped to bring to pass.

#### THE WINTER KINGDOM AND THE WAR IN BOHEMIA, 1619-22.—BATTLE OF PRAGUE, 8TH NOVEMBER, 1620.

The choice of the Bohemians during the same days of August fell upon the head of the Union, the Elector Palatine Frederic V., because, so it was stated, "he is a very discreet gentleman, possessing great qualities, and is acquainted with divers languages," because "he has a powerful and well-trained people, and is in alliance with great foreign powers, England, Holland, and Switzerland." In Bohemia, they knew neither the internal weakness of the Union nor the untrustworthiness of its foreign allies; they believed in it, and looked for help from it which it could never afford.

Frederic V. was married to Elizabeth Stuart, a daughter of James V. The marriage had been hailed with joy in England, as a family alliance between the still suspicious English king and the leader of German Protestantism, and Parliament was afterwards always ready to send subsidies to

the Elector. This connection with England had great weight with the Bohemians.

The Elector vacillated a long time; and when he did arrive at a decision, it was not, as has been long supposed, the result of his wife's influence, but of other things. He was personally a very insignificant ruler—amiable in private life, a patron of artists and learned men, but wholly incompetent for grave political business, to say nothing of undertaking a great venture; he was always dependent on the advice of others, and was not a man who, in critical moments, would resolve to stake everything, as was necessary in such a situation. He was influenced by ambition not to give up the leadership which had been for a generation in his family, by the hope of aid from England, and in great part by the help of a number of people who then ruled the policy of the Palatinate—landless princes, younger sons of younger brothers. Such an one among others who eagerly advised him to accept the crown was Christian of Anhalt; then came the suggestions of the clever but misguided Ludwig Camerarius, and the Calvinist confessor Scultetus.\*

Thus it came to pass that at the end of October, 1619, "the Palatinate went to Bohemia."

Frederic V. hoped to find strength in Bohemia, and the Bohemians hoped for strength from him. But he found only a Slavonian revolution, uncontrollable nobles, and a state in process of dissolution, over which the aristocracy wanted to rule themselves. Everybody was relying upon somebody else, and everybody was deserted.

Bohemia was chiefly ruled by the Slavonic party, at the head of which were a number of ambitious nobles, and the majority of the people revelled with them in the recollection of the national monarchy of the fifteenth century. The new King at once ruined his cause with both parties: with the nobles, because he would not listen to their claims to take part in the government, and only followed the advice of Anhalt and Camerarius; with the people, by his singular way of life and Calvinistic narrowness. An antiquated and somewhat pedantic mode of life prevailed in Bohemia, and there were deeply-rooted prejudices against the licentious courts of those days; but the young Elector Palatine and his whole court were infected with French frivolity to a

\* Upon this section see Häusser, *Geschichte der Pfalz*.—ED.



degree which could not but offend the strict views of the Bohemians. Frederic's demure Calvinism was a curious contrast to the gallantry of the men and women of the court; he belonged to the Reformed party, while the Bohemians were Lutherans. He had, indeed, acknowledged unconditional religious liberty in Bohemia; but the zealots about him, Scultetus at their head, would not rest until, in the principal church at Prague, all images, pictures, and relics were cleared away, and the beautiful church converted into a Calvinistic meeting-house. The irritation produced by differences of creed increased, and contributed more than anything else to estrange the people from their king. They were at variance in language, nationality, manners, and creed. It would have been a miracle had prosperity ensued.

Ferdinand had not the power to subject Bohemia by force of arms. He had acquired moral importance as Emperor, but the dignity did not provide him with money or troops. He was therefore compelled to throw himself into the arms of the League. The League was something different from the Union; it was not an alliance in which every member laid claim to many rights, and owned but few duties, but a united organization in the hands of an energetic martial prince, whose allies, so called, had only to provide funds.

The League now became, and remained for several years, the leading power in Germany.

On the 8th of October, 1619, Ferdinand concluded a treaty with his relative and the friend of his youth, Max of Bavaria, in which the latter took good care of himself.

It provided that the Duke should undertake the unconditional and exclusive command of the whole proceedings against the rebellious heretics in Austria, Bohemia, and Upper Austria; this last, indeed, had first to be taken as security for indemnification for the expenses of the war. In return, Max collected all his forces to assist the deserted Emperor.

In 1620 the war began.\*

\* In March of the new year the "Winter King" had addressed a letter to Louis XIII. of France, asking for help, which Häusser found and made extracts from, among the MSS. of the Bibliothèque Royale, entitled "*Memoires pour l'Histoire d'Allemagne depuis 1619 jusqu'à 1638.*" It is dated 24th March, 1620, and tries to prove that the threatened war was entirely political and by no means religious in its character; see, for example, the following passage:—"Mes actions aussy bien que mes déclarations monstrent assez que je n'ay eu la pensée,

The war might not be lost if only it were rationally carried on in Bohemia. Money, indeed, was wanting, and so were efficient troops; but neither had Max any superfluity of means, and would be lost unless he speedily gained a decisive battle. In the Bohemian camp, therefore, it was necessary to keep strictly to the defensive. In those days, if a general had not the means to pay his troops, there was nothing else to keep them together—neither oath nor devotion to any person nor cause. This was one cause of the weakness of the army of the League, and it suffered also from sickness, in consequence of the bad weather. The army must have been dissolved if, on the Bohemian side, they had known how to avoid a battle and to starve the enemy by a tedious defensive war.

But just the contrary course was taken. With a corps of officers who caroused in camp instead of doing their duty, and ill-disciplined troops, they faced a well-trained army one-third greater in numbers. On the 5th of October, Christian of Anhalt took up his position on the Weissenberg, near Prague, and three days afterwards, notwithstanding his personal bravery, sustained an ignominious defeat, which decided the fate of the Winter Kingdom in an hour.

The rebels in Bohemia and Moravia immediately submitted; Mansfeld only carried on a hopeless banditti warfare for months on his own account. Frederic fled to Silesia; at Breslau appealed to the Union for help, and tried to incite the Protestant States of the country to oppose the reaction which, as he truly foretold, would take place against the whole of Protestantism. But it was in vain; here also they submitted to the victorious Duke; that one battle had ruined the cause. Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Lusatia again belonged to the prince whom they had deposed a year before. The Protestant princes watched with malicious satisfaction the flight of the helpless Winter King, who, even

moins encore la volonté de faire ou permettre estre fait aucun desplaisir à mes subjects de la religion catholique romaine à cause de la dite religion, qu'au contraire j'ay et auray toujours en soin, particulier de les protéger également avec les autres sans distinction." Should the war really break out, he calls to mind the ancient alliance between the Palatinate and Louis's father, and begs respectfully "qu'il vous plaise me tendre la main de vostre bonne assistance fondée sur la confiance que j'ay de vostre dicte bienveillance, et sur les vœux que j'ay fait de conserver inviolablement l'affection héréditaire que je porte au bien de vostre couronne."—ED.

among his own relations, scarcely found even the refuge he needed, to say nothing of succour.

The revolution in Bohemia had not been quelled by Ferdinand, but by the League; yet the victorious cause was common to both,—it was the cause of ecclesiastical restoration, of conversion by means of Jesuits and soldiers.

No foreign intervention was to be feared; the hopes of the Winter King, of help from abroad, melted like spray before the wind; his own inheritance soon became a prey to the enemy; the distribution of the spoils of victory could begin. Upon the way in which this was done, it depended whether the war, which had hitherto scarcely been a German, far less a European one, should develope into one of world-wide importance.

#### THE ECCLESIASTICAL REACTION IN BOHEMIA AND THE PALATINATE.

The dreaded crisis which had been hanging over Germany for decades had taken place. The supremacy of the Emperor was decisively pronounced. One of the leaders of German Protestantism was pitifully defeated; it was a blow which could not but be severely felt by all German princes; still, it was far yet from being a religious war.

If Ferdinand now zealously carried out the Restoration in Bohemia, and declared that the charter was forfeited because it had been infringed by the country itself, it was no more than could be expected. It was but revenge for the imprudent policy of 1619-20, which was seen through at once by every one except Frederic V.—that of taking the course they did without the necessary means.

But it was another thing to show Bohemia who was master by openly proclaiming the system of forced conversion, and carrying it out with sanguinary strictness. This was the way to let loose the religious war, and to give occasion for foreign intervention.

With but a little moderation, Ferdinand and the League might have obtained an easy victory in his own country, and yet have disarmed suspicion at home and abroad. But this they could not do. Whether the fault was in the times or in their personal passions, they went to work rashly and inconsiderately, and the war ceased to be a Bohemian or German, and became a European one.

The Protestant Union was already entirely out of joint. When, in the summer of 1620, Spinola advanced up the Rhine with Spanish soldiers, the Union had nothing to oppose to them but an absurd reference to the imperial law which forbade the presence of foreign troops in Germany. This was before the catastrophe to their brother in the faith. When afterwards Ferdinand appeared with the defiance of a victor, the Union was dissolved, submitted ignominiously, and the empire again resounded with jeers and malicious joy.

On the 29th of January, 1621, Ferdinand had pronounced the unhappy Frederic under the ban of the empire, and appointed the Duke of Bavaria to execute the sentence. Of all the forms prescribed by the constitution, even in cases of proved guilt, not one was observed; the aggrieved person, accuser and judge, was one and the same individual. After this beginning, little clemency could be looked for from the Emperor.

In June, 1621, a fearful reign of terror began in Bohemia,\* with the execution of twenty-seven of the most distinguished heretics. For years the unhappy people bled under it; thousands were banished, and yet Protestantism was not fully exterminated. The charter was cut into shreds by the Emperor himself; there could be no forbearance towards "such acknowledged rebels." As a matter of course, the Lutheran preaching was forbidden under the heaviest penalties; heretical works, Bibles especially, were taken away in heaps. Jesuit colleges, churches, and schools came into power; but this was not all.

A large number of distinguished Protestant families were deprived of their property, and, as if that were not enough, it was decreed that no non-Catholic could be a citizen, nor carry on a trade, enter into marriage, nor make a will; any one who harboured a Protestant preacher forfeited his property; whoever permitted Protestant instruction to be given was to be fined, and whipped out of the town; the Protestant poor who were not converted were to be driven out of the hospitals, and to be replaced by Catholic poor; he who gave free expression to his opinions about religion was to be executed. In 1624 an order was issued to all preachers and teachers to leave the country within eight days, under pain of death; and finally, it was ordained that whoever

\* See Reuss, *La Destruction du Protestantisme en Bohême*. Strasbourg, 1867.

had not become Catholic by Easter, 1626, must emigrate. Light and air, the simplest rights of man in a state, were denied to the Protestants. But the real conversions were few; thousands quietly remained true to their faith; other thousands wandered as beggars into foreign lands; more than thirty thousand Bohemian families, and among them five hundred belonging to the aristocracy, went into banishment. Exiled Bohemians were to be found in every country of Europe, and were not wanting in any of the armies that fought against Austria.

Those who could not or would not emigrate, held to their faith in secret. Against them dragoonades were employed. Detachments of soldiers were sent into the various districts to torment the heretics till they were converted. The "Converters" (Seligmacher) went thus throughout all Bohemia, plundering and murdering. There were sanguinary revolts; in some places they fortified and defended themselves to the uttermost. No succour reached the unfortunate people; but neither did the victors attain their end. Protestantism and the Hussite memories could not be slain, and only outward submission was extorted. Striking proof of this appeared when Joseph II. published his Edict of Toleration; and a respectable Protestant party exists to this day in Bohemia and Moravia. But a desert was created; the land was crushed for a generation. Before the war Bohemia had 4,000,000 inhabitants, and in 1648 there were but 700,000 or 800,000.

These figures appear preposterous, but they are certified by Bohemian historians. In some parts of the country the population has not attained the standard of 1620 to this day.

As early as the summer of 1622, the imperial policy made way for itself into the inheritance of the "Winter King" by an unparalleled piece of villainy.

A certain degree of unity and spirit had been introduced into the planless banditti warfare which the adventurer Mansfeld and the chivalrous Colonel Obertraut had been carrying on in the Upper and Lower Palatinate against Spain and Bavaria since the summer of 1621, when in April, 1622, the outlawed Elector Frederic suddenly appeared among his faithful subjects in the Palatinate.

The brave Margrave, George Frederic of Baden, joined Mansfeld with a splendid troop, and obtained a brilliant victory over the Bavarians under Tilly at Wiesloch. In spite of the defeat of the Margrave at Wimpfen in May, and

of the wild Christian of Brunswick, near Höchst, in June, Frederic V. had in Alsace a strong and valiant army, when, from his love of peace and confidence in his father-in-law, James I., who was himself deceived, the unwary youth allowed himself to be ensnared by perfidious negotiations—first, to suspend hostilities, and then to dismiss his army, in order, as the diplomatic deceiver said, that peace might be made.

Now that the Palatinate was laid open, and the Elector disarmed, Tilly, who, at the first news of Frederic's arrival, had given up the siege of the Dilsberg, could complete the subjugation of the Palatinate in peace. Nevertheless, it was only with great difficulty that Heidelberg was taken in September, and Mannheim in November, while the garrison of Frankenthal defended themselves successfully against him. With the Bavarian soldiers, who here, as everywhere, behaved with great barbarity, came the Jesuits to destroy this nest of Calvinism. The Reformed ministers were driven away, and were replaced by priests and monks; the flourishing university was closed, and the treasures of its world-renowned library dragged in fifty waggons to Rome. The conversion of this out-and-out Protestant people was begun with a certain moderation, but afterwards carried on with more vigour. The Lutherans, who were at first spared, had an opportunity here, as in Bohemia, of watching the ill-treatment of the Reformed party with malicious satisfaction. But their turn came next.

At the meeting of princes summoned by Ferdinand in November, instead of a Diet, at Ratisbon, the dignity of Elector Palatine was solemnly conferred on the victorious Duke of Bavaria. The new Government at once distinguished itself by a passionate zeal for conversion. While the dissolute conduct of the "Converters" (Seligmacher) in Upper Austria was driving the obscure peasants to a desperate revolt, the Bavarians began to make the good old Protestant country Catholic. It was more easily accomplished than in Bohemia and Upper Austria. The Papal Nuncio, Caraffa, who was met there by almost unconquerable defiance, considered that the inhabitants of the Palatinate had passed through their second birth far more painlessly than their brethren in the faith in Austria and Bohemia. The witnesses of it were the many thousands of the inhabitants who left their fair country, and became proverbial in Europe as refugees from South Germany.

## CHAPTER XXXIII.

### THE DANISH WAR, 1625—29, AND ALBRECHT OF WALLENSTEIN.

Change of Sentiment.—The Protestant League: England, Holland, Denmark, 1625.—Christian IV. of Denmark.—Albrecht von Wallenstein.—His Character.—The War of 1626-8.—Defeat of Mansfeld at Dessau, April, 1626.—Defeat of Christian IV. at Lutter, on the Barenberg, August, 1626.—Wallenstein and Tilly in North Germany, Mecklenburg, Stralsund, 1628.—Peace of Lubeck, May, 1629.—The Edict of Restitution, March, 1629, and its Significance.—Machinations of the League against Wallenstein.—The Meeting of Princes at Ratisbon.—Dismissal of Wallenstein, June, 1630.

### CHANGE OF SENTIMENT.—THE PROTESTANT LEAGUE BE- TWEEN ENGLAND, HOLLAND, AND DENMARK, 1625.— CHRISTIAN IV. OF DENMARK.

THE affairs of 1622-3 in Bohemia, Upper Austria, and the Palatinate had a terribly irritating effect in and beyond Germany.

When the Winter King hastened through Germany, fugitive and defenceless, after the lost battle, denied by his own relations as a criminal, and avoided like a leper, not a single voice was heard in his favour; and when he warned them in a public appeal that his cause was the cause of Protestantism, that his defeat would result in the establishment of Spanish absolutism in Germany, he was met with jeers by the Lutherans; and Saxony advised the Silesian States not to be seduced by the rebels, or just that which they wished to avert would happen. Frederic's father-in-law, James I. of England, did not find it advisable, from reasons affecting the legitimacy of rulers, to give a bad example, by supporting a revolution; and, besides this, he



had promised Spain not to take any part but that of a neutral mediator.

But these sentiments were changed when the consequences of such an attitude appeared.

The beginning of the brutal Catholic reaction, first in Bohemia, then in Austria, showed what was meant by the victory of the League. Then came the perfidious abuse of James's mediation against his son-in-law, the deposition of the Elector, and the forced conversion of the Protestant Palatinate. All this, in spite of the fair speeches, for which popular wit invented the name of "Spanish sleeping-cup," pointed to a Catholic reaction, in face of which no one was secure against a system of compulsion which would overthrow all law and usage.

At the meeting at Ratisbon, which was intended to give an appearance of legality to the proceedings against the Elector, there were warnings of opposition. Pliant Saxony spoke against his deposition, and even withdrew her previous recognition of the ban; Brandenburg warmly took the part of the Elector, whom she had hitherto contemptuously neglected.

In Lower Saxony ideas of armed resistance were already rife, for the foreign soldiery was almost ruining the country, when a change took place in England which opened up a prospect of a great European coalition against Spain and Hapsburg.

James I. and Buckingham, embittered by Spain's jesuitical intrigues, proposed it to Parliament in February, 1624. Parliament received it with joy, and with the assurance that it was ready to defend the true religion and the rights of the royal children with body and soul. When Mansfeld arrived in London he was greeted with acclamation by the whole population, up to the aristocracy, as the hero of religious liberty.

From the well-known vacillation of the Government of James I. and Buckingham, no persistent military interposition could be reckoned on; more energy was thrown into it under his successor, Charles I., after March, 1625, and the Protestant League was at length an accomplished fact. A treaty was entered into on 9th December, 1625, at the Hague, between England, Holland, and Denmark, the object of which was a great expedition to the Continent, to oppose the Hapsburgs and reinstate the Elector.

Negotiations had previously been entered into with Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, but they had not been able to agree on the conditions, and the cautious Swedish policy had rejected the project as rash and too extensive.

England was not in a position to carry on the war in Germany on her own account; Holland was in the same situation; they were both obliged to depend on subsidies from the warlike rulers of the Continent, and the help of their fleets on the coasts.

King Christian of Denmark declared himself ready for intervention. As Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, he was a prince of the German Empire, and had been appointed chief of the district by the district of Lower Saxony; besides the hope of enriching himself in North Germany, it was greatly to his interest that Catholic restoration should be checked. The kingdom of Denmark had become what it was solely through the Reformation and its results, political and ecclesiastical. Frederic I. and Christian III. had caused the Reformation to be brought to their kingdom proper from Schleswig, Holstein, and Jutland; their crown first attained power and dignity through the destruction of the temporal and ecclesiastical feudal system; so that for this kingdom a religious restoration meant a return to the ancient yoke under which it, in common with the burgher and peasant class, had so long suffered.

Frederic II., 1559-88, and Christian IV. had diligently aided in building up the new State and in giving it a healthy domestic foundation.

The downfall of the mighty ecclesiastical system had indeed only been effected by means of an alliance of the crown with the nobles, in which the latter had contrived to secure the lion's share for themselves; they took care to have their privileges, their power in the senate, their legal jurisdiction and immunity from taxes, secured to them by the bond as clearly as possible. Still, there was scope enough left for the government to take quietly in hand the emancipation of the middle classes, by means of a conscientious, economical government; by the lenient administration of laws in themselves severe; by having regard at the same time to the finances of the State and the prosperity of the people, by increasing their earnings, by rational encouragement of trade and manufactures, by turning to account the natural inclinations of this insular people for

navigation and colonial enterprise—thus making the cause of the monarchy the cause of the working population, who now first began to lead a life worthy of men. Frederic II. and Christian IV. accomplished this with skill and assiduity.

Up to the time of the war in Germany, Christian was a beloved and successful monarch. A man possessing rare gifts, a great variety of knowledge, and broad views, he laid during his long reign the foundations of the material prosperity which Denmark enjoyed until the last century.

He was at once the first military organizer of Denmark, and the founder of its domestic and commercial policy, thus exhibiting qualifications not often combined. The foundation of the commercial cities of Christiania and Glückstadt, the exchange in Copenhagen, the introduction of uniform weights and measures, the colonies in Iceland and Greenland, regular postal intercourse, the attempt to check the commercial supremacy of the Hansa, and the formation of a standing army not composed of foreign hirelings, but of native peasants led by Danish officers, all date from his time.

At the head of an efficient army, this monarch was a power not to be despised, especially if the aid of England and Holland were as trustworthy as it was readily promised.

As wearer of a crown to which the success of the Catholic restoration would be a fatal danger—as a prince of the German Empire, enjoying great influence in North Germany, Christian IV. could not look on with apathy at the war in Germany, besides which he might have an idea of rounding off the possession of Holstein in Lower Saxony. So he accepted the offer of England and Holland, and began the war in North Germany, supported by some of the North German princes who were influenced by similar considerations.

The war was not successful; at the very beginning of it the army of the League occupied North Germany, and when it came to a battle Christian was driven from the field, and the Danish army pursued by Wallenstein back to its own country. But the significance of this war lies elsewhere. About this time Ferdinand II. succeeded in detaching himself from the guardianship of the League, and in carrying on the war with his own resources. The formation and triumphs of this new army are connected with Albrecht von Wallenstein.

## ALBRECHT VON WALDSTEIN, OR WALLENSTEIN.

Wallenstein belonged to the nobility, but not to the high Bohemian aristocracy. His parents and grandparents, and his family, with few exceptions, were Protestants, but by a singular dispensation, the young Albrecht, born 15th September, 1583, and early left an orphan, was adopted by an uncle, one of the few of the family who had remained faithful to Catholicism, and he brought him back to the old faith. ~~He grew up as a pupil of the Jesuits.~~ A Catholic nobleman was a rarity in Bohemia. He was introduced by his uncle into the service of the Hapsburgs, and early distinguished himself. He performed a great service to the Archduke Ferdinand, in Styria, in his war against the Venetians, in 1617; when the fortress of Gradiska was besieged by the Venetians and closely pressed, he contrived to convey rich stores of provisions to it through the ranks of the besiegers; and, still more important than this, he equipped a regiment from his own resources, whose officers and troops adored him, and whose appearance was the pride of the whole army. A talented young soldier, who was at once a Catholic and an adherent of the house of Hapsburg, was a real treasure in those days of general defection. When the revolt broke out in Bohemia, and all his relations were on the Protestant side, he distinguished himself by his strongly marked imperialism; he helped with his cuirassiers to decide the engagement against Count Mansfeld at Teyn, and he covered Bouguoy's retreat with great dexterity against the hosts of Bethlen Gabor.

Wallenstein had early rendered himself independent by a rich marriage. He shunned no sacrifice to secure the favour of the Hapsburgs at the time of their great difficulties, and he had the knack of keeping up an appearance of great expenditure, while he was a good manager; he never lost a favourable opportunity, and even when he gave liberally was only casting the net for greater gain.

As nearly all the aristocracy were upon the rebel side in the Bohemian revolution, his faithfulness was doubly valuable, and, when the great confiscation of property took place, the time came for him to reap his harvest.

By the year 1622, Ferdinand had confiscated no less than 642 lordships and estates of Bohemian noblemen; and, as he was in great want of money, the spoil was sold at ridi-

culous prices. The market was flooded with estates; he who had ready money to spend could quickly acquire immense wealth. Wallenstein was a millionaire, and spent seven millions and one-third of florins in buying some of these estates, mostly at absurd prices; and, in addition to the sixty properties thus acquired, he received from the Emperor, for the advances made in his service, the important territory of Friedland, with the little town of Reichenberg, for the price of 150,000 florins.\*

Besides having this good fortune, Wallenstein was an unusually talented man, not so much as a general, as in his great skill in organizing, exercising, disciplining, and providing for an army.

The military system of Europe was then in a transition state from old forms to new, or rather the old forms had disappeared and the new ones had not been discovered. The last relics of feudal service had vanished, and the modern system of a levy of the inhabitants for a standing army had not become general; the armies were neither the one thing nor the other; the men were neither bound to their leaders as faithful vassals, nor bound together as belonging to the same nation. War was a trade which motives of gain were the only inducement to engage in; a moral bond of common sentiments and higher duties was unknown. The troops were hired from all countries. Wherever circumstances were unhappy or oppressive, thousands were ready to seek their fortunes in war; whoever, for less honourable reasons, was expelled from society, followed the drum, and gained his livelihood under any colours he pleased. The Bohemian exiles were found in thousands in all the armies which fought against Austria. The Irish were as numerous in those of their opponents; it was the same with the Walloons, &c. The Germans were pretty equally distributed on both sides.

It was Wallenstein's forte to form an army out of such elements; and, when every other bond of union failed, to make himself their centre.

In this respect no army was equal to his; no one succeeded as he did in casting the whole in one mould, in inspiring the native soldiers with an *esprit de corps*, and in making himself the centre of the hirelings, and of the army as a whole. For the rest, he was one of those characters who

\* Förster, Wallenstein als Feldherr und Landesfürst. 1834.

rise up in times like these—an upstart, who, from a modest position, had become a magnate, with principalities under him; yet he was coarse by nature, never knew any other motive than thirst for power. Even people who are on the conservative side share the revolutionary characteristics of the age.

He had no more respect for tradition, usage, or legal rights, than a successful soldier is likely to have; he had seen so many of the great fall, he had taken so many successful steps over other people's heads, that he entertained the idea that his own iron fist might attain for him what the mere accidents of birth had cast into the laps of others. He therefore thoroughly despised the ancient German character, and had a profound contempt for the motives which actuate little men. He was a man like Napoleon's marshals, and held the opinion that it was not too rash to aspire to higher things than he possessed, and which in the opinions of other mortals might possess.

He was disposed to follow the phantasies of an extravagant ambition, and to form all sorts of hazardous projects beyond his means. He liked to play at hazard, to stake all on one card, and to follow dark paths with a certain superstition. He was fond of reservations and equivocations; called it lofty wisdom; and what others called cunning only appeared to him as diplomatic skill. No considerations, either religious, national, or personal, interfered with his ambition. He served the house of Hapsburg because it was with them that his star had risen, but it cost him nothing to engage in projects which had nothing in common with the duties of a loyal imperialist. He fought for the Catholic cause, but without the fanaticism of his master or Tilly's zeal for conversion. He was praised for his toleration, but it arose from indifference.

This personage, with immense resources, princely wealth, unusual political and military virtuosity, aspiring ambition, and a thorough contempt for tradition, appeared at the Emperor's side, and almost eclipsed him.

The Emperor was oppressed with the idea that a foreign army, that of the League, should obtain his victories and re-conquer his territories. Wallenstein created an army for him which rendered him independent of Bavaria, and was large enough to maintain itself and conquer whole countries. He said that he would provide, not 20,000, but 50,000 men, and he knew that such a force would, like an



emigrant nation, be able to live from war itself and put any enemy to flight.

### THE WAR OF 1626-8.

Wallenstein took the field openly, with the purpose of carrying on the war on his own responsibility, and for his own fame, and therefore of altogether ignoring, or, if possible, of eclipsing the army of the League under Tilly, which, to the great terror of the inhabitants, had been encamping for months in Lower Saxony.

From the autumn of 1625 Wallenstein encamped with his hosts between Magdeburg, Halberstadt, and Dessau, well provided with money, provisions, and every necessary, and for months worked at the erection of a secure *tête du pont* and gigantic fortifications; while Tilly, in already exhausted districts, pressed by Christian IV., wandered about in despair, his army near dissolution from sickness, want, and desertion, and he looked in vain for help either from home or from Wallenstein.

To Wallenstein belonged the fame of the first military achievement of the year. In April, Ernest of Mansfeld arrived at the Elbe with the most splendid army he had ever commanded—20,000 men, with thirty pieces of heavy artillery—and began to storm the *tête du pont* at Dessau. A fearful conflict lasted for several days; the imperial general, Aldringen, held out with heroic perseverance, and enabled Wallenstein, by a final attack with the cavalry in the rear, to decide the engagement. On April 25th, 1626, Mansfeld was signally defeated, and pursued through Frankfort into Silesia. It was his last campaign. On his journey through Bosnia he fell ill, and died as he had lived. When he felt death approaching he put on his best uniform, and awaited the end standing upright, supported by two of his companions in arms.\*

A few months after him died that other fierce general and sharer of his views, Christian of Brunswick.

These two losses almost decided the fate of the Danish campaign. As long as these two heroes were active, and Tilly's army was scarcely in a situation to stand a united attack, Christian IV. had hesitated; but now Tilly began

\* A warm apology for Mansfeld has lately appeared: Ernest Graf zu Mansfeld, 1580—1626, vom Grafen Uetterodt zu Scharffenberg. Gotha, 1867.



to revive, Münden and Göttingen were taken with horrible slaughter. There were still favourable moments, in which, had they been taken advantage of, much might have been recovered; but Christian neglected them, and on 27th August suffered a complete defeat at Lutter and Barenberg, and was compelled to retreat to Holstein. The army of the League was now master in Brunswick and Hanover.

Wallenstein and Tilly found no further opposition in North Germany. All Silesia with its fortresses fell into the Duke's hands, and the Emperor granted him the Duchy of Sagan and the lordship of Priebus as hereditary possessions. Thence he made preparations on a large scale for a campaign against Christian of Denmark on his own territory; in Wallenstein's Duchy of Friedland, forges, powder mills, and manufactories of arms, were at work day and night for the equipment of his army, and his own mint coined the ready money for the payment of the troops.

When, in the autumn of 1627, he advanced by rapid marches towards the north, the two Dukes of Mecklenburg at once submitted to him, all the fortresses were garrisoned by Wallenstein, and, in conjunction with Tilly, he began operations against Holstein and Schleswig.

His schemes now, as appears from his correspondence, were gigantic to a fantastic degree.

At the end of the year he took leave of absence for three months. His representative, Colonel Arnim, was commissioned to occupy and fortify all the harbours of Pomerania, to take all the ships he could, and to arm those fit for it; "for, you see, we shall now betake ourselves to the sea." He was to watch Sweden carefully, "for Gustavus Adolphus is a dangerous visitor, of whom one must beware;" he was to burn his ships when it was possible; meanwhile he was to negotiate with the Danish States, to induce them to depose their Christian, and to elect the Emperor Ferdinand king. If they consented, he promised that all their privileges, even the Reformation, should be held sacred; but if not, they should become his vassals. Meanwhile he was trying to induce the Emperor to secure Mecklenburg to him, and seeking a pretext for suspending an imperial ban over the dukes.

Now, however, the long-concealed rancour of the Duke of Bavaria and his party broke out. Wallenstein cared nothing for priests; and instead of joining with Tilly in making

North Germany Catholic, his sole concern was to found a powerful principality for himself, which delayed the schemes this party had in view. He had also let fall some ominous expressions, from which it appeared that it was his intention, if possible, that all the German princes, with their "German liberty," should share the fate of the Mecklenburgers. Let the palaces of the princes, he had said, be pulled down; they would no longer be wanted; there was but one king in France and Spain, and there should be but one Emperor in Germany. The Electors, in particular, he must teach morals, and show them that the Emperor was not dependent on them, but they on the Emperor, &c.

Such counsels did not prevail, though it was thought that there were signs that the Emperor himself was of opinion "that the power of the Electors must be somewhat restricted," for he felt the burden of a personal dependence on the Elector Max, who still kept possession of Upper Austria as a pledge.

Wallenstein obtained the promise of Mecklenburg, first as a pledge and then as a principality, and the Dukes were declared to have forfeited their country. At the same time the Emperor Ferdinand released himself from the guardianship of the League. In March, 1628, the Elector Max received the Upper Palatinate instead of Upper Austria, and the Lower Palatinate on the right bank of the Rhine, as indemnity for the expenses and sacrifices of the Bohemian war. Ferdinand was thus again in possession of his inheritance; Max had deprived his own relation of his country, and the war, which could only be put an end to by bringing back the banished Count Palatine, seemed likely to go on for ever.

In the spring, Wallenstein, "the Admiral of the North and Baltic Seas," as he was now called, began to take possession of the shores of the Baltic. He had cast his eyes especially on two points—Rügen and Stralsund. The first was taken; the second resisted, being assisted by Denmark and Sweden with money, munitions, provisions, and troops. Wallenstein was determined to have the city, "even if it were attached by chains to heaven." But it was all in vain: all his attacks were repulsed, his proposals rejected; his troops suffered enormous losses from the enemy's fire, want, sickness, and bad weather, and after a six months' assault they were obliged, in August, 1628, to beat an ignominious retreat.

Wallenstein's military successes, and his splendid dream of dominion over the seas, were put an end to by the ramparts of Stralsund, and the heroic endurance of its Protestant population. He was now the first to counsel peace; the ground burnt under his feet. Tired of a hopeless contest with maritime powers, against which he was defenceless, he was eager speedily to come to terms with Denmark. The Treaty of Lubeck was entered into in May, 1629; both parties renounced compensation, and all his cities and provinces were restored to the vanquished King Christian, as if he had been the victor.

Meanwhile the party of the League had obtained a great success. They had extorted an edict from the Emperor, to issue which he could only have been advised by his bitterest enemy; this was the Edict of Restitution of 6th March, 1629.

#### THE EDICT OF RESTITUTION, 1629, AND DISMISSAL OF WALLENSTEIN, 1630.

Among the conditions imposed by the Elector Max of Bavaria, when he gave up the territory north of the Ens to the Emperor, there were two secret ones—the banishment of the Calvinists and the restitution of Catholic Church property. After long delay and consultation with ecclesiastics and laymen, the Emperor decided to accede to these demands. This was effected by the Edict of Restitution, by which it was ordained that “all bishoprics, monasteries, and other Church property not held directly under the Crown (*mittelbar*), confiscated since the Treaty of Passau, shall be restored to the Catholics; all the bishoprics held directly under the Crown (*unmittelbar*), which, contrary to the ecclesiastic reservation, had come into the hands of the Protestants, shall again be occupied by Catholic prelates. The Catholic States are empowered to compel their subjects to adopt their religion, and in case of refusal, they are to leave the country on receiving an adequate sum of money; further, the religious peace only concerned the Catholics and the adherents of the unaltered Confession of Augsburg. No other sects, Calvinists or Zwinglians, were to be tolerated in the empire.”

This edict had, in part, strict legality on its side; but put in practice it involved a great revolution, which would be

absolute annihilation to the property and churches of the Protestant States, and indeed to German Protestantism itself. The bishoprics not held directly under the Crown, but under some local ruler, had been confiscated in great numbers by Protestant and Catholic princes. In 1552-5, when the Protestants were in the ascendancy, and had nothing to fear from the Emperor, the number of secularisations by Protestants had greatly increased; and when, in 1555, the question was discussed, no clause could be carried which enjoined restitution. The *status quo* was quietly recognised; but this was now more than seventy years ago, and was all to be changed by a stroke of the pen.

The ecclesiastical reservation proviso, if King Ferdinand's clause, so called, was still to be considered in force, had certainly been infringed.

Several Protestant princes had taken advantage of the occasion, and contrived that their sons or brothers should be made bishops, and afterwards, on their conversion, had changed the bishoprics into secular Protestant territories.

In now demanding that things should be restored as they were before the infringement of the reservation, they were formally right. But then they ought not in the next article to have granted to the Catholic States the right of converting or banishing their Protestant subjects, for that was contrary to another proviso still in force, by which religious liberty was expressly granted to the Protestant subjects of ecclesiastical rulers.

If one was law, so was the other.

Then, after the religious peace, large territories belonged to the adherents of the Reformed faith: the Electoral Palatinate, Hesse Cassel, Zweibrücken, Cleve, Berg, and the electoral line of the house of Hohenzollern. These territories were deprived of their legal existence by the last article, and sacrificed to the unlimited power of the Catholic reaction.

Besides, in standing upon formal legal rights, they were taking a step, the consequences of which might be incalculable, and which could only be considered practicable by a blind camarilla elate with victory. There could no longer be any peace under such a system.

Even Saxony and Brandenburg, who were surprisingly passive so long as religion only was in danger, became very

uneasy as soon as Church property was at stake ; it drove them into the enemy's camp. The bishoprics held directly under the Crown, which were to be restored, formed together a little kingdom. They were the archbishoprics of Magdeburg and Bremen, the bishoprics of Minden, Verden, Halberstadt, Lübeck, Ratzeburg, Meissen, Merseburg, Naumburg, Brandenburg, Havelberg, Lebus, Camin. The Restitution also affected numberless abbeys.

If such an edict were enforced, it would be to challenge the dynasties and people to a struggle for life and death. But this was not taken into consideration, although there was a nine years' war about trifles to look back upon.

The Protestants were often afterwards reproached with having forgotten country, honour, and everything in their hatred of the Hapsburgs, and with having served under foreign colours, Danish, Swedish, and even French, and this cannot be gainsaid, nor the fearful confusion which resulted from it amongst our people.

But the guilt of the originators of this mischief must not be forgotten. What could they do but accept any help that was offered them, when hundreds of thousands of them were deprived of their rights, religion, and property, and driven from their country by a stroke of the pen? The German Protestants were brought to the same point as the Irish Catholics, who in blind revenge opposed everything Protestant.

The result proved the impracticability of the edict. After six years of bloodshed, the Emperor was compelled to grant the abolition of it to Saxony and Brandenburg, and, after thirteen years more of fearful warfare, to all the other Protestants and Reformers ; so that all that was effected by a nine years' contest was that the edict was torn to shreds.

And if the restoration of Church property had been honestly intended—that is, if it meant the restoration of it to its previous owners—this was by no means what was generally understood by it. If its confiscation was called robbery, it could not be made good by fresh plunder.

Most of the bishoprics belonged to religious orders in whose days the Jesuits did not exist, especially the numerous Benedictine abbeys. When these demanded the restitution of their property, it was already occupied by the Jesuits.

And it was just the same with the appointments to the archbishoprics and bishoprics. Instead of allowing the prelates to be elected as was prescribed by ancient regulations, archdukes and magnates of the house of Austria were always ready to take the places of the old owners.

The Emperor's blunder was soon punished, and in a way he did not anticipate.

The least that he expected to attain when he yielded to the entreaties of the Jesuits and the League, was the satisfaction of their increasingly inconvenient demands. But in this he was mistaken. When he now requested the League to withdraw or dismiss its armies for the relief of Franconia and Swabia, the Elector Max summoned a meeting of the League at Heidelberg; and, after dismissing a few troops in its name for the sake of appearance, demanded that the Emperor himself should disarm—that is, dismiss Wallenstein and dissolve his army, or at least summon a meeting of Electors to establish a speedy and secure peace.

The Edict of Restitution had induced the tamest members of the Protestant aristocracy to take up arms against the Emperor; all that was now wanting was to deprive him of the man who had set him upon his legs, to hurl him from the giddy heights to which he had climbed. And this was now to be accomplished.

There were numerous complaints against Wallenstein. His whole military system, his plan of making the countries in which his armies were encamped provide for them, was a fearful one. When they came into a district, not only the interest of capital, but capital itself was devoured. If his troops did not behave worse than others, the horrors occasioned by the dissolute bands of fierce soldiers were bad enough. The fire and destruction, the outrages upon women, the relentless cruelty towards every living thing, were not more horrible among his soldiers than among others, but generals looked with envy upon a camp which never lacked necessities, because a regular system of plunder and torture prevailed, while they who would have been ready enough to follow his example could never succeed in providing comfortably for the soldier.

The rulers had great reason to complain of him. He had offended them all by his scornful tone; some of them he had driven from their countries, had made himself



their ruler, and openly pursued a policy intended to exterminate all ruling princes, and to set up an aristocracy of successful soldiers under an imperial military dictatorship.\* All classes were agreed in their hatred of Wallenstein; the priests could not forgive him because he cared nothing for their conversions, and he sometimes exclaimed, "The devil and hell-fire take the priests." There was scarcely one of the Protestant party whose country he had not ruined, who had not had to famish while his head-quarters were rolling in luxury, and the League desired to avenge his treatment of Tilly, his open intention of thrusting it on one side, and, if possible, of utterly destroying it.

Thus a great storm was gathering around the "Dictator of Germany," as Max of Bavaria called the Duke of Friedland.

In June, 1630, the meeting of princes took place at Ratisbon—there were no Diets until 1640—and a long accusation was laid before it against Wallenstein, who was the cause of "all the trouble, disgrace, and scandal, of all the horrible and unheard-of military oppression." It demanded the dismissal of the imperial infantry and its leader. Among the most zealous of this party were the French embassy, who were present in consequence of an Italian business.

While the Emperor was considering whether he would enter into a contest with the ruling aristocracy and their allies, France, England, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, or give up his only support, Wallenstein had coolly taken measures for giving the law upon the battle-field in the first case.

He had divided his men, between 50,000 and 60,000, into two parts, and caused them to occupy highly suspicious posts in Alsace and Swabia, in order that at a given sign one division might attack Bavaria, the other France.

But it was not to come to this. Ferdinand, as the patron of a man like Wallenstein, did not venture on an enterprise which he might perhaps have undertaken as the commander of his own army. He granted his dismissal, and Wallenstein submitted without question.

It was a most critical decision. Just when the Edict of Restitution had ignited a fearful conflagration, when Gus-

\* For his plans with Tilly and Pappenheim, see Gfrörer's *Gustav Adolf*.



tavus Adolphus had already landed in Germany, the Emperor allowed himself to be compelled by his States to dismiss his general ; and in this case it meant much more than the ordinary dismissal of a general—it deprived all his military force of their head. The army was the creation of Wallenstein. No longer kept together and paid by him, it would be dispersed, and this was abundantly proved in the succeeding period ; in this case the Emperor would, as before, be dependent on the League, when he had been obliged to pledge his heritage to the Elector.

Seldom have great historical events followed in such close connection as in this case. During the same days of June when the Emperor was guilty of the imprudence of sacrificing Wallenstein to the League, Gustavus Adolphus landed on the shores of the Baltic, in order to summon the threatened Protestant elements under his banner.

Khevenhiller attributes these events to an intrigue of Richelieu, who, in order to bring to nought the growing power of the Hapsburgs, zealously advocated two measures—an edict for the restitution of all church property confiscated after the Treaty of Passau, and the dismissal of Wallenstein. The one was fatally to estrange from Ferdinand all the Protestant states, and thereby to cause perpetual schism in the empire ; the other, to deprive him of his most powerful weapon, and to render him defenceless against both foreign and domestic foes.

One thing is certain, that these results did take place, and the warning of the Elector of Saxony in 1629, that the Edict of Restitution would please no one but adverse foreign powers, was strikingly fulfilled.

5-8.

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## PART IX.

### SECOND PHASE OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.— GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

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#### CHAPTER XXXIV.

##### SWEDEN AND GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.\*

Sweden before Gustavus Adolphus.—Erich XIV., 1560-68.—John III., 1568-92, and Charles of Südermanland.—Charles as Regent, 1592-1604.—Charles IX. as King, 1604-II.—Gustavus Adolphus in Sweden, 1611-30.—Position of Affairs at the beginning of his Reign.—Political, Military, and Domestic Reforms.—Wars with Denmark, Russia, and Poland.—The Contest for the Baltic.

##### SWEDEN BEFORE GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, 1560-1611.

GUSTAVUS VASA had risen from being a rebel and conspirator to be regent and king, and with wonderful ability had succeeded in two things—in founding a hereditary monarchy, and in providing the means for its stability by taking possession of the mediæval church property and incorporating it with the crown lands.

The poorest of countries became by these means one of the most wealthy; its trade, navigation, harbours, army, and fleet began to prosper; and the Swedes are right in regarding Gustavus Vasa as the founder of their greatness,

\* Besides the literature mentioned in Chap. xii.: Pufendorf, *De rebus suec.* 1686. Geijer, *Geschichte Schwedens.* III. Bd. Gfrörer, *Gustav Adolf.* 1845. Helbig, *Gustav Adolf und der Kurfürst v. Sachsen,* 1854. 2 auf. Bensen, *Das Verhängniss Magdeburgs.* Also Droysen's Aufsätze: 1. *Ueber Magdeburgs Zerstörung, 1631.* 2. *Die Schlacht von Lützen in Forschungen zur Deutschen Geschichte* III. and V., and O. v. Guericke, *Belagerung Magdeburgs, 1630.*

though in his lifetime he never had the satisfaction of living on peaceful and happy terms with his people.

He left four sons, Eric, John, Magnus, and Charles—the last a child, the others youths—and so deeply rooted were the ancient Germanic views of inheritance in the mind of this mighty ruler, that, though he had spent a long life in the arduous task of founding a sole monarchy, at the close of his life he proceeded to the division of his work.

The eldest son, Eric, for whom he expressly intended the crown, did not appear to him adapted for the arduous task of governing; he therefore ordained that his brothers should assist him, and conferred power on them which, while it would not make them independent, would, he thought, impose a wholesome restraint on the power of their brother.

The result was as unsuccessful as possible. Gustavus Adolphus afterwards said, “My grandfather made a mistake: the King’s brothers were too great for subjects—they were sure to strive to be masters.”

A melancholy reign of eight years now began.

Eric XIV., though he possessed mind, talent, and acquirement, had something of that wild and stormy passion, breaking out into unaccountable actions, which was peculiar to some branches of this family, and which in some cases resulted in insanity; not only Eric, but Magnus also, died insane, and personages like Gustavus IV. and Charles XII. show how long such traits may remain in a family.

This did not at first appear plainly in Eric, but it was indicated by an impulsive feverish activity. Scarcely any other monarch wrote and administered so much as he did. But his hasty, ill-considered acts appear like those of a morbidly excitable man, who throws himself into business to escape from his own humours.

Then a tendency appeared to a dangerous sort of extravagance, and after a few years of wretched government all the mischievous traits of his character gradually unfolded themselves. He surrounded himself with all sorts of unscrupulous persons, who assisted him in his passionate deeds.

Next, he took one and another for a conspirator; his suspicions especially rested upon his brother John, who was an agreeable, popular man; he imprisoned him, treated him like a criminal, but suddenly drew back from proceeding to

extremities. Fear of conspiracy tormented him like an evil conscience, and there were only too many people ready to make sport of this unhappy tendency. His favourite, Pehrson, made quite a trade of it, and the King so far forgot himself as to commit reckless crimes.

He stabbed one of the Stures in prison, and had his distinguished fellow-prisoners slaughtered. Then anguish of mind drove him into the open air; he wandered through the fields and woods in the garb of a peasant, knocked down his old tutor who accosted him, and then did penance by giving up his favourite to justice.

In a country which had only lately seen the establishment of royal authority, such a government could not be tolerated. In 1567 a ferment began to take place; a conspiracy, which had been haunting men's minds, was actually formed; the brothers, backed by the nobles, raised a revolt; the burgher class, too, were weary of the King's mad acts.

In September, 1568, Eric was seized, and for nine years was dragged from prison to prison—the best method, of course, of producing complete insanity; still, he was never looked upon as harmless. This murder by the State, of a man who was clearly not responsible, is unexampled in history. Seven years after his dethronement, the bishops and ministers declared that if the King did not cease to threaten the Government, and to furnish a pretext for revolt and disturbances, it would be the duty of his keepers to put him out of the way. In February, 1577, he died under circumstances which left no doubt that this hint was taken.

John then began to reign, together with his brother, Duke Charles of Südermanland.

John was, on the whole, lenient and well-meaning, but had very superficial views of his position and vocation. Charles, on the contrary, was cold, firm, severe, and reserved; quite destitute of the winning characteristics of his father, which were, to a certain extent, inherited by John; though in mind and political principles Charles most resembled him. As a youth of eighteen he came forward to help to dethrone his brother, and his whole character was stamped with determined ambition.

In 1688 this singular joint reign began, of two rulers who were constantly opposed to each other: and through

their contradictions the inheritance of Gustavus Vasa seemed likely to be ruined.

By this division of the empire the most essential condition of a strong monarchical power was impaired ; it only remained for the regulation of ecclesiastical affairs, with which Gustavus Vasa had taken so much pains, to be called in question, and this was done by King John.

He was but little acquainted with this question, so vital for the young Swedish kingdom, and vacillated between Catholic and Protestant opinions. He had, however, read a good deal on the subject superficially, and conceived an ambition similar to that of Henry VIII. He had a project for combining the two parties, then a particularly difficult task.

He felt the hierarchical system of the Catholic Church, and the majesty of her worship, to be imposing, and those about him favoured these sentiments. He had early married, against the will of his brother Eric, a Polish princess, who was a strict Catholic, had great influence over him, and did all she could to bring him over to her faith. Jesuits in disguise, who appeared to be good Lutherans, were daily about him, and at Rome his speedy conversion was confidently looked for. We have the instructions which were sent to the Jesuits to advance the work ; they were always to talk of faith, not of works, and to show that the Catholic Church really enjoined nothing different from the Protestant.

But Protestantism in Sweden was not merely a matter of opinion, which might be adjusted one way or the other according to individual needs ; it was a political fact of the greatest significance. The empire itself was based upon it ; and, even if the King was sincere in his schemes of mediation, he could not but get into a false position in being cool to a party with which the existence of the country was bound up ; and in coquetting with the other, which had no adherents in the country except his wife.

He made all sorts of futile efforts to effect a reconciliation which did not satisfy either party. He had Catholic changes introduced into public worship ; and in 1576 a new Liturgy appeared, which was based upon the new Mass book of the Council of Trent. Great opposition was made to this "Red book," as it was called by the people. He had hoped by its means to effect a reconciliation between the churches, but all the Swedish clergy

declared against it, and yet it did not go half far enough to please the strict Catholics.

This retrograde tendency appeared more and more openly, and it made the King's position in the country all the more difficult. The people said, "The King is secretly a Jesuit, and wants to make us all Catholics;" and the growing boldness of the Jesuit preachers, the abolition of the Lutheran Catechism, and the ostentation with which the Queen adhered to their faith, seemed to confirm the suspicion.

When the Queen died, in 1583, the Protestant bishop, with a courage which would do honour to any Court theologian of to-day, showed so little tact as to laud her as a staunch Catholic. Though the King now suddenly turned round, and expelled the Jesuits from the country, yet he obstinately held fast to the "Red book."

In another important point John was untrue to the traditions of his father. In the struggle with the Church, Gustavus Vasa had not been able to dispense with the aid of the secular nobles, and had therefore been obliged to give them a share of the spoil of the Church property. But it was to be a final concession, and no further interference from them with the rights of the Crown or the country were to be tolerated. But on this point John's conduct was at least ambiguous. He favoured the privileges of the nobles, allowed them to divert public justice to the advantage of their class, lightened their obligations to the Crown, and the service of their vassals, thereby increasing the burdens of the burgher class and free peasants, who dreaded a new government by the aristocracy; and, though this made the sentiments of all more in favour of a monarchy, it none the less estranged them from the monarch himself.

From these two mistakes in the internal administration arose a still more serious complication in the foreign policy.

King John, who had once been himself attracted by the worthless crown of Poland, conceived the idea, after it had escaped his hands, of making his son, Sigismund, King of Poland—that is, of transplanting him into a country where Catholicism and government by the nobles prevailed unhindered, and where the state of things was quite different from that of Sweden.

The republic of Poland was already on the road to ruin;

the crown was not worth having. The first principles of a real political administration would have to be settled; the arbitrariness of the nobles and disruption of parties was beyond all bounds, and a foreign king would be betrayed and sold.

It was inconceivable that a man in his senses should entertain the idea of combining with the difficult position in Sweden the still more difficult one in Poland. The result would certainly be that the Swedish crown would be lost, and the Polish one not gained.

Poland was then a decidedly Catholic State—at any rate its ruling elements were Catholic; the King must, therefore, be so too; and so the heir of a thoroughly Protestant country, who could scarcely tolerate the lukewarm Protestantism of its king, took, in 1587, the ominous step of going over to Catholicism in order to be King of Poland.

There was one man who knew how to take advantage of these embarrassments which the King created for himself; but it was also for the advantage of Sweden and the work of Gustavus Vasa; this was Charles of Südermanland, the youngest son of Gustavus, a cool, clever, moderate statesman, who opposed every one of his brother's mistakes.

John introduced the "Red book;" Charles forbade its use. John tried to unite the two churches: Charles adhered strictly to Lutheranism, and granted hospitality to all victims of persecution. John favoured the nobles: Charles checked them. In short, Charles was the decided and persevering representative of the traditions of Gustavus Vasa, which were ignored by John; and was, therefore, the spokesman of all those who were displeased with John's behaviour, especially of the peasant and burgher class—of all the patriots to whose hearts modern Sweden was dear, and whose existence or non-existence was in fact at stake.

When Sigismund was made King of Poland, or rather protector of the Polish aristocracy and their so-called constitution, the Swedish nobles held up their heads. It was well known what would be granted by the Polish King to those who elected him, and they tried to obtain the same in Sweden. Just as the King of Poland was about to embark, a plan was handed to him, the object of which was nothing less than the establishment of a Polish-Swedish constitution, which simply set aside the monarchy of Gustavus Vasa. They intended to gain over King John by accepting his



favourite Liturgy; and to secure the joint government of the nobles, they proposed the establishment of a Parliament in which seven of the chief of them should take it in turn, for from two to five years, partly to exercise some of the most important prerogatives of the Crown, partly to guard them. John and Sigismund were weak enough to approve the scheme. It was justly characterized by Gustavus Adolphus when he said that "they wanted to stab King John and Duke Charles with one spear, and thus to get rid of them both."

John left behind him, in 1592, a distracted kingdom. His son was away; the people and the nobles split up into factions; everything insecure.

In this time of perplexity, Charles's activity began; ambition persuaded him that his path to the throne was open, and that he alone was walking in the steps of his father. He thrust aside the clamorous nobles, with their proposed Senate. Parliament might advise according to Swedish law, but the duty of ruling belonged to the sovereign, and in his absence it became his own duty to fill the post. When the King was for a short time in the country, he made him take an oath to protect its religion and laws, and, in accordance with the wishes of the States, the laws against the Catholics were made more stringent. From 1592-1604, one difficulty follows closely on another. The King could not carry on the government of two countries; he was compelled to appoint a regent, but his resolute and ambitious uncle was made governor of the land, not the Senate of seven nobles.

With the aid of the peasantry, he systematically opposed the nobles; and with the aid of Protestantism, the King and Court. At a solemn assembly of the Diet, at Upsala, February, 1593, attended by a great number of ecclesiastics, the irrevocable determination of the people was expressed to abide by pure Lutheran teaching, and everything was abolished which had tended to question the supremacy of the Reformation during the reign of King John. Angermann, the vehement opponent of the "Red book," was made archbishop; all Catholic innovations were abolished, and the Lutheran Catechism reinstated.

This was clearly a manifesto against the Catholic Sigismund, but a still plainer one was to be issued. The King in Poland did all he could to embarrass his uncle, and a

party of defiant noblemen who lusted for Polish freedom held to him, while Duke Charles openly joined the great party of his father, that of the burghers and peasants. In the Senate he addressed them, not the nobles; and with their countenance he upset the obnoxious project.

All the instigations of the Catholic camarilla and of the ambitious nobles were met by the Swedish peasants with the simple answer, One was master in the country, and he was ruling in the spirit of Gustavus Vasa! Once more the courageous Dalecarlians were the chief support of the monarchy. It came at last to a sanguinary collision.

The battle of Stängebro, September, 1598, went entirely against Sigismund, and his flight left his followers to the Regent's revenge. The Diet of 1604 conferred on him the crown of Sweden. Charles IX. reigned after this for seven stormy years.

Since 1560, Sweden had had no real king who could keep down faction and foster the interests of the country. All that had been accomplished by Gustavus Vasa—the establishment of regal power, careful administration of the laws, and a military force—had had a severe shock; even the religious revolution had been endangered. Charles had all this to restore, while he was kept in suspense by three wars. The perpetual difficulties with Sigismund took him to Livonia, where he was compelled to break off the contest, in which he was at first successful, by attacks from Russia and Denmark. He was a broken-down old man, who had almost lost the power of speech, when Christian IV. invaded the country with a great force; and when Charles died, in October, 1611, not one of the recent difficulties was adjusted.

#### GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS IN SWEDEN, 1611-30.

He was succeeded by his son Gustavus Adolphus, who was called upon in his seventeenth year to undertake a most difficult task. It was not his lot to be greeted by the unanimous acclamations of a happy and contented people; he was the heir of irreconcilable hatred and numerous complications. His father had had many enemies, and had increased their number by his conflicts with Sigismund and the aristocracy; all the Catholic party hated him and his house; the resources of the country were low; his right to

the throne disputed; the kingdom involved in wars with Poland, Russia, and Denmark. Yet, in the course of twenty years, Gustavus Adolphus had triumphed over all his foes, and established a sovereign power which was in a position to take a decisive part in the great contest of the age, and which it required much misfortune and stupidity to overthrow.

He was born on the 19th of December, 1594, in the midst of his father's struggle for the crown, and he took pains to accustom his son to these rough and stormy times. When he was eleven years old, he took him with him to the sittings of the Senate, and allowed him to attend and even speak at his audiences. An interest in military life was early awakened in him. There was ample opportunity to cultivate this taste at his father's Court, which was visited by officers from almost all the European Courts, and the campaigns in which he took part completed the course of instruction. At the same time, his father took care that his successor should receive a careful mental training and learned education, such as, in the variety of subjects it embraced, no other northern monarch had yet enjoyed. While still quite young, he spoke Latin, German, Dutch, French, and Italian fluently, amused himself with Xenophon, and diligently studied Hugo Grotius. With all this early familiarity with politics, war, and learning, physical training was not neglected.

In short, the old king\* might regard his successor with pride; he was leaving behind him a second Gustavus Vasa.

The young king's first task was to heal the disorders of fifty years, which existed in every department of the State.

The most difficult task was the restoration of healthy relations with the nobles. His father had sent many a seditious nobleman to the scaffold, which had sown the seeds of fearful hatred, and was not the path to successful reorganization.

Gustavus Adolphus took the kingdom upon himself "with two empty hands," as it was said in his funeral sermon. With three wars on hand, he had neither money nor trustworthy troops. Both had to be raised, and it could only be done by a reorganization of his relations with the

\* From the admonitions, written and spoken, which he addressed to his son, it appears what a high-minded spirit this rough, harsh ruler possessed.

nobles. With their large landed property, their vassals, and legal and administrative privileges, they were practically exempt from taxation, and, though thoroughly warlike, they were entirely unaccustomed to military service as followers of the King. It was necessary that this state of things should cease, and that it should be accomplished, not by violence, but by agreement and treaty, if the citizens and peasants were not to succumb to the burden of taxation, and the State itself to be divided up into a number of aristocratic courts under "provincial kings."

The war with Denmark, which came to an end in 1613, was so unsuccessful mainly because the nobles furnished the King neither with men nor money. The King reminded them, in an address which he made to them clad in armour, that they only received their privileges in return for "equestrian service," and that he, who, instead of doing his duty in the field, had preferred to stay by the stuff, had, according to Swedish law, forfeited his privileges.

After various negotiations, often interrupted, he at length succeeded in establishing permanent, well-regulated relations, which both parties found to be to their advantage.

The King, in the main, permitted the nobles to retain their traditional privileges, and even granted them a new one, by the establishment of an Upper House; but he was in earnest in compelling them to join the army, and effected that they should not be behind the other classes in money contributions.

The Swedish nobles had always been a warlike race; every nobleman was a soldier, and the greatest lords always came to attend the meetings of Parliament with hundreds of horses. But the sovereign had hitherto only experienced the dark side of this feature of Swedish chivalry—defiant demands, and unpatriotic self-sufficiency. Under Gustavus Adolphus all this was changed within certain limits. The nobles found themselves an acknowledged power, and on good terms with the Crown; their warlike ambition was no longer in contradiction to their class feelings and privileges; they soon considered it an honour to serve this chivalrous King, as leader of the nation's forces; and the King, as the representative of the army as well as of the people, appeared even in the Senate in armour. In 1627 the relations between them had become so cordial that the nobles, who already took a share of most of the taxes, took upon

themselves to furnish recruits for the general levy from their estates.

This was the result of the prudent and personally winning manner in which Gustavus Adolphus went to work. It had never been thus in Sweden before, and has never been so since. All his successors have split upon this rock.

With these weapons Gustavus Adolphus fought his way through two great wars, by the end of which Sweden was the first great power in the north, and was competent to take her place as arbiter in Europe.

While these things were being slowly matured, Gustavus had undertaken energetic creative reforms in other spheres. The administration and the whole legal system had undergone a thorough revolution; the former was committed to carefully chosen officials, under proper control; for the latter, new rules and new municipal laws were introduced, as a completion of the common law of Charles IX. Two courts of appeal were also established against the sentences of the district courts and the patrimonial judges. In legal matters the sentiments of Gustavus Adolphus were those of a really great ruler. In a dispute which was tried between him and a nobleman, he said to the judges, "Forget that I am King; but do not forget that you are the highest judges in the land, and let your consciences pass sentence." And as they decided against him, he asked for the documents, convinced himself that he had been in the wrong, and commended the judges for their conscientiousness. In a protocol of the Supreme Court of 5th November, 1618, are the words: "His Majesty admonishes the royal courts of justice not to take the side of any party. If any one of the judges should turn aside the law in favour of the King or of any one else, let him know that it is his Majesty's intention to have him scalped, his head nailed to the seat of judgment, and his ears to the pillory."

The administration of public justice also underwent a change little in accordance with modern liberalism, but all the more in unison with the strictly military monarchy of the Sweden of that day.

By a new regulation of the Diet, which was accepted by the States assembled at Oerobrö in January, 1617, the right of initiative was conferred exclusively on the Crown. The Crown only could bring forward motions, and no other subjects were discussed. Each estate deliberated by itself,

and the King pronounced the decision. The Diet was no longer the scene of the intrigues which had occasioned so many difficulties to Charles IX. ; its power had, in fact, vanished, and this, as well as the new legal system, formed a counterpoise to the privileges of the nobles.

Together with this organization, untiring efforts were made to advance the prosperity of the oppressed people.

Ruined cities, such as Gothenburg, were rebuilt ; sixteen new ones founded, and their prosperity secured by good constitutions and mercantile privileges ; navigation, commerce, and the export of the products of the country—timber, copper, iron, pitch, and tar—were encouraged ; restrictions imposed on the introduction of foreign manufactures ; Swedish products were introduced into the great markets by means of commercial treaties ; so that in 1614 Sweden maintained active intercourse with Holland, and after 1624 Swedish merchants conveyed pitch, iron, planks, and rye in their own ships as far as Spain. Skilful foreigners were attracted to the country ; one of these found means to raise the mines of Sweden to a high state of prosperity ; and the King established a manufactory of arms and military requisites on a large scale. All this brought the fact to light that a people who had hitherto been supposed to be exclusively adapted for war, agriculture, and fishing, under judicious guidance could develope a capacity for industrial pursuits of every kind.

The dark background of this active creative life is formed by the three sanguinary wars which Gustavus Adolphus inherited from his father, in which he, his state, and army, had to stand a fiery ordeal.

These wars, as well as the war in Germany, were especially aimed at the acquisition of dominion over the Baltic ; it was Gustavus Adolphus who projected this as a leading idea of Swedish policy, and he pursued it with remarkable success.

When he entered upon this project all the south of Sweden was still in the hands of the Danes, together with the keys of the Baltic and the North Sea, Calmar and Elfsborg. Sweden was quite shut out from the sea. In this situation every attack of the Danes threatened the existence of the whole country, and this explains the obstinate war into which the young King was compelled to enter at the very beginning of his reign, in which neither party was victo-



rious, though it caused unspeakable desolation in Sweden. By the Treaty of Knäröd, January, 1613, both parties had to give up what they had taken from the other. Sweden received, under the form of a purchase, for one million dollars, the highly important points of Calmar, Oeland, Elfsborg, and the surrounding country. This was the first step towards the creation of the Swedish naval power.

The war with Russia was more successful.

With the revolt of Michael Romanow, in 1613, Russia began to free herself from the troubles occasioned by pretenders to the throne, foreign interference, and the immigration of foreign nations. Still it was but the beginning of a normal political life; no power existed sufficient to oppose Gustavus Adolphus. The Swedes were everywhere victorious, and peace was bought at a very high price. By the Treaty of Stolbowa, February, 1617, Sweden received Carelia, Ingermanland, and Livonia; that is, Russia lost the Baltic.

This was an immense success. With just pride Gustavus Adolphus could say to his Parliament, in the spring of 1617, "Not the least of the benefits which God has granted Sweden is that Russia must for ever give up the robbers' den from which she has so often molested us. She is a dangerous neighbour; her frontiers extend along the North and the Caspian Sea and approach the Black Sea; she has a powerful aristocracy, a superfluity of peasants, populous cities, and can send large armies into the field. But she cannot send any vessel into the Baltic Sea without our leave. We are separated from her by the great Lakes of Ladoga and Peipus, thirty miles of marsh and strong fortresses. Russia is shut out from the Baltic, and I hope to God that the Muscovite will henceforth find it difficult to leap over this brook."

Sweden then possessed all those points to which the Russian Empire afterwards extended itself, the main part of the territory which Peter the Great acquired for Russia for ever. Sweden made good her claims upon Livonia, seized parts of Courland and Esthonia, conquered one Polish and Prussian harbour after another, and finally received, at the Peace of Westphalia, the mouths of the Oder, the Weser, and the Elbe, Pomerania, Bremen, and Verden—in short, "the whole bastion of the Crown of Sweden," as Axel Oxenstierna expressed it. It was an im-



mense district on the Baltic coasts, in the power of a State hitherto the poorest of all in coast territory.

The third and last war with Poland lasted till 1629. The enmity between Poland and Sweden was vastly increased by the contest about the right to the throne of the two lines of Vasa. In Poland the King of Sweden was called a usurper. Sigismund's Catholic followers joined cause with all the foes of Gustavus Adolphus, and the Polish coast of the Baltic was quite enough to become an apple of discord. The last war was also the most successful for Sweden.

By the truce which ended it in 1629, Sweden received Elbing, Braunsberg, Pillau, Memel, and her claims were recognised to the Baltic territory.

During this warlike period of eighteen years, not only had a vast empire been conquered, a school of generals and warriors had been trained such as had not been seen in Europe since the decline of the Spanish school. Yet, singularly enough, when the news came to Vienna of the landing of Gustavus Adolphus, they looked in the State Almanack to see where the country of the little Gothic king was situated.

## CHAPTER XXXV.

### GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS IN GERMANY, 1630-32.

Origin and Significance of the Swedish War.—Motives, Political and Religious, of Gustavus Adolphus.—Characteristics of him and his Army.—Their Landing and First Successes, June—December, 1630.—Gustavus Adolphus in Pomerania.—Siege of Stettin; Treaty with Duke Bogeslav.—Tedious Advance into Pomerania.—Imperial troops driven out of Pomerania, December, 1630.—Treaty of Bärwalde, January, 1631.—Convention of Leipzig, and Fall of Magdeburg, May, 1631.—Electoral Brandenburg and Electoral Hesse join Gustavus Adolphus, June—August.—Battle of Breitenfeld, September 7, 1631.—Victorious March of Gustavus Adolphus towards South and West Germany, October—December, 1631.—Plans for Restoration.—Overthrow of the Power of the League.—Return of Wallenstein, April, 1632.—Battle of Lützen, 16th November, 1632.—Death of Gustavus Adolphus and its Significance.

### ORIGIN AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WAR.

THE invasion of Germany by Gustavus Adolphus was a result of the protection he had afforded to Stralsund against Wallenstein, and this protection was a result of his relations with the Baltic and with the Reformation. He could never hope to rule the Baltic so long as Mecklenburg and Pomerania were in the hands of the imperial party, and the opposition Polish king had a support in the Hapsburgs—indeed his own kingdom would be endangered if the Catholic Restoration were not energetically opposed.

The same controversy about which the world-wide war in Germany had broken out, was raging in Sweden; it was only the iron grasp of Charles IX. which had kept the monarchy of Gustavus Vasa above water; and the country on the other side of the Baltic was the seat of perpetual intrigues to undo his work. If this were allowed to go on,

a time would come when his own kingdom would be in the same danger as the little states of North Germany.

And this was no idle dream. Since Wallenstein's successes, the wings of the reaction had almost overshadowed the Scandinavian States.

The Emperor Ferdinand and his brother-in-law, Sigismund, had been eagerly discussing how Sweden could be made Catholic; at what point the attempt at conversion which King John had been compelled to give up, had best be taken up again; and they had great hopes of attaining their end. The truce which had cost Poland so many losses on the Baltic, lasted purposely until Sigismund, with the aid of the Emperor, had recruited his strength, and for years the latter had openly taken part in Poland against Gustavus Adolphus.

There were also pressing Swedish interests which impelled Gustavus to join in the contest, and to overlook these would be to misunderstand the position of affairs. But these were not his only points of view.

In one respect Gustavus Adolphus was a unique personage in this century; he was animated by the fresh, unbroken youthful spirit of the early days of the Reformation, like that which characterized such men as Frederic of Saxony and Philip of Hesse. If it can be said of any ruler in the first half of the seventeenth century, that he was filled with Protestant zeal and sincere enthusiasm for the greatness of his cause, it may be said of him, and of him alone. To a world full of mean artifices, miserable intrigues, and narrow-minded men, he exhibited once more the qualities and characteristics of a true hero.

This explains why he called forth enthusiasm where it had been for many decades unknown—why he succeeded in kindling men's minds for ideas which had been engulfed in the miseries of the times. Sacred things were no idle sport with him. Because he was himself in earnest with his prayers and religion, the divine worship which was held, the spiritual songs and psalms that were sung in his camp, had power to restrain the terrible brute strength of his army; but it was he alone who succeeded in it, not one of his successors could do so.

His mind was also large enough in a fearfully demoralised age to go back to the origin of the peaceful relations which had existed between the adherents of the different creeds

for more than half a century. He alone proclaimed the principle that the object was not mutual destruction, but the restoration of the law as it existed before the war; he alone restored their rights to the Protestants without encroaching on those of the Catholics. This was something in a contest in which both parties had become so fearfully embittered. He could justly say to the princes and nobles at Nuremberg, "For shame, that I, the foreigner, must teach you your natural duty!"

It was this that gave importance to the following war. During the whole period Gustavus was the only person to whom men could look up, who could inspire them with enthusiasm. The Catholic party did not produce any individual of equal greatness to confront him. This gave to Protestantism, in the days of its deepest dejection, an unaccustomed impetus, and the part played by this one man is shown by the retrogression which took place only too quickly after his death.

There is another point on which this episode is of importance. It was not only that the weight of a great and powerful personage was thrown into the scale, that of a king and a general to whom no one, and least of all Ferdinand II., could be compared; Gustavus Adolphus commanded the only army in this war which either did not soon get beyond discipline and control, or at any rate throw off its distinctive creed. Who could call the armies around him, or after him, either Catholic or Protestant? In the imperial armies there were masses of Protestant hirelings, especially in those of Wallenstein, and as many Catholics among the troops of their opponents. The most deplorable thing in this war was, that, especially after the fourth decade, those who were carrying it on had entirely forgotten its origin—that everything had been engulfed in passion and tumult, and that religion had only become a blasphemous pretext for horrible devastation and plunder.

All this was quite otherwise in the army of Gustavus Adolphus. Even after his death it continued to be brave and well commanded, though there was no one capable of keeping up its spirit, its inner life, as he had done.

The armies of his adversaries consisted of collections of rabble without country or conscience. His army was a national Swedish one; his soldiers were Sweden's brave peasants, led by their chivalrous nobles. All the national

enthusiasm of the people and the aristocracy lived in these hosts, and this was a most important factor against the hiring troops, who looked for nothing in war but plunder, debauchery, and excess.

The Swedish army was also religious. It was Lutheran, like its King, and every feature indicated that it was so. The neglected levers of the sixteenth century were still in use. "Ein' feste Burg ist unser Gott," "A mighty castle is our God," was sung, understood, and sympathized with. What a fearful contrast were the lawless bands who, in the name of the one true faith, tore our unhappy country to pieces!

This gave a consecration to this war. Gustavus Adolphus managed to control the wild lawless masses by higher motives; sentiments of nationality and religion had some weight with them. All this was changed by his death. After this, when a battle was lost, some of the Swedes took service under the Emperor, and they were in no way behind the other soldiers in barbarity towards defenceless citizens and peasants.

It was this which conferred on the war of 1630 a peculiar greatness, notwithstanding its short duration, and caused it soon to lose the character of a mere invasion. Gustavus Adolphus became a leading personage, Sweden a commanding power in Europe. This arose from his personal character, the character of his army, and the moral power of both over Catholics and Protestants. Even the Pope did homage to the hero, and said, on hearing of his death, "A hero, a perfect man, who wanted nothing for perfection but the true faith."

There was nothing of this spirit to be found anywhere else. Who would venture to call a Wallenstein, a Tilly, or a Pappenheim, a Catholic hero?

#### LANDING AND FIRST SUCCESSES, JUNE—DECEMBER, 1630.

The situation of affairs in which Gustavus Adolphus now began to take part has been characterized by our previous remarks.

The power of the League had been for two years on the decline, and the Emperor had done all that was in his power to weaken it. He had created for himself the embarrassment occasioned by the Edict of Restitution, and thereby driven the Protestant states into the enemy's

camp, and now he had dismissed Wallenstein into the bargain.

In so far, then, the situation was more favourable than ever. Had Gustavus come three years earlier, when Wallenstein was victorious on the Baltic, the Edict not yet issued, and the League still strong in the field, the struggle would have been a desperate one.

It was by no means a slight one as it was, and there was something so adventurous in the commencement of the undertaking, that any less courageous person must have shrunk from it. In Sweden, except the King and his impatient officers, there was not a man for the war. The country was recovering itself, after the sacrifices and sufferings of eighteen years of warfare, and was now to be involved in another great war, the end of which no one could foresee. Parliament would not be convinced that instead of adhering to a watchful defensive policy towards the Emperor, it was necessary to adopt an offensive attitude exposed to a thousand dangers. The States declared that there was no money, and tormented the King with their blunt refusals until immediately before his departure.

After the hated King's back was turned, Denmark seemed disposed to attack the country; and, until there was some result to show, nothing but smooth words came from France, England, and Holland; and nothing whatever was to be expected from the German princes whom it was intended to aid.

The Duke of Pomerania, to whom Gustavus Adolphus hoped to appear in the light of a liberator, sent an embassy to him just as he was about to embark, urgently to entreat him to stay at home, or, at all events, not to land in Pomerania, for the country was already nearly ruined, and could not stand the passage of troops again.

On 24th June, 1630, exactly one hundred years after the presentation of the Confession of Augsburg, Gustavus Adolphus appeared before the island of Usedom, and at once began to disembark his troops and artillery.

He was preceded by a manifesto, which set forth all his causes of complaint against the Emperor Ferdinand, and explained that the King came to protect liberty in general, which was threatened by Hapsburg, and in particular that of the German Electors, who had just presented their ultimatum to the Emperor at Ratisbon.

The project was certainly well enough conceived, but still it produced no immediate result.

Germany was invaded by a splendid force of 20,000 or 30,000 men, but the German empire remained to be conquered. Suppose the feeling should be, Away with the foreigner, who could find fault with it? Suppose the Germans, who had been tearing each other's eyes out, should now make peace to avoid the disgrace of foreign intervention, who could regard it as anything but an act of reasonable self-defence? Such sentiments did here and there arise. It was asked, "What will become of us if strangers insinuate themselves amongst us and meddle in our affairs?" But these feelings were not strong enough to unite parties, or to oppose a compact front to the foreigner.

Still, he was regarded with suspicion and distrust; only if it came to the worst would the Protestants side with him. The attitude of Saxony and Brandenburg towards the Emperor, or rather their want of a decided attitude, was the result of mere weakness, and fear withheld them from risking anything for Sweden. The other Protestant elements were isolated. The Landgrave of Hesse Cassel was a long way off, and could not render any help, for he wanted help himself. The imperial cities of South Germany looked eagerly towards Gustavus Adolphus, but could do nothing at so great a distance: their adherence would only be possible if great victories brought him to South Germany.

The King was therefore in utter isolation on German soil; and not only so, his line of retreat was quite insecure. His great distance from home, the watchful enmity of Denmark and Poland, who were only awaiting a favourable moment for attack, could but lead to a fatal catastrophe if he met with a decided repulse half way.

Under such circumstances, it required a bold, adventurous spirit to undertake the invasion, and much prudence and foresight not to make shipwreck at the very outset.

Gustavus Adolphus was quite equal to the task. He proceeded like a man who accurately weighs every consideration and the means at his disposal, and, knowing that he cannot retrace his path, advances only step by step, and sometimes by circuitous paths.

The imperial army under Conti, which opposed him in Pomerania and Mecklenburg, might be equal, if not superior, to his in numbers. It was in possession of all the places



which it had won during the successful warfare of several years, but it was deprived of the great leader who had created and kept it together. It suffered from hunger, desertion, and discouragement, was widely scattered, in part given up by its leaders, and therefore it melted away day by day, and was ill adapted to repulse a resolute, well-conducted attack, though it made any advance into the country very difficult.

The first success of Gustavus worth naming, after taking the islands of Rügen and Wollin by surprise, was the occupation of Stettin in July.

It took place under circumstances which were striking enough. The Protestant population trembled at the horrors which had been connected with every occupation by foreign troops, whether Catholic or Protestant. Bogeslav feared the Emperor's reprisals if a change should take place, and threatened hostilities if the Swedes did not keep themselves at a respectful distance. But Gustavus would not be repulsed, rejected every proposal of neutrality, and so pressed the anxious Duke that with a heavy heart he at length granted them entrance. The Swedes behaved admirably; they were not, like other troops, quartered on the citizens, but lived in tents, went peacefully with the inhabitants to church, and, with great energy, in four days constructed a system of fortifications round the town which might have served for a model, not for that period only.

At the same time a treaty was concluded between Sweden and Pomerania, which not only established a perpetual alliance, but dexterously provided that in the event of Duke Bogeslav's death Pomerania should fall to Sweden, which afterwards took place.

This was the beginning of the tedious warfare by means of which Gustavus Adolphus spread his forces over Pomerania, Mecklenburg, and Brandenburg. Napoleon considered him to be the greatest general of all times, chiefly because, during a dangerous and tedious campaign, from June, 1630, to the autumn of 1631, he advanced slowly, but surely, towards the centre of Germany without suffering any repulse worth mentioning. It was upon these tactics that the whole fate of his undertaking depended; not a single false step must be made. And this solves the much-disputed question why he did not relieve Magdeburg while it was still possible to do so.

Magdeburg was certainly an important place as the capital of North Germany, and the most prosperous seat of Protestantism. But important as he must have considered its fate, he could not sacrifice his existence, the results of three great wars, the army which it had taken him nineteen years to create, by placing himself between two fires, and involving himself in a catastrophe which the authorities of the city had brought upon themselves by culpable imprudence.

Nothing occurred during the summer of 1630 but an advance step by step into North Germany. It took months to get the whole of Pomerania into his hands, and to conquer every town, and months more before he had gained a firm footing in Brandenburg.

So difficult was the situation that his own brother-in-law, in Brandenburg, afterwards only allowed a few fortresses to be taken from him by force.

On 24th December a decisive blow was struck at the flower of the imperial troops, who, tortured by cold and hunger, were lying between Greifenhagen and Garz. The whole of Pomerania, with the exception of Colberg and Greifswald, and part of Neumark, was now in his power; but his only allies were Francis of Saxe Lauenburg, the exiled Dukes of Mecklenburg, the Administrator Christian William of Magdeburg, and Bogeslav of Pomerania; with the exception of the latter, princes without land.

The most laborious part of the campaign was now over, and it had become obvious to every one that the Swedish war was no repetition of the unhappy Danish one, which had been conducted without the least skill or success. In the present instance resolute determination and prudent foresight were singularly combined.

5-18 **TREATY OF BÄRWALDE, JANUARY, 1631.—CONVENTION OF LEIPZIG AND FALL OF MAGDEBURG, MAY, 1631.—VICTORY OF BREITENFELD, SEPTEMBER, 1631.**

With the beginning of the new year a new ally appeared, who was not without value—Cardinal Richelieu. He could do pretty much what he pleased in France, and was in a position to entertain the idea of renewing the foreign policy of Henry IV., Henry II., and Francis I. France had neither finances nor army for independent intervention. If she desired, therefore, to take a part in European affairs,

she must ally herself with some foreign military ruler, and Gustavus Adolphus appeared to be the man.

He was in want of money, for his resources were still very limited, and as a foreigner he seemed adapted to support the acquisitive schemes in which France indulged in the name of "German liberty." He might perhaps be employed as a battering ram for the French policy. Richelieu gave Gustavus credit for being what Bernhard of Weimar was afterwards to be, and what the Swedes at last actually became; and there did not now seem to be much cause to anticipate failure on his part.

But Richelieu found his master in Gustavus Adolphus. France had hitherto known nothing of a "King" of Sweden, for the rulers of that country did not wear their crowns by the grace of God, only by the election of the States and people. Gustavus declared at once that only as King would he negotiate, and Richelieu was obliged to yield.

And, what was of more importance, he was also obliged to make important concessions. His endeavour to obtain an influence over the conduct of affairs was futile. All that he could obtain was a promise from Gustavus that he would nowhere attack the Catholic Church as such, and would otherwise restore everything to its previous condition of peace. Even the cession of a slice of Germany on the French frontier, which Richelieu desired to have for the protection of German liberty, was refused. "Not a village shall the French have," said Gustavus Adolphus.

Thus he had fully accomplished his object. France granted him subsidies in the name of their common interests; but the political and military leadership belonged solely to Sweden. The Treaty of Bärwalde (January, 1631) was therefore a great diplomatic victory for Gustavus Adolphus. It provided him with the means of carrying on the war, while he fully maintained his independence.

Meanwhile the contest about the fortresses continued. By the spring the King had made two important conquests—that of Colberg in March, and of Frankfort-on-the-Oder in April.

Consciousness began to dawn upon the Protestant States which had not yet joined either side, that the time was come for them to take an independent course. The Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, as the chief representatives of German Protestantism, and yet not favourable

to Sweden, both severely menaced by the Edict of Restitution, were now compelled to adopt a decisive policy. The Protestant States of South Germany were in the same position; they had everything to fear from Catholic restoration, and little to hope for from Sweden. For both these groups there was a common programme prescribed by the nature of the case—armed neutrality, for the protection of Protestantism against the Emperor, of the German nation against the foreigner. Since the dismissal of Wallenstein the imperial arms had been everywhere at a disadvantage. The League, or rather the Elector of Bavaria, maintained a policy of delay which displayed little zeal for the Emperor. If the King of Sweden had to halt before Saxony and Brandenburg, he would be left in the lurch. If these adversaries united to form a compact mass, and said to the Emperor, "We will keep to the religious peace, and have nothing to do with the foreigner," there would be a prospect of a peace which would satisfy both the religious and national demands of Germany. Armed mediation is certainly often the most thankless policy; but under some circumstances it alone can turn the scale. The means of those upon whom it depended were quite sufficient; but then there must be no delay in collecting and using them; and, above all things, it must not be imagined that the end would be attained by boastful speeches and endless scribbling. This simple and obvious policy was pursued with great firmness by a man who has been much censured and misunderstood, Count Arnim von Boytzenburg.\*

In February a convention took place at Leipzig, at which there was a brilliant assemblage of Protestant States, and they discussed the subject of a common programme till May.

Neither of the military parties took part in it—neither the League nor Gustavus Adolphus. The Jesuits jeered, and published mocking fugitive pieces,† because they per-

\* Until 1629 he was in Wallenstein's army, after 1631 an Electoral Field-Marshal. Upon his continued relations with Wallenstein, see Gfrörer, who seems to overlook the fact that in the existing position of affairs, it was quite a different thing to be in connection with Wallenstein and with the Court of Vienna.

† For instance:—

"The poor little Lutheran princes  
Are holding a little convention at Leipzig.  
Who is there? A princeling and a half.  
What are they going to do? Make a little war.

[Who's

ceived the danger of success, and Gustavus Adolphus set his Chemnitz to negotiate, because he foresaw that if their end were obtained, all that he had attained would be lost.

But the helpless indecision of the princes and their ministers took good care that the one thing should not happen which could have given Germany peace by German means. After discussions which lasted for months, great festivities and carousals, the assembly broke up without the smallest result. The decision with which they finally consoled themselves was simply ridiculous. They had intended to form a league, but instead of that they reckoned up what number of troops each party could bring in case they should form a league some other time.

A religious discussion also took place. Of course no agreement was come to; but a praiseworthy promise was given to treat each other better in future than they had hitherto done. The Convention of Leipzig is best described by one who took part in it: "For four weeks we feasted and caroused like excellent Christians, and can say, like the bishop who cut his finger, 'Quantum patimur pro Jesu Christo.'"

Meanwhile the League had roused itself up. Tilly had joined Pappenheim, who was besieging Magdeburg, and before Gustavus Adolphus arrived the city was taken, devastated, burnt, and the inhabitants butchered with unparalleled barbarity.\*

This stirred up the hatred of the Protestants afresh

Who's going to lead it? The little King of Sweden.

Who'll find the money? Topsy George of Saxony.

Whom will it please? Little Palatine Fritz.

What's it all about? His little nest at Heidelberg."

—RAUMER, Vol. III.

"Die armen lutherischen Fürstelein

Halten zu Leipzig ein Conventelein.

Wer ist dabei? Anderthalb Fürstelein.

Was sollen sie anfahren? Ein klein Kriegelein.

Wer soll's führen? Das schwedisch Köniclein.

Wer wird's geld geben? Das sächsisch Biergörglein.

Wer wird sich dessen freuen? Das pfälzisch Fritzlein.

Warum ist's zu thun? Um sein heidelbergisch Nestelein."

\* Droysen considers it probable, though not certain, that the storming from May 10-20th was begun on receiving a treacherous sign from the city itself. By whom given cannot now be ascertained. The city was set fire to by Pappenheim's orders, but whether he intended its entire destruction it is impossible to say.

against the Emperor, and brought the behaviour of the Swedes during the war into a favourable light. They were everywhere in an enemy's country, yet they could not be reproached with anything like the outrages of the imperial troops in the empire itself. In March, Gustavus Adolphus had issued strict regulations to protect those who had soldiers quartered upon them from exorbitant demands from the officers and troops;\* and this gave him more adherents among the people than victorious battles would have done.

Meanwhile the intermediate party was quite broken up. There was no neutrality; on one side was Tilly, on the other Gustavus. Both coveted accessions, and sought to gain them, now by persuasions, now by threats. The Elector of Brandenburg had only consented with great reluctance, and under all sorts of conditions, to surrender Spandau and Küstrin to the Swedes. After the fall of Magdeburg he demanded Spandau back again, and as he would not listen to the King's friendly remonstrances, the latter advanced with his artillery to Berlin, and while it was directed against the castle, he compelled the Elector to sign the treaty with Sweden. The neutrality of electoral Saxony was soon also at an end.

The indecision of this court was so great, that until both parties were in the country and demanded its adherence, nobody knew who was its friend or foe. The country was purely Protestant; the imperial troops behaved as they did everywhere, while the Protestant Swedes spared both people and country. This decided the question.

At the end of August, Saxony went over to Gustavus Adolphus, and this gave an impetus to other accessions in central and southern Germany. In the beginning of September, the Saxon and Swedish armies met at Düben, and advanced into the plains of Leipzig, to give the Imperialists battle. Tilly had united all the imperial forces that were at hand, but did not intend to give battle. Pappenheim, on the contrary, and the officers, who were weary of perpetually moving hither and thither, were eager for it, and when the Swedes came in sight rushed away with their cavalry from the main army to begin the contest. The attack was a failure, and now Tilly himself was obliged to give battle.



They fought from the 7th to the 17th of September, on the Breitenfeld. The Swedes fought mainly by themselves, for the Saxons only kept their posts for a short time, and the Elector, who a few days before had declared, that if Gustavus Adolphus did not at once advance to battle he would attack Tilly alone, fled miles away from the battlefield. The Swedes fought against 34,000 imperial troops, with 13,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry. The material of the former was not bad, and their leader was a hitherto unvanquished general.

Tilly's plan was to outflank the enemy's line of battle by means of his superior number of cavalry, and then to surround them. But the plan was frustrated by the skilful tactics of the Swedish infantry and cavalry together. After the conflict had begun by a fierce cannonade, the masses of cavalry rushed at each other, and after each attack, the Swedish cavalry parted to the right and left, thus leaving space for the fearful firing of the musketeers, and the light cannons behind them. Thus the divisions of infantry and cavalry continually relieved each other; the excellent discipline of the Swedes, the regular interchange of weapons, the skill of their leaders, and the unusual agility of the separate divisions, finally gained the day. The valour of the imperial troops was worthy of their ancient fame. They stood the enemy's fire like walls, but could not match his tactics. The approach of night put an end to the contest, which had lasted for five hours. Tilly's army was almost annihilated, and he narrowly escaped death himself.

#### VICTORIOUS MARCH OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS TOWARDS SOUTH GERMANY, OCTOBER, 1621.—HIS PLANS OF RESTORATION.

Immense results followed this victory. All that had been accomplished by the imperial arms since 1620, in North Germany, was undone. The fruits of the victories of Wallenstein and Tilly, by which North German Protestantism was lamed, were destroyed, and from the manner of the retreat of Tilly's army, it was doubtful whether it would confront the enemy again. The greater part of Germany would probably now be open to the Swede; perhaps he would head a triumphal march to the Rhine



and the Maine. The King at first advanced cautiously towards the south, as yet unconscious of the great results of his victory; he reached the Maine and Würzburg without striking a blow, and when Tilly opposed him, he was victorious over him again.

It has often been asked, why, after the victory of Breitenfeld, Gustavus Adolphus did not at once advance to Bohemia, march to Vienna, and before the Emperor could assemble an army, decide the contest before the walls of the capital. Why, instead of doing this, he left the attack on the Austrian hereditary dominions, to the Elector of Saxony, and himself advanced to the Rhine and the Maine, where there was no hostile army of any importance. Eminent men about the King regretted afterwards that he took this course, and eighteen years after his death, Oxenstierna was of opinion that the King made a great blunder, contrary to the advice of his best friends.

Many reasons may be imagined which determined the King not to take the former otherwise obvious course.

In the first place, he had not then that idea of the importance of his victory, in the plains of Leipzig, which he afterwards derived from its actual results, and it was on these results that the opinions of the generals were mainly based. It could not then be precisely known how completely the power of the League was destroyed.

Then the very loose alliance with the Elector required peculiar caution. The Elector maintained that he was still the independent leader of his troops. If this were conceded to him, his command must be of a kind that, however exercised, could hurt no one but himself. Gustavus Adolphus sent him to Bohemia, because he thought it more prudent to set his doubtful ally to harry the Austrian territory than to send him to the Maine and the Rhine, where, as the succourer of the Protestants, he would have appropriated to himself all the results of the Swedish victories; would have taken up his old alliances more injuriously than ever, and have been changed from a lukewarm ally into an open enemy.

By going himself to the south, he made the Elector innocuous, and created a permanent power for himself by the adherence of the Protestant princes and imperial cities of the west and south. He was not mistaken in the value of these allies. The South Germans remained the longest

faithful to the Swedes, and allied themselves so closely with them that there was no fear of their defection.

It was here that Gustavus Adolphus had his most gracious task to perform, and he really seemed like a saviour to the oppressed Protestant States. In Bohemia and Upper Austria, Protestantism had been completely crushed, and could not be revived simply by the entrance of Protestant troops; but in the favoured provinces of the Maine and the Rhine there were millions of Protestants who, since 1622, had been groaning under the oppression of their fanatical "converters," and were anxiously awaiting their liberation. This was expressed in the invitation to Gustavus Adolphus to lend them a hand against Hapsburg, which was addressed to him by a number of states assembled at Frankfort. He came to assert the rights of Protestantism; if he did not redeem his word, he would lose not only his prestige, but the substantial support of his whole policy.

Hesse Cassel, Darmstadt, the Palatinate, and its collateral lines, Würtemberg, and all the imperial cities from Frankfort to Ulm and Augsburg, formed together a great power in Germany. The time was come for wresting them from the Hapsburg power, and restoring the ascendancy of the Protestants.

After taking Erfurt with one blow, in the beginning of October, he passed through Thuringia to Franconia without meeting with any resistance; and now began the period of his triumphs, and a time of prosperity for his troops such as they had never known. Königshofen, Würzburg, Hanau, Frankfort, and Höchst fell quickly one after another into his hands. The States of the Franconian district did homage to him as the Duke of Franconia, and his famished troops revelled in the luxuriance of the great "priests' row" (pfaffengasse), as the line of ecclesiastical states from the Maine to the Rhine was then called.

At Würzburg there was again a sanguinary passage of arms with Tilly, which ended in his retreat. After this, Gustavus could peacefully take possession of the country from Franconia to the Rhine. His position was as brilliant as that of any one who had taken part in this war. From the coast of Pomerania he had advanced to the line of the Maine; there he appeared only as an adventurous general. Here, in the heart of the empire, he received the Protestant States like a German Emperor of the olden time.

Still, his position was not without difficulties. His alliance with the German princes was always insecure; the faithfulness of the imperial cities was no security against their defection; a single failure would drive Saxony and Brandenburg into the enemy's camp. Those only were true to him who had much to receive and little to give. The exiled princes who expected him to re-instate them—those who were landless, who looked for a rich booty, the distressed South German princes—such as the Prince of Hesse Cassel—who hoped for protection against the foreign rule of the Spaniards and Jesuits. But none of these conferred any power; they were only *protégés* whom it was often hard to please. That Saxony and Brandenburg regarded the King with distrust and aversion, was not merely a suspicion; it was a fact. Both had only been frightened into alliance with him by threats. If now or later, they found any loophole which would enable them to come to terms with the Emperor, they would avail themselves of it. Gustavus was not in the least deceived by them.

Among the princes of Central Germany there was a fear lest all this should end in merely exchanging a Hapsburg master for a Swedish one, and this could but be strengthened as the King's plans were developed by the growing success of his arms.

At any rate, the victorious march towards the south and west had essentially changed his plans.

The Swedes had hitherto found a scanty subsistence in the most sterile and exhausted parts of Germany; but now they were in countries which rejoiced their hearts. They have themselves given us naïve descriptions of their surprise. They seem to say, It is good to be here; let us make tabernacles—whereas this had never entered their heads in the camp at Werben or on the sandy plains of Brandenburg. That Gustavus Adolphus also may have now entertained ideas of permanent conquest and settlement, which did not occur to him on the Pomeranian coast and in the Mark, is quite intelligible. Was he not revered as if he had been Emperor? Were not his meetings of princes held with all the old imperial pomp? Was he not regarded with enthusiastic affection by the people?

Nuremberg, the most German of the imperial cities, and the proudest of the republics, told him expressly that if there were an election of a new head of the empire, "they knew

of no one whose choice would be more suitable and happy than that of his Majesty himself."

When Gustavus Adolphus was advancing from Pomerania to Brandenburg, the Elector sent an embassy to him, to ask what recompense he should demand as a material indemnity in Germany. The King replied that if the exiles were restored, religious liberty granted to the States, and he were assured that he need not fear any attack from the Hapsburgs in his own country, he should be satisfied. But by this assurance he meant a pledge which should at once indemnify him, and protect him against attack. He intended probably some slip of the Baltic coast, like that which afterwards fell to Sweden on the mouth of the Oder in Pomerania.

But now that he was at Mayence the case was different. He was now justified in demanding what would then have been premature. When the Catholic party made overtures of peace, he made the following stipulations:—

1. The Edict of Restitution shall be null and void.
2. Both the Catholic and Protestant religion shall be tolerated in town and country.
3. Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia shall be restored to their previous condition; all the exiles shall return to their estates.
4. The Elector Palatine Frederic V. shall be restored to his country.
5. The Bavarian Electorate shall cease; the electoral vote shall be restored to the Palatinate.
6. The practice of the evangelical religion and all civic privileges shall be restored to Augsburg.
7. All Jesuits, as disturbers of the public peace and authors of the present difficulties, shall be banished from the empire.
8. Protestants, as well as Catholics, shall be admitted into every institution.
9. The monasteries in the Duchy of Wurtemberg which have been illegally taken possession of by the Catholics shall be restored.
10. Out of gratitude for the salvation of the German empire, your Majesty the King of Sweden shall be elected King of Rome.
11. All expenses incurred in the imperial cities and in the Duchy of Wurtemberg by the Edict of Restitution shall be repaid.

12. There shall be as many Lutheran as Catholic canons appointed to the cathedrals.

We have two accounts of these conditions, one by Khevenhillier (vol. xii.), the other in Richelieu's memoirs (vol. vii.). They agree, except on one point; the clause about the election of Gustavus Adolphus as King of Rome is wanting in Richelieu. This important point is not well authenticated. There is very important testimony of another kind against that of Khevenhillier.\*

About the same time Gustavus Adolphus told the people of Nuremberg† that "from his friends he required nothing but gratitude. What he had taken from his foes he intended to keep. The Protestant League must separate itself from the Catholics, and provide itself with a suitable leader, especially for the war. He could not be satisfied with pay for a few months, like a military adventurer. He might demand territory '*ex iure gentium*,' according to Grotius, although he had enough of his own. He could not give up Pomerania, on account of the sea; and if he gave anything back, he might at the same time demand the rights of supremacy which the Emperor had hitherto enjoyed. The old imperial constitution was good for nothing; it was like an ancient ruin, good enough for rats and mice, but not habitable for men."

A resolution of the Swedish Parliament now proposed religious liberty, abolition of the Inquisition for ever, and restitution to the Protestants; compensation for Sweden's war expenses, and security for the payment of them; a league between the Protestants and the King of Sweden, with the *directorium belli*, which was his due, in all the wars with the Emperor and other potentates; the cession of Pomerania and Wismar to Sweden, in compensation for which Brandenburg was to have Silesia; Saxony, Lusatia, and the Landgrave of Hesse, the Dukes of Weimar, and others, were to be endowed at the expense of Austria.

This programme was quite in accordance with the wishes of the Protestant imperial cities; but the rulers did not approve of it, and were all the more suspicious of it because the details of it were unknown, and because it was clear that its ultimate objects were purposely left obscure.

\* Would the difference between being acknowledged Protector of a Protestant league and king of Rome be really so great?—Ed.

† Geijer.

In the circles where politics were enshrouded in the mists of petty sovereignty, they foreboded the worst. They already beheld the Swede as Emperor, and German liberty destroyed by Sweden instead of by Spain. Saxony especially was filled with alarm, and even among those who were dependent on the King's favour great discontent was spreading, since it had appeared that he would not hear of the reinstatement of the exiled princes in the now partly vanquished countries before the end of the war.

In short his relations with the princes, with lands and without, became less friendly week by week, while with the people and the inhabitants of the imperial cities they became closer and closer. He reproached the princes with the un-German attitude of their armies and policy, while he gained the hearts of the people by amiable words. Like his grandfather, he was a great orator, and was wonderfully skilful in adopting the popular confidential tone which works upon the masses, and every speech of his to such audiences was a triumph.

OVERTHROW OF THE POWER OF THE LEAGUE.—RETURN OF WALLENSTEIN.\*—BATTLE OF LÜTZEN, NOVEMBER 16TH, 1632.

Thus passed the winter of 1631-2. In the middle of February the King advanced into the parts of South Germany which he had not before entered, in order to attack the League in Bavaria, the chief seat of its power. On the Lech, Tilly encountered him once more; and in a hot and final conflict, thanks to the execution done by the Swedish artillery, the remains of the forces of the League were defeated, and the Lech was crossed in April. Tilly died of his wounds a few days afterwards, and Gustavus Adolphus made his entry into Munich, which was quite unprotected. The whole of Bavaria up to the last fortress fell into the hands of the Swedes. The conquest of Germany up to the Austrian hereditary dominions was accomplished.

This had been foreseen at Vienna, and since the winter of 1631, vast efforts had been made to insure the defence of the country against the Swedes, in case the power of the League should be shattered. But the coffers were empty,

\* Hurter, Wallenstein's vier letzte Lebensjahre. Vienna, 1862.



and men were wanting for the re-organization of the degenerate army.

The extremity to which they were reduced at Vienna is proved by the assiduity with which Wallenstein was again approached. He had been living meanwhile like a prince on his estates in Bohemia, and endeavouring to throw even the Emperor into the shade by his unparalleled magnificence. No monarch of those days kept such a court as he did. He had taken his dismissal with affected coolness, yet those who knew him were convinced that no mortal could feel being degraded from the highest position more keenly.

His whole life had been passed in war and military command, and his mind had been engrossed by passionate and boundless ambition. It was a great mistake to suppose that he had forgotten his disgrace, and was meditating upon anything but revenge. There was not a single trait of magnanimity or of self-forgetfulness in his coarse nature. All his plans, even when he was acting in concert with the Emperor, revolved round self. He had sprung up, as the favoured child of fortune, out of the revolution; he had seen too much greatness laid low to regard loyalty or devotion to any party or person as anything more than a prejudice. He never forgot that the Emperor had once betrayed weakness towards his foes.

After the battle of Breitenfeld the Emperor had no peace; those about him became louder and louder in demanding the recall of Wallenstein, for he alone could help them in their distress. The Emperor had only dismissed him with reluctance, as the least of two evils; he now sought to enter into negotiations with him in the tone of a repentant petitioner, but Wallenstein took no notice of any overtures for months. He persistently behaved as if the idea of undertaking the command of the army again had never crossed his mind, and played out the comedy of obstinately refusing what he most anxiously desired. At length, after many fruitless entreaties, he was persuaded to equip an army within three months, on the express condition that as soon as it was under arms he should give up the command to another; the State should not be without an army in its great distress, so far as it was in his power to help it, but he would not lead it at any price. January, 1632.

The name of Wallenstein worked, as of old, like a charm. With his accustomed skill, and with all the pecuniary aid



the imperial government could afford, within three months he collected an army of 50,000 men. All the colonels had received their brevets from him, and the troops would doubtless soon be dispersed, if he was not at their head to take all those means to keep them together, which no one else understood.

At the end of March he declared that his task was done. The army was on its legs ; it was for the Emperor to name the man to whom he had promised the command, and then he should withdraw.

The Emperor sent a first, and then a second messenger to implore him, but the Duke was inexorable ; the third succeeded in inducing him to take the command, but on the most extraordinary conditions. The articles of Znaym, of April, 1632, established between the Emperor and his general a relation elsewhere unknown in history.

It provided that the Duke of Friedland is, and shall remain, the commander-in-chief not only of the Emperor and all the archdukes, but also of the Spanish crown. Wallenstein wished to secure himself against a second dismissal.

Further : this office confers unlimited supremacy on him. Neither the Emperor nor the King of Hungary shall ever be with the army, still less take the command. The sole disposition of the army in the field shall be entrusted to him ; neither advice, nor any personal influence from Vienna shall interfere with him. Still more incredible were the stipulations made by the Duke as to the results and rewards of his victories.

As ordinary reward, an Austrian hereditary territory was to be made over to him ; as extraordinary reward he was to have sovereign jurisdiction over all the conquered countries. It must be remembered that nearly all Germany was to be conquered.

He was to have the sole right of confiscating estates in the Empire ; neither the Aulic Council, nor the Imperial Chamber at Spire, were to interfere in it.

Pardons also were to be granted only in accordance with his will. If the Emperor granted safe conduct to any one, or any other favour, it was only to affect his person and honour, not his property. Unconditional pardon or repeal of confiscation could be granted only by the Duke of Friedland, "For," he added to this extraordinary condition, "the Emperor is far too lenient, and grants pardons to

every one at Court. This diminishes the necessary means for rewarding the superior and inferior officers, and for keeping the soldiers in good humour."

This treaty was Wallenstein's first sin against the Emperor, and it was an immense mistake; it was impracticable and contradictory. Either Wallenstein must be practically Emperor, and Ferdinand must abdicate, or the house of Hapsburg must keep its power and Wallenstein must perish; in either case a catastrophe must ensue. As he could not be deposed, the only probable course would be to murder him. All that followed therefore, first dalliance with treason, then actual treason, and Wallenstein's murder lay hidden in the bud in this treaty.

But he had preserved the skill with which he could create an army out of homeless soldiers of every nation, rabble, and vagabonds of all sorts, and handle it like a tool.

He had quietly looked on at the misfortunes of his old friend Max, of Bavaria, and had withstood all his entreaties for help with revengeful satisfaction. His plan was at first to carry on a defensive warfare, which he could sustain better than the foreigner, and his troops had to be accustomed to war.

Wallenstein's first operations were successful. Early in May he fell upon Prague unawares, and compelled the troops of Electoral Saxony to make a hasty retreat. By the end of June the Elector of Bavaria joined him with the remnant of his troops, and their united forces advanced to Franconia. Near Nuremberg, Gustavus Adolphus had erected a fortified camp; Wallenstein established himself in like manner opposite to him. He did not obtain a victory, but the assaults of the Swedes on his redoubts were fruitless.

In the middle of September, Gustavus Adolphus divided his army, and returned with one division to Bavaria, when news came that Wallenstein had invaded Saxony. He had in fact just begun to act on the defensive, and had attacked the weakest part of the Swedish line of communication. An invasion of Saxony was doubtless the best means of compelling Gustavus Adolphus to return northwards; and, besides this, owing to the untrustworthiness of the Elector, the greatest political consequence might ensue from it.

Gustavus Adolphus advanced by forced marches to Saxony, in order to arrive before the Elector should have

gone over to Wallenstein. When he appeared in Thuringia and Saxony, where Wallenstein's troops had behaved atrociously, the people received him with acclamations. From November 6-16 he encountered Wallenstein in the same plains where he had fought his first battle, near Lützen.

The battle which took place here was one of the most severe and sanguinary of the whole war. Command was at first difficult, for a thick fog lay upon the plain, which did not clear off till ten o'clock. The morning passed without a decision. The Swedes sprang over the trenches and broke one of the imperial squares, but were forced to retreat again. Both sides fought with the greatest valour, but the combat still remained undecided. The King had for a long time disused armour, on account of his corpulence, and wore a light leather jerkin. His idea was, God is with us, and if it is His will to protect us He can do so without armour. He was near-sighted, and, as ever in the thickest of the fray, he rode forward with but few companions, and got among a host of hostile cuirassiers. A shot struck his horse as he was dismounting; a second shot struck his arm. His companions were quickly dispersed; his two pages found it difficult to help him from his horse, when a third shot struck him, which seems to have been fatal. The page who was last at his side, related that while he was helping the King to dismount, hostile cuirassiers came up and asked who the wounded man was; that he would not say; but that the King made himself known, and then some one shot him through the head. The page himself was fatally wounded, and died a few hours afterwards.

It was not until his horse sprang riderless over the plain that the news spread among the Swedes, "The King is dead." His body was afterwards found stripped. With fearful rage the Swedes now threw themselves upon the enemy, and during the evening hours the imperial army was totally defeated. The victory was won, but at what a price!

But the cause for which Gustavus Adolphus fought did not die with him. The course of events preserved the stamp which he had impressed upon them. The effects of what he accomplished in two years were felt during the whole war; and when peace was concluded, sixteen years afterwards, the essential features of his plan were realised. It was not therefore as affecting this that the im-

portance of his death lay. At the time of his death, too, he had attained that height of personal dignity which could scarcely have been surpassed, but from which he might have had to descend. For the splendour of his name he died at the right time. In proportion as the hitherto ideal forms of his political plans became more clearly defined, his relations with those around him in Germany would have been clouded, and this had already taken place to an extent which foreboded no good. Gustavus Adolphus died in the very height of his fame, and therefore the moral influence of his character was undiminished.

But for the immediate conduct of the war, and for his policy, it was an irreparable loss.

There was no one at hand so competent to command on the field of battle as he had been. Wrangel, Baner, Torstenson, Bernhard von Weimar, were the most distinguished generals of the age, and all were trained solely in his school; but in the main points, the organization and the discipline of the army, none of them were equal to him. The Swedish army was broken up into wild bands, which were in no way superior to those of the enemy, and Swedish bestiality was soon as notorious as that of the imperial Croats.

Politically also it made a vast difference, whether a king such as he was, was at the head of affairs, or generals and diplomatists. He alone had been at the head of everything; neither France nor the German princes had been allowed to interfere, and this was a great blessing to Germany itself, for their only idea was to share the rags and tatters of the country between them. It was his mental superiority, the loftiness of his aims, his whole character in short, which enabled him to do this. Even his ambition was of a noble stamp.

He was fighting for himself, his family, his monarchy, and for Protestantism, and this was something totally different from the struggles of his successors for rich booty or a German principality. The objects of the ambition of these men were narrower and therefore coarser. He might have entertained the idea of setting up a Swedish empire in Protestant Germany; but an Oxenstierna was not capable of it, nor any of the others. They behaved in Germany like robbers and incendiaries; and the trophies from our churches and castles, which are preserved to this day by their pos-

terity in their palaces, are but the memorials of a lawless adventurous war.

The death of Gustavus therefore was a great misfortune for Germany. It was an exchange of one great and eminent man for a number of military generals, who tore Germany to pieces and drenched her with tears and blood; it was nothing to them if the French scuffled with them on this vast theatre of war, and they had no other idea than to drag on the war for ever without object or aim. Gustavus Adolphus had a distinct and definite aim in view; not so his generals. When they returned to Sweden, they would be nothing but Swedish subjects; in Germany they were playing the part of generals; the war was to them a lucrative trade—their living.

When, therefore, the war was dragged on for sixteen years longer, and for ten of them without any good reason, it was because there was no longer any power to give it a political aim or end, and because there were many who were interested in perpetuating the conflict and in bringing the unhappy empire to utter ruin.

## PART X.

### THIRD PHASE OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR. RICHELIEU, OXENSTIERNA, AND BERNHARD VON WEIMAR.

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#### CHAPTER XXXVI.

##### FRANCE AFTER THE DEATH OF HENRY IV.\*

LOUIS XIII., 1610-43 and Mary of Medici.—The Parliament of 1614.—Murder of the Marshal d'Ancre, April, 1617.—The Duke of Luynes.—Cardinal Richelieu, 1624-42, and Louis XIII.—Characteristics of both.—Richelieu's political method.—His testament.—His rule at home and abroad.—Fall of La Rochelle, 1628.—The affair in the Valteline and the War about Mantua, 1630.

LOUIS XIII., 1610-1643, AND MARY OF MEDICI.—THE PARLIAMENT OF 1614. — DEATH OF THE MARSHAL D'ANCRE.

IT has already been expressly mentioned that by the treaty of Bärwalde, Gustavus Adolphus provided that he should receive French subsidies, but would not agree to any cession of German territory nor to any interference with the conduct of the war nor his policy, thus forming a striking contrast to Maurice of Saxony, who by the treaty of Chambord ceded the three bishoprics to France.

This lasted so long as Gustavus lived. His death was

\* Besides the literature before mentioned—Le Vassor, *Histoire de Louis XIII.* 18 bde. Michelet, *Hist. de France au 17ème Siècle.* 1857, Vols. xi., xii. (the memoirs of this period). *Mémoires de Richelieu* in the *Mém. relatifs à l'histoire de France*, 1823, vii., viii. *Testament politique du Cardinal de Richelieu*, 1764, 2 bde. *Journal du Cardinal Richelieu*, 1664, 2 bde. Aubery, *Mém. pour l'hist. du Cardinal*, 1660. Leclerc, *Vie du Card. de Richelieu*, 1753. *Lettres, instructions, &c., du Cardinal de Richelieu*, par Avenel; Paris, 1853.

a most desirable turn of affairs for France. He had been ostensibly the ally of Richelieu's policy, but had in fact curbed it, and when he was out of the way it had freer scope than it ever otherwise would have had.

Henry IV. had died just as he was about to interfere in German difficulties, and to re-assert the old French policy of opposition to Hapsburg and the extension of France towards the east. His death was a crisis for France, which lamed her for ten years; but this will surprise no one who considers the condition in which he found the country, and that a reign of twenty years was not sufficient to overcome the effects of the religious civil wars. It is not in the least to be wondered at that all the elements which he had set at rest were in a ferment again. The surprise rather is to what an extent he had controlled them.

A repetition now occurred of the period of the Valois, only with this great difference, that the transition was not marked by a long civil war, and the genius of a priestly statesman sufficed to establish the monarchy of Henry IV. on a firmer basis than he had found it.

Louis XIII. was still a child, and a regency was therefore inevitable. Under any circumstances this is an anxious thing, and it was doubly so in this case, because great difficulties had but just been overcome, and the Regent was a foreigner who had not the smallest vocation for government. Mary of Medici was not in the least like Catharine. She was neither so intriguing, so malicious, nor so filled with passionate ambition; she was rather a pleasure-loving Italian, neither deep nor dangerous, but entirely without the seriousness required for her task.

The traditions of Henry IV. were incompatible with such a government. Sully, who had hitherto had the chief conduct of affairs, could not control the unhealthy influences which now came into play, and as he was not the man to belie his convictions for the sake of keeping his portfolio, he resigned; he did not choose to be responsible for a system which he did not approve. Under these circumstances it was the only dignified course for a statesman to pursue, but it was a rare example, and especially so in France.

The most reckless extravagance ensued; offices, dignities, favours and pensions were lavishly squandered, just what might be expected from a woman's government, confronted



by an ambitious and exacting aristocracy. When the great lords asked for important places they were given to them, to insure their allegiance, but, instead of having this effect, it only gave rise to new demands which robbed the crown of its resources.

The finances, which had only just been extricated from the difficulties of twenty years, were soon so exhausted and the Crown so impoverished that it was compelled to have recourse to those means which Sully had studiously avoided, and which had been quietly allowed to fall into disuse under Henry IV., the States-General and assemblies of notables.

Forms were thus reinstated which had been laid aside for twenty years. | In October, 1614, the States met at Paris. It was the last meeting of the States-General of old France, for those of 1789 were no longer the same. Had these States adhered to the historical traditions of certain defined liberties, had they wisely co-operated in the administration and in the enactment of laws, this assembly of 1614 might have been a most important historical event.

But these conditions were entirely wanting. The States-General seemed to be already defunct; all their acts related to separate class interests; the nobles and the clergy treated the third estate with sovereign contempt. Whatever was desired by one party was sure to be frustrated by another, and no common legal ground was recognised. How different in England! Ten years later, the Stuarts were in a situation similar to that of the regency in France. There we see the nation, supported by the traditions of the past and a never obsolete constitutional law, skilfully availing itself of new situations, and guided by courageous and talented men, it enters upon a new order of things. Where was the third estate in France which could aspire to take a part in the government, where the lower house that could say, "We are three times as rich as your house of Lords," where the independent men who could lead the attack upon the monarchy!

This meeting of the States-General sufficed to bury their rights for ever.

It will be interesting to devote a little attention to this last assembly of the States of old France, for its transactions are characteristic of the period, and of the relations between them and the crown; it is also not without importance for a comprehension of the situation of the people. The

mission of the Assembly, as it was defined by the King, in a short opening speech, was to bring the grievances of the different States before the crown. Each estate held separate sittings to draw up statements of such grievances, and each informed the others by message, of what it considered of sufficient importance to be brought forward.

A great diversity of demands and interests at once came to light.

The nobles and clergy, desired the abolition of the sale of places, which involved exclusion of the burgher class from official posts, but the representatives of the third estate, who almost all held such offices, were against it, until the annuities and gratuities granted to the great nobles should also be abolished. The discussion of this gave rise to bitter accusations of one class against another. The third estate stated, in the king's presence, that the nobles plundered the State, and that by the enormous expenses to which they had compelled the government, things were brought to such a pass that the people were obliged to go into the fields and eat grass like oxen. The nobles then defended themselves; some thought these expressions slanderous, others considered the citizen class so far beneath the nobles that the accusations were beneath contempt. But no agreement was come to on the main question.

It was just the same with the second point. The clergy demanded the proclamation of the decrees of the Council of Trent; though with a reservation of all the liberties of the Gallican Church, but the third estate was decidedly opposed to it, fearing the condemnation of the heretics and the introduction of the Jesuits.

There was another sharp discussion about the Jesuits in the assembly. The third estate legally opposed the heretical political doctrine of the Jesuits as to the insecurity of all temporal political power, and the right of the masses to revolt. It demanded that it should be declared by an inviolable and fundamental law, that as the King was acknowledged as sovereign ruler in his own country and derived his crown from God, no power on earth, temporal or spiritual, had any right to his kingdom, neither to deprive his sacred person of it, nor to release his subjects from their fealty under any pretext whatsoever.

Behind these differences lurked the religious controversy; it would have been a hard task to settle it, even to a strong

government, and a weak one could in no wise adjust the differences. While Condé, Bouillon, Rohan, Soubise, and Sully, seemed ready to take up arms against the government, allied as it was with Spain, attention was excited by the determination with which Armand du Plessis de Richelieu, Bishop of Luçon, asserted the right of the Catholic clergy to a share in the government, and demanded the proclamation of the decrees of Trent. Clearly and firmly he developed his ideas of church and state, and the emphasis with which he spoke, bore witness to the self-reliance of this dignitary of the Church.

The government became more pitiful and helpless every day; it was obliged to make all sorts of concessions; all parties, and each with louder threats than the last, made demands upon the crown, and the government was so intimidated that it consented to contradictory things.

The chief influence at Court had fallen into hands which no party could tolerate, and which reminded the nation that France was governed by a foreign regency.

The Queen, Mary of Medici, had brought with her from Florence, a waiting maid, Eleonora Galigai, a cautious, reserved Italian; she dressed the Queen's hair, and at the same time gained possession of her ear. She was married to a certain Concino Concini, a Florentine of obscure birth and in decayed circumstances, who had made her acquaintance on the voyage from France. The attitude of this couple was a model of that Italian virtuosship which can accommodate itself to all circumstances; can be at first content with a little, and when it has gained a footing assumes the policy of the parvenu.

The Concinis made themselves indispensable to the Queen, had a finger in all the court intrigues, were now in league with this coterie, now with that, and preyed upon them all. She collected treasures, he acquired offices and dignities, rose step by step, was adorned with all sorts of titles, and finally created Marquis d'Ancre, and Marshal of France.

This favouritism was a thorn in the sides of all, and of course all the faults of the government were ascribed to it.

The Queen adopted a policy more and more opposed to that recurrence to ancient traditional policy, which was inaugurated by Henry IV.; she leagued herself with Spain, by treaties and marriage contracts, and the lukewarmness

that she evinced in all government transactions deprived her of the confidence of all parties.

The discontent which was most loudly expressed by the princes and the eminent Huguenots, fermented for a long time and became deeper and deeper.

In 1614-15, a blow could be foreseen, which would put an end to this misgovernment. Meanwhile, the King had reached the age of sixteen; he also had his advisers and courtiers, and thus a remarkable schism took place. The Court of the Queen did just what it pleased, and another party assembled around the King and devised the fall of the favourite.

The recollection of a fearful time was still fresh in men's minds, when assassination was quite in vogue, and the idea presented itself to some of Concini's foes that he must be murdered. The Marshal was summoned to the King, and, as he was crossing the bridge to the Louvre, in April, 1617, he was struck by a fatal shot.

It was a singular coincidence that the beginning of the King's independent reign should be marked by a political murder.

When he heard that Concini had fallen, he exclaimed, "Now I am king." But he was mistaken; it soon appeared that he had only exchanged his Mayor of the Palace.

Among his playfellows was the Duke de Luynes, a man with a large family connection, clever and adroit, quite a match for Concini; he now became the all-powerful favourite, and the only difference between the new government and the old was that the duke was a native and had the nobles on his side instead of an Italian adventurer.

#### CARDINAL RICHELIEU, 1624-42, AND LOUIS XIII.

The real change, however, took place with the Duke's death in 1621, when the King was again obliged to choose a Mayor of the Palace.

Since the murder of the Marquis d'Ancre, the King and his mother had not been on good terms. The Queen had to lament the loss of all political influence, together with that of her favourite, and on the death of the Duke de Luynes, she thought of the clever bishop Richelieu, who had attracted the attention of all at the meeting of the States-General in 1614. He first appears as a mediator

between the King and Queen, begins to take a part in politics in 1621, and, after 1624, guides the policy of France.

This office of Mayor of the Palace, which Richelieu held for twenty years, placed him in a singular position, for the King never liked him, never reposed confidence in him; he always had the painful feeling of dependence on a superior will, and yet, conscious of his own inability, he allowed him to govern France. For twenty years, all sorts of attempts were made to deprive the Cardinal of his power; mother, wife, brother, favourite, parties, and factions all tried to persuade the King to dismiss him, and he was often on the verge of a precipice; a hint from the King would have consigned him to the obscurity of a prison, still it was always the King himself who prevented it, and would not part with him, perhaps because he secretly feared him, and had an idea that the man represented the greatness and power of France.

Louis XIII. was now twenty-three years of age; he had always been a weakly boy, and had nothing of his father's talents. He was grave, monosyllabic, and insignificant looking, his whole appearance gave the impression of a commonplace person. But he was also free from his father's bad qualities, he was free from his soldier-like licentiousness and sensuality; he was more respectable and less given to excess than any king before Louis XVI. He was so prosaic and taciturn that it was quite an event if a friendly word to one of the ladies of the Court escaped him, but during the whole of his life he was addicted to anything rather than the cares of royalty. He tried to harden his weakly body by the chase and physical exercises, his military tastes were expended in playing at soldiers with some Swiss youths, whom he exercised in making a collection of curious arms, in erecting little fortresses, &c.; instead of governing men, he trained hawks and falcons; but with all these innocent fancies, one virtue was united, he was free from the ambition which had filled the minds of the last of the Valois, without in the least better fitting them for their calling; although placed by destiny in the first place, he was modest enough to condemn himself to the second, and to allow those who were more competent to rule. Singularly enough, he died immediately after Richelieu. His self-denying subjection to a minister whom he did not

like is unique in history. It arose from an idea that Richelieu was the man to establish the greatest monarchy in the world.

Richelieu began to take part in the government about 1620; first in the anxious position of a mediator between two contending parties at Court, then as the leading man who ruled everything.

He had been trained in a remarkable political school.

When the States-General met in 1614 he was under thirty years of age, but had excited general surprise by his gift of eloquence. He early betrayed the qualifications of a born statesman, whom chance only had clothed in the ecclesiastical garb; indeed he afterwards displayed more skill in everything than in the affairs of the Church. The Roman purple was to him but an outward garment, though a welcome aid on account of the authority it conferred.

In the seventeenth century the ecclesiastical power had still weight enough to accomplish more than the secular arm, and it is certain that Richelieu could not have ventured on many of the things which he did without the palladium of the clerical garb. His most intimate confidant in his foreign policy was a Capuchin monk, a man belonging to the old French nobility, and inspired with the corresponding ambition. He and his alter-ego, Pater Joseph, established a state which more than any other assumed a development opposed to the Romish ecclesiastical power, and sought to make the hierarchy of the Church a hierarchy of the State.

The family from which Richelieu sprang belonged to the old French nobility. Men of the race of Du Plessis, who had distinguished themselves, could be mentioned even in early times. He had nothing, therefore, of the unequal birth of the *parvenu* who has laboured hard to attain his position, and then displays audacity on the one hand and cowardice on the other. Richelieu had the stately gait of a well-born man, who rules the nobles, not as a plebeian, but as the representative of a political idea, who can venture to oppose his equals. His path brings him into contact with the highest personages in the State, and he pursues it without faltering.

He found circumstances, as they were sure to be after thirteen years of misgovernment, without principles or power. The State was in the utmost confusion; there was



neither orderly administration nor regular income, nor a healthy financial condition. No obedience was rendered to the Government: the officials either did what they pleased, or were under the command of the great nobles or powerful governors, whose favour was of more importance than that of the King and his ministers. All the popular advantages of a good government were also sacrificed; uniformity of the law, security of person and property in town and country. The advantages of Sully's administration were sorely missed, and France no longer maintained the distinguished position in foreign affairs to which she had been raised by Henry IV. This great monarchy exercised scarcely any influence upon the fate of Europe. If Spain took her in tow, she might, with the help of her Hapsburg relations, help France to regain her lost possessions.

All this had to be changed; internally the use of its natural powers must be restored to the State; it must regain the influence abroad which was its due.

Richelieu was resolved to recur to the home and foreign policy of Henry IV., and especially to sever the bond with Spain. His plan was to take part in the great war which was just begun, and to round off France at the expense of the German empire.

But before this could be seriously thought of, the internal administration must be readjusted; before he could send his armies to take part in the German war, France must have a government which could secure the service of her subjects and the use of the country's wealth; the monarchy must regain popularity, factions must be humbled, and the trustworthiness of officials restored.

The first ten years of Richelieu's reign were devoted to this task of renovating the French state, and it was the part of his labours most worthy of admiration.

Richelieu never could tell in the morning whether he should be at the helm in the evening. Countermines were continually at work against him, instigated by the King's mother and brother, the nobles, the clergy, and the Protestants; he had to be perpetually on the watch to frustrate these intrigues, yet never to interrupt the course of business. He succeeded perfectly. He pursues undaunted the path he had marked out for himself, and his daily struggle to maintain his power is never apparent, neither does the admirable and persevering energy come to light with which



he overcomes all sorts of hindrances, the dexterity which enables him to anticipate all the devices of the enemy, or the boldness with which he makes all around him feel the power of a great master. He has identified himself with the State; whoever opposes him opposes the State; in the name of the common weal he banishes the King's mother and brother, sends many of his opponents to the scaffold, and does not spare the highest.

It may be imagined that it was not an amiable rule. Authoritative measures, espionage, interception of correspondence, executions and imprisonments, were indispensable to it. But in all this his personal interests always coincided with the demands of the common weal; he was the State; his ambition was the greatness of France; all that was French was his interest; all that was opposed to him was opposed to France. He did not pursue his personal enemies as such—he mostly despised them—but woe to those who brought family interests or factions to bear against him; on these he inflicted the most severe chastisement.\*

A nation does not easily submit to such a rule; but the French do so more readily than any other. They willingly sacrifice peace and comfort for splendour, surrender liberty to a strong government which secures fame and martial glory. Richelieu conferred outward splendour on France, and created internal order; but religious and political liberty had to be confined within the narrowest limits. His rule was violent and unrelenting; but even his enemies did not deny that it was able, and therefore it was a turning-point in history, not only for France but for Europe.

#### RICHELIEU'S POLITICAL METHOD.

All Europe took to imitating his system, and Louis XIV. was not the originator, but only the inheritor, of those ideas of political power and sagacity which, under him, made the round of European governments.

The principles of, and precepts for, his method of government are laid down in the observations comprised in the political testament, so called, of Cardinal Richelieu,† and which were written either by himself or from his dictation.

\* For Richelieu's characteristics see Ranke, II. 531.

† Schmidt, III. 464.

The following are some of the most important points. The most necessary thing for a government to secure is the unconditional obedience of all—"the most secure foundation of the submissiveness which is indispensable to the existence of states." In order to this it is necessary for the government itself to possess a resolute will to accomplish what, after due consideration, it considers to be right, that it should never falter in its course, and severely punish the contumacious. The government of the country demands manly vigour and unswerving firmness, the opposite of that yielding weakness which exposes the country to danger and infuses courage into the enemy. Most of the great schemes of France have failed, because she has been deterred by the first difficulty from prosecuting them. Unswerving consistency, secrecy, and despatch are the best methods of insuring success. Further, political objects must always, and in every case, be supreme over every other consideration.

Public interests must be the sole object of the ruler and his ministers; it is a great evil for the State when private are preferred to public interests. The majority of the misfortunes that have happened to France have been caused by the devotion of many organs in the administration to their own interests, to the detriment of those of the State, and by the fact that compassion and favour have prevented the carrying out of good resolutions.

Punishments and rewards must be adjusted, so as to keep their end in view. The latter are not to be despised; but the former are more often necessary, for they are less easily forgotten. Not to punish an important error, which might open wide the doors to license, is criminal neglect, and there is no greater injury to the public good than to be indulgent towards those who endanger it.

This indulgence has produced an anarchy in France which has only served the cause of the numerous parties, and has greatly injured the royal authority. In the case of political crimes pity must be set aside, and the complaints of the accused, as well as the babble of the ignorant masses, disregarded; for they often find fault with what is most salutary for them, and absolutely necessary. It is a Christian duty to forget personal offences; but to forget offences against the State, to let them go unpunished, is not to forgive them, it is to commit them anew. In ordinary matters justice requires full proof of guilt; but not so in

the case of political crimes ; then conjecture, derived from strong probability, must often suffice, because the formation of parties against the public good is generally conducted with so much cunning and secrecy that proof is only possible when it is too late to punish.

The motto, therefore, is, *All for, but nothing by the people.*

The Cardinal asserts the rights of the State in relation to the Church.

It is the duty of rulers in spiritual matters to be subject to the Popes as the successors of St. Peter and the vicegerents of Christ ; but they are not to suffer any interference from them in temporal affairs. In making appointments to bishoprics, abbacies, and smaller benefices, the king should consider merit, an exemplary life, and uprightness of character. Persons of loose morals should be excluded, and those who offend must be punished, so as to make examples of them.

The position of the nobility, one of the main sinews of the State, requires reform. The nobles must be protected against the large number of officials who have been raised up to their disadvantage ; but they must be restrained in their acts of violence towards the people. They must be protected in the possession of their estates, and the acquisition of new ones must be made easy, that they may regain their former dignity, and not be incapacitated for serving the State in war. This last is the main thing ; a nobility which is not ready to render military service to the State is a luxury, even a burden, to it, and does not deserve the privileges and dignities which distinguish it from the burgher class.

The judges in the parliaments shall pronounce sentence on the subjects, for that is the purpose for which they are appointed ; but they shall not assume to do more. They are not to be permitted to interfere in the jurisdiction of the Church, nor in the enactment of laws. It would be the ruin of the royal authority if the officials were allowed to have a voice in political questions, for which they have neither the necessary knowledge nor power of comprehension.

The people must be kept in a state of subjection. The taxes serve to hinder them from becoming too prosperous, and from surpassing the limits of their duty.

The burdens which remind the people of their subjection should not be too heavy ; they should be in proportion

to their ability to pay, and it is the duty of rulers not to exact more than is absolutely necessary. In extraordinary cases they should lay claim to the superfluity of the rich before bleeding the poor to an extraordinary degree.

In the matter of instruction and learning great caution is needful. A knowledge of the sciences is indeed a great ornament to the State, and cannot be dispensed with; but it is equally certain that it cannot be imparted to every one without distinction. As a body having eyes in every part would be a monster, so would a State possessing only learned subjects, who would exhibit pride and assumption, but would not render obedience.

Learning would ruin trade, which enriches the State, and agriculture, which is the true nourisher of the people; it would in a short time depopulate the nursery-ground of soldiers, who flourish far better in ignorance than amidst the refinements of learning. Learning itself would be desecrated by being communicated to all alike; there would soon be more people to raise doubts than to solve them, to oppose truth than to defend it. Too large a number of colleges and classes is an evil.

It will be sufficient in towns which are not capital cities if the colleges are limited to two or three classes, which are enough to raise the youth out of too great ignorance; those who are capable of more must be sent to the large cities.

It will be seen that this is not so much a new system as a new method, which aims to effect the absolutism of the power of the State, while it never loses sight of the interests of the populace. There is as yet nothing of the Sultanism to which it degenerated under Louis XIV.; nothing of that boundless increase of the burdens of the State, the absorption of the State in the Court, nothing of the blind despotism which is destructive of the roots of its own existence.

This centralisation of the political power in one hand, the limitation of the mediæval corporations, estates, and privileges; this simplification of the machinery of State, this provision for equal rights and rational administration, for sparing and furthering the material prosperity of the people; this is the absolutism of the seventeenth century, which we now see exhibited by its first able representative, and it was a policy which was to be nobly pursued by Frederic William, the great Elector.

A new sort of administration was now introduced by means of paid officials, who gradually displaced the rule of the nobles and the power of provincial governors; that sort of centralisation, in short, which, since De Tocqueville's time, has not been looked upon as a product of 1789, but as a creation of the ancient régime. People of the burgher class, without family interests, and entirely dependent on the Government, became the organs of the State. The masses felt this to be a great advantage, having learnt that under the rule of the nobles there was no security of life or property. For the same reason Richelieu was able to put an end to the great corporations, or to let them decay and die out. He was backed by the people, who rejoiced to see him restrain and punish the arrogance of the great. What was it to them if now and then one of the highest nobles was thrown over night into the Bastille or was brought to the scaffold?

#### RICHELIEU'S ADMINISTRATION AT HOME AND ABROAD.

His relations with Rome and the Huguenots were peculiar and thoroughly statesmanlike. He made both parties feel equally the power of the law and the national interests of France.

As to his relations with Rome, he was in fact a secular politician rather than a spiritual ruler, and outwardly he allied himself with the heretics and took the field against the Catholics. This was painfully felt at Rome; but the man was too powerful for them to venture to do anything against the minister of the most Christian king, though a half-suppressed sigh might escape them.

Henry IV. had given the Huguenots too much, not religious, but political liberty, fortresses garrisoned by themselves and great civic privileges. In the recent revolts it had repeatedly happened that discontented nobles had appeared at the head of the Protestants, and had turned the possession of fortresses, like La Rochelle, to good advantage against the Crown. This was an abuse which could only be dangerous to Protestantism. Then this republic of a self-governing religious party within a monarchy, this State within the State, was not to be put up with. Richelieu did not attempt to abolish the toleration of different creeds, though it could not fail to suffer if the

surest pledges of it were done away; but this political isolation which so easily led to open rebellion must cease.

Fanatical zeal for conversion was not his forte, but it was quite in accordance with his principles to deprive the Protestants of their fortresses, garrisons, and self-government; and the skill with which he prevailed over them is peculiar to him. At first he weakened the position of the Huguenots in alliance with England, the natural ally of Protestantism, and employed English ships against La Rochelle; but when England saw her mistake, and came with a great fleet to the help of the Protestants, he was strong enough in spite of this, late in the autumn of 1628, to overthrow La Rochelle. The fall of this great fortress was a catastrophe for the privileged position of the Reform party, but it did not result in any powerful reaction against their creed.

There was now neither man nor party in a position to set Richelieu at defiance. The King was completely under his influence; the aristocracy were partly intimidated, partly made harmless; the clergy obeyed him; the Huguenots, who a few years before shared the King's power, were now only a sect, no longer a political party.

For an effective foreign policy two things were wanting; well-ordered finances—always his weak point—and an efficient army. Neither could be obtained quickly, especially the latter, with limited means. He therefore proceeded at first with caution, contented himself with moderate results; but he was continually negotiating, and ever alert to let no favourable opportunity slip, and to keep everything in his power. The chess moves of his foreign policy may be counted on the fingers. No alliance with Spain, but opposition to the whole house of Hapsburg, for where France abutted on its Spanish and German possessions, France had an ancient hankering for the acquisition of territory. In league with Spain she would have the approval of the papal party, but that would be all; in conflict with her there was a prospect of rich booty. The Pyrenees were not then the real boundary of France; Spain still possessed Burgundy, and some parts of the South of France, and the chain of fortresses from the Ardennes to Ostende, by the possession of which France first became what she now is.

After the course the great German war had taken during the second decade, the danger did not seem so distant that Ferdinand and the Spanish Hapsburgs might regain their



position. Since the victories of the League, the decline of the Union, the progress of Tilly, the subjugation of the revolution in Bohemia and Upper Austria, and the restoration in Central and North Germany, Ferdinand had acquired a position in and beyond his hereditary dominions, such as had never been attained by Charles V., and in the ancient Hapsburg territory between France and Germany, an effective Spanish army had appeared under Spinola, which was renewing the war in the Netherlands, and advancing up the German Rhine; in short fresh courage and ambition seemed to have been infused into the power which, at the close of the sixteenth century, had appeared to be approaching dissolution, and its increasing success could not be indifferent to a watchful French statesman.

If the genuine French idea were once conceived of keeping down the old Hapsburgian rival, alliances would follow as a matter of course. England, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, the German Protestants, all the heretics in the world were desirable allies to help to oppose Spain.

It had cost Henry IV. his life that he had been a Huguenot, and as a Catholic king pursued a heretical foreign policy. It was thought that this betrayed the fact that at heart he was a heretic still. This was a reproach which could not be cast on a cardinal of the Romish Church, who kept outwardly within her bounds and had destroyed the power of the Protestants at home. People did not regard his religious but only his political motives, and these were forgiven when there was no help for it.

Richelieu began to make the voice of France heard in smaller questions, such as in the Valteline and Mantua.

The Valteline was the key between the old Duchy of Milan, now Lombardy, and the Tyrol, the mountain fortress of the German Hapsburg territory. The country was of the greatest strategical importance, and rich in all the products of a fruitful soil; it was then dependent neither on Spain nor Hapsburg. During the time of the fierce persecution of the Protestants in Italy, after the middle of the sixteenth century, the Grisons had become a refuge for the exiled Italians, and on this Roman soil a very strict form of Calvinism had been established. The Engadine is still more rigidly Calvinistic than any other country in the world. The country was dependent on Rhætia, but was protected in its creed. In July, 1620, at the instiga



tion of various persons, something like the Sicilian vespers took place among the Protestants. Horrible deeds were perpetrated; on the northern slopes of the Lake of Como the castles may still be seen from which the Spaniards attempted the invasion, and Bibles may still be found in the villages in which the grandfather inscribed the names of some of the murdered. After this the Spaniards occupied all the fortresses, and the German Hapsburgs were well content to have their Spanish cousins for neighbours.

It was under Richelieu that French policy assumed an attitude in this question, at first purely a local one, that gave it importance. Richelieu interfered, sent an army into the Valteline, drove out the foreign troops, and thus prevented the Hapsburg power from possessing itself of this important Alpine pass.

A similar case occurred in Mantua. There the Spanish claims were contested by those of a French noble, the Duke of Nevers. This gave Richelieu the desired pretext for securing a footing in the neighbourhood of Lombardy. Himself in armour, he came at the head of an army, drove the Spaniards before him, and conquered Pignerol and Chambery—indeed almost the whole of Saxony. By the treaty of Chierasco, April, 1631, the French pretender received Mantua.

These were small matters. He had still to forego great enterprises, because he had neither fleet nor army. Then Gustavus Adolphus appeared as an ally; he hoped to find a client in him who would allow him to pursue his French policy in Germany. But in this he was altogether mistaken, for he was, in fact, only permitted to share expenses, not to advise with him, nor to act conjointly. But with the death of the Swedish king, this embarrassment was at an end. The traditions of the past might still have some influence with the Swedish generals and statesmen; but this was an obstacle which could scarcely exist very long or be insurmountable.\*

\* For the history of the beginning of French interference in the German war, the unpublished reports of the embassy supply some particulars which Häusser extracted in Paris (B. R. MSS. Français, No. 2249, suppl.). At the conclusion of a paper on the progress of the German and Spanish Hapsburgs in 1620 this passage occurs: "It seems to be more than enjoined upon us 'de se reveiller d'une si profonde et fatale léthargie en laquelle la France est tombée par la disastreuse mort de notre grand roi Henry.' If now Spain were to

take it into her head to seek a quarrel with us, and to attack us in the rear, as at the time of the League, all paths would be closed to us, and we should have neither troops nor money from Germany, Switzerland, or Italy, such as the late king could procure in his necessity,—internal peace and unity among all Frenchmen, and dutiful obedience to our just and good king, and the skilful conduct of affairs by a minister who would ‘*reprendre les sages leçons et magnanimes du feu roi et les erreurs d’une bonne intelligence avec les plus sincères amys et anciens alliés de cette couronne*’ would be the only means of averting the evil.” A dispatch of 1620 severely blames the rapacity of Austria, advises an alliance with the Protestants, and says it is a calumny to call the war a religious war, the object of which on the Protestant side was to crush the Catholics. It is said in a report of 1626 that the war will not come to an end until Holland, France, and England are conquered by Spain and Hapsburg. On December 24th, 1619, Bouillon (fol. 183) advises the king at least to mediate. A letter from the Emperor to Gustavus Adolphus, ‘*traduit de l’allemand en français*,’ dated from Ratisbon, August 18th, 1630, is also there, in which the Emperor expresses surprise at the hostile attitude of Sweden, and demands either a formal declaration of war or a peaceful understanding. Gustavus Adolphus answers from Stralsund, October 30th, 1630, and expressly reminds him of his former conduct and his many hostile acts.—ED.

## CHAPTER XXXVII.

GERMANY FROM THE DEATH OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS TO  
WALLENSTEIN'S CATASTROPHE. NOVEMBER, 1632—  
FEBRUARY, 1634.\*

Dissensions in the Swedish Camp: Oxenstierna and Bernhard of Weimar.—Beginning of the French Negotiations: Marquis de Feuquieres.—The Treaty of Heilbronn, April 23rd, 1633.—Wallenstein's ambiguous conduct of the war in 1633.—Negotiations with Saxony. The letter of December 26th, 1633.—The Bond of Pilsen, January 12th, 1634,—The murder at Eger, February 25th, 1634.

OXENSTIERNA, BERNHARD OF WEIMAR, FEUQUIERES, AND  
THE TREATY OF HEILBRONN. APRIL, 1633.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS was general and diplomatist in one person. In this the greatness of his character consisted; and it gave a unity and emphasis to his far-seeing and thoughtful policy, of which his opponents, with their far simpler tasks, could not boast.

On his death this unity between warfare and policy was at an end. There were two parties in the Swedish camp, one represented by the Chancellor Oxel Oxenstierna, the other comprised the greater number of the superior officers

\* Förster, F., Wallenstein's Briefe; Berlin, 1628. The same, Wallenstein als Feldherr u. Staatsman. The same, Wallenstein's Prozess; Leipzig, 1844. Von Aretin, Wallenstein; Regensburg, 1848. Dudik, Forschungen, 1853. The same, Wallenstein von seiner Enthebung bis zur Uebernahme des Commando's, 1858. Helbig, Wallenstein und Arnim, 1850. The same, Kaiser Ferdinand u der Herzog von Friedland, 1852. The same, Gustav Adolf und der Kurfürst von Sachsen, 1854. Hurter, zur Geschichte Wallensteins, 1855. The same, Wallenstein's vier letzte Lebensjahre, 1862. Röse, Herzog Bernhard; Weimar, 1828. Barthold, F. W., Geschichte des grossen deutschen Krieges; Stuttgart, 1802. Droysen, Preuss. Politik.

and a host of adventurers, more or less distinguished, who had attached themselves to the victorious headquarters.

Oxenstierna was the statesman who, always keeping in view the political objects of the war, urged as speedy a decision as possible; then an acceptable peace might be concluded, and he had no interest in advancing the supremacy of the generals by an aimless continuance of the war.

They, on the contrary, wished to continue it precisely on the grounds which made Oxenstierna wish for peace. They had no wish to lay down their arms, until every one of them had secured a splendid booty; they were the magnates of the camp, and thought it a singular piece of assumption to dictate their course to them with the pen. Among the generals there was but one on Oxenstierna's side; this was Gustavus Horn, who was related to him, and was one of the most distinguished pupils of Gustavus Adolphus.

Besides these, there were in the camp a multitude of German princes and rulers whom the war had driven from their countries and subjects, and who hoped to make their fortunes in soldier fashion, so long as there was a chance of it. Many of them had been so ill-used by the house of Hapsburg that they longed to revenge themselves with the sword. These younger sons of younger brothers, as Shakespeare says, were continually fomenting war; they had everything to gain and nothing to lose; for them the war would still have an aim, until every one of them had found a peaceful home again beneath the shadow of some principality.

Bernhard of Weimar, who was far superior to the others in abilities, and might be called the leader of the German war party, was one of these emigrants. The youngest of seven brothers all living, born August, 1604, he was left an orphan at thirteen, and brought up by his eldest brother, John, to the profession of arms, he had grown up as a thorough soldier of this martial age. Temperate, free from the vices of the age, not highly cultivated, but a sincere Protestant, and an amiable, excellent man, he was indisputably one of the best elements in this circle. He had early shown talent and aspiring ambition; was the impersonation of hatred of the House of Hapsburg and the Albertines,

and, when the war broke out, he and several of his brothers took up arms as a matter of course. With his brother William he entered the service of the chivalrous Margrave of Baden, in the spring of 1622, and took part in the campaign in the Palatinate and the unfortunate battle of Wimpfen. After various vicissitudes he made the acquaintance of Gustavus Adolphus, the great leading spirit of the war, joined him in the campaign in Franconia, on the Rhine and in the south, in which he greatly distinguished himself, and to him especially belonged the fame of following up the victory to the upper Lech and the Tyrolean passes. By the time of the unhappy day of Lützen he was already a well-known and distinguished general.

He possessed the art of attaching the soldiers to his person, and had occasionally ventured to oppose Gustavus Adolphus. The discontent in the German element in the camp often found a spokesman in him, and this had given rise to his playing a certain independent part.

After his troops—4,000 cavalry and 8,000 infantry—had unanimously chosen him as leader, he openly demanded a German principality—such as a duchy in Franconia, consisting of the bishoprics of Würzburg, Bamberg, &c.; he also thought that he should be able to provide for himself in Alsace and on the Upper Rhine; at all events, he had very concrete aims in view in his warfare and policy, and made no secret of them.

This discord explains the fact, that after the victory of Lützen, which was decisive in a military point of view, and perceptibly weakened the Emperor for a long time, nothing of importance was done by the victors. The strife between the generals and Oxenstierna was to blame for it.

No agreement of any importance had been arrived at when France began her negotiations. Richelieu sent his commissioner, Feuquieres to Germany to see what was to be done now that the little Gothic King was out of the way. According to his instructions he was to offer the chief command to Saxony, so as to induce it to unite itself with the Catholic States against the Emperor, to consult with Oxenstierna, not to conclude any peace without France, and to maintain the conditions of the Treaty of Bärwalde as regarded the Catholics. Brandenburg and other states of the empire were to be treated with, the Swedes were to be won over, the Chancellor especially was to be enticed by

the prospect of the marriage of his son with the young Queen Christina, and, above all, his consent was to be obtained to the cession of the most important fortresses on the left shore of the Rhine to France. Various other agents were at the same time paving the way for French interests in Germany.

But Oxenstierna was not idle either. Even before authority came from Sweden, nominating him legate of the Crown in the Roman empire, and with all the armies, he had proceeded to Central and North Germany to promote his objects—the alliance of the Protestant States with Sweden, and indemnification for the latter. At Dresden and Berlin he found the old hesitation and want of decision; he hoped to find more readiness among the little states of Upper Germany, whom he summoned to Heilbronn at the beginning of the year.

Feuquieres came also, after convincing himself that nothing would come of giving the command to Saxony. The object now was to prevent Sweden from taking everything in hand alone. He had already received a repulse from Oxenstierna about the Rhenish fortresses; perhaps he might be more successful now at Heilbronn, especially as Saxony and Brandenburg would be opposed to the Swedish supremacy. In fact, the Protestant States of Upper Germany were not disposed to enter into the close alliance under the leadership of Sweden which Oxenstierna desired, and this offered an opportunity for the French commissioner to step in as a mediator.

So, on the 23rd April, 1633, the alliance of the Crown of Sweden with the four upper circles of the empire was formed by the Treaty of Heilbronn. It was not precisely in accordance with Richelieu's wishes, for more weight was conceded to Sweden than he liked; but neither did it altogether satisfy the Chancellor, for a *consilium formatum* was placed at his side, in which ten representatives of the States of the empire were to watch the Swedish conduct of the war. Before this a treaty with France had been renewed, essentially on the basis of the Treaty of Bärwalde. By this the French subsidies were secured, while Sweden still maintained the leadership, and it was only with him, not with France direct, that the Upper German States had entered into alliance.

Meanwhile, Bernhard of Weimar, who had taken the com-

mand of the army of Gustavus Adolphus, had, by the end of January, advanced into Franconia from Thuringia, occupied the bishopric of Bamberg, and proceeded southwards to join Horn in Upper Swabia. In spite of the marauding expeditions of John of Werth, the meeting was effected at Donauwörth in April. But here all advance was at an end, for a mutiny broke out in the army, which was with difficulty quelled.

Meanwhile, Bernhard caused the princes of the confederation assembled at Heidelberg to grant the Duchy of Franconia to him, and a month later he received the oath of allegiance. The chief command of the federal armies was, however, refused him by Oxenstierna, although, as the event proved, his nomination would have been the most suitable. Horn, whose superior he felt himself to be, was placed over him as field-marshal, and the army was only pacified by granting its most urgent demands and the promise of better days.

The military events during this crisis were not of great importance, and the war only lost its dilatory character at the end of the year.

Part of the conquests on the Danube had been lost again by the rash acts of John of Werth. Bernhard now advanced, crossed the Danube near Neuburg, and suddenly appeared at Ratisbon, which capitulated in November. After several months of inactivity, Wallenstein had evacuated Silesia, threatened Brandenburg, and turned again towards Bohemia, when Bernhard advanced towards the Austrian territory without opposition from any considerable foe.

#### WALLENSTEIN'S CATASTROPHE ; THE AMBIGUOUS CAMPAIGN OF 1633 ; NEGOTIATIONS AND TREACHERY ; THE BOND OF PILSEN ; THE ASSASSINATION, FEBRUARY, 1634.

As things had been for months in the Swedish camp, it would have required but little skill and energy on the Imperial side sorely to punish the enemy for its unprotected state. But things were no better in the Imperial army ; if the Swedes did little, Wallenstein did nothing. If the relations between Bernhard and Oxenstierna were cool, those between the Imperial generals and the Court of Vienna were still cooler. And this was mainly the reason



that the war did not take an unfortunate turn for Sweden in 1633.

After the battle of Lützen, Wallenstein had returned to Bohemia, and had lain quiet the whole winter. It was obvious that his army must have suffered severely, and therefore that the first thing to be done was to re-constitute it. He also considered that he had reason to be dissatisfied with his generals, as is proved by the severe sentences of the court-martials. As to the necessity of a still longer period of rest for the re-organization of the army, Wallenstein must have been a better judge than they were at Vienna, who knew nothing of war. Besides this tarriance in Bohemia, this "natural bastion," although it might occasion some losses in other places, was easily to be justified on strategic grounds.\* But that spring should pass over and nothing be done, after the winter had been passed in idleness, might well occasion anxiety.

While the population of the hereditary dominions was almost ruined by the taxes required for the support of Wallenstein's army,—every official, from the judge to the town-clerk, had to pay ten per cent., there was a tax of 100 florins on every doctor's degree, every patent of nobility, every carriage, sledge, or handsomely harnessed horse—the Swedes advanced southwards to Ratisbon, and northwards to Hameln; still nothing was heard of Wallenstein but complaints of arrears of pay, nothing of his army but complaints of their treatment of the peaceful inhabitants. The general had shut himself up in unapproachable seclusion at Prague, and admitted no one but his own confidants to his presence for weeks.

At length, with the beginning of June, he advanced against Arnim, who was in Silesia, with a Saxon army at least equal to his; but instead of a battle taking place, for which both were prepared, an armistice was concluded. When this had expired, Arnim drove Wallenstein back from Schweidnitz, when he again relapsed into inactivity for weeks. Meanwhile, in July, the imperial troops and those of the League under Gronsfeld were together defeated in the north, near Oldendorp, in Hesse; Hameln was taken, and in August in the south-west a faithful partizan of the Emperor, the Duke of Lorraine, was overpowered by the Swedes at Pfaffenhofen and taken prisoner.

Great uneasiness now began to be felt at Vienna; at Munich they had been uneasy for a long time. At the former the disastrous results of the treaty of Znaym were recognised, at the latter they felt the revenge of mortal enmity. It is clear that Wallenstein was glad of any pretext for sacrificing the Elector to the enemy. When Wallenstein's only crime was that he had raised an army for the Emperor which thrust aside the League, and restored Austria to him, Max of Bavaria had incited the Emperor against him till he was deposed. This the Duke never forgave him. Then there were political differences. Wallenstein represented the Emperor's military power, Max the principalities; Wallenstein hated the priests and their restoration to power, Max saw no other object in the war than their victory. Wallenstein beheld the Elector's difficulties with malicious satisfaction, and when through the Emperor he earnestly begged Wallenstein for help, instead of giving it he concluded a fresh armistice with Arnim, by which it was expressly forbidden to give any support on the Danube, and on every remonstrance he appealed to his right to make war, conclude truces, and negotiate peace according to his pleasure.

When the end of the year came, Wallenstein's only military achievement was that with 20,000 men he had compelled 5,000 Swedes, who had ensconced themselves at Thurn, in Steinau, to capitulate, thereby freeing Silesia from the enemy.

But this enigmatical mode of warfare was no longer Wallenstein's only fault. During the course of the spring and summer of 1633 he had caused negotiations to be entered into, second and third hand, the object of which could scarcely have only been to divide and deceive the enemy. Discontented Bohemian noblemen, such as Counts Terzky and Kinsky, crafty commissioners like Resina, had, though disclaiming Wallenstein's responsibility, undertaken various correspondence, in which he must have had some participation, for the acts and omissions of his inexplicable plan of warfare are entirely in accordance with it; and in spite of Förster's attempt (in three volumes) to clear the Duke of suspicion, few persons will conclude that he was not implicated in these things.

The negotiations themselves certainly admit of a harmless explanation. Wallenstein was aware of the discontent

between Saxony and Sweden. If, therefore, he first put himself into communication with Saxony, there was nothing treacherous in that; his object might be to divide the enemy. Besides, the right of negotiating had undoubtedly been granted him.

The policy of the Edict of Restitution was not his affair; he wished for an acceptable peace based on a reconciliation between the creeds, as did Saxony also, and therefore he might well enter into an agreement with Arnim. It was also as much the interest of the Imperialists as of Saxony, to expel the Swedes by one means or another from German soil.\*

Thus these things may be looked at without prejudice to him on the principle, *Quilibet præsumentur bonus*.

But Wallenstein was not the man to establish an honourable peace which would have served the good cause.

He was not given to truth and openness; he was fond of mysterious intrigues for their own sake, apart from their purpose, and he always had the lofty schemes of personal ambition in view which his astrological researches pointed out to him as ends to be easily attained. Even had the peace which he was projecting been an honourable one, which would better have served the great German cause, for Max of Bavaria and the Jesuits of the Court of Vienna it was treason to everything that they held sacred.

These transactions did not long remain secret. The universal dissatisfaction with his mode of carrying on the war, or rather *not* carrying it on, gave reason enough for putting the worst construction upon the rumours that were flying about, and foes were not wanting at Vienna and Munich who zealously fomented discontent with him, and late in the summer of 1633 an outbreak could be foreseen. Wallenstein, therefore, began to consider his plan of retreat before it should take place. But the negotiations were dragging slowly on; Sweden and France had been sounded, no agreement had been come to with Saxony, for the unfathomable cunning of the Friedlander excited distrust.

By the end of 1633 the situation of affairs was such that it was no longer possible to think of honourable negotiations or the danger of probable complications; the complications were at hand, the danger was present, and the breach could be calculated on beforehand.

\* Compare the expressions attributed to him by Chemnitz, II. 135, and Khevenhiller, XII. 578, on the occasion of the armistice of July.

When the idea of real treason or open revolt began to take possession of Wallenstein's mind, it is impossible to decide, in spite of all the materials collected and published by Förster, Aretin, Dudik, and Helbig. That he did not to the last entertain any such idea, as Förster thinks, is consistent only with a very ingenious interpretation of the documents.

It is probable, however, that after November and December, 1633, Wallenstein was more and more convinced that his position was untenable, saw that his influence at Vienna was coming to an end, and that his enemies there would again succeed in compassing his fall. He did not choose to be surprised by it; it could but cast him down lower than before, for he stood higher than even the Emperor himself, and he would probably not be in a position to retire as a misunderstood magnate to his estates.

He therefore preferred to come to some agreement with Sweden, Saxony, and France, which should compel the Emperor, on the basis of the religious peace and the amnesty, to lay down his arms, and to acknowledge him as King of Bohemia, and which should at the same time enable him to slake his revenge on the Elector of Bavaria. It was in this spirit that Terzky and Kinsky negotiated, and during the last few weeks of the year in such a manner as to frustrate any attempts at justification.

The Elector of Saxony felt the approach of the crisis, and began to treat more seriously than before, but was desirous of discovering whether he could trust Wallenstein.

Various negotiations went on in December, which were intended to clear the ground. There is a letter of Count Terzky to Kinsky, under date of December 26th, in which he says, "that he is to send passes to the Duke Francis Albert of Saxe-Lauenburg—who was going to and fro between the camps—to enable him to go to Bohemia, that they may make terms with him—he was treating in the name of Saxony—'for the Duke is resolved to enter into an agreement not only with the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, but also with Sweden and France. We shall not need the French army, but we shall need their money. The master will therefore soon come. We are preparing to unite our armies in fourteen days, and to lay aside the mask.'"

About this time also the Elector of Saxony sent over his

personal friend, Colonel Schlieffen, that the above-mentioned agreement might be discussed. The despatches among the Dresden archives have been made known. The contents bear the most obvious marks of internal probability. Wallenstein says, among other things, "Spain is trying to establish a world-wide dominion: that he would not permit. Neither was the King of France to be permitted to cross the Rhine. The Palatinate must be restored, and France settled with somehow. He would himself drive the Spaniards from Flanders and Artois. There would be no great difficulty with Sweden, if she were indemnified on the North Sea. The Electors and bishops must have their bishoprics again. To the Duke of Weimar something in Alsace may be given, or in Bavaria, the 'Elector of which,' remarks the ambassador, 'the Duke intends entirely to annihilate.'"

A few days afterwards the Elector sent another ambassador, and Wallenstein declared that he had nothing to add to what had been stated to Colonel Schlieffen.

Wallenstein wished, in possession of all the forces of the defenceless Emperor, to extort a peace which would empower him to settle with France and Sweden, to annihilate Bavaria, and to effect a reconciliation with the Protestants. There is nothing in the despatch as to what he proposed for himself. Bohemia is not mentioned, but it is highly probable that he had no intention of "leaving this country to the empire," like the Tyrol, but that he had selected it as his own price for the peace. But, of course, he would not say so to the Saxon ambassador.

The object, therefore, was, in defiance of the League and the Edict of Restitution, to conclude a peace with the Emperor, which, to a certain extent, coincided with Richelieu's plans, and which might reckon on popularity in Germany itself.

The distracted nation was thoroughly tired of the war, which had nearly lost all significance, and this peace would have a reasonable basis in the restoration of the exiles and the toleration of Protestantism, which would give Wallenstein the support of hundreds of thousands of Germans. He certainly would have all the Protestants on his side, and probably all the Catholics, who were convinced of the impossibility of carrying out the Edict of Restitution.

But it was decidedly not an imperial policy, and it was

obvious that the Court of Vienna would endeavour to wrest the army which should protect Austria from such hands.

But this was no easy matter. The army was so completely in Wallenstein's power that it was doubtful whether he could be got rid of without inciting it to rebellion. Still, he had offended many of the generals, and made irreconcilable enemies of them. He was fond of boasting that he had thrust aside the Spaniards, Italians, and Walloons in favour of the Germans, so they would soonest fall away. A number of duels afterwards took place between them and the Germans, and the Germans have never been persuaded that the Italians were not his assassins.\*

It is some mitigation of the guilt of the horrible deed, that at Vienna,—itself in the greatest peril,—there was really no power after the Treaty of Znaim to separate the man from his army. The only thing that could be done was to divide the army, and then employ some subordinate instrument.

About the middle of January, 1634, Wallenstein took a step at Pilsen which proved to the Emperor that the moment for action was come. The Emperor had desired him to set apart 6,000 men for the support of the Cardinal Infanto of Spain, who was coming to the aid of Hapsburg, and to set out to re-conquer Ratisbon. Wallenstein would do neither the one nor the other, and secured the like disobedience from the officers. On the 11th of January they were summoned to Pilsen. Wallenstein communicated to them through his confidants, that under such circumstances he should be compelled to lay down the command, and asked what they, who were enlisted on his credit, thought of it. The officers begged him to retain it as a personal favour to them. Twice he declined, but finally informed them through Illo, that on one condition he would alter his resolution, namely, that they should swear to hold by him, and not swerve from their allegiance. To this they all consented, and then Illo produced the well-known Bond, in which the following was the chief clause: †—"Seeing what distress, misery, and ruin would result to them and

\* Hurter in Wallenstein's letzten Lebensjahre, p. 377, calls attention to the fact that his bitterest enemies, Aldringen, Maradas, Suys, Hatzfeld, Colloredo, Wangler, were not Italians; and that the most distinguished among the Italians, Gallas and Piccolomini, remained faithful to him the longest.

† Authenticated by Aretin. Urkunde, 31.



their poor soldiers from the Duke's retirement, they earnestly entreated his highness not to allow any weight to the motives for it; not to forsake the army without their knowledge and consent, in consideration of which they take an oath to stand faithfully by your highness; not to forsake you, to do all that tends to the preservation of yourself and the army; to shed our last drop of blood for this cause; to regard every one who acts inimically to it as a faithless and perjured person, on whose possessions, person, and life we are bound to take revenge." Whether the limitation clause, "without prejudice to allegiance to the Emperor," was used in reading it, we do not know; it is certain that it was not inserted in the document presented for signature. It was signed by forty-two persons, and the new oath was celebrated by a great banquet on the 12th of January.

Wallenstein continued to write the most affectionate letters to the Emperor, and received the most affectionate letters from Vienna. Each tries to deceive the other, for each feels that the time was come for decisive action. Information now came from Vienna to the foreign elements of the army that well-founded suspicions were entertained against Wallenstein; it was their duty to keep the army for the Emperor. Gallas came with an imperial patent, which released "all honourable officers, cavaliers, and soldiers from obedience to Wallenstein and his creatures Illo and Terzky, and placed them under the command of Gallas. The document was first of all circulated confidentially, and, when most of the regiments were secured, publicly proclaimed on the 22nd of February with beating of drums at Prague.

Wallenstein had been losing precious time in astrology and scribbling. When the mysterious messages became more and more urgent and more and more gloomy, he issued his commands, but they were little or not at all obeyed, and on the 23rd of February he left Pilsen. On the evening of the 24th he met the remnant of his faithful followers, from five to six thousand men, at Eger. In the evening there was a noisy banquet; when the wine had had its effect, Butler's dragoons fell upon Kinsky and Terzky, and cut them down amidst cries of "Long live Ferdinand!" Soon afterwards, Wallenstein himself, who had just been again reading the stars with his astrologer, was struck down in his bedchamber.



No definite orders had been given at Vienna; the instructions had only been to secure the Duke, dead or alive. It appears that the accomplishment of the rightly interpreted command was intrusted to subordinates, foreign adventurers, such as Butler and Deveroux. It will never be known whose hand struck the blow.\*

The horrible manner in which Wallenstein was slaughtered makes the impression of an execution of the victim of an abominable intrigue. This was the opinion of the contemporary world, who compared the tragic end of the man with his former greatness, and the Court of Vienna did all it could to support this view, for the murderers afterwards became inconvenient to it at Vienna. They were rewarded, and then a justification of the murder was drawn up, as the most convenient mode of getting rid of the traitor. The Duke was murdered "because the dead cannot bite," and the Emperor allowed it all to be put down to his account. He even afterwards had a sort of official justification published, entitled, "*Perduellionis chaos*," in which the proofs adduced are so insufficient and so badly put together that it is impossible to help thinking that the Court really had no conclusive reasons for it.

That they had no documentary proof against Wallenstein at Vienna does not prove his innocence; and time has brought evidence of his guilt to light, and proved that the Court of Vienna was justified if it was morally convinced that Wallenstein was in its sense a traitor.

\* In one of the archives of the war at Vienna, in a petition to the King of Hungary, Deveroux is said to have confessed to having been the man, who conducted the halberdiers to Wallenstein's chamber.—Hurter, p. 437.

5-2-4.

## CHAPTER XXXVIII.

### THE WAR FROM THE BATTLE OF NÖRDLINGEN, 1634, TO BERNHARD'S DEATH, 1639.

Defeat of the Swedish army at Nördlingen.—Oxenstierna's fruitless negotiations.—The peace of Prague, 1635.—Its significance and results.—Baner's victories and vicissitudes, 1636-7.—Victories and death of Bernhard of Weimar, 1638-9.

### THE BATTLE OF NÖRDLINGEN ; DEFEAT OF THE SWEDISH ARMY.

THESE events explain the inactivity with which the war dragged on in 1633 and the first half of 1634. The Swedes were lamed by want of unity amongst their leaders, the Imperialists by Wallenstein's treachery and catastrophe. But the second half of 1634 brought a change. The Imperial leaders, chiefly by the help of the divisions in the Swedish camp, gained a decisive victory in September, which caused the misfortunes of 1631 and 1632 to be forgotten ; and now Richelieu secured the command which for four years had been persistently refused him. The affairs of Sweden and Germany are henceforth indissolubly connected with French policy.

The first half of the new year brought with it no decisive military events ; a certain confusion, which is quite intelligible, had crept into the imperial camp, and that the enemy did not take better advantage of this was caused by their own want of unity, particularly by dissensions between Bernhard and Horn, Oxenstierna's son-in-law. The Imperialists gained some isolated victories in Bavaria, but in lower Germany they lost Hildesheim ; in the south, Philippsburg was obliged to capitulate, and the army of Lorraine suffered a fresh defeat, which resulted in the expulsion of the house. The French had not only gained a firm footing

here, but also on the Rhine, and had taken possession of some fortresses in Alsace which Andre had conquered. The French had obviously gained in territory.

Oxenstierna had meanwhile been extremely active. Full of anxiety on account of Bernhard's efforts to assert his independence, the growing assumption of the French, and the ambiguous conduct of the Saxons, on the 6th of February he convened a meeting of the representatives of the districts of lower and central Germany, and sought to gain accessions for the League of Heilbronn. His endeavours were fruitless, and at Frankfort, where the representatives of Upper and Lower Germany met in April, it was no better. Feuquieres had gained adherents in the south partly by means of money. The votes were not in favour of the Swedish command. Brandenburg, though not against the League in itself, became excited when there was a talk of indemnifying Sweden by Pomerania, which was quite intelligible; and Saxony openly opposed the League of Heilbronn. So there was no prospect of success for the Swedish proposition; but neither did France attain her wishes. She demanded that Philippsburg should be given up under a solemn promise to restore it without any other "reward or indemnity," "*que l'honneur de vous avoir assisté avec la sincérité et généreuse conduite qui accompagnent toutes les actions royales.*" The states of Upper Germany were disposed to accede, but Saxony put a veto on it, and there it ended. Thus the meeting was fruitless, and presented the unedifying spectacle of selfish action without unity, or any more lofty views. It was unmistakable that the interests of Swedish and French command were in almost open hostility. Meanwhile the imperial army, 25,000 strong, had reached the upper Palatinate.

It is a proof of the excellence of the organization of Wallenstein's army, that although intended for totally different political objects, it now permitted itself to be employed in accordance with the Emperor's views, and that it was so efficient under far inferior leaders. Those who replaced Wallenstein were not likely to cause his loss to be forgotten. Neither Gallas nor Ferdinand's son, the King of Rome, an inexperienced youth, were likely to do so; yet by the end of six months the army was not only in an efficient state, but for the first time since 1630 gained a decisive victory, which not only completely changed the aspect of the

military situation, but produced perceptible political results during the rest of the war.

After the end of May the imperial army directed its steps from the Upper Palatinate towards Ratisbon. The Swedish troops, diminished as they were, were divided into two armies. Horn was on the Lake of Constance, to prevent the advance of the Cardinal Infanto, who was coming by tedious marches from Lombardy, and Bernhard was trying to protect Ratisbon. They were on very bad terms; each cast reproaches on the other, and they did not unite their troops till the 12th of July. By this time they had 22,000 men assembled near Augsburg; it was too late. They did indeed take Landshut by storm on the 22nd of July, but when they slowly advanced thence, Ratisbon had already fallen, after a brave resistance, on the 26th, and they had to retreat to Augsburg. At the same time Baner and the Saxons in Bohemia were advancing successfully, Hildesheim in nether Saxony had fallen, but the great danger was that the Cardinal Infanto would join the Imperial army, and then all South Germany would be lost.

Bernhard and Horn had at first separated, then united again near Günzberg; but their armies, consisting of scarcely 10,000 efficient men, exhausted and famished, were in a pitiful condition. Bernhard wrote to Oxenstierna that "as the enemy gave him no rest to recover himself, the chancellor must find another army to meet the enemy."

Meanwhile the imperial army, before the arrival of the Spaniards, after taking Donauwörth, had turned towards Nördlingen. In order to save Würtemberg, Bernhard and Horn crossed the Danube near Leipheim and Günzberg, encamped themselves securely near Bopfingen, and sent reinforcements to Nördlingen; but they could not prevent the enemy's cavalry from devastating Franconia and Swabia. The situation of the Swedes appeared so hopeless that, on the 26th of August, Oxenstierna signed a treaty with Feuquieres by which Philippsburg was given over to the French, to be garrisoned by French and German troops as a pledge to be restored in time of peace. Even with the promised French help, there was but small prospect of success, for the Cardinal Infanto had brought from twelve to fifteen thousand men to his cousin, and the imperial army, consisting of Spaniards, Italians, Germans, &c., was standing thirty thousand strong before Nördlingen.

The troops of Bernhard and Horn did not amount to more than 24,000 men. Bernhard advised to give battle, Horn to wait for the reinforcements. On the 5th of September they approached the town, and by a successful surprise of the enemy obtained a good position; but all attempts on the 6th to drive the enemy from theirs were in vain. The loss was so great and the prospect of success so small, that about noon Bernhard advised to discontinue the battle; but the enemy divined their purpose, and pursued them so hotly that the retreat became a desperate flight. Bernhard escaped with difficulty in the tumult, and Horn was taken prisoner. The loss was reckoned at 12,000 dead and 6,000 prisoners. The might of the army of Gustavus Adolphus was destroyed. Swabia was now defenceless; the Duke of Wurtemberg and his troops fled; Bernhard attempted to dam the stream, but it was no longer possible. By the middle of September the wild hordes of cavalry rushed on, took Göppingen and Heilbronn, and made sad havoc in Waiblingen, the vale of Weinsberg, and all unprotected places. Thus the supremacy of the Imperial arms was established for three years and a half, and an ardent desire of Richelieu fulfilled.

Sweden's political position experienced the same fate as her military force. The meeting at Frankfort broke up abruptly. Oxenstierna tried in vain to infuse some courage into the leaders, and to induce them to collect their scattered forces and to unite with the troops from Bohemia.

The troops sent from the north to join the remnant of Bernhard's army at Frankfort were an undisciplined set, a scourge to the population, a torment to the officers, and little adapted to promote success. Baner, however, in Bohemia, did not go southwards but northwards, in order at all events to maintain that part of Germany. Even Oxenstierna now urgently solicited French help. In October, two commissioners, Löffler and Streiff, were sent to Paris, in order to settle with France, even, as their instructions expressly stated, at the price of the cession of Alsace.

Meanwhile, before the end of the year, nearly all Franconia was occupied by the Imperialists, and all the country as far as Swabia and the Upper Rhine was the scene of horrible barbarities. Calw, in Würtemberg, was almost annihilated. On the 7th of October Philippsburg was given up to the

French, and a few days later the dying Count Otto Ludwig ceded to them the fortresses in Upper Alsace.

Meanwhile, Löffler and Streiff arrived at Paris. Richelieu was well pleased to make considerable conquests without sacrifice or war, and was not disposed to leave this pleasant path without occasion. The offers of the German ambassadors had meanwhile been forestalled by the course of events, and this they were disdainfully made to feel at Paris. There was no inclination to give either pecuniary or military aid; so on the 1st of November they were compelled to agree to an ignominious treaty which only gave conditional promise of French help, but definitely ceded important pledges to France. In return for a place in the sittings of the Confederation, participation in the conduct of the war, the fortresses and Alsace, nothing was granted but an engagement to support 12,000 men, either Germans or troops of some other nation, to be commanded by a prince belonging to the German Confederation, and a payment once for all of 500,000 livres.

At Worms, where a number of the States of the Empire had assembled around Oxenstierna, they were willing to agree to it, being utterly powerless, and having nothing more to lose. But Oxenstierna would not sign, and sent Hugo Grotius to Paris to negotiate on some other basis. Meanwhile Heidelberg, which had been so repeatedly threatened, was relieved with the aid of the French troops who were summoned across the Rhine, and thus for the first time French arms were openly employed against the Emperor. Up to this time a secret game had been played; France had been carrying on war without declaring it.

#### THE PEACE OF PRAGUE, 30TH OF MAY, 1635.

The defeat at Nördlingen had thrust down the Swedish army and policy from the commanding position which Gustavus Adolphus had acquired for them; the army, not only because it had for the first time lost a great battle after being considered, and having really been for four years invincible, but still more because the original character of the army, already greatly changed, was now entirely lost. Some gaps had been made in the old Swedish army with its national and religious stamp, even under Gustavus Adolphus, but they were well filled up with material which,

though serviceable in a military point of view, had considerably changed the character of the army. After this great defeat they could not afford to be nice in the choice of material, and had to put up with a homeless rabble of fugitives and deserters, whose lawlessness soon made the Swedish army equal to, if not worse than, others in wickedness. Even the first corps which Oxenstierna collected at Frankfort in order, in case of need, to oppose the advancing Imperialists, showed what miserable creatures they were getting together. To keep them from open mutiny he had to extort 100,000 florins from the free city, and, to rid it of their wild doings, Bernhard was obliged to lead them across the Rhine, their track being everywhere marked by boundless excesses.

The Swedish policy in the German war did not recover from the defeat at Nördlingen. Sweden immediately lost her most important allies in the camp of the German princes. At a time of great distress, when both enemies were already in the country, Saxony had been pressed into alliance with Sweden ; but the Saxon court, full of mistrust of Gustavus Adolphus, had constantly chafed against the alliance, and only joined in the war by halves for the sake of appearances. When his military successes were at their height, Gustavus Adolphus had left the march through Bohemia to Vienna to the Saxons, because he wished to compel them to open enmity with the Emperor, and feared, in case of non-success on his part, to see them immediately rejoin the Hapsburg party. If this was the position of affairs when the Swedish arms were at the height of their fame and under the impression of the victory of Breitenfeld, it was clear that now, after the defeat of Nördlingen, nothing would outweigh the imperial influence in Saxony. The 6th of September was the signal for a treaty between the Saxon Court and the Emperor. It also involved a change in the relations between Sweden and France.

Richelieu had laboured unceasingly to gain an influence in the German difficulties ; Gustavus Adolphus had accepted his subsidies, but absolutely forbidden any interference with his plans. After the King's death, Oxenstierna had hoped to keep the French co-operation within the same limits, and to a certain extent he succeeded. But after the defeat of Nördlingen all this was changed. Richelieu was no longer a burdensome interloper to be outwitted, but a desired ally



for a little help from whom, great sacrifices must be made.

In short, the battle destroyed the Swedish army, ripened the long-cherished ideas of the two North German Electors of entering into separate treaties with the Emperor, and brought about a closer approach between Sweden and France, in that they now assumed the conduct of the German war on terms of equality.

Meanwhile, the military events of the first part of 1635 showed the superiority of the imperial and the inefficiency of the Swedish-French arms. In January the Imperialists took Philippsburg from the French by a successful surprise; John of Werth also succeeded in surprising Spire; and in March the Spaniards took Treves, and carried off the Elector as a prisoner.

These misfortunes, however, only disturbed Richelieu's diplomacy on the surface; he quietly pursued his way. It was his perpetual aim to deprive the Swedes of the command, to form a French party among the German princes, and by means of subsidies to attach the Duke of Weimar to his interests. The progress of Spain finally led in this case also, to a breach in this unnatural alliance.

On the 8th of February, Richelieu had concluded a treaty with Holland against Spain, and in May followed the declaration of war.

A few days after, the Peace of Prague \* between Saxony and the Emperor was signed; the conditions had been previously discussed on the 24th of November at Pirna.

The affair did not do much honour to the diplomacy of Electoral Saxony. At first the Elector made large demands, and then allowed himself to be miserably intimidated at Pirna. He then held fast to the Pirna preliminaries in a lump, and disregarded all the remonstrances of the Protestants; but when the Imperialists proposed a number of alterations he immediately agreed to them.

From the narrow-minded Lutheranism which prevailed at this court, no religious peace could be expected which would include the Reformed party. The opinions held here were those of the court theologian, Hohenegg, who said, "For it is as plain as that the sun shines at mid-day, that the Calvinistic doctrine is full of frightful blas-

\* Helbig, *der Prager Friede*. Compare with Rommel, *Gesch.* v. Hessen, viii. 366. Droysen, iii. 132, with Barthold.

phemy, horrible error and mischief, and is diametrically opposed to God's holy revealed word. To take up arms for the Calvinists is nothing else than to serve under the originator of Calvinism—the devil. We ought, indeed, to give our lives for our brethren; but the Calvinists are not our brethren in Christ; to support them would be to offer ourselves and our children to Moloch. We ought to love our enemies, but the Calvinists are not *our* enemies, but God's."

The Treaty of Passau and the religious peace of Augs-burg were, in a general way, confirmed; but all who did not accept the treaty were excluded, and the subjects of Austria, the inhabitants of the Palatinate, and the members of the council of the confederation, were excepted from the amnesty. The amnesty itself, like everything that concerned ecclesiastical affairs and the fate of the bishoprics, was full of side-doors and purposely designed loopholes, so that a Jesuit of Cologne could write to a fellow of his order who was uneasy about it, "The Elector will lose his reputation by the treaty, and the allies will be divided by taking the bait; everything will be well guarded by clauses, and the concessions will only be apparent. (*Latet ubique anguis in herba, nihil concessum, nihil conclusum, quod a nostris non fuerit ponderatum et in recessu aliquid habeat.*)"

A subversion of the imperial constitution, also, was involved in the Treaty of Prague. All unions and alliances were by it declared to be at an end, except the electoral union, the hereditary unions of the house of Austria and the hereditary fraternity between Saxony, Hesse, and Brandenburg; the ancient right, therefore, of the princes to conclude treaties was abolished. To this was added the regulation, that for the future there should be only one army in the empire, to be headed by the Emperor, not only as the chief, but sole commander. Finally, it was decreed that the Duke of Lorraine should be re-instated, which meant that Saxony, who desired peace at the sacrifice of all her allies, should be involved in a war with France, and that in the interests of Austria.

Brandenburg, which, after long vacillation, finally submitted to the Emperor, soon experienced what was meant by the imperial military supremacy. The Elector was no longer master of his own country; his own officers, under

oath to the Emperor as well as to himself, established an anarchical military rule of the worst kind.

One thing, however, was noteworthy in this peace. The Emperor, Ferdinand II., in all essential points, with very little exception, gave up the Edict of Restitution for Saxony and Brandenburg. Not that this was brought about by the treaty, but it was the first evidence that the Emperor no longer expected to carry out this ordinance. It required thirteen years more of fearful warfare to prove that it must be given up for the other German states also.

The idea of putting an end, in one way or another, to this unholy war must certainly have been attractive at this doleful period. But the Treaty of Prague held out no prospect of it either to the empire or for the states, who thought they had at least taken good care of themselves. A time of fearful suffering now began for Saxony and Brandenburg; both countries were the victims of a refined brutality; the Imperialists treated them like hostile countries, and the Swedes with the malicious vengeance which is the portion of renegades. The condition into which the countries of North Germany were brought by the peace was a fearful satire upon it.

#### WEIMAR IN FRENCH PAY.—BANER'S VICTORIES AND VICISSITUDES. 1636-7.

Before the end of 1635 a favourable turn took place for the Swedish arms.

In the western seat of war Duke Bernhard was fighting with decided ill success. The Imperialists were making unhindered progress on the Rhine and in Alsace, when at length the French appeared in the field with a second army. It consisted of 15,000 men, commanded by the Cardinal de la Valette, youngest son of the Duke of Epernon, and it comprised the flower of the French nobility. That military training now began for them which afterwards produced heroes. Turenne, Guiche, Guebriant, were in this army. But Bernhard had sufficiently painful experience that this corps had not got beyond the very elements of military training. La Valette's delays sent him nearly out of his mind, and, before he came, Kaiserslautern was lost, and the Imperialists gained a firm footing on the left shore of the Rhine. They met at last, and again advanced

through the Palatinate, and occupied Kreuznach. While the Cardinal besieged Bingen, Mayence was relieved, but in August, Frankfort was lost. Bernhard now urged La Valette to cross to the right bank of the Rhine, and he was willing to do so, but the Swiss and the French cavaliers in the army opposed it. They were only silenced by threats that the mutineers would be cut down, and by the assurance that William of Hesse was on the other side. So they crossed; but the Landgrave did not come, and both armies were in a very critical situation. The French, who lay before Hochstein, suffered from want and sickness, and mutiny was rife in Bernhard's German regiments. Hard pressed by the enemy, amidst some feats of arms, but on the whole with great losses, Bernhard made the brilliant retreat to the Saar which won admiration even from the enemy. The Cardinal would not cross the Rhine again, but extolled the excellent military discipline they had passed through, and the warlike merits of the Germans. His soldiers sang a satirical song about him, with the refrain—

‘Où est le duc de Vimar?’

which the Cardinal had always been exclaiming when in difficulties.

In the north, Oxenstierna, who had not been able to accomplish anything at Paris, tried to gather the scattered elements together, but could not succeed in keeping the Duke of Lüneburg on his side, nor in coming to any terms with Saxony. Baner's army consisted of 26,000 men, and was in good condition; but as they were almost all Germans, the Swedes did not altogether rely upon them. The Elector of Saxony was continually trying to induce the colonels to make peace with the Emperor, and rudely broke off the negotiations with Oxenstierna, by saying he would send his decision to him at Stralsund.

Half in despair, Oxenstierna retreated to Wismar, and left it to Baner, who was in perpetual difficulties, from the defections of the German princes and of his own troops, to hold the middle and lower Elbe until he should succeed in bringing reinforcements to the seat of war, and in forming a new army on the sea-coast.

Meanwhile the Saxons set out to divide the Swedish troops on the Elbe. They proceeded down the river; and

the vanguard of the Swedes, which was weak, yielded ; but on the 1st of November an engagement took place at Dömitz, in which the Saxons were beaten. This was the beginning of returning success to the Swedes ; it infused courage into their depressed allies ; the hard-pressed Landgrave of Hesse, especially, gained breathing time, since the imperial army was compelled by this defeat to move towards the north.

Before this an important diplomatic event had taken place, which had a decisive influence on the course of events—the peace negotiations with Poland. It was perfectly clear that war could not be carried on in Germany and in Poland at the same time. But which was to be given up? There was a strong feeling in Sweden for the war with Poland, while Richelieu made every effort to put an end to it, that the Swedes might be at liberty for the war in Germany. With this object, Count d'Avaux was sent to Poland. On the other hand, it was the policy of the Pope and of the Hapsburgs to keep on the war in Poland. At the end of May the negotiations began at Ruhmsdorf, near Marienburg. After much vicissitude and vacillation, and having been more than once threatened by fresh conflicts, they were successfully terminated on the 12th of September, chiefly through D'Avaux's diplomatic energy and virtuosoship. The treaty was honourable and advantageous to the Swedes, and set their armies under Wrangel and Torstenson at liberty for Germany.

The results soon appeared. Baner, united with Torstenson in Mecklenburg, gained several decided advantages. From the 7th to the 17th of September Torstenson defeated the Saxons near Kiritz, and after having boasted that they would drive the Swedes across the sea, they sued ignominiously for a truce. This produced a reaction in the south-west ; William of Hesse again stood firmly by the Swedes.

Towards the end of November, Gallas had to commence a disastrous retreat from Lorraine, and to confine himself to petty warfare. Nevertheless, in November, Mayence, after having been held for four years by the Swedes, was ceded again by capitulation. The Rhine district was then invaded by wild foreign visitors, the Cossacks and Hussars, and the distress in the whole western part of the empire fearfully increased.

Richelieu, who had gained an important diplomatic

victory by means of D'Avaux, was not satisfied with the way in which the war was carried on. This is shown by the severe punishments which he ordained, and still more plainly by the decided connection into which he now entered with Bernhard of Weimar. In the summer, on discussing the subject with La Valette and other French generals, he had convinced himself that nothing was to be done without the Duke. In July he had conjured La Valette to neglect nothing which was calculated to secure the Duke for the interests of France. If Alsace failed, he should be provided for in Lorraine; should that fail too, France would take care of him.

On the 27th of October a formal treaty was entered into at St. Germain between France and Weimar.\* He was to maintain an army of 18,000 Germans for an annual grant of 4,000,000 livres, of which 200,000 were to be allotted for the Duke's income. Besides this, the Landgraviate of Alsace and the prefecture of Hagenau, with all the rights of the House of Austria, were to be made over to him, with one condition only, that the Catholic religion should be upheld. For this territory compensation was to be made in time of peace. The Duke was to place his army under the King of France, and to promise to lead it wherever he should desire.

The Duke did not conceal from himself the importance of this treaty, and took special care not to disturb the opinion of his troops that he was in the field only as an independent ally of France; but he wanted the French, and trusted that he should be able to abide by the treaty without forfeiting his independence. He went through various painful experiences on his way to Paris, but maintained a princely bearing at the Court, where they tried to allure him by banquets and beautiful women. In the subsequent conduct of the war he successfully imitated his model, Gustavus Adolphus, and was in fact much more independent than might have been expected from the conditions of the treaty. He was his own master, but carried on the war with French money.

The time had now arrived when the remnant of the Swedish army regained its importance. Saxony and Brandenburg were once more drawn into the war, and were fearfully chastised for the separate treaties they had made.

\* Röse, ii. 467-469, 479.



The most able man whom Sweden now possessed was Baner. He was a thorough soldier, steeled and hardened in all weathers, and exhibited a certain blustering indifference to death and danger. He was an active and skilful general, and was the first of the successors of Gustavus under whom the Swedish arms achieved victory again; but he was also a complete representative of this later period of the war, for he carried it on without any lofty aims, solely as a business which brought with it gain, enjoyment, and revelry. He gave himself up to pleasure and excess like the soldiers under his command, was a wild, lawless fellow, a creature of the army and the age; but he possessed the military ability of a generation who knew peace only by name, and who had grown up amidst the rough gales of fearful conflicts.

But the war had assumed a character at which even Baner sometimes shuddered. He once said of his own soldiers that it would be no marvel if the earth opened and swallowed up such shameless wantons.

It was he who brought the scourge of this war into unfortunate electoral Saxony. He had first invaded the country in January and February, 1636, but not being strong enough to advance further, he had retreated to a post of observation in a camp near Werben. While he was lying still here, and, as far as it was possible in his painful pecuniary embarrassments, obtaining reinforcements with French money, the imperial troops under Peter Götz were devastating Lower Hesse and part of Westphalia. Eighteen towns and three hundred villages were ruined, forty-seven castles burnt, and one-third of the population disappeared, and John of Werth, with his hordes of cavalry, was terrifying the neighbourhood of Paris. "Jean de Werth" threw the capital of France into a panic of fear, and the people were preparing for the horrors of a visit from these dreaded horsemen. Richelieu alone, on whose head imprecations were called down, maintained a manly attitude, and with imposing calmness faced the furious mob. It was shown once more what the French were as a nation; they readily furnished money and troops when necessity required. When a large army was equipped the panic subsided, and the enemy would not have been able long to remain on French soil if want of skill in the command, dissensions, and political intrigues had not lamed the defensive efforts of the people.



They were, however, at length relieved by the first great victory which Baner meanwhile had gained in the north.

At the end of September he had again advanced against the Saxons, and overtaken the Elector and Hatzfeld near Wittstock. On the 4th of October a sanguinary and long-doubtful struggle took place, which, however, ended in the retreat of the Saxons and Imperialists. Six thousand dead and the baggage and artillery of the Elector were left on the field of battle. The results, if not to be compared with those of the victory of Nördlingen, were sufficiently important. They inspired fresh hopes into Austria's enemies; Saxony's defection recoiled with a heavy weight upon the instigators of it; France was relieved; Denmark remained quiet; and those who had lately gone over, such as George of Lüneburg, were placed in a most painful situation.

In November, Baner proceeded southwards towards Saxony and Thuringia, and made inroads as far as Hesse. These unfortunate countries suffered fearful devastation from both friends and foes. In December, he again turned towards electoral Saxony, subdued Erfurt, and then advanced by way of Naumburg to Meissen, in order to intercept the meeting of John George of Saxony with the troops of Brandenburg.

At this time, the 22nd of December, 1636, the son of the Emperor Ferdinand II. was elected King of Rome. It had been attempted unsuccessfully before, and was not now accomplished without opposition—the Elector of Treves was in prison, of the Palatinate in exile, the Elector of Bavaria not generally acknowledged—but just then it was an important success for the imperial cause. On the 15th of February of the following year Ferdinand II. died.

The year 1637 brought increasing success to the Imperialists, so that they were able to project the expulsion of the Swedes from German soil. But then they should not have displaced competent leaders like John of Werth, and have put a man like Gallas at their head, who often forgot his duty in the pleasures of a luxurious camp-life.

Electoral Brandenburg now zealously took part in the war. George William entered into a treaty with the Emperor at Prague, in which he agreed to raise an army of 7,000 men in Brandenburg and Pomerania, which was to swear fealty both to the Elector and the Emperor.

Meanwhile, Baner had been shut in at Torgau by a force

at least double his own, and he was obliged to be on the alert lest he and his troops should be lost. He resolved to retire to the coast and maintain his position in Pomerania. There was a dexterous rumour that he would appear before Erfurt, and a detachment of the imperial army was therefore kept on the left shore. Baner then crossed the Elster near Herzberg, and, proceeding by way of Luckau and Lübben, reached the Oder near Fürstenberg, and crossed it in shallow places. But as he was proceeding to Landsberg on the Warthe, he was pursued by the Imperialists by way of Jüterbogk, Baruth, and Küstrin, and on the 4th of July they were before Landsberg, while Wrangel, who was to advance from Pomerania to meet Baner, had only reached Schwedt. Once again Baner deceived the enemy. Pretending that he was going through Poland, he returned to the Oder, waded through the shallow stream opposite Göritz, and on the 13th of July joined Wrangel's vanguard. The forces of both then retreated to Stettin.

#### VICTORIES AND DEATH OF BERNHARD OF WEIMAR.

1638-9.

Neither the armies nor the generals who had been carrying on the war in Germany for the last four years showed a trace of its original object, either in their character or proceedings; on all sides there was the same degeneracy, the same lawless doings of homeless soldiers, who only cared to live through a few merry years amidst the universal misery. Among the common soldiers this was indicated by incredible bestiality; by their leaders in the same manner, though in a less degree. Every sentiment of patriotism, faith, justice, and morality had utterly perished in this vortex of unbridled passions. Richelieu's tenacious diplomacy and Austria's blind zeal for conversion are almost the only remaining symptoms of a conscious purpose.

Under such circumstances Bernhard of Weimar attained a renown which would not otherwise have been his portion.

He was the most gifted of all the princely adventurers who were hoping to gain a principality in this game of chance—the only one among the generals who had not degenerated into a homeless hireling. In Germany they forgot that he was a French field-marshal, for he not only, in spite of the Treaty of St. Germain, had maintained a

certain independence towards the French, but raised a German army to make himself independent both of the French and the Swedes. He took advantage of the rivalry between the Germans, the Swedes, and the French, and appeared everywhere as the champion of Protestant Germany. To add to this now, there were his brilliant military achievements, which put even those of Baner into the shade, and seemed to bring back the days of Gustavus Adolphus. Up to this time the jealousy of the Swedes had not allowed him to develop his talents to the full; he had always been placed in the second rank, but now he acted independently, and with a skill like that of Wallenstein, he created an army of his own, and it could not be denied that it bore that decided stamp which German troops, German officers, and German military skill conferred on an army. In a surprisingly short time he had a splendid force in the field, and after the beginning of 1638 accomplished feats which placed him among the ranks of the first generals of his time.

The Treaty of St. Germain had not been fully carried out by the French. Months had passed in vexatious negotiations about the bare performance of their engagements. At length, in April, 1637, an agreement had been come to. Bernhard only received two million and a half of livres, and only 10,000 men, instead of the 20,000 he had hoped for. Then, to please Richelieu, he was obliged to agree to defend Lorraine, and several weeks passed before pressing pecuniary difficulties permitted the expedition to begin. Nothing decisive could take place in that year, and it was with difficulty that Bernhard obtained leave, after some progress had been made, to cross the Rhine, and come to Baner's relief.

The Rhine was crossed at the end of July; the first attacks of John of Werth were successfully repulsed, but it was not possible to maintain the right bank without reinforcements, in face of the increasing forces of the enemy. In October, Bernhard commenced a retreat, and spent the winter months in the bishopric of Basle, continually negotiating with the Court at Paris, who at length agreed, in February, to pay the arrears of 2,400,000 livres for the new year; but instead of the 8,000 men whom Bernhard demanded, he only received an indefinite promise of a considerable force on the left shore of the Rhine.

But before Bernhard received this intelligence he had taken decisive action on his own account. Relying upon the Imperialists being dispersed in their winter quarters, and the discord among the generals, on the 27th of January he set out in profound secrecy from near Delsberg; on the 29th suddenly invaded the Frickthal; on the 30th crossed the Rhine in fishing-boats, surprised Säckingen and Laufenburg, destroyed a hostile regiment; on the 1st of February took Beuggen and Waldshut, and the next day appeared before Rheinfelden, and besieged it with great vigour.

The Imperialists, in their scattered cantonments, now began to bestir themselves; the peasants of Schwarzwald were called upon, and, just when Rheinfelden was reduced to extremity, Savelli and Werth came to the relief of the country round Beuggen. An engagement took place near Rheinfelden, where the Imperialists, after a hot and disastrous combat on both sides, succeeded in getting help and provisions into the town, and compelled Bernhard to raise the siege.

But owing to the want of system in the imperial army and the dissensions and confusion at head-quarters, this success was not turned to advantage, and Bernhard formed the bold resolution of at once attacking the careless enemy. In the early morning of the 3rd of March he again appeared before Beuggen. The Imperialists now suffered a complete defeat; the army was dispersed in wild disorder, and the surviving generals, among them John of Werth, were taken prisoners.

A few days afterwards a treaty was signed between France and Sweden at Hamburg, by which they made common cause; subsidies from France were stipulated for, for the past and the future, and it was agreed that peace negotiations should only be undertaken in common.

As a result of the victory of Rheinfelden, the town, the neighbouring fortresses, and soon Freiburg, also fell into Bernhard's hands, and his troops extended themselves over Swabia; only Breifach offered an obstacle on the Upper Rhine.

Meanwhile the Imperialists sent reinforcements to the new commander, Götz; but their warfare was wanting in unity and spirit. After sundry skirmishes, Bernhard attacked them at the beginning of August in the Ortenau. He advanced by way of Kenzingen, Mahlberg, and Lahr, towards Schuttern, and secured the bridges near Dinglingen and

Friesenheim. Götz took up a good position near. When, on the morning of the 9th of August, the vanguard set out for Breifach, Bernhard began his attack. Although taken by surprise, the Imperialists and Bavarians, near Wittenweyer, fought with great obstinacy, and were only beaten after a long and changeful contest. Three thousand men, artillery, trophies, and the provisions intended for Breifach, as well as camp and baggage, fell into the hands of the victors. By the middle of August Bernhard again stood before Breifach.

This change in the south reacted upon the northern theatre of war, for the imperial forces there were diminished. Baner once more gained ground in Pomerania, and the change was felt in Hesse. But Bernhard's victory would have been followed by greater results if the French had given him substantial help, instead of fair speeches only. He complained bitterly of the non-fulfilment of their promises, and predicted the loss of the advantages gained, and his own defeat. Nevertheless, the repeated attempts of the imperial party to gain him over were entirely unheeded.

The siege of Breifach was now begun in earnest; but the promised help from France either did not come at all or was ineffective when it did.

From a sick-bed at Colmar, Bernhard did all that it was possible for man to do to frustrate all attempts to make peace until he should receive succour and supplies. On the 15th of October the Duke of Lorraine was beaten at Tann. On the 24th there was a long and doubtful contest in the lines about Breifach; but Bernhard, who was still ill, was carried out of his tent, and was this time powerfully aided by Guebriant and Turenne, finally carried the day, after his assaults had been seven times repulsed.

On the 1st of November, Lorraine was a second time defeated, and the last outworks of the fortress were lost, though everything was done on the imperial side to save them. Götz was recalled, doubts having arisen about his loyalty, and he was subjected to a tedious trial; but his successor was not able to do more than lead his exhausted troops back through the Schwarzwald; and how different even then might have been the result if Bernhard had been efficiently supported by the French, instead of having to spend weeks and months in begging for every two or three thousand men.

Reduced to extremities, and without hope of succour, on the 17th of December, Breifach capitulated. The Duke at once established himself comfortably in this fresh acquisition, and filled his French allies with alarm about the formation of this new principality. A glance at the French mode of warfare, as compared with the annihilating blows dealt by Weimar, must have relieved as well as shamed them. Richelieu was right in exclaiming, on receiving the latest news of victory, "*We have no Duke of Weimar!*"

In the north and east, also, the Imperialists had lost their favourable position; Baner was again master in Pomerania and Mecklenburg, and could entertain the idea of joining Bernhard's operations.

Bernhard's feats had a wonderfully inspiring effect in Protestant Germany. In the course of a few months he had been victorious in a number of engagements, taken fortresses thought to be impregnable, sometimes on the first assault, and within one half year he had restored the supremacy of the Protestant arms in South-west Germany—even in districts which, since 1634, had been sacrificed to jealous reaction. He now restored to the oppressed Protestants an independent existence, drove the Imperialists back to Bavaria, and achieved moral successes which had been granted to no one since Gustavus Adolphus.

It was this that gave the Duke of Weimar so peculiar a position at this period. The archives do not exhibit him in the most favourable light, but his deeds were dazzling; Richelieu was practically nobody in comparison with him. The army recognised no one but him, and his victories were the greatest exploits of the last six or eight years.

But those short episodes were brilliant meteors, speedily to be extinguished; and it indicates the hopeless state of German affairs, that the day came when the death of Bernhard, the French field-marshal, was a sort of national misfortune. He was the last who, as it were, in French garb and with French money, fought for other than French interests. When he was out of the way the inexhaustible patience of French diplomacy had overcome all obstacles, and Richelieu's endeavours were crowned with success.

Early in the summer of 1639 this change took place. In the spring, Baner had set out for Central Germany; had invaded Saxony, and, encouraged by a victory at Chemnitz, attempted to invade Bohemia. But this turned out most



unfortunately. His hopes of a rising among the people were not fulfilled ; he was too weak to take Prague, and in June, amidst fearful devastation, he commenced a retreat.

In Paris they vacillated between satisfaction over Bernhard's latest victories and anxiety as to his designs. It had become clear, when he sounded them on the subject in 1638, that they were not disposed to leave him in possession of Breifach. But the affair dragged on. Richelieu reckoned that Bernhard would yield, and had already selected Guebriant as governor. Bernhard remained quiet, and his commissioner referred the subject to communications which he would make personally.

Meanwhile, in January, 1639, without consulting any one, Bernhard suddenly set out from Breifach, took the castle of Landskron, and advanced towards Lorraine. The Spaniards and the Duke of Lorraine were surprised. Portarlier and Joux fell, and nearly all this rich country lay open to him.

Even this, satisfactory as it seemed in itself, was a source of fresh anxieties at Paris, and the Duke was still silent about Breifach. All that could be learnt about it was that he would arrange the matter personally at Paris. But warned by the other side, he gave up the journey to Paris, in spite of the most flattering invitations, and tried to subdue the Cardinal's ill-humour by friendly letters.

But it was plain that he was scheming to form a powerful principality out of Alsace, parts of Lorraine, the free earldom, and other Upper Rhenish districts, while the utmost intentions of France were to grant them to him for his lifetime. It was the interest of both to avoid a breach. Bernhard therefore tried to find a solution of the difficulty, and in April sent his commissioner to Paris. He was to represent that the surrender of Breifach would give rise to a suspicion that the empire was overpowered by France, which would displease both the German princes and the Swedes. The Cardinal was ready to pay the promised subsidies, and even some extra supplies ; but then the Duke must engage to hold Breifach and the conquered fortresses under his Majesty the King, not to surrender them to any other person, and to give up the disposition of his conquests.

Whether Bernhard would agree to this was very doubtful ; but his commissioner accepted an annuity of 20,000 livres, and engaged to guard Breifach for Richelieu, now,



and in the event of Bernhard's death, and to furnish Richelieu with private information respecting the Duke.

Meanwhile, Bernhard exercised sovereign rule in the conquered territories, averted the interference of French officials, fostered agriculture, and did what he could to render his rule acceptable to the people. His relations with France were on the verge of an open breach. In July he had discussions with Guebriant at Pontarlier, which nearly led to it. He demanded Alsace and the most important fortresses as a possession, declined to make any concessions of his former or future conquests to France, and demanded larger subsidies.

He left Pontarlier, and arrived on the 14th of July at Hünningen; there he fell ill, and on the 18th sank under his sufferings.

There were suspicions of poison, for there were spots on his body after his death, for which the medical art of that day could not account; but this proves nothing, for nothing can be more absurd than the medical reports of those days of the facts and symptoms of an illness. On this and other occasions the impression conveyed is that the fatal result of the malady must be mainly ascribed to the doctor's art.

Still, it is worthy of note that the idea of violence was spread far and wide—allusions were even made to it in the preacher's funeral discourse at the grave—and all agreed in pointing to Richelieu, his ally, in whose service he was fighting, as the author of it. There was an instinct which prompted this improbable notion, for the people had thought:—they are at variance; the Cardinal takes no pleasure in the Duke's victories; he wants to get rid of him, that he may put a real French field-marshal in the place of the ostensible one.\*

In fact, if ever a man's death was welcome to any one, Bernhard's was to Richelieu. Twice had his purposes been thrust into the background, and he had to play the part of a discontented ally, who had to find the money, but was not permitted to have any voice in the management; now he would be able to get the best army in the world into his own hands, and to pursue his policy with a prospect of success. The French command could no longer be set aside.

\* Röse, ii. 328, shows how entirely unexpected Bernhard's death was to the French.

As we have seen, Richelieu found it very difficult to create an army commensurate with his aims, and equal to that of the enemy. The French military system was then unusually bad. The feats of the French army were spoken of in that warlike age with the greatest contempt, and the performances of La Valette's army were not calculated to dispel it. The French had fallen into the background, though no one will deny the military efficiency of the nation in itself.

The Duke left a will, in which he bequeathed the command to one of his brothers, and ordained, besides, "As to the conquered countries, and they are very considerable countries and fortresses, we wish them to be preserved to the German empire, and we therefore bequeath and devise them to whichever of our dear brothers shall desire to accept them, and can and will best serve your Majesty and the crown of Sweden, that your Majesties (Ihre Liebden)\* may be the better supported in the aforesaid countries."

If neither of the brothers would take them, France was to have the preference; but when peace was made she was to restore them to the empire.

This did not suffice to protect the interest of Germany in the great commotion that arose about the inheritance. Sweden still looked upon the army as a branch of her own; Bernhard's brothers took steps to gain it for themselves; even the Emperor had a scheme for gaining possession of it; but Richelieu was more on the alert than any of them. On the 28th of July, D'Oissonville appeared at Breifach with a handsome sum of money, to bribe the leaders and gain over the fortresses. Longueville was selected as the Duke's successor. Erlach and Guebriant were naturally zealous in the interests of France; the masses were helpless, the leaders cheap.

It was, of course, but a small matter for Richelieu to put aside this inconvenient will; still, it was not until October that the business was concluded. Under pretence of maintaining previous agreements intact, new ones were entered into. The army was kept together as a whole; in return for some considerable rewards, and other immediate advantages, for the engagement to supply provisions and the necessaries of war, and to carry out gifts of land by the deceased, the commanders and officers of the whole army

\* A title given by sovereign princes to each other.—Tr.

promised allegiance to the King, engaged to serve against any one, to be ready for any enterprise on behalf of the restoration of public liberties and the oppressed classes, as the King might see fit, should it be in France, Burgundy, Lorraine, or the Netherlands. The conquered fortresses should at once, "in accordance with the Duke's will" (!) be made over to the King, Breisach and Freiburg should be garrisoned with half French and half German troops, and commanded according to the King's pleasure.

This was immediately carried out, and the negotiators were handsomely rewarded. The Count Palatine Louis, who too late appeared as a candidate, was detained in France; Bernhard's brothers were duped, and even deprived of their personal legacies.

The army was now French; a Frenchman was at its head. Some French regiments were placed by the side of the German ones, that they might take lessons from them. The army was but moderately commanded for a long time, and suffered a number of defeats; but it was the school in which Turenne and other great generals were trained, who were to raise France to the position of the greatest military power in Europe.

It was a great thing for Richelieu, who had hitherto only exercised a secondary influence by means of money, and had only attained to a partial co-operation with great difficulty, that he was now all at once relieved from these restraints, and had an army pledged to his service, and entirely supported by him.

These events were the turning-point in the Thirty Years' War, towards which things had been tending ever since the death of Gustavus Adolphus. The twofold interference of France and Sweden determined the last act of the war, and the supremacy of France in Europe is connected with the enlargement of the country by the Peace of Westphalia.

## PART XI.

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END OF THE WAR. THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA.  
1640-48.

### CHAPTER XXXIX.

BANER'S END, MAY, 1641, AND TORSTENSON'S VICTORIES,<sup>\*</sup>  
1642-5.

Battle of Leipzig, 2d November, 1643.—Campaign against Denmark, 1643-44.—Victory near Jankowitz, February, 1645.—Simultaneous warfare of the French.—The Peace Negotiations and end of the War.—The Diet of Ratisbon from September, 1640.—Brandenburg's Proposition of Unconditional Amnesty, and Restoration to the Condition of 1618.—The Hamburg Preliminaries, December, 1641.—The Meeting of Deputies at Frankfort, 1642-45.—Beginning of the Peace Congress and end of the War, 1644-48.

#### BANER'S END, AND TORSTENSON'S VICTORIES.

THE war still went on for eight years, but the only influence that it exerted upon the subsequent Peace was that it overcame the last doubts of the Imperial court as to the indispensable principles of the Peace. The indemnification schemes of the governments which had interfered in the conflict were not altered, but until the fourth decade they could not accustom themselves at Vienna to the idea of the amnesty and the restoration of the old treaties of peace. The last few years of the war decidedly conduced to this end.

The first event of importance on the theatre of war after

\* Besides the before-mentioned literature, Chemnitz, *Geschichte des Schw. Krieges*, new ed., Stockholm, 1857. Keller, *Drangsale des Nass. Volks im dreissigjährigen Krieg*. Gotha, 1854. *Der Abenteuerliche Simplicissimus*. Neue Ausgabe, Stuttgart, 1854, 2 Bde. Bougeant, *hist. du Traité de Westphalie*, 2 Bde. Meiern, *Acta pacis Westphalicae*, 1734, 6 Bde. Rütter, *Geist des Westphäl. Friedens*, 1795.—Hippolitus Lapide, *de ratione status in Imperio R. Germanico*, 1647.

Bernhard's death was Baner's attempt to join the army of Weimar in central Germany. Not in a condition to pass the winter in Bohemia, and threatened in Saxony and Silesia, he did the only thing which rendered the longer trarriance of a Swedish army possible—he resolved to cross the Erzegebirge into Thuringia, to compel the vacillating Hessians and Lüneburgers to help, and to join the French-Weimar army. In March, 1640, he commenced a retreat amidst fearful devastations, crossed the Elbe at Leitmeritz, and arrived April 3rd at Zwickau. He succeeded in joining with the mercenaries of Weimar and the troops of Lüneburg and Hesse at Saalfeld, but want of unity in the command, discord among the princes, the privations that had to be endured in these exhausted countries, and mutiny among the Weimar troops, prevented any joint action. They had to commence a retreat, and to confine themselves to a watchful defensive action. Until December, the war on both sides consisted of marches hither and thither, accompanied with horrible devastation ; but nothing decisive occurred.

In September the Diet met at Ratisbon. While wearisome attempts were being made to bend the obstinacy of Austria, Baner resolved to compel her to yield by a bold stroke, to invade the Upper Palatinate, to surprise Ratisbon, and to put an end to the Diet and Emperor together. At the beginning of September he set out. Not without difficulty Guebriant was induced to follow, and to join Baner at Erfurt. At the beginning of January they advanced together towards Baireuth and Bamberg. It was only on January 2nd, when the fugitive country people began to arrive, that the Imperial troops were aware of their advance. But the surprise of Ratisbon was a failure. The Emperor declared that he should remain, and thereby restored the composure of the Diet. Troops were summoned from all sides. Baner and Guebriant did indeed advance as far as Hof, and threw some balls into the town ; but the enterprise was a failure, and a longer trarriance was undesirable.

The armies now separated again. Baner exhausted his powers of persuasion in vain to induce Guebriant to go with him. The French went westward. Hard pressed himself, Baner proceeded by forced marches towards Bohemia, and by the end of March reached Zwickau, where he met Guebriant again, and they had a sharp conflict with the Impe-

rialists on the Saal. There Baner died, on the 21st of May, 1641, leaving his army in a most critical condition.

The warfare of the Swedish-French arms was come to a standstill. Both armies were near dissolution, when, in November, Torstenson, the last of the Gustavus Adolphus school of generals, and the one who most nearly equalled the master, appeared with the Swedish army, and by a few vigorous strokes, which followed each other with unexampled rapidity, restored the supremacy of its arms. These feats were the more remarkable, as Torstenson was so ill with the gout that he could not mount a horse, and had to be carried everywhere in a litter.

After three months of rest, which he mainly devoted to the reorganization and payment of his army, by the middle of January he had advanced towards the Elbe and the Altmark; and as the Imperial forces were weakened by sending troops to the Rhine, he formed the great project of proceeding through Silesia to the Austrian hereditary dominions. On April 3rd he crossed the Elbe at Werben, between the Imperial troops, increased his army to 20,000 men, stormed Glogau on May 4th, stood before Schweidnitz on the 30th, and defeated Francis Albert of Lauenburg; Schweidnitz, Neisse, and Oppeln fell into his hands.

Meanwhile Guebriant, after subduing the defiant and mutinous spirit of his troops by means of money and promises, had, on January 17th, defeated the Imperialists near Kempen, not far from Crefeld, for which he was honoured with the dignity of marshal.

But this was a shortlived gleam of light, and was soon followed by dark days, occasioned by want of money and discontent in the camp. An attempt to recruit the army with the country people of Brittany was a failure,\* and, more from necessity than from any hope of success, he had turned eastward from the Rhine to seek quarters for his murmuring troops in nether Germany, when Torstenson effected a decision in Saxony.

After relieving Glogau, and having in vain tried to enter Bohemia, he had joined the detachments of Königsmark and Wrangel, and on October 30th he appeared before Leipzig.

On November 2nd there was a battle near Breitenfeld, which ended in a disastrous defeat of the Imperialists. In

\* Barthold.

spite of all the advantages which Torstenson gained for himself, it never came to a united action with the French; and the first victory won by the French in the Netherlands, in May, 1643, did not alter this state of things.

Torstenson was in the way to obtain successes like those of Gustavus Adolphus eleven years before, when he was suddenly called to a remote scene of war in the north. King Christian IV. of Denmark had been persuaded, by means of the old Danish jealousy of Sweden, to take up arms for the Emperor. He declared war just as Torstenson was proceeding to Austria. Vienna was now saved; but so much the worse for Denmark. In forced marches, which were justly admired, Torstenson set out from Silesia towards Denmark at the end of October, conducted a masterly campaign against the Danes, beat them wherever he met with them, conquered Holstein and Schleswig, pushed on to Jutland, then, while Wrangel and Horn carried on the war (till the peace of Brömsebro, August, 1645) he returned, and again took up the war against the Imperialists, everywhere an unvanquished general.

The Imperialists under the incompetent Gallas intended to give Denmark breathing-time by creating a diversion; but it did not save Denmark, and brought another defeat upon themselves. Gallas did not bring back more than two thousand men from Magdeburg to Bohemia, and they were in a very disorganized state. He was pursued by Torstenson, while Ragoczy threatened Hungary. The Emperor hastily collected what forces he could command, and resolved to give battle.

Torstenson had advanced as far as Glattau in February, and on March 6th, 1645, a battle was fought near Jankowitz, three miles from Tabor. It was the most brilliant victory ever gained by the Swedes. The Imperial army was cut to pieces; several of its leaders imprisoned or killed. In a few weeks Torstenson conquered Moravia and Austria as far as the Danube. Not far from the capital itself he took possession of the Wolfsbrücke. As in 1618, Vienna was in great danger.

Things might have taken a turn as disastrous for the Emperor as they were in the days of Gustavus Adolphus, had the French been able to keep pace with this mode of warfare. But their ill success always counterbalanced the Swedes' advantages. Either they were beaten just as the



Swedes were victorious, or could not turn a victory to account. So it was during this year.

The west frontier of the empire was guarded on the imperial side by Mercy, together with John of Werth, after he was liberated from prison. On 26th March, Turenne crossed the Rhine, and advanced towards Franconia. There he encamped near Mergentheim and Rosenberg. On 5th May a battle near Mergentheim ended with the entire defeat of the French, and Turenne escaped with the greatest difficulty by way of Hammelburg, towards Fulda. The victors pushed on to the Rhine.

To avenge this defeat, Enghien was sent from Paris, and, at the beginning of July, arrived at Spire, with 12,000 men. His forces, together with Königsmark's, the remnant of Turenne's and the Hessians, amounted to 30,000 men. At first Mercy dexterously avoided a battle under unfavourable circumstances, but on August 3rd the contest was inevitable. A bloody battle was fought between Nördlingen and Donauwörth near Allerheim, which was long doubtful, but, after tremendous losses, resulted in the victory of the French. Mercy's fall, Werth's imprudent advance, and a final brave assault of the Hessians, decided the day. But the victors were so weakened, that they could not fully take advantage of it. Condé was ill; and in the autumn Turenne was compelled, not without perceptible damage to the cause, to retreat with his army to the Neckar and the Rhine.

Neither had Torstenson been able to maintain his position in Austria. He had been obliged to raise the siege of Brunn, and learnt at the same time that Ragoczy had just made peace with the Emperor. Obligated to retire to Bohemia, he found his forces considerably diminished.

Meanwhile, Königsmark had won an important advantage. While Torstenson was in Austria he gained a firm footing in Saxony. Then came the news of Allerheim, and of the peace of Brömsebro. Except Dresden and Königstein, all the important points were in the hands of the Swedes; so, on the 6th of September, the Elector John George concluded a treaty of neutrality for six months. Besides money and supplies, the Swedes received Leipzig, Torgau, and the right of passage through the country.

Meanwhile, Torstenson had retreated into the north-east of Bohemia, and severe physical sufferings compelled him

to give up the command. He was succeeded by Charles Gustavus Wrangel.

#### BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND END OF THE WAR.

It is singular that during the whole time, from 1640 to the last exchange of shots at Prague, peace negotiations were going on.

They were set on foot just as Richelieu began to possess himself of the Weimar army. Singularly enough, it was Denmark, then neutral, a foreign power among the imperial states, that first made the proposal. At a meeting of the Electors at Nuremberg an amnesty was proposed, and the convocation of a Diet, which had not met since 1619.

The Diet was opened in September at Ratisbon. The Emperor consented to grant safe conducts to the foreign ambassadors, and to admit Hesse Cassel and Brunswick-Lüneberg among the Protestant States. Brandenburg openly and decidedly advocated the only just programme, and that which, after eight bloody years, was carried out, release from the peace of Prague, and proclamation of a general unconditional amnesty. "If," says a Brandenburg report of January, 1641,\* "the amnesty *universaliter pure et absque ulla conditione* is not conceded, and their rights not *plenarie* restored to the States, and the Treaty of Prague and the Imperial Religious Edict fully set aside—if everything is not restored to the state of things that existed in 1618 before the war, all treaties of peace will be in vain, confidence will never exist between the head and the members, or between the members themselves, but distrust and dissensions will be increased, and everything will be in confusion, dissolution and dismemberment, *totius Imperii*, which, however, may the good God graciously avert."

In fact, the mischievous results of the Treaty of Prague could not have been more strikingly pointed out than they were by the Brandenburg commissioners; instead of union, discord had been produced; instead of peace, a war of incalculable length; instead of keeping foreigners away, it had brought them into the heart of the empire. But Brandenburg did not succeed with its proposals of a general, unconditional amnesty. Electoral Saxony not only shame-

\* Urkunden und Aktenstücke zur Geschichte Friedrich Wilhelms.

fully left it in the lurch, after characterizing the Treaty of Prague as *lapidem offensiois*, but, with Bavaria and Cologne, went over openly to the Emperor's side.

The Emperor only consented to an empty amnesty, specially excepting his own dominions. It was also decreed that the Peace Congress should take place at Münster and Osnabrück, that the mutual grievances of the States should be heard at a meeting of deputies at Frankfort, and that afterwards the former actions against the Protestants should be again introduced.

The second act of these preparations was played at Hamburg, where, in December, 1641, the Emperor's ambassadors, and those of France and Sweden, met to settle the preliminaries: the place of the Congress, its neutrality, and separate negotiations with Sweden and France. It was not until September, 1642, that the Emperor ratified the proceedings. He had been keeping his eyes on the seat of war; every success of his arms, every disadvantage experienced by the enemy, was a welcome pretext for refusing concessions, and delaying those promised, while the enemy boasted none the less of every victory of the Swedes, in order to hasten a conclusion. Thus the victory of the Swedes at Leipzig was required, to bring about the meeting of deputies at Frankfort which the Emperor had been in no hurry to set about. It was not under the Emperor's thumb, like the Diet at Ratisbon. There was vehement expression of dislike to this "endless Spanish war." Even Electoral Mayence and Würzburg were very bitter against Spain and Bavaria; the former advocated the restoration of the Palatinate, that Spain might at length be compelled to give up her posts on the Rhine; the latter declared in private that the "religious war" which the Emperor and the Elector of Bavaria were always talking about had turned out to be a war for their "sole private interests, in which they had been obliged to take part and be ruined," and demanded a general amnesty, "because they had practical experience that nothing was to be done with the Protestants by force."

In the face of these proposals, the recall of Torstenson to Holstein was very welcome to the Emperor. Saxony said again that the time was come "for getting rid of the Swedes." Nobody had any longer any faith in treaties; Mayence was of opinion that it would have been well if the useless meeting of deputies had not been called, "and

money not thrown away." Amidst tedious discussions as to whether it should be dissolved, or adjourned to another place, it dragged on till the spring of 1645, and then broke up, scarcely any result having been obtained.

3 Meanwhile, the Congress had begun to assemble (1643-44). The French insisted that ambassadors from the German States should attend. The Emperor tried to prevent it, and wished to represent the Empire as a whole, so that he alone might treat with foreign powers, and the princes only through him. Sweden joined in the demand of France, and both finally demanded that the transactions should not begin until all the States were assembled. The Emperor was obliged to give way, and the States accepted the invitation.

The Emperor's sentiments were mainly dependent on the position of his arms. In June, 1645, Sweden and France enunciated the principles of their demand. These were: Unlimited amnesty even in the Austrian dominions, in the Palatinate, Baden, and Würtemberg, according to the normal conditions of 1618; settlement of the Imperial constitution, abolition of the election of a king of Rome; acknowledgment of the right of the States to form foreign alliances; indemnification for France and Sweden. Hesse and Ragoczy were to give up intervention in the quarrel between France and Spain. The Emperor declined to accede; for meanwhile, after the battle of Allerheim, the French had disappeared from Bavaria, Torstenson had gone northwards, and, as the war in 1646 was carried on feebly, and without any decisive result—though Bavaria did, in its distress, come to terms with France and Sweden—the Emperor would give no binding promises. After the death of Gallas, the imperial army was commanded by Holzapfel, the Protestant Hessian. So far had the religious war deviated from its purpose.

In the year 1648 the imperial arms were so persistently pursued by misfortune, that delay was no longer possible.

In the spring of the year, Bavaria and Bohemia were overrun by the enemy. In May, Holzapfel was beaten, and fatally wounded, near Zussmarshausen; every attempt to hold the Lech for the Bavarians and Imperialists had been fruitless; Königsmark had entered the country, and in July had taken possession of part of Prague; then came the victory of Condé over the Imperialists, in the Netherlands, near Lens, in August.

With great difficulty, John of Werth had just arrived, to endeavour to regain some ground in Bavaria, and especially to liberate Munich, when the news of peace came.

The Emperor had at length conceded, as the basis of the religious peace, the amnesty, and the restoration of the exiles, reserving the exceptions in favour of his hereditary dominions. His father, Ferdinand II., would scarcely have agreed to it even then. In order to extirpate heresy, he had made Germany and the Hapsburg countries a desert; yet heresy was not extirpated. He had died in February, 1637, just before Bernhard of Weimar began his triumphant course, and, following in his footsteps, French co-operation thrust itself upon Germany in full view of the general conflagration which Ferdinand's fanaticism had ignited. Now, even as in 1637, he would have opposed every attempt at reconciliation, but, happily for Germany, he was dead. His son had grown up during the troublous times of war, was personally less rigid in his ideas than his father, and now, when the course of the Thirty Years' War was nearly run out, he consented to that which, had it been honestly conceded thirty years before, would have kept the peace.

*beginning of 18th century*  
*P 241 on*  
*6-2*

## CHAPTER XL.

### THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA.

**T**HE general course of the transactions and the alternations of the parties, are best seen in the provisions of the treaty itself.

On all purely political questions, Sweden and France kept faithfully together. Whenever the object was to limit the power of the Hapsburgs, to strengthen that of the principalities, to represent the rights of the exiled princes, but also to treat the empire as an indemnification for themselves, they were like hand and glove. Until the seventh decade of the seventeenth century, Sweden and France were closely allied in these endeavours, greatly to the disadvantage of Germany.

But in religious matters it was otherwise. Sweden and France were the leaders of opposite parties. Sweden was the mouthpiece of the Protestants and of every Protestant interest. There is no doubt that we owe many beneficial regulations to the attitude taken by Sweden. France was, of course, on the other side. It was for her interest that the Protestant princes of Germany should not be annihilated, for they were the natural enemies of Spain and the Hapsburgs; but it was by no means her interest to allow Protestantism so to increase that it might become dangerous to the creed of France. Though she did not, therefore, ally herself with the Emperor, she did with Bavaria, and it was now that those relations were first entered into with this state which have repeatedly earned for it the honourable title in France of "our oldest ally in Germany." Maximilian of Bavaria was the first German prince who proposed the cession of Alsace to France.

This was the curiously disjointed way in which the most

important parties at the congress were grouped. Sweden secured the adhesion of all Protestant, France of all Catholic elements; but the Emperor, both on religious and political questions, had all parties against him, or, at any rate, none for him. His plenipotentiary, therefore, could not assume the position which was strictly his master's due, and all the foreign powers with whom he had mediately or immediately to transact business met him as the representative of a foreign power, and by reason of their adherents in Germany, they were greatly his superiors. His conduct, therefore, betrays the insecure position of an isolated party.

The peace congress at Münster and Osnabrück gradually became a European one. The powers which had not taken part in the war were either present or represented, and thus no European matter was left undiscussed, though the archives of the Peace do not contain decisions about them all.

The Netherlands tried to obtain the recognition of their independence by the German empire, as did Switzerland also. The representatives of the policy of the restoration of ancient Catholicism, from which even the Emperor gradually withdrew, came to the congress to prevent and alter the treaty as much as they could. Neither Spain nor Rome was in a position to hinder it; but they protested against its validity, which gave rise to the express declaration in the documents of the Peace, that no protest or interference was valid, let it come whence it would.

The negotiations continued till the autumn of 1648. The last shots were being exchanged at Prague when a messenger brought news of the conclusion of peace, on the 24th of October, 1648. France had treated with the Emperor at Münster, Sweden at Osnabrück, and come to terms. On all essential points the treaties were in unison, except on those questions on which the territorial interests of France and Sweden diverged.

How the Peace changed the face of Europe, how the fundamental principle of these peace transactions, in which all the European powers took part, completed the emancipation of the western world from the traditions of the Middle Ages, and introduced the new era of European balance of power, we shall afterwards see. We will first consider the contents of the treaty.



The points of divergence and agreement in both treaties may be thus grouped:—Part of the provisions of both relates to temporal affairs, cessions, indemnities, restorations.

A second part, and, in extent, the most important, relates to religious and ecclesiastical questions, especially for Germany, to the gist therefore of the whole war.

A third part relates to the imperial constitution of Germany, to the settlement of regulations which were intended to determine, and did determine, the political life of the German empire for more than a century. A constitution was formed for Germany which issued in the Confederation of the Rhine, and the dissolution of the “Holy Roman Empire of the German nation.”

#### TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS.

By the Treaty of Osnabrück, Sweden received the whole of Upper Pomerania with the island of Rügen, of Lower Pomerania, Stettin, Gartz, Damm, Golnau, Wollin, the mouth of the Oder and the Frische Haff, as a hereditary fief, with all the rights of a State of the German empire; also Camin and Wismar, and the whole of the archbishopric of Bremen and the bishopric of Verden, with the exception of the city of Bremen, which was to remain free.

As Duke of Bremen, Verden, and Pomerania, governor of Rügen, and lord of Wismar, the King of Sweden had a vote among the temporal princes in the Diet, a legal position in the district directory and the meetings of deputies, and the “*privilegium de non appellando et supremum tribunal constituendi*” belonging to princes of the empire.

This was pretty much what Gustavus Adolphus had in view at the beginning of the war in Germany, only that now a piece of the North Sea was added to indemnity on the Baltic, and dominion over the Elbe and the Weser to that over the mouth of the Oder.

The national character which, in spite of its loose constitution, the German empire had up to this time tolerably well maintained, was now lost, and replaced by a European one. Until the end of the eighteenth century no less than six European princes were members of the empire; at last all the European powers were represented in it, except France, Russia, and Turkey, and it was not the fault of the

empire that these were not in it also. The merit of having proposed the reception of the Sultan belongs to a German politician. Peter the Great once had a project of becoming a member of it, and it was suggested to France at the congress; but she did not desire it. Louis XIV. did afterwards wish it at one time, that he might hold his reunions still more conveniently, but consoled himself with the idea that it was better as it was. If he were in the empire the incorporation of Alsace would only be more difficult; it was not easy to detach it from its fealty to the empire; being outside it, he could simply ignore the decrees of the Diet, and do as he pleased.

When the question arose about admitting France, the Protestants, for the first and last time, were at one with the Emperor; they joined in opposing it.

The European character of the empire caused the rotten body to hold together longer than might have been expected from its constitution. In the wars with Louis XIV. England especially, repeatedly stood up for the old German empire; and the fact that a revolution of this wonderful structure, within and without, was a European question, caused its vegetative existence to be spared by all conservative powers as much as possible. But it could not be a healthy existence that required to be so ingeniously kept together.

The following were the terms agreed upon at Münster with France:—

The district of Burgundy shall be, as before, a country of the German empire, after the settlement of the disputes between France and Spain. But should disputes arise in future between these two powers, they shall not affect the treaty between the King of France and the German empire as such; but the individual states shall be free to help one side or the other, "*extra imperii limites*," though only in accordance with the imperial constitution ("*secundum imperii constitutionem*").

The empire therefore lost the right of interfering for Burgundy as a member of the empire; but the individual States were, in a given case, to be permitted to unite with the enemies of the empire, "beyond the boundaries, but within the constitution of the empire." The anarchy established by treaty, of the new constitution cannot be more strikingly portrayed than in these words. A time came

when all Western Germany was on the side of France, and helped to protect her in her conquests. This was a commentary on this article.

The supreme authority "*supremum dominium iura superioritatis aliaque omnia*," over the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, was to be conferred on the French Crown, and they were to be incorporated with it for ever—"*eique incorporari debeant in perpetuum*." Up to this time the possessions of these bishoprics had been only an actual one, not legally acknowledged; the Peace of Westphalia made the robbery legal. Pignerol was ceded. Emperor and empire renounced all their rights and those of the House of Austria over Breifach, the Landgraviate of Upper and Lower Alsace, the Sundgau, the prefectures of the ten imperial cities (Hagenau, Colmar, Schlettstadt, Weissenburg, Landau, &c.) in favour of France, but with a reservation of all the rights and privileges which these places had previously received from Austria. France was to have the right of garrisoning Philippsburg; the rest of the imperial cities were to retain the immediate connection with the Holy Roman empire which they have hitherto enjoyed, "*in ea libertate et possessione immedietatis erga imperium romanum, qua hactenus gavisi sunt*," the German fortresses on the right and left of the Rhine to be demolished.

The boundaries of France, therefore, were advanced to the Rhine, the defence of the German frontier as far as Philippsburg, which served the French as a *tête du pont*, destroyed.

The mode of cession was purposely full of contradictions.

The constituent parts of the empire ceded to France,—that is, the ecclesiastical rulers, who still partly resided here, the imperial nobles, and ten imperial cities, were not to suffer any diminution of their rights and privileges under French rule, were to retain their direct connection with the empire, were to be subject to the imperial courts; in short, they were still to be members of the empire, but with the reservation *that it should be without prejudice to the rights of France* ("*ita tamen ut præsentī hac declaratione nihil detractum intelligatur de eo supremi Dominii, iure, quod supra concessum est*").

In the very nature of things, such ambiguous regulations

were sure to give rise to all sorts of disputes. The German empire appealed to its expressly reserved rights, France to the clauses by which her sovereignty was secured. The power of France finally decided the matter. Actual incorporation with France was, doubtless, intended to be averted by these articles; but their meaning was not defined sharply enough, and it required more power to enforce its claims than the German empire possessed.

Louis XIV. preferred not to be a member of the empire, because had he been so he must have submitted to its decrees, and would have been hampered in his schemes. He had only to put his own construction on the articles as a foreign power, and practically to complete the incorporation. During the following wars and treaties of peace these questions were always coming under discussion, and it was in the very nature of things that they were always decided to the disadvantage of the empire.

The many-headed empire, with its tedious transactions, was confronted by a power that never for one moment lost sight of its aims, never let a favourable opportunity slip, and was always the stronger party.

The internal conformation of Germany was settled on the basis of the general amnesty, to which Hapsburg, after long resistance, had agreed.

"All hostilities," says the document, "that have taken place from the beginning of the late disturbances, in any place, of whatever kind, by one side or the other, shall be forgotten and forgiven; so that neither party shall cherish enmity or hatred against, nor molest nor injure the other for any cause whatsoever," &c.

From this followed the unconditional re-instatement in their previous position of all who had been driven from their country and subjects, or deprived of offices or dignities, house or home, during the war.

Bavaria retained the Electorate and the Upper Palatinate, but had to renounce its claim of thirteen millions. The Palatinate received an eighth Electorate and the Rhenish Palatinate back again. The official posts in the Bergstrasse were restored to Electoral Mayence. The line of Simmern was re-instated. Würtemberg, with Mömpelgard, Baden-Durlach, Nassau, Solms, Isenburg Sayn, Waldeck, Hohenlohe, Erbach, and many others, were restored.

The restitution extended also to all persons in civil and

military service: "*a summo ad infimum, ab infimo ad summum*," as it is stated in the documents. This was one of the disputed points, and the Emperor took care that it should not be carried out without exception. It might do in Germany; but in the Austrian hereditary dominions the case was different.

Bohemia was almost depopulated, as a result of the reaction. Instead of four million inhabitants, there was now scarcely one million, and some of the best subjects of Catholic Hapsburg had taken possession of the estates of the banished Protestants.

To have ordained unconditional restoration to the previous state of things in this case would have been to make the existing government of Austria, the dynasty itself, impossible. To have restored to its property and rights the party which had been doomed to destruction, and which for thirty years past had been fighting under various colours against Austria, would have been fatal to the House of Austria and its newly-founded dominion.

In the German empire the restitution simply meant the restoration of Protestant lands to Protestant masters; but in Austria the whole state of things introduced by the Restoration, which had lasted for nearly thirty years, would be upset, and all the hostile elements would be in the ascendant again.

The "*amnestia perpetua*," therefore, was construed in a very limited sense in the Austrian dominions. As Austrian subjects, the Protestants were permitted to return, without damage to "person, life, reputation, or honour;" but they forfeited the ancient privileges of which they had boasted as a party. Estates which they had lost before going over to the hostile party were to remain in the hands of their present owners; but those that were lost later, through the act of joining the Swedes or French, were to be restored.

In every country of Germany there are traces of the exile of the Bohemian aristocracy in the Thirty Years' War. In going through the names of the noble families, Bohemian names may be found even in the furthest north. Those of Boyen and Gneisenau are among them.

## RELIGIOUS AND ECCLESIASTICAL QUESTIONS.

The basis of the religious peace, and the principle of equality between the creeds, were more unconditionally and distinctly defined than in 1552-5. The treaties of that period were confirmed, and an interpretation put upon them which was to be of unquestionable validity, against which neither protest from nor interference by the imperial or ecclesiastical power was to avail anything—"non attenta cuiusvis seu Ecclesiastici seu Politici, intra vel extra Imperium quocunque tempore interposita contradictione vel protestatione quæ omnes inanes declarantur." This was aimed at the protests to be expected from Spain and Rome, accustomed as they were to protest against everything connected with religious toleration.

In all religious questions complete equality was to exist between electors, princes, states, and individuals ("*æqualitas exacta mutuaque*"), each is to allow what seems right to the other ("*ut quod uni parti iustum est, alteri quoque sit iustum*"), and every kind of violence is for ever forbidden between the parties.

This principle, honestly carried out, was worth making great sacrifices for, and it was more comprehensive than before; for it included not only Catholics and Lutherans but also the Reformed party, to whom liberty and equality was now expressly granted. Toleration was also expressly promised to those who should hereafter change their religion.

It was more difficult to calculate on the results of this principle as applied to ecclesiastical restitution. The consistent thing would have been, and it was demanded by all the Protestants, to recur to the state of things before the war; but that would affect the Austrian dominions as deeply as the amnesty; it would involve restoring Bohemia, Moravia, Upper and Lower Austria, to the condition of 1618. The Emperor, therefore, was as determined against restitution in this sense as against the amnesty, and all that was attained was that Silesia should remain as it was.

The question, therefore, was to find a normal year for the restitution which should satisfy both parties. The Protestants demanded 1618; but the Catholics rejected it. For them it would have been to put all the results of the religious war in doubt again, and they demanded 1630,



which was the year most favourable to them, as it was after the Edict of Restitution, and before Gustavus Adolphus had gained any victory of importance. But this was strongly opposed by the Swedes and Protestants, and after a long dispute they came to a *medius terminus*, for which there was nothing to be said, either on logical or historical grounds; they divided the twelve years, thus arriving at 1624. The Protestants could content themselves with this, if it obliged the Austrian hereditary dominions to be given up.

So it was decided that for ecclesiastical possessions and rights, as a whole and in detail, the 1st of January, 1624, should be the criterion. What was at that time a Protestant or Catholic institution should remain such in future. Ecclesiastics who change their religion shall give up their offices, but "*honore famaque illibatis*."

The ecclesiastical right of election shall remain unlimited, and the *preces primariæ* of the Emperor, annats and pall money in Protestant bishoprics shall be abolished. The archbishops, bishops, and prelates elected by the adherents of the Confession of Augsburg shall be immediately installed by the Emperor.

The mediate ecclesiastical possessions, without exception, shall remain to the Protestants, as on the 1st of January, 1624.

Knights of the empire and imperial cities shall have the same privileges as the superior states of the empire, and for them, also, the 1st of January, 1624, shall be the criterion of restitution.

The mediate states of the empire shall be protected in their creed, and the intolerant principle, "*cuius regio eius religio*," given up; but at the same time the sovereign rights of the immediate states in religious matters were granted with a regulation calculated to occasion some anxiety ("*nulli statui immediato ius quod ipsi ratione territorii et superioritatis in negotiis religionis competit, impediri oportere*"). Still, it was expressly stated that the Protestant subjects of Catholic states, who, in 1624, "whether by treaty, privilege, long usage, or only by observance," shall have been in the habit of using the Confession of Augsburg, shall retain it, together with its "appurtenances;" that is, the institution of consistories, ministers, schoolmasters, right of patronage, &c.

Those who have been molested shall be reinstated—of



course reciprocally. The Catholic subjects of Protestant States shall receive the same privileges.

During the war, as the armies moved hither and thither, new congregations had been formed in various places of adherents of one creed or the other, with whom the year 1624 had as little to do as with those who should hereafter change their creed. It was settled that "their rulers of a different creed shall tolerate them patiently, that they shall be at liberty to have domestic worship without molestation, to attend the public services of their persuasion in the neighbourhood whenever they like, and to send their children to foreign schools of their profession." Had this article been honestly kept to, we should have had little more persecution to complain of on account of differences of religion.

The treaty goes on to say, "No one of any party shall look askance at any one on account of his creed; nor shall any one be excluded from the communes, guilds, corporations, inheritance, legacies, hospitals, or the distribution of alms, nor be deprived of honourable burial."

But this was more easily said than done. If any one wishes to emigrate, or is induced to do so by his ruler, he may do so without molestation, and without prejudice to his property; he may either alienate it, retain it, or have it managed by another. This was specially intended for the Austrian and Silesian Protestants. The Emperor's subjects in Silesia, and the counts, barons, and nobles in Lower Austria were not to be compelled to emigrate. They had not been able to agree, it was added, upon further concessions, "on account of the opposition of the imperial plenipotentiaries." Sweden and the Protestant States reserved to themselves the right of interceding with the Emperor on the subject at the next Diet.

No one shall in any wise dispute the treaty ("*concionando docendo, disputando, scribendo, consulendo*"), nor meddle with the treaties of 1552 and 1555. Disputes shall be referred to the Diet.

At the ordinary meetings of the deputies of the empire the number of deputies of each religion shall be equal. In extraordinary commissions for the settlement of disputes, Catholics or Protestants, or both, shall be represented according to the religion of the disputants. Religious questions shall not be decided by majority of votes.

An early Diet shall regulate the affairs of the Court of Judicature; besides the judges and four presidents, two of whom were to be Protestants, the assessors were to be increased to fifty, of whom the Catholics were to appoint twenty-six, the Protestants twenty-four.

To the article which declares the equality of the Reformed party is added, "But except the above-mentioned religions, no other shall be admitted or tolerated in the holy Roman empire."

In the eighteenth century this clause was enforced against the Pietists.

#### POLITICAL REGULATIONS.

The important political changes which resulted, first from the European and then from the religious character of the empire, have already been partially noticed. The aristocracy of the rulers and cities, which forms the essential feature of the future constitution of Germany, is already stamped upon it.

Article 8 contains the transfer of the sovereignty of the empire to the States and their sovereign pleasure. They enjoy, so it runs, the right of voting in all transactions relating to the affairs of the empire, especially the enactment of laws, questions of war, peace, treaties, taxation, levies of soldiers, &c.; and without their consent no important business can be decided. To every, even the smallest regulation the consent of the three Courts is required. The right of forming alliances with foreign powers, for its own support and safety, is expressly granted to every individual state, so long as they are not entered into against the Emperor, the empire, and the public peace, but consistently with the oath which every one has taken to the Emperor and the empire (*"ita tamen ne eiusmodi fœdera sint contra Imperatorem et Imperium, pacemque eius publicam vel hanc imprimis transactionem, fiantque salvo per omnia iuramento quo quisque Imperatori et Imperio obstrictus est"*).

The last vestige of sovereignty which had been preserved in the rickety German constitution was destroyed, and all that appertains to the essential character of a State distributed among the members of the republic of the States.

This completely deprived the empire, as such, of its power. It was almost impossible with this constitution to

decide great and urgent questions. The empire might be ruined while the three Courts of the Diet were coming to an agreement on a complicated question. The article by which the right of forming alliances was conferred on every State contained within itself the dissolution of the empire. All subsequent separate alliances were entered into "for the sake of German liberties," and with a reservation of loyalty to the Emperor and empire; even the confederation of the Rhine maintained that it was formed from great regard for, and boundless loyalty to the German empire.

And this hampering organization was inflicted on a corporate empire which had suffered considerable losses both in the north and south—besides Alsace, Pomerania, &c., Poland was sacrificed, Belgium loosened, Switzerland withdrawn from the imperial jurisdiction—and it was surrounded on two sides by powerful neighbours.

This was the end of the great revolution which had been raging in Germany during the Thirty Years' War. That it put the finishing-stroke to the already rotten constitution was the least of the evil; a blow was struck by it at the nation itself, its prosperity, and the foundations of its existence, from which it took generations to recover. The descriptions of the misery inflicted by this war everywhere in Germany are heartrending. The conduct of the soldiers towards the defenceless citizens and peasants, their wives and children, was so horribly barbarous that it seemed to be their object literally to destroy the whole population. The power of the armed over the unarmed was exercised with bestial ferocity. It is said of the Imperialists that they baked the poor people in ovens, roasted them before the fires, put out their eyes, cut strips from their backs, cut off arms, legs, ears, noses, breasts, and set pitch on fire on their living bodies. Just the same things are reported of the Swedes after their degeneracy after the battle of Nördlingen. The "Swedish drink," manure-water, poured down the throats of the poor wretches, was their invention.

The depopulation and devastation of the country was fearful. Especially in the south and west, Germany was a wilderness of ruins; places that were formerly the seats of prosperity were the haunts of wolves and robbers for many a long year. It is estimated that the population was diminished by twenty, by some even by fifty per cent. The population of Augsburg was reduced from 80,000 to

18,000; of Frankenthal, from 18,000 to 324 inhabitants. In Würtemberg, in 1641, of 400,000 inhabitants 48,000 remained; in the Palatinate, in 1636, there were but 201 peasant-farmers; and in 1648, but a fiftieth part of the population remained. In Hesse, 17 towns, 47 castles, and 400 villages were burnt; in Bavaria alone, in 1646, more than 100 villages were ruined; and in Würtemberg 8 cities, 45 villages, and 36,000 houses.

The measures which were necessary to bring the wilderness into cultivation again are indicated by the decrees of the Palatinate of that period.\* Whoever repaired old houses, was exempt from taxes for two years; whoever built new ones, for three; whoever brought waste lands, devastated places and vineyards into cultivation again, for one, three, six years.

Here, as everywhere, the most extraordinary exertions were necessary to restore order and civilisation after the devastations of the war. But it was not the mission of the empire; that was condemned to inaction; but of the individual states who now entirely freed themselves from their loose connection with it, and whose independent efficiency was now severely tested.

In reviewing the situation of Germany as a whole, the best criticism of the new circumstances is contained in a pamphlet published in Brandenburg in 1658.† “Our noble country has been fearfully spoiled in the name of religion and liberty; we have sacrificed our blood, our honour, and our names; and all that we have attained for it is, that we have made ourselves the servants of foreign nations, and made masters of those whose names were almost unknown to us. What are the Rhine, the Weser, the Elbe, and the Oder, but the captives of foreign nations? What are our liberties and our religion but things for others to play with?”

The part of the German Empire, both at home and abroad, was played out. At home it was superseded by the acknowledged sovereignty of the ruling princes, the nobles, and the cities; abroad it was thrust aside by the new position of two ambitious powers who had begun to lay the foundations of their greatness at its expense. The Swedish power was established, as projected by Gustavus

\* Häusser, *Geschichte der rhein. Pfalz*, ii. 585. † Droysen, iii.

Adolphus, as an empire surrounding the Baltic and even ruling a portion of the North Sea. It was a power which it needed much hostile talent, and still more stupidity on its own part to ruin.

France had acquired a similar position in the west: during the war, by the skill and rigid consistency of her diplomacy, she had made her way out of great internal difficulties, and with but little sacrifice she had secured a rich booty, which offered a prospect of still greater gain; her army also had experienced a discipline which was not lost in ensuing times.

But the power which the German and Spanish Hapsburgs had wielded since the times of Charles V. and Philip II., and for which they contended for the last time during this war, was now thrown entirely into the background by their two more fortunate rivals. Spain was thoroughly disabled, and the authority of the Emperor in the empire reduced to a shadow. The essence of that which had been desired by Chemnitz\* a year before the peace—that Austria might be constitutionally thrust out of the empire—was accomplished.

The mediæval order of the European world was over; the union which once more took place between Imperialism and the Papacy to oppose church reform was for ever at an end. An era begins of national consolidated governments, with a new policy both foreign and domestic. For both these tendencies France became the standard in the spirit inaugurated by Richelieu.

\* Hippolitus a Lapide, de ratione status in Imperio Germanico. 1647.

## PART XII.

### COMPLETION OF THE REFORMATION IN ENGLAND.

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#### CHAPTER XLI.

##### THE REFORMATION OF THE PROTESTANT CHURCH UNDER EDWARD VI., 1547-53.

The inheritance of Henry VIII.—Character of the young King.—The first Protector, Edward, Duke of Somerset, 1549.—The second Protector, Earl of Warwick, Duke of Northumberland, 1553.—Character of the Church Reform, Bible, Catechism, Book of Common Prayer, Abolition of the Mass, Celibacy, &c.—The Catholic reaction under Mary, 1553-8.—Abolition of the Ecclesiastical Laws of Edward VI., and first acts of revenge.—Marriage with Philip II. of Spain, 1554.—The question of Church Property.—Parliament and the Laws concerning Heresy.—The Ordeal by fire of English Protestantism.—The untenable position of the Government after the loss of Calais and the breach of the Constitution.\*

##### THE REFORMATION UNDER EDWARD VI.

WHAT was attempted by Henry VIII. was not in anywise a Reformation, but a wanton experiment of autocratic absolutism.

\* Camden, *Annales rer. Angl. regn. Elisabetha*, 1675, fol. Collection of State Papers, left by Cecil Lord Burleigh, 1740. Letters of negoc. of F. Walsingham, 1655, fol. Forbes, *Public Transactions*. Townshend, *Proceedings of the four last Parliaments of Elizabeth*, 1680. Birch, *Memoirs of the reign of Queen Elizabeth*, 1754. Lucy Aikin, *Memoirs of the Court of Elizabeth*, 1818. Turner, *History of the reigns of Edward VI., Mary, and Elizabeth*, 1829. Neal, *History of the Puritans*, 1723. McCrie, *Life of John Knox*, 1839; Whitaker. *Mary Stuart Vindicated*, 1787. Bengier, *Memoirs of Mary*, 1823. Raumer, *Elisabeth und Maria Stuart*, 1836. Mignet, *Histoire de Marie Stuart*, 1850. Ranke, *Englische Geschichte*, vol. i.-vii., 1859-68. Weber, *Geschichte der akatholischen Kirchen Englands*.

From motives of a very various character he had reduced the ancient Church to ruins, united the monarchy and the Papacy in one person, but retained the worship, the doctrines, and the hierarchy of the Romish Church. Although the most determined opponent of the Curia, he was no less, from first to last, the declared enemy of Luther; but what his subjects were to be, if they wished to escape being hanged as rebels or burnt as heretics, it was not easy to say. If a man was a Catholic, he was sent to the scaffold because he refused to take the oath of supremacy; if a good Lutheran, he was burnt because he would have nothing to do with the mass, celibacy of the clergy, &c.

The untenableness of the new position lay in the fact that it was not based on any fixed principles, but depended on the will of a relentless despot; it could not therefore be permanent. It was easy to foresee that at his death the structure of Church order raised by this monarch would fall, for the arm would be wanting that held it together.

It was long doubtful whether England would be Protestant or Catholic; but that the present state of things would not last, and did not deserve to last, was obvious to every one. It was also evident that this distraction of men's consciences must at length become insupportable. People were called Catholic, and then again heretical Protestants; and were in fact neither the one nor the other.

To add to all the other confusion bequeathed by Henry VIII., the succession to the throne was entirely doubtful.

At the time of the King's death there was no doubt that his only son was his lawful successor; but if he should die early, as soon afterwards happened, the question was not so simple.

By his first wife, the unfortunate Catharine of Aragon, Henry had one daughter, Mary; and in the opinion of all unprejudiced persons she was the King's legitimate child. But her mother's marriage with the King had been officially declared illegal.

The second marriage with Anne Boleyn did not last long, and the only issue was another daughter, Elizabeth. On doubtful testimony her mother was accused of all sorts of unchastity, and condemned by the same corrupt votes which served the King in all these odious transactions. She died upon the scaffold; her offspring therefore could not be considered legitimate.



The third marriage was with Jane Seymour, the only wife who was not made wretched by her union with Henry, for she died in childbed, and had not to drink the cup of his humours to the dregs.

The fourth marriage with Anne of Cleves scarcely deserves the name, so short-lived and fugitive was the connection. The fifth wife, Catharine Howard, seems really to have been guilty of adultery. The sixth, Catharine Parr, the widow of a nobleman, maintained a tolerable understanding with the King; but as she had suspicious leanings towards Protestantism, it is probable that she would have been got rid of on account of theological scruples had the King lived much longer.

Out of this family history arose most of the convulsions by which England was torn during the second half of the century, especially the conflict between the two queens—Mary Stuart and Elizabeth, the Catholic and the Protestant.

The Seymour family, from whom on the maternal side the young King Edward VI. was descended, gathered round him in order to reign in his name, for he was only ten years old. From all that we know of the King it appears that he displayed a good-natured character, without any of the Tudor haughtiness or despotic tendencies; but he early showed great weakness and delicacy of constitution. Thus there came to be a government of guardians, not by princes of the royal family, but by nobles, who therefore had all the other nobles who were excluded from power against them. At first, the King's maternal uncle, Edward Seymour, Duke of Somerset, was Protector, a vain ambitious man, but not without good qualities, which endeared him to the people. His own brother, Thomas, conspired against him, was subdued, and executed (1549); then another party was formed against him under Dudley Earl of Warwick, Duke of Northumberland, who succeeded in compassing the Protector's fall, and in sending him to the scaffold (1552).

Taken altogether, the first Protectorate was the best. It was not over-efficient, its projects were often much more daring than its performances; but it was lenient, well-meaning, and popular. The Duke of Somerset had the prosperity of the state, and the good of the lower classes sincerely at heart; he neither enriched himself nor mis

used his power by aggrandising his relatives at the expense of the country.

With the second Protectorate came all the evils which cannot be laid to the charge of the first—barefaced nepotism; the public money was shamefully squandered on favourites, and there was an attempt to secure the crown itself to the family of the Protector.

The most important question, however, was what the attitude of the government would be towards the Reformation, and the untenable policy of Henry VIII. And on this point the new government was stamped with a sharply-defined character.

The young King had been won over to Protestantism by Cranmer, and notwithstanding his youth showed a warm enthusiasm for and premature comprehension of the new doctrines. He had the noble ambition to make his country the vanguard of the Reformation, and to offer a refuge to the fugitive professors of the new creed in his free island.

The Seymours also favoured a thorough reformation from conviction. The leading powers in England therefore were Protestant, and Cranmer was allowed to give the supremacy to those doctrines to which he had long been devoted in secret; he could now openly express in dogma that approach to Lutheranism which he had been obliged to conceal within his own breast. A great number of the nobles were with him, the King and Protector eagerly took his part, Parliament was easily gained over, and thus, with comparatively little opposition, the traditions of Henry VIII. were set aside, the Church system adapted to the continental Reformation, the Anglican Church made Protestant by authority.

The English Reformation could not be productive and original. In the constitution of the Church the royal supremacy could not be set aside; in the doctrines there was nothing original to oppose to Lutheranism. It was still a monarchical-aristocratic structure, an episcopal hierarchy which, except that it had a temporal head, was Catholic; in the forms of divine worship Catholic and Protestant elements were mingled with a preponderance of the former; but the doctrines of the Church were thoroughly Protestant.

These changes were made with prudence and tact; and, first, the policy of compulsion as it existed under

Henry VIII. was discontinued. While the government appeared to be walking in the steps of the late King, they entirely renounced the essential features of his attitude; while they seemed religiously to be abiding by usage, on the most important points it was entirely changed.

The Six Articles were withdrawn by act of Parliament; as to practices, to the omission of which heavy penalties had been attached, such as oral confession, full liberty was introduced. Regular teaching of the congregation from the English Bible, and of the youth from a purified catechism, a new liturgy by the Book of Common Prayer, the administration of the communion in both kinds, abolition of the mass and of the celibacy of the clergy, restrictions upon processions, abolition of the worship of images, and invocation of saints—with strict injunctions against image-breaking—were the most important of the religious innovations. The ruling powers were as firm in their Church policy as they were weak in the secular government.

These changes did not arise, as in Germany and Switzerland, from pressure from the people, but were ordained by authority. Although there was but little opposition, the consent of the masses was by no means certain; they undoubtedly liked the reforms much better than the terrorism of Henry VIII., still it was not clear that they would not some day doff the new garments as easily as they had put them on, whether a future sovereign might not succeed in undoing the work of Edward VI.

No reformation which had been effected in this official way had hitherto been strong enough to set a reaction at defiance.

To add to these anxieties which lay in the nature of the case, the second Protector had jealously to guard the influence of his family. Since the King's health awakened fears of an early death, he busied himself, in opposition to the mandates of Henry VIII., in planning a succession to the crown, which should on the one hand prevent a Catholic reaction under Mary, and on the other secure the crown for his family.

The daughters of Henry VIII. were, he considered, both incapable of succeeding, the marriages of their mothers having been pronounced invalid. Recourse must therefore be had to the legitimate posterity of Henry VII., of which there was one princess whose claims bore precedence, Lady

Jane Grey, the great grandchild of the first Tudor, and daughter-in-law of the Protector. She was to be proclaimed Queen, with the declaration that her accession would be a guarantee of the modern Church reform, while the Catholic reign of Mary would upset it.

The King consented to this, excluded his sisters from the throne and disregarded his father's injunctions, for the safety of the Protestant doctrines outweighed everything with him; and he gave their adherents credit for power to maintain the good cause in any struggle that might ensue.

On the 6th of July, 1553, Edward died suddenly, and it now remained to be seen which party had the stronger sympathies among the nobles and the people.

The Catholics, of course, were for Mary, and would have been so had her rights been much more doubtful than they were. All the powerful enemies whom Warwick had made by his supercilious rule were against Lady Jane Grey, and the majority of the Protestants were at least doubtful whether, for the state of their creed and at the risk of civil war, they should help to upset a legitimate succession.

The *coup d'état* must have been very skilfully planned to succeed against such sentiments, and it was not so; the attempt to place Lady Jane Grey on the throne, a learned young lady, who was never more surprised than at the news that she was Queen, was from the first miserably frustrated. Mary had only to show herself, some courageous adherents had only to proclaim her Queen, and the opposing party fell to pieces; Warwick himself was eclipsed by the herald who proclaimed her.

#### CATHOLIC MARY, 1553-58; BORN 1516.

This was a most important turn in the course of events. The question whether the Reformation ordained by authority would stand, was still awaiting solution. A princess now succeeded to the throne who undoubtedly had decided opinions on religious matters. Whatever her sentiments might be on other subjects, in religion she was a strict Catholic.

A government ensued which, perhaps without or even against her consent, began to tread the path of Catholic reaction, which first tested the vital power of Protestantism.

Mary's portrait, as drawn by English historians, those only excepted who favour strict Roman Catholic views, is not a very flattering one. The greater number of them speak of her only as "Bloody Mary." It is perfectly intelligible that the feelings of the nation, outraged by the Spanish terrorism under this Queen, should revenge themselves by such a title; and Mary cannot be absolved from enormous blood-guiltiness. Still it is not fair to yield altogether to this impression. On unprejudiced psychological observation of her, we find the weakness of a woman which deserves rather to be pitied than condemned, instead of the wild fanaticism of a bloodthirsty character.

Mary Tudor was now no longer young, and had an unhappy childhood and youth to look back upon. She had seen her innocent mother separated from her father by a party tribunal, banished like an intruder from the court, supplanted on the throne by a more fortunate rival; she herself had been thrust into the background, threatened, neglected, ill-used. Such things might have left fainter traces on a sprightly and vigorous character, but they were inflicted on a person who had an early bias to melancholy and bigotry.

The remembrance of her lot was still further embittered by the idea that her mother had been persecuted for her faith, and that she herself had been condemned to obscurity for the same reason. Her mother's misfortunes and her own had begun with the day when the king broke faith with the ancient church; and the victory of the rival was at the same time, in her eyes, a victory of modern unbelief. It was not so, but so it appeared to her. All the bitterest experiences of her life were connected with the position of affairs on religious questions. Protestantism was not only a new doctrine which was opposed to her faith, but a hostile principle which had brought wretchedness to her and her mother.

She therefore hated the new creed, and felt herself a stranger among the people. She was more Spanish than English, regarded the English as accomplices in the outrages against her mother and her faith, and worshipped everything Spanish. This was another cause of estrangement.

Then she was weakly and sickly, and had something of the sour misanthropy of an old maid. This all conspired

to drive her to fearful deeds, for which an explanation must be sought in all the circumstances of her life before they are roundly condemned.

It was not that she came to the throne with her head full of evil intentions. Many things were rather brought about by the course of events than ordained by her despotic will.

On her accession she made a declaration that the Protestants should not be molested in the profession and practice of their religion, nor should compulsion be used in matters of faith; but she forbade the use of the offensive names, "Papist" and "heretic."

Perhaps this was only done to allay the fears of the Protestants, and to deprive the enemy of its latest adherents, for she was no doubt resolved at heart to restore Catholicism. The first acts of the new government were acts of revenge. Northumberland, whose behaviour now was as cowardly and craven as it had before been insolent and ambitious, was sent with five accomplices to the scaffold; and Lady Jane Grey and her husband were closely imprisoned.

Then followed the measures for Catholic restoration, and the supremacy which Henry VIII. had connected with the regal power came to her aid, and still more so the subservience to which he had trained Parliament and the judges. She filled all offices in accordance with her views; those who had suffered for their Catholic opinions under Edward VI. were re-instated in their posts; Bishop Gardiner stepped out of prison into the office of chancellor, and a number of eminent bishops, who were the pillars of Protestantism, were dismissed. The ministry was formed in a Catholic spirit, and in a few months the state of official England was thoroughly reversed.

Edward VI. had only just made Protestantism the basis of the government, and now pure Catholicism was lifting up its head again. This arose from the nature of the Reformation; Henry VIII. had systematically deprived it of the people's sympathy, and during the short reign of Edward VI. it had not been able to take deep root.

The counter reformation was taking its course when the elections for the new Parliament took place. If any defence could be looked for in England against the arbitrary government, it could only be from Parliament. It had hitherto



been fickle, and had had no will of its own. Still it held a weapon in its hand which might some day be effectually used. The retrograde step made itself felt in the elections, for the restoration of Catholicism was represented in them ; and it can scarcely be supposed that the new Parliament was such as it was solely from government influence.

The first duty of Parliament was to abolish the edict which had pronounced the marriage of Mary's mother invalid. After the Queen's succession was an accomplished fact, the edict had lost its significance, and it was passed without opposition.

But it was different with the next proposal, to abolish the religious innovations of Edward VI. and the Book of Common Prayer. This, however, was also carried, though not without a sharp contest. Public worship again became Catholic. The doctrines of the Church were placed upon their old footing, and a wide breach made in the work of the Reformation.

To go further than this did not seem practicable to the Queen's prudent advisers, among whom was the Emperor Charles V. So the mass was introduced once more, the Catholic liturgy restored ; but the temporal headship of the hierarchy, the royal supremacy, remained, though the Queen would have preferred at once to restore the supremacy to the Pope.

After a long alienation from Rome, a sort of reconciliation took place, but it is remarkable that while grateful for the restoration, they thought it best at Rome to moderate the Queen's zeal. They did not venture to appoint a Papal legate immediately. Among the chief of those who had strenuously opposed Henry's innovations was Cardinal Pole, who had escaped death by flight. He was looked upon as the representative of exiled Catholic England, and was treated at Rome with great favour and distinction. Pope Julius III. appointed him his plenipotentiary in England, but it was long before the people were supposed to be ready for his reception, and when he returned, after thirty years of exile, he belonged to the moderate party (a rare case with a refugee), and was soon in despair at Mary's want of moderation.

The consequences of turning into the paths of Catholic reaction soon developed themselves. The first Parliament might have laid claim to some indulgence for its compliant



spirit, but the Queen thought it presumptuous for proposing her marriage with an Englishman, so she dissolved it, and interfered arbitrarily with its decrees. The performance of divine service in the English language was forbidden; many thousand married clergymen were driven with their wives and children from their offices, and reduced to beggary. Soon afterwards a marriage scheme was formed in the background of which a fearful ecclesiastical counter revolution was justly foreseen.

That at her age the Queen should still entertain the thought of marriage appeared natural to every one. It was wished in England that she should marry an Englishman, and in the highest circles and in Parliament the young Earl of Devonshire was thought of as a candidate for her hand. But the daughter of a princess of Aragon would not hear of an Englishman. She had never had any personal attachment; it was not difficult to believe her when she told the imperial ambassador that she did not know what love was, but that it had always been the secret wish of her heart to form a marriage with the best Catholic house, that of Spain. The hand of Philip II. was just then set free by the death of his second wife, and Mary had turned her eyes towards him. They were already diplomatically casting about for a wife for him, and had been negotiating with Portugal, when it was learnt that he would meet with the most cordial reception in England.

The Emperor was most agreeably surprised by Mary's communication. Father and son had just suffered a great defeat in Germany; the connection with England seemed to offer compensation. The marriage treaty was concluded; Mary secretly consented to it in October, 1553; but the mere report of it sufficed to set all England in a commotion. Spanish absolutism and the Spanish inquisition were already beheld transplanted to England.

For the first time all parties were united in their fears. Parliament spoke against the marriage, and was dissolved. It then came to open rebellion. The nobles, who saw their possession of Church property rather than their faith endangered, were in a mutinous frame of mind; outbreaks took place in Kent and Cornwall. It was difficult to say whether the voices of the Protestants or of the English nation itself prevailed.

The revolts of Wyatt and Carew failed ignominiously,

and the results followed which almost always ensue from unsuccessful revolts. The Queen went still more recklessly forwards. She was not cruel by nature, but after being threatened with insurrection in her own capital, she was resolved upon the worst.

In February, 1554, fifty people were hung, and the unfortunate Lady Jane Grey, an amiable, inoffensive person, entirely innocent of any share in recent events, was brought to the scaffold as a possible accomplice, together with her husband and the Duke of Suffolk. Elizabeth was also imprisoned in the Tower, but as nothing could be proved against her, she was soon set at liberty.

The marriage of Mary with Philip of Spain took place in July, 1554. The new Parliament, worked upon and intimidated, had approved the marriage treaty, but it did not seem at all disposed to set its seal to the completion of the Catholic restoration, and was therefore immediately dismissed. King Philip was as amiable and affable as his Spanish haughtiness permitted, and acquired numerous friends among the aristocracy by showering pensions and favours around him.

The Queen, meanwhile, impatiently urged a complete return under the authority of the Pope. Her ecclesiastical title, the leniency towards the heretics, to which she had been compelled, the spoil of Church property which had been begun, lay heavily upon her conscience as sins for which she was personally responsible. However impolitic this might be as far as the English crown was concerned, it so much the more proved the sincerity of her fanaticism. The Church property had been unmercifully cut up; a large portion of it had been seized by the Crown itself, and, fortunately for England, sold again at prices so moderate that the well-to-do middle class gained immense wealth by it. The question, how to right this wrong without committing another, was a very complicated one. As it is not seldom the case that men find it harder to surrender a portion of their worldly goods than to abjure their faith, it might be expected that the great majority would sooner put up with a return to the mass, the papal supremacy, and even to the laws against heresy than to a demand for the restoration of Church property.

It does honour to the Queen's faithfulness to her convictions, if not to her political insight, that this was not her

feeling — that she would have liked to restore her own estates which had fallen to the Crown, together with the others ; but in this view she was entirely alone.

No decisive progress could be made in England without a dispensation to secure the forty thousand heads of families in the possession of the Church property they had purchased, but with it everything might be attained.

In fact, the new Parliament declared itself ready to abjure its Protestantism, and to regulate the Church and her doctrine in accordance with the Pope's pleasure if no one would interfere with the distribution of Church property, and when a pledge to this effect was given, it consented to render obedience to the Pope and to renew the edicts against heretics.\*

Thus the counter revolution was legalised, and the trials for heresy could begin. All the more eminent foes of Catholicism, among them the first names in the nation, and the stars of English learning, were summoned before the inquisition, condemned, and executed, not for any guilty deeds, attempts at insurrection, or for disturbing Catholic worship, but solely for theoretical views on religious questions which differed from those of Gardiner, Bonner, and the rest of the strict Catholics. The intellectual aristocracy of the land was brought to the scaffold, and most of the victims met their fate in a manner worthy of their moral rank. During the three years before Mary's death it was reckoned that two hundred and seventy heretics were burnt, among whom were fifty-five women and four children. One of the first victims was old Archbishop Cranmer, who had hitherto managed to pass muster, but was now thrown into prison by his mortal enemy, Gardiner. By a disgraceful transaction he was induced to try to save his little span of life by a recantation, and yet he was burnt. An odious game was played with the old man, which outrages every feeling of humanity.

For Protestant England these days of persecution, in which the best blood of the nation was spilt, was a time of awakening and revival. Up to this time it had been the custom to adhere in the main to traditional views of religion, but to change their outward garb with the changes of the government.

Mary no longer allowed any freedom of choice. She did her best to separate the chaff from the wheat. To set against the thousands who bowed down before each successive government, there were hundreds who preferred death to giving up an iota of their faith. Indeed, under the impression of the sublime contempt of death with which most of them mounted the scaffold, all the Protestant part of the nation gradually became inspired with sentiments of emulative self-sacrifice; death lost his sting, the leaders drew the multitudes along with them, and faithfulness unto death, which had hitherto been wanting to English Protestantism, was given to it by its bitterest enemy.

If Protestantism stood this fiery trial, it could not fail to become more than it had hitherto been. No longer something officially commanded or tolerated, it would be strong enough to stand alone.

All that was now wanting was that the government in its foreign policy should take an anti-national course, and thus make the sufferings of a party coincident with the shame and enthrallment of a whole nation.

This was effected by the foolish part which Mary in her infatuation was induced to take in the Spanish-French war. The defender of Metz, Francis of Guise, took Calais from England, January, 1558—the last proud reminiscence of the time when England ruled as far as the Loire was lost, because the Queen sided with Spain, and a dangerous misunderstanding had arisen at home.

Pope Paul IV., the Pope of the most rigid and relentless restoration, had reversed the decision of his predecessor on the subject of Church property, and demanded at least the devolution of the Church property in possession of the Crown. Mary, with whom this was a matter of conscience, appeared herself in Parliament to urge this act of justice, and succeeded in carrying it by a very small majority, December, 1555; but the suspicions of the aristocracy who had Church property in their private possession could no longer be subdued. To add to this was the unhappy war. Parliament would not grant any further supplies; the Government imposed arbitrary taxes, and proceeded with violence against the courts which sided with those who refused to pay the taxes. The Government, which persecuted the Protestants as if they had been criminals, with fire and sword, trod also the laws of the land underfoot, and sacrificed the

national honour. Thus the idea arose that Protestantism and English nationality were identical, and the Government had reached that point which Charles V. and Cardinal Pole warned them to avoid if they did not wish that the country should be made Protestant by force.

General and increasing discontent prevailed. If a revolution broke out, no legitimacy could protect the Queen ; it would be sure to succeed. Just when suspense had reached its height, on the 17th of November, 1558, Mary died.

She was quite forsaken in her latter days ; even Cardinal Pole no longer possessed her confidence ; she had only the fanatical Bonner now, as ever, on her side. She died just in time to escape being the victim of a revolution.

There was no doubt in the minds of the people as to her successor. Mary had never regarded her sister Elizabeth with affection, and it was not to be expected of her ; but the Protestant Elizabeth had, with great prudence and no small success, avoided everything which would have rendered her suspicious in the eyes of her sister. Had she not done so, it would have been easy for Mary to have had her executed as a heretic, and thereby to have smoothed the path of Mary Stuart to the throne. But Elizabeth had happily outlived the time of persecution, and was now led forth from the Tower to be seated on the throne.

## CHAPTER XLII.

### QUEEN ELIZABETH, 1558-1603.

Cautious beginnings.—The Parliament of 1559 and the Re-establishment of the Anglican Church.—Beginning of the conflict with Mary Stuart.—The Reformation in Scotland, John Knox.—Mary Stuart in Scotland, 1561-8.—Darnley.—Rizzio.—Bothwell.—Mary Stuart in England.—Attitude of Rome and Spain against Elizabeth.—The Conspiracies.—Norfolk, 1569-1572.—Elizabeth's forced enmity towards Rome and Spain, 1572-85.—Conspiracy of Savage and Babington.—Mary Stuart's Trial and Execution, 1586-7.—The Spanish Armada and Elizabeth's last days, 1603.

#### CAUTIOUS BEGINNINGS. THE PARLIAMENT OF 1559, AND THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF ANGLICANISM.

QUEEN ELIZABETH had preserved a sound mind during years of suffering and oppression. During the five years of Mary's reign she was watched by spies belonging to the ruling party, whose whole endeavours were directed to surprising her in some false step, so that she might be put to death as a conspirator. She avoided all their snares with great dexterity, and so escaped the fate of Lady Jane Grey.\* Her lot had been pretty much the same as that in which Mary imbibed her gloomy misanthropy, but her character was totally different; she had the youthful sprightliness, the light French blood of her mother, just the qualities which had captivated Henry VIII., though she had not her mother's beauty. Her sufferings had not crushed her spirit, nor disturbed her love of and confidence in the world. As triumphant as if she had had a happy life to look back upon, she stepped from her prison to the throne, resolved to remember no longer that her life

\* For the part taken in this matter by Philip II. see Ranke, i. 293.

had been schemed against, to reign as if she had always been treated as the future Queen. She could associate without constraint, and as if nothing had happened between them, with men who had conspired against her life. It was not everybody who could have done this, and after a period of bitter and bloody party conflicts, had it been for this reason only, this reign would have been a blessing to the country.

Although mortally hated by the Catholics, Elizabeth did not hate them. On the contrary, it often appeared as if she was too lenient towards them. With all her weaknesses and bitternesses, hers was a character which people could not help liking in spite of all her calumniators. She *was* just what she appeared to be; with her feminine sensitiveness, her often ludicrous vanity, and her love of homage and flattery, great and regal qualities were united; her whole life was a manly struggle to uphold the power of the State and the national idea, and when she had to choose between her personal tastes and fancies, and the great requirements of the State, she never failed to choose the latter. The Englishman is right in holding his "Queen Bess" in grateful remembrance. She gave her country fifty years of domestic peace, security, and order, and laid the foundation of England's greatness; not that she did it all herself, but nothing was done in which she did not take a decided part.

She did not, when she began to reign in 1558, seem likely to become the Elizabeth she afterwards proved herself to be—the pillar of Protestantism, the opponent of Spain and Rome.

At first she had neither inclination nor occasion to take this part. Though not romantic, she was easily interested in such ideas; she was cool, quiet, and reasonable, not without a trace of cunning which often became falseness; it was her intention to keep peace with all parties, and Europe was chiefly to blame for the fact that she afterwards diverged from this path. She had at first no other idea than to leave Catholicism alone, though she intended to grant the legal protection to Protestantism, which it had to dispense with under Mary. Her first act therefore was to put a stop to the bloody edicts against heresy, and to abolish the courts for trying it; but there was nothing else that bore any special Protestant stamp, no declaration was



made that Catholicism was no longer the dominant religion in the State, and at this the Protestants who had been persecuted and oppressed took offence.

This did not arise altogether from the feminine tendency to mediate, where men had quarrelled ; there was another reason for it. Elizabeth did not hate Catholicism ; she was a Tudor, and every one who bore that name placed a high value upon authority, and in the eyes of many the Catholic hierarchy was authority personified ; then the outward pomp and consecrated splendour of the Romish worship was imposing to her womanish character.

Thus her first ecclesiastical acts might be called syncretistic. She went to mass because she thought she owed it to her Catholic subjects ; she even forbade the preaching because of the disputes about the pulpits that began to arise, but in the rest of the service she permitted the use of the English language which had been forbidden by Mary ; she took care, however, not arbitrarily to undo what Mary had done. She did not wish that it should appear that she was giving things a one-sided Protestant colouring. It was her desire to be at peace with Spain, Rome, and France, with all the world, in fact, as well as with her own country.

Her first proceedings in religious matters are connected with the dissolution of the old Parliament and the election of a new one.

It was quite intelligible that, in 1553, the popular voice, excited and irritated as the nation was, should be sincerely in favour of the Catholic party, and that it should therefore have the majority at the elections ; but it was equally intelligible that, after five years of bloody persecution, an entire change should have taken place, and that not a single Catholic candidate was even nominated. There was no need for Elizabeth to speak, the people spoke for themselves.

All that Mary's government had achieved for Catholicism was the defection of the nation. Government and Parliament now went hand in hand, to restore the most important things which had been abolished under Mary, and they succeeded with comparatively little resistance.

The completion of the national Church of England, of which the foundations had been laid under Edward VI., was now taken in hand ; and in all essential points it re-

mains to this day as it was then built up. The mass was abolished, the liturgy of Edward VI., and the royal supremacy in ecclesiastical matters restored. The new organization overcame all opposition, and excluded every element which, tending either to Catholicism or Calvinism, held opinions differing from its own. The new Church undoubtedly comprised the greater part of the nation; but on the one hand there were the Catholics who were excluded from the government, on the other the strict Reformers of the Genevan school, who accepted the breach with Rome and the Papacy as a matter of course, but did not like the English hierarchy. Perhaps, if votes were taken now, the majority of the nation would belong to the opponents of the Anglican Church, but the structure raised by Queen Elizabeth is still practically of great importance; it is based upon a well organized and internally coherent ecclesiastical hierarchy; it possesses very considerable power through its Church property, which though then diminished has since greatly increased, a number of seats in the Lower House are at its disposal.\* Through the bishops it occupies a number of seats in the Upper House, and is thereby an essential support of the aristocratic constitution of England.

It is possible to have a great aversion to a State Church and yet to be compelled to admit that at that time, after the confusion and transitions of the last thirty years, it was necessary to establish an organization which should brave all future storms. This the English Church has done; she has survived two revolutions and remains to this day, no longer, indeed, exercising the same spiritual authority, but holding the same political position as she did then.

Elizabeth did not bring this project with her ready made to the throne; but when with a true instinct she perceived the need of it, she allowed the voice of the people to be heard, and gave her sanction to what was for their interest.

On these points she allowed herself to be borne on by the voices and movements of the people, and her relations with the different parties were by no means so sharply defined as we commonly suppose. We think of her as the mortal foe of King Philip and the Papal Curia, as the protector of the Netherlands and the Huguenots; we shall

\* On this point Professor Häusser has evidently been misinformed.—*Tr.*

see her afterwards playing these parts, but she did not begin to play them at once. She still wrote to Madrid and Rome in a tone of affection, and it was only when she ceased to do so, that it was remarked that she was not a legitimate daughter of Henry VIII., that she had no right to the throne, and that the voice of Parliament, which was more decidedly on her side than it had been on Mary's, was null and void.

The opposition to her right to the throne by all the foes of English Protestantism and English liberties, gradually compelled her to take up a position of decided partisanship, which was rendered doubly bitter by the fact that it was coloured by personal intrigues and interests. The personage who was opposed to her as the Pretender to the throne by the Catholic powers, who disputed her honourable birth and her claim to the throne, was her neighbour in Scotland, Mary Stuart, who entered into the contest with all a woman's passion.

These two women quarrelled after the fashion of their sex; the one was a frivolous coquet who knew nothing of self-control, the other did exercise it, though also a sensuous woman; the one possessed all the virtues and vices belonging to such a character, the other, though not free from affected prudery, was sustained by a certain masculine ambition and political greatness wholly wanting in the other. They were complete contrasts in most of their characteristics, and they could not live together in peace when politics brought them in contact. Elizabeth must either subject herself to the Queen of Scotland—that is, renounce her throne and honour, or carry on a struggle with her for life and death; there was no third course.

When Elizabeth first came to the throne no opposition was offered by the powers which afterwards opposed her;\* it was only after the ecclesiastical proceedings that the legitimacy was called in question; at first in whispers, and then openly declared against. The same confusion of ideas prevailed which had been employed against Mary on the other side.

Those who considered her mother's adultery as proved, might pronounce Elizabeth illegitimate. Her sister Mary had always treated her as her father's legitimate daughter.

\* Häusser appears not to regard the Pope's protest (Ranke, i. 301), as it had no immediate consequences.—ED.

Mary Stuart's right was indisputable, but it would only come into force after the death of Elizabeth and her heirs.

Margaret, eldest daughter of Henry VII., first of the Tudors, made a Scotch marriage, and as wife of James IV. (1513), became the mother of James V. He married Mary of Guise, a sister of the Victor of Calais and the spokesman of Trent. Of this union was born Mary Stuart, as she was called, to distinguish her from the other Marys who played a part in her history. When very young she was married in France to Francis II., who began to reign in 1559 and died in 1560. It may have been partly this circumstance which prevented the Catholic opponents of Elizabeth from earlier thinking of setting up Mary Stuart as a pretender to the throne. It was only really as Queen that success for the scheme could be looked for; before she was Queen, and when she was so shortly Queen no longer, there was no prospect of it.

Mary Stuart was a widow at eighteen. There was no lack of proposals of a second marriage, for her youth and beauty and the possession of the crown of Scotland made her a desirable match. Philip II. knocked at her door as he did at Elizabeth's. She did not, however, then form any second marriage, but followed the advice of her uncle, to cross over to Scotland and take possession of her throne. Up to this time the government had been carried on by her mother, Mary of Guise.

With Mary's reign in Scotland the contest between the two Queens began.

Mary assumed the rights of a crown which were of themselves difficult to defend, and they had just met with a strong counterpoise in the Reformation.

### THE REFORMATION IN SCOTLAND.

The monarchy in Scotland had always been a limited one, partly from the power of the landed nobles, partly from the defiant and independent spirit of the people. Revolt against the royal authority was an everyday affair. The resolve to rush into the king's presence with pikes and guns was accompanied by no more hesitation or pricks of conscience than it was anywhere else in the Middle Ages.

If any of the nobles were dissatisfied with the Crown,

they stirred up a quarrel, and followers were seldom wanting among their vassals and the people. To reign amidst difficulties so great required a tact which the Stuarts by no means possessed. Their arrogance, their exaggerated idea of the sacredness of their authority, their severity, capricious obstinacy and unyielding defiance, their proverbial vacillation between despondency and presumption, totally unfitted them to be rulers of Scotland.

King James V. died on the 14th of September, 1542, and Mary was born only a few days before his death. There was therefore no king in Scotland; the heiress to the throne was a new-born babe, and her guardian was a Guise. This happened, too, at a time when that great crisis was taking place in the North of Europe, in which everybody was either engulfed in the reform movement or resolutely opposed it.

Scotland was also affected by it, but differently from England. The Reformation there took a course of its own. In this case it was not the conflict of theological opinions or national aversion to interference from Rome, but the degenerate lives of the clergy which gave the impulse to it. It was not the whim of the sovereign, or the shrewd calculations and political ambition of a ruler which gave rise to the breach, but the moral exasperation and love of liberty of the best spirits in the nation.

Calvinistic Geneva was the school of Scotch Protestantism; and inasmuch as Calvinism was one of the most remarkable figures of the age, Scotland, its favourite daughter, claims a special interest.

John Knox (born 1505) takes the foremost place in this movement. With the fiery zeal, the rigid strictness, the gloomy theocratic sentiments of Calvin, he united the unyielding love of liberty, the stormy spirit of opposition, which belong to his nation. A Calvinist than whom, Calvin himself excepted, there never was a more rigid one; a man of blameless purity of life, a preacher like his master, and filled with the theocratic zeal of an Old Testament prophet, he possessed the unconciliatory radicalism of these revolutionary tendencies. In his ideal of Church and State there was neither royal nor priestly supremacy. The priesthood and the clergy were to be abolished, the Romish worship expunged from the earth, the ruler or nobleman who made an ill use of his rank should be outlawed, unconditional church reform was the sacred duty of the commu-

nity, if the rulers neglected it, and no pains must be spared in the execution of this duty.

Under the regency of Mary of Guise he had been compelled to leave Scotland. At first he was a convict in the galleys in France; then he went to Geneva, and sat at the feet of Calvin.

On his return, at the end of 1555, he began to preach Calvinism with all its exclusiveness, but also with all its energy and greatness of character. He began by quietly forming congregations, to whom he administered the Lord's Supper according to Protestant forms. The common bond was—no communion with Romish "idolatry," and adherence to the word of God unto death. In this propaganda the example of the mother Church at Geneva was first carried out on a larger scale; the principle of self-government by self-elected elders and ministers was introduced, and the rigid simplicity and plainness of the Calvinistic worship carried to a fanatical point. Knox went further than Calvin, because he was surrounded by a Catholic State Church which violently opposed every innovation; and amidst the irritation occasioned by this Scotch Calvinism assumed an exaggerated degree of rigidity and austerity.

It was the peculiarity of Calvinism that it was more than any other phase of Protestantism the implacable enemy of the Roman Catholic Church and worship, and that it was represented by characters who personified it, from its greatest features to the minutest detail, with inimitable onesidedness.

John Knox was one of these men; half prophet, half tribune, dictator to the Church, pulpit orator, and popular agitator, he carried his countrymen along with him as no one else could. Contrast this gloomy personage, full of pith and marrow, with the bright Mary Stuart, who was just opening to the pleasures of life, brought up in the elegant, immoral atmosphere of the French court, and you will have some idea of the incongruous elements which were soon to produce an explosion.

There was a powerful nobility in Scotland, who had always looked upon the Stuarts merely as their equals, and in the violence of the government and clergy against the heretical doctrines they saw a menacing assertion of the royal authority. A great many of the nobles adopted the new doctrines, which were a pledge alike of religious and political liberty. One of their most zealous partisans was



one of the Stuarts themselves. James V. had seduced a noble lady, and a son was born who bore his father's name, and whom Mary herself afterwards created Earl of Moray. The father's sin was to be revenged on him. He was a gifted and passionate man, attached by conviction to the new doctrines, and he was in the foremost ranks of its adherents.

In March, 1559, the Protestant nobles demanded of the Regent that the bishops should be chosen by the nobles of the diocese, the ministers by the congregation, and that divine service should be performed in the native tongue. Instead of granting it, the clergy persuaded the Regent to let the courts take proceedings against the heretics. In May, therefore, stormy scenes took place.

John Knox, who had just returned to Scotland, preached fiery sermons against the idolatry of the mass and the worship of saints, and but a slight impulse was wanting to incite the masses to violence. In Perth an attack began upon images, altars, monasteries, and abbeys, which in a few days spread over a great part of the land, and was followed by a tumultuous victory for the Protestant worship. A number of churches were dismantled, about two hundred monasteries destroyed, the mass abolished, and the liturgy of Edward VI. introduced.

By means of promises, intended to be broken on the first opportunity, the Regent tried to quell these disturbances; but when French troops arrived in the country it came to open revolt. In October, 1559, the Presbyterian party met as the "nobles and commonalty of the Scotch Church," and declared that the Regent had forfeited her office by her infringement of the constitution.

The unity of religious and political revolution had become a fact, and the preachers justified these proceedings from the Bible.

It was therefore political as well as religious considerations which helped to procure victory for the revolution.

Elizabeth was not enough of a heroine of the faith, and too much of a Tudor, to lend a hand to the rebels against a legal government.\* Philip II. must have regarded the proceedings of the Scotch Presbyterians as an unpardonable crime against all that he held sacred as a

\* Compare the characteristic letter to Mary Tudor of 1556.—Raumer.



ruler and a Catholic, and yet even he advised that the Scotch should be supported against the Regent; for an union of the crowns of France and Scotland appeared more dangerous to him than even the Calvinistic heresy, and this consideration at length prevailed with Elizabeth.

Through the aid of England a treaty was concluded at Edinburgh in 1560, according to which the French troops were to withdraw. With this, the last obstacle to the complete victory of the Presbyterians disappeared, and Parliament could make the Protestant faith, the abolition of episcopacy and the mass the law of the land without opposition.

This was the position of affairs in Scotland when, in the summer of 1561, Queen Mary, who had been a widow since December, 1560, arrived in Scotland.

#### MARY STUART IN SCOTLAND.—1561-68.

The Stuarts are one of the most unfortunate royal families in history. James I. and III. were murdered, James II. was killed by the bursting of a gun, James IV. fell in battle, and James V. had to submit to the aristocracy. He died with the most gloomy forebodings. When, on his deathbed, the birth of his daughter, Mary Stuart, was announced to him, he said, "The kingdom cam' wi' a lass" (the daughter of Robert Bruce), "an' it wull gae wi' a lass." From the circumstances under which Mary came to the throne, it could scarcely be hoped that this family misfortune would yield to a better fate.

The country was ruled by an austere fanatical Protestantism; the Queen was a zealous Catholic; a tone of gloomy severity of morals reigned in the new Church. Mary was a young, pleasure-loving woman, in the heyday of life, and came from a luxurious and frivolous court, which was regarded by the Calvinists with horror; the country had ridden itself of the French by force, and Mary was accompanied by French courtiers, jesters, and confessors, who daily reminded the people that their Queen was a foreigner.

The days of her reception were the happiest that Mary spent in Scotland. The Scotch have themselves described how the beautiful young Queen was greeted by the rejoicings of the people. She was a real ruler, after there had been a regency for nearly twenty years; but in the solemn processions which went forth to meet her there were many

things in the devices and songs which breathed the Calvinistic hatred of Papal idolatry.

Mary was soon to feel this more keenly. Zealous Catholic as she was, she would have liked to make her creed once more that of the whole country; but as it was impossible even to attempt this, she desired at least to be unmolested in her Catholic domestic worship and the private service in her chapel. But the fanaticism of the all-powerful John Knox would not permit it. He and his party preached openly against the heresies of the unconverted Queen. Knox allowed himself to say in his prayers in the church—"Purify, O Lord, the heart of the Queen from the poison of idolatry, release her from the bondage of Satan in which she was brought up, and in which, from want of true teaching, she still remains." And when mass was read in all privacy before the Queen, tumults took place in which several priests and persons about her had their heads broken and their ears cut off.\*

Queen Elizabeth watched these events with the interest of a person whom they concerned more nearly than any one else. From the time when Mary first set her foot upon Scotch soil, she found herself in opposition to Elizabeth. Elizabeth demanded the recognition of the Treaty of Edinburgh, which Mary absolutely refused. It may easily be imagined, therefore, with what feelings she watched the fate of the Queen of Scotland.

She took pleasure in her rival's self-made difficulties, for they lamed her, and while her possession of the Scotch crown was in the balance, she could scarcely think of grasping at the English one. She supported the Scotch nobles in their opposition, and the Calvinists in their defiance, while in England she kept both these parties within very circumscribed limits. Mary had not given up any of her projects against Elizabeth and Protestant fanaticism; but she took care not to increase her isolation by giving any challenge to England.

For a time the two Queens thought it well to write the most amicable and peaceable letters to each other; but, politically, they were entirely at variance.

Meanwhile, Scotland was in a state bordering on anarchy, in which Mary could with difficulty maintain her position.

\* Even as early as September 8th, 1561, a few days after her arrival  
—Raumer.

The barons and the Calvinists attempted to overthrow her Government with one blow; but this revolt was quelled in 1563.

This convinced Mary that if she took advantage of her enemies' mistakes she should be able to maintain her power, but that in the present excitable state of the people she must not expose herself to attack.

The life she led was certainly not adapted to inspire the Scots with respect for a crown, the value of which depended on the personal excellence of the wearer.

In her intercourse with men, she was frivolous to a degree which it did not require Puritanical strictness to think repulsive. In the case of such characters, report often exceeds anything that admits of proof; and if more is laid to Mary Stuart's charge than holds good under strict investigation, there is so much that is historical that there is no need to add to it.

To avoid scandal, and to have a support in some man against the nobles, she resolved upon a second marriage.

There were many distinguished Scotchmen—for a Scotchman it was to be—who might be proposed to her as husbands, and among them were some worthy and excellent men. But she selected amongst her suitors the handsomest and most empty headed, her cousin, the Earl of Darnley, who, as Dahlmann says, "was nothing but that repulsive object called a beautiful man." Like her, he was vain, superficial, frivolous, and a flirt, and as cowardly and devoid of character as a man could be. He had previously conspired against her, and now joined her in proceeding against the conspirators. She was not guided in her choice by any idea of duty or political interest, but by a fugitive sensual fancy.

Elizabeth was not inaccessible to such feelings. She had her preferences, and many a man was pleasing to her; but when she seriously entertained the idea of sharing her throne with any foreign prince, she began to consider whether it would comport with her national policy; and when an English nobleman was in question, she did not forget what was implied in raising a subject to the throne. She flirted and coquetted with Leicester and others; but would not permit any one of them to become her master.

Mary celebrated her marriage with Darnley in July, 1565. It may be imagined how it turned out.

After the first fleeting pleasure was over, they went their separate ways. The King, who took no pleasure in anything but coarse excesses, soon joined a set of lawless comrades, and they played all sorts of pranks, which would have been unpardonable in any one, and were totally unworthy of a King. The Queen did not conceal her contempt for her husband, and they soon ceased to meet. The only result of this marriage was the birth of a successor to the throne; but, before the future King was born, the relations of the conjugal pair were disclosed to all the world by a frightful catastrophe.

Mary's favourite at that time was an Italian, David Rizzio, who beguiled her lonely hours with his musical talents; the King, probably quite unjustly, called him her paramour—not that Mary was incapable of unfaithfulness; but there is no proof whatever except her husband's accusations, and the relation admits of an innocent explanation: she found a companion and confidant in the skilful Italian, and in many respects he compensated for what she lacked in her husband.

He sang well, and she was fond of music; he was a skilful correspondent, and she wanted one; otherwise, he was not particularly likely to have been the lover of the Queen. It appears to me that he was nothing more to Mary than the secretary who carried on her private correspondence with Rome and Madrid, and this was why John Knox and his party were so furious against him. To them he was not the Queen's paramour; but the Papist in the service of the Catholic with her plans of restoration.

This relation—unwise, imprudent, but not culpable—inflamed the King's wrath and the thirst for revenge of his wild companions. A horrible project was formed of murdering the Italian, who during the evening was generally to be found with the Queen in the ladies' apartments. One evening, in March, 1566, the conspirators entered the Queen's apartment, some Scotch lords, and among them the King, not courageous enough to strike the blow himself, but base enough to cause it to be done by others.\* Rizzio threw himself at the Queen's feet, weeping like a child. He was dragged into an adjoining room, and dispatched with fifty-six blows.

\* According to the French ambassador's report (Raumer) he, Darnley, struck the first blow.—ED.

It would have required more than human self-control in the Queen to forget that it was the man whom she had raised to the throne who had committed this shameful deed, unexampled in history, before her eyes.

It was intended to appear to the world as a punishment for adultery; thus, while Rizzio was pierced by one dagger, another was aimed at the Queen. She was then pregnant with the prince, who was born three months afterwards; and it is worthy of remark, that this weakly creature came into the world at this tragical time. It was ascribed to his mother's excitement at the time of the murder that James I. could not see a naked sword without shuddering.

The Queen naturally entertained only thoughts of revenge towards her unworthy husband; but there is a long step from these feelings of hatred to that which really took place. In public opinion, Darnley had nothing more to lose, but the Queen had not gained anything. The public feeling was less favourable to her than before this catastrophe, and the Calvinistic preachers raved against her as an adulteress.

Among the men distinguished by the Queen's favour, there was one remarkable for his rash daring, and, as it appears, for his seductive talents, the Earl of Bothwell, a man who stood on the boundary line between a hero and a captain of banditti, and it was in the latter capacity that he ended his career. It was his belief that no woman could withstand him, and his conquest of the Queen seems to justify the idea; he also held that the end justifies the means. He was a person whom no one liked, but neither, before the Queen favoured him, did any one hate him. His past life and the history of his marriage gave rise to great calumny, and he was held to be capable of the darkest crimes.

With this creature the Queen entered into friendly relations; and, in spite of all the efforts of her defenders, it is still unproved that the love letters to him are not genuine, that the scented French verses to Bothwell were not by her hand.\* So far could the sensuality of this woman lead her astray, that, in order to get rid of Darnley, she fled into the arms of his murderer.

The year 1556 was coming to an end. Darnley and the Queen had not met for months. Darnley then fell dan-

\* Even Ranke considers them genuine in the main.

gerously ill, and there were all sorts of scandals as to the cause and nature of his malady, when it was reported that Mary was reconciled to Rizzio's murderer, had visited him at Glasgow, had him brought near to her palace at Edinburgh in a litter, and nursed him devotedly night and day. All this was true. But on the 9th of February, 1567, Mary was at a court ball, and two hours after midnight Edinburgh was awakened out of sleep by a terrible explosion. The house in which the sick Darnley was lying was blown up while he was in it; his body was found in a neighbouring garden.\*

In all Scotland there was but one opinion: that this deed was done by Bothwell. Some suspected the Queen of being directly or indirectly an accomplice, and her conduct before and after showed that, at any rate, she approved of the act, though perhaps she did not help to originate it.

A storm of exasperation burst over the country. Bothwell was openly accused of the murder by handbills in the streets, and punishment was demanded for him and his accomplices. The Queen gave a reward to one of the servants who was openly accused of being one; and, instead of bringing Bothwell to trial, she made him commandant of Edinburgh. In possession of this dignity, and still a member of the privy council, he conducted his own trial, appeared before the court with his accomplices armed, and persuaded the judges, who were all his followers, to acquit him. The judges, so called, dared to say, among other things, that the indictment was null, for it described the murder on the 9th of February, whereas it took place at two in the morning of the 10th. A number of members of Parliament, at a jovial supper given by Bothwell, even went so far as to recommend him, a married man, as a husband for the Queen.

Scotland had scarcely recovered from the excitement of the murder and this disgraceful trial, when it was surprised by some news which surpassed everything.

It was reported that Bothwell had, with her consent, carried off the Queen to his castle, and a few days afterwards that she had married the murderer of her husband, scarcely cold in his grave.

Nothing can be more disgusting than the lying part which the Queen played in this affair; she allowed herself to be

\* And strangled, so that he had survived the explosion.—Raumer.



abducted, acted the part of a prisoner, and then declared that she had been carried off by force, but that Bothwell had behaved so well to her, that she had resolved to marry him. For a woman of five-and-twenty to be ready to give her hand to her husband's murderer, however guilty he might be, was to be sunk low indeed.

The revolt now broke out which overturned Mary's throne, and drove her, as a helpless fugitive, into the arms of her rival. Elizabeth possessed neither magnanimity nor insight enough to let her alone, now that she was no longer dangerous. She did what was neither noble nor prudent : gave her a friendly invitation, and then let her languish in prison, which only made her dangerous ; for it caused her crimes to be forgotten.

**MARY STUART IN ENGLAND.—ROME AND SPAIN TURN AGAINST ELIZABETH.—THE CONSPIRACIES — NORFOLK, 1569-72.**

It was a strange resolve of Mary's to fly to England. Elizabeth had been pronounced illegitimate by the Pope, and therefore incapable of reigning ; the negotiations between her and Mary as to the succession in England had not led to any result ; the Queen looked upon Mary as an inconvenient rival, the nation as its bitterest enemy. Her history and reputation made it unlikely that a rebellion of the Catholics would be excited in her favour against Elizabeth. Mary's resolution, therefore, could only have been formed in a moment of excitement, and was not based upon any sound political considerations.

She was soon bitterly punished for it. She had stormed Elizabeth with letters ; she had sent her complaints against the Scotch nobles, urgent entreaties for help, assurances of devotion, and descriptions of her pitiful condition, as if she thought that Elizabeth could have no other idea than to relieve her in her distress, to defeat her enemies, and replace her on the throne with English arms.

Elizabeth was too much of a Tudor not to disapprove the revolt of the barons under Moray ; her opinions on the sovereignty of rulers were almost as strict as those of the Stuarts ; but there was a long way from these sentiments to undertaking the restoration of Mary.

The fugitive Queen was not received in an unfriendly



manner. Elizabeth allowed her to be greeted on the frontier with the honours pertaining to her rank, and accompanied to Carlisle ; but there she was imprisoned, and the series of Elizabeth's errors begins.

Mary was kept in a state of mild, but well-watched imprisonment, which she felt all the more keenly, because it was pretended that she was only watched. Elizabeth had chosen a course which was half legal, but which could neither conciliate Mary, nor make her harmless ; indeed, it was just this mode of imprisonment which made her dangerous, for, for eighteen years, she was the soul of a series of conspiracies which only increased the painfulness of her lot. It was a spot on Elizabeth's character that she betrayed the confidence of an unhappy woman who sought her help, and placed her enemy in an attitude of self-defence. Either that which it was afterwards thought necessary to do should have been done at once, or the world's reproach should have been averted by conciliation and magnanimity, which would at the same time have rendered Mary harmless.

Womanlike, Elizabeth chose a middle course, which, instead of having the advantages she desired, had precisely the disadvantages she wished to avoid.

Mary was enough under restraint to learn to hate Elizabeth as her mortal enemy, but enough at liberty to set conspiracies on foot against her.

Elizabeth had no intention of re-instating Mary upon the throne of Scotland, but declared herself ready to do so if the conflicting parties would submit to her arbitration, and Mary should be pronounced innocent of Darnley's murder ; but she absolutely refused her the desired permission to go free to France or Scotland.

After this Mary knew where she was. She wrote a proud and queenly letter to Elizabeth, reminding her that she came to find a helper in her, not a judge. Then she turned to the kings of Spain and France for help against the Queen of England ; but this step brought no succour. Philip II. was prevented by the Moriscoes, Charles IX. by the Huguenots, and the only effect of it was to cause Elizabeth to remove the prisoner further from the frontier to Bolton Castle for greater security.

A fruitless attempt at arbitration was followed by the long series of plots and projects, the last and greatest of which led

to Mary's execution. This contest of eighteen years with her rival and her adherents, and the necessity at last of getting rid of her, was the consequence of Elizabeth's first false step.

The first conspiracy proceeded from the House of Norfolk and others of the highest English nobles. The House of Norfolk had distinguished itself, partly at the head of affairs, and partly in the opposition, ever since the time of Henry VIII., and one of the members of it had played such a part as no other English magnate has done. A project was now formed by his grandson which would have united all the elements hostile to Elizabeth under one banner.

The Duke of Norfolk had numerous adherents among the Catholics of England, although himself, as he declared upon the scaffold, a Protestant; there were advocates of his cause in the Queen's council, Spain and France were in his favour, and he had a project for securing the crown of Scotland for his family, and, after Elizabeth's death, that of England also, by gaining the hand of Mary Stuart. He was possessed of brilliant talents, was skilful in gaining adherents to his cause, and the past history of his house, as well as the number of his supporters among the highest aristocracy, justified him in aspiring to these projects. In reality, indeed, all this was but a web of self-deception. The Scotch scornfully rejected his advances at the first mention of them; it was as great a folly to reckon upon Elizabeth's consent as upon help from France and Spain; all that was certain was, that Mary wrote him the tenderest letters, and that some of the English aristocracy were ready to take up arms in his favour.

This was Mary's first plan of rescue. It coincided with a crisis in England's foreign policy. Elizabeth had detained Spanish ships which had taken refuge in English harbours from the Sea-Beggars, and seized the money which the Duke of Alba was eagerly expecting. In revenge, Spain had made reprisals, both countries had declared war, and a Spanish invasion was expected. If it came to an irreparable breach, Mary and all her adherents would stand between two fires. In order to avert this, the conspirators, especially the Duke of Norfolk and the Earl of Arundel, laboured to compass the fall of Cecil, who was the soul of all measures in favour of Protestantism, and against the

Catholic powers. They succeeded not only in this, but in inducing the Queen to enter into negotiations for a reconciliation with Spain and Mary; but during these negotiations the conspiracy was betrayed.

Elizabeth was beside herself when she learnt what had happened, and was intended to happen among her most intimate advisers. So long as anything was hanging in the balance, she vacillated, and tried to find resources in half measures, not without a certain duplicity; but at critical moments her masculine and resolute presence of mind never failed her, and did not fail her now.

Mary was immediately placed in stricter confinement at Coventry, and in order to be prepared against any attack by sea, the coast was guarded by seven of the largest ships of war, the land forces were summoned, and everything placed in readiness.

The Duke of Norfolk, seized with sudden faint-heartedness, came to London on a summons from the Queen, and was thrown into the Tower. Meanwhile the Duke of Northumberland and the Earl of Westmoreland effected a rising in the north of England; the Catholics among the nobility and people of England joined them, and, preceded by a figure of Christ crucified, they swarmed over the country, rushed into the churches, burnt the Bibles and Prayer-Books, and again introduced the mass. The Catholic arms had just been victorious over the Huguenots in France: it seemed as if there was to be a similar reaction in the north of England, which might perhaps turn to the advantage of Alba in the Netherlands. But the Queen's general, Thomas Ratcliffe, confronted the rebels and routed them without difficulty. The revolt was entirely quelled and the leaders had fled, when Pius V. hurled his ban at the heretical Queen and absolved her subjects from their oaths and fealty.

Queen Elizabeth answered this assault by a unanimous vote of Parliament, which declared every attack upon the legitimacy of the sovereign to be high treason, every assault on the Anglican Church a crime against the State.

Meanwhile, Norfolk, on a solemn promise to renounce all thoughts of marriage with Mary, was placed in less strict imprisonment; but the conspiracy went on and assumed a very serious character. Besides the correspondence with Mary, there were negotiations with Spain and Rome

carried on by a Florentine banker, Ridolfi, which were countenanced by a large number of the nobles. Norfolk promised to go over to Catholicism; to place himself at the head of a Catholic conspiracy to liberate Mary and dethrone Elizabeth; Spain promised a considerable number of troops. Alba was of opinion, that unless Elizabeth's person were secured, the revolt would share the fate of the last, and that it was not advisable for Spain to interfere until that was done.

In Spain it was greatly feared that the scheme for Elizabeth's marriage with the Duke of Anjou might succeed, and thus both empires would be united against Spain. It was therefore necessary before all things to capture or murder Elizabeth, and in July, 1571, Philip II. was discussing the subject with his council, when in England the whole plot was discovered; Norfolk was again in the Tower, and this time to leave it only for the scaffold, in June, 1572.

This was a death-blow to the aristocratic party; similar attempts were made during the following years, Rome and Spain did not relax their efforts, but they did not find sufficient followers in England; by degrees Elizabeth was forced into the camp of the irreconcilable enemies of Catholicism.

#### ELIZABETH'S FORCED ENMITY TOWARDS SPAIN AND ROME. 1572-85.

The next few years passed in perpetual irritation with the Catholic powers, conspiracies and attempts in favour of Mary, and vigorous measures of self-defence on the part of Elizabeth.

The contest between the two Queens assumed more and more a character of personal hostility, and Elizabeth became more and more convinced that she and Mary represented two great principles entirely opposed to each other. The designs of Spain and Rome allowed her to entertain no doubt of it, and the continuance of the plots compelled her to defend herself from foes where she had hitherto sought friends, and to look for support in quarters where she had hitherto met with refusals or an attitude of indifference.

Shortly after the Spanish-Roman scheme of getting rid of Elizabeth, and English Protestantism was frustrated by the execution of Norfolk, came the news of the massacre of St. Bartholomew. France had been suing for the friendship of

England, a marriage scheme had been zealously advocated, and now came the news of this terrible massacre. A cry of rage and horror was raised throughout England and Scotland; the aged Knox, who had one foot in the grave, again ascended the pulpit to testify against the horrid deed. Elizabeth and her council received the French Ambassador in mourning; she told him that France had betrayed her, and that she could but fear that those who had made the King of France the assassin of his own subjects, would make no difficulty of sacrificing her—a foreign Queen.\*

After this experience, it seemed to be a necessary policy of self-defence for Elizabeth to assist the Beggars in the Netherlands, and the Huguenots in France to the utmost of her power; their enemies were hers also, and reconciliation was no longer possible.

All this re-acted on Mary's fate. Soon after the discovery of the Norfolk plot, it had been openly said, that the axe must be laid to the root of the tree, that she who was the plotter of all this mischief must be put out of the way. Protestant theologians proved from the Bible that Mary had forfeited her life; the lawyers referred to the laws against treason and revolt, and both Houses of Parliament desired that a bill of attainder should be brought in against the prisoner. Elizabeth rejected all these demands, but it was doubtful how long she would be able to do so.

Mary's situation had already become so hopeless that her imprisonment appeared like a sort of protection against the passionate revenge of the English people, while her over-zealous friends were always adding to her misfortunes. The year 1576, again brought to light a great plan for a rescue. The hero of Lepanto, the chivalrous Don John of Austria, had early conceived an enthusiastic desire to liberate the martyr of the Catholic faith from the hands of the heretics. Rome gave him her blessing on a project so pleasing to God. Catholic Ireland hoped for a Spanish King. Mary offered him her hand, and was ready to deprive her son of his right to the throne, if he were not a strict Catholic. Things were more favourable to Mary in Scotland than ever, since her most dangerous enemies, Moray and Lennox, were out of the way; in short, if the new Stadtholder of the Netherlands could reckon upon his

\* Mignet, ii. 85, according to the correspondence of the French ambassador, La Mothe.—Fenelon, v. 122.

another Philip II., if he threw all his power into the scale in favour of the plan, there would be a prospect of an immense change throughout the north. But Philip II. hesitated, and the favourable moment passed by.

This state of secret warfare continued for years. There was no end to the conspiracies and schemes of invasion; the Spanish Ambassador, Mendoza, in London, held the threads of them all; there was increasing prospect of their success from the increasing excitement in Scotland, the successes of the Guises in France, the conquests of Alexander Farnese, won partly by the sword and partly by diplomacy; everything pointed to an open breach with Spain, which at length took place. Elizabeth dismissed the Spanish ambassador, concluded a treaty with the Netherlands, and dispatched Leicester with English troops to Vliessingen, and Francis Drake to the West Indies, 1585-6. England's part in the great conflict of the age was irrevocably decided on, and sentence passed upon Mary Stuart.

#### TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF MARY STUART, 1586-7.

These acts of Elizabeth gave tardy expression to the prevailing feeling of the whole of Protestant England. Amidst continued threats of the disturbance of the public peace, the fanaticism of the age, the desire for religious persecution was again awakened; the people trembled for the Queen's life, for it was the security of all Protestants against Spanish tyranny, rejoiced at the execution of the traitors, and were always urging more decisive measures. Parliament was the organ of these sentiments, and required rather the curb than the spur; Elizabeth had much trouble in restraining its zeal.

But the situation, especially after the beginning of the eighth decade, had become so gloomy that it would have been intolerable for long.

The threads of some conspiracy were discovered almost every year, always originating with the same parties and having the same end in view—the liberation of Mary, the assassination of Elizabeth, and the restoration of Catholicism in England.

No end to all this could be foreseen, for since 1570 there had been seminaries in Rheims and Rome established by emigrant English Catholics in the interests of the con-



spiracies against the Protestant Queen ; they bound themselves by oath against her, and every year sent a number of fanatical apostles over to the country. Parliament issued stringent decrees, the courts passed sentences without mercy, but they could not uproot the evil. In 1585, Parliament threatened that if another conspiracy were formed, the nation would be justified in striking a blow at the chief author of the mischief, when the last plot was discovered, which made Mary's catastrophe inevitable.

Philip II. and the Duke of Guise were of opinion that the time was come for gravely entertaining the long-projected, but oft-delayed, scheme of invading England and effecting a revolution in Scotland ; but they agreed that there was no hope of success while Elizabeth was living. The murder of the heretical Queen must precede every invasion of the country.

In the circles of the rejected priests and the Catholic nobility, they had long been familiar with the idea, and relied on the support from abroad which Spain and Rome seemed likely to offer.

John Savage, formerly an officer who had fought under Parma in the Netherlands, and had afterwards been persuaded in the seminary at Rheims that the murder of Elizabeth would be a work more pleasing to God and man than any other, and Anthony Babington, an influential gentleman, undertook the conduct of the plot. The latter took a considerable number of persons of the same way of thinking into his confidence, and Mary Stuart, now under the care of a harsh Puritan named Paulet, was initiated into the scheme. It has been proved that she was not only acquainted with the details of the project for her own rescue, but with the scheme for Elizabeth's assassination, and that she had no more objection to the one than the other. It is singular that the conspirators, who must have known how much they were risking, were deceived as to the trustworthiness of their confidential agents. Those who were intrusted with the most secret commissions were in the pay of Walsingham, the most shrewd and wily of Elizabeth's ministers ; not a despatch was written by Babington or Mary, which was not at once handed over to him and deciphered by one of his agents. Walsingham was earlier and better instructed in all the details than the conspirators themselves, and it would have been easy for



him to stifle the plot in the bud ; but his plan was to let it go on until there were written proofs of unpardonable complicity against all, and especially against Mary, and then to step in.\* It may be said that under his fostering care the conspiracy assumed larger proportions, the audacity of the authors of it increased, and all was so arranged that nothing was wanting but the attack and the thrust of a dagger, to put an end to Elizabeth's life, when Walsingham appeared before her with irrefragable proofs, and urged those in power to take extreme measures to avert the catastrophe.

The heads of the conspiracy fell unsuspectingly into the hands of his myrmidons, and, overpowered by the proofs of their guilt, they confessed, and in September, 1586, were one and all executed.

On the 14th of October the trial of Mary Stuart began. The act of Parliament of 1585 was taken as the basis of the proceedings whereby persons in whose favour a rebellion was attempted, by whom any attempt was made on the life of the Queen should be deprived of their rights, and if they had personally taken part in it should forfeit their lives. This already pronounced sentence of death on Mary ; and if it had depended on the nation alone, it would have been confirmed by an overwhelming majority.

The popular conception of the case was simply this : England had enjoyed years of peace and quiet under a happy and prosperous reign ; then a band of assassins and conspirators, equal to any wickedness, had invaded the country, seeking to overthrow the government, to place a guilty woman on the throne, and to give England up to the Spaniards and Jesuits. For eighteen years war had been waged with these rebels ; proofs of their guilt were now in hand and the leaders secured ; the heads of the instruments had been struck off, as a matter of course the instigator must share the same fate.

When the catastrophe was inevitable, Mary behaved with more coolness and composure than she had ever done before ; and this explains the fact that so many dark spots have been overlooked in the life of this unhappy woman. She rejected a trial, did not at first defend herself at all, insisted upon her rank as Queen, with the emphasis of a Stuart, and played with great dignity the part of an inno-

cent person dying for her faith and her right to the crown. The proceedings were informal, and showed that it was less a case of a legal sentence than an act of political necessity.

It was, in fact, as Robespierre said of the trial of Louis XVI., "*une mesure de salut public à prendre.*"

Elizabeth was not indifferent as to what the world would say of her conduct; and would have fain appeared as the magnanimous person who would have given anything to save Mary, but was compelled by the nation to let the law take its course. But she could not keep up this appearance, if she gave her consent to the execution of the sentence. It would have been a great relief to her if Mary had been secretly put out of the way; it would have delivered her from her rival without loading her with the world's hatred. There is no doubt that she expressed herself cautiously and in a double-tongued way about the execution of the sentence, thereby betraying how gladly she would have shifted the responsibility to another. The secretary, Davison, was selected for this part, and he was not a virtuous hero. Elizabeth signed the warrant, but he had to affix the great seal. This done, on the 8th of February, 1587, the Council had the sentence executed. Because Elizabeth had not been again consulted about it just at the last, as was customary, she thought herself justified in punishing the obedient Davison as the guilty person. He was thrown into prison, and paid the penalty for the double-tonguedness of his Queen by years of captivity.

#### THE SPANISH ARMADA, 1588, AND ELIZABETH'S LAST DAYS.

The violent agitation of the Queen on receiving intelligence of the execution of the sentence may be taken for genuine, consistently with the supposition that after this transient emotion there would be a permanent feeling of relief that the mountain of anxiety which had weighed upon herself and her country for twenty years was removed.

After February, 1587, no conspiracy was formed worth mentioning; the instigator of the plots was gone, and if ever an act was justified by its results, it was so in this instance. The people of England, with the exception of a few Catholic noblemen, were in favour of Queen Mary's

death ; the news of it was received with general rejoicings, and whatever of bitter feeling there might be, was soon swallowed up in the terrors of the period which immediately followed. It was a piece of rare good fortune for Elizabeth that an event which had long been threatened now took place, and justified the extreme measures which had caused her so much anguish ; a great attack upon the island was preparing by Spain, which would have cut a different figure had Mary been still living.

Spain was equipping an immense fleet which was to repeat the feat of William the Conqueror, to extinguish the independence of England and its Protestantism, and at the same time carry out Mary's will. Elizabeth appeared so great, so superior, so equal to the people's expectations in this contest, that, in their eyes, all that was connected with Mary fell into the shade, and Elizabeth's character appeared in the brightest colours ; the time of her historical greatness begins in this conflict with Philip II., "the shield of the Christian republic," as the Jesuits called him.

In a masterly manner Elizabeth took advantage of those national sentiments, before which even religious differences vanished. The English nation, with all that it held dear, was threatened with a fearful irruption of foreign barbarism, Elizabeth felt herself to be one with the people, and could therefore reckon upon its best powers and most noble passions.

Pope Sixtus V. had excommunicated her, and commissioned Philip II. to execute the sentence : a hundred and fifty great ships of war, with 2,620 guns, 8,000 seamen, and 20,000 troops were embarking from Lisbon, and Alexander of Parma was preparing for a diversion in the Netherlands. The Pope had contributed half a million, and a number of priests and monks who were at once to begin the task of converting the heretics.

Elizabeth was never greater than at the time of this terrible danger, and in the eyes of the world it relieved her from the obloquy of the deed of 1587. She was now the Queen whom England wanted, and for whom she had hoped. She showed that she had, as she told the Spanish ambassador, the body of a woman, but the heart of a man.

In the circles of the Protestant zealots, a scheme had been formed of replying to the declaration of war of the foreign Catholic Powers, by a bloody execution of the native

Catholics ; but Elizabeth refused to listen to it. She appealed to the patriotism of the whole nation, irrespective of difference of creed, and she was not disappointed. The expectation of the allies of the co-operation of Scotland proved false. The young King James had, indeed, bitterly felt the death of his unfortunate mother, but he regarded Elizabeth as a protection against Spain, and therefore joined her cause.

France remained inactive, and Alexander of Parma was not ready, so that the prospects of the great enterprise were less favourable from the first than had been anticipated.

Meanwhile, Elizabeth called her people to arms. It was the first attempt by a government to rely on the defensive powers of its own people and to await the attack of a great military power without trained soldiers. It succeeded beyond all expectation. The country people rivalled the great towns, with London at their head.

In a short time two hundred ships were manned by 15,700 sailors, and in the counties, the nobles, both Protestant and Catholic, with their tenants and vassals, took up arms in accordance with ancient usage ; 76,000 infantry, and 3,000 horsemen were soon ready for the conflict. The coasts were fortified, voluntary contributions flowed in from all sides. The people did all they could for the national cause, with the Queen at their head.

It was a proud moment, one which a nation only lives through once in its history, when Elizabeth, an Amazon in armour, appeared, in the camp at Tilbury, and thus addressed the soldiers as they stood in rank and file :—" Let tyrants fear. I have always so behaved myself that, under God, I have placed my chiefest strength and safeguard in the loyal hearts and good-will of my subjects, and therefore I am come amongst you, as you see by this time, not for my own recreation or disport, but being resolved in the midst and heat of the battle to live or die amongst you all ; to lay down for my God and for my kingdoms, and for my people, my honour and my blood, even in the dust. I know I have the body but of a weak and feeble woman, but I have the heart and stomach of a king, and of a king of England too ; and think foul scorn that Parma, or Spain, or any prince of Europe should dare to invade the borders of my realm, to which, rather than any dishonour shall grow by me, I myself will take up arms ; I myself will be your general, judge, and rewarder of every one of your virtues in the field."

The dreaded conflict on English soil did not take place. Destiny interposed, but the events and impressions of this time formed an epoch for England. The enthusiasm called forth by them was not easily forgotten.

The Spanish ships were colossal and unwieldy. They had not the lightness of the little English vessels, nor the sailors the naval training of those of England. The fleet which embarked from Lisbon on May 30th, 1588, encountered storms on the way, and was involved in a number of minor engagements in the Channel, which, though not equal to a single real naval battle, sorely pressed the already damaged fleet, so that a retreat had to be contemplated instead of a landing. Storms did the rest, and before Parma could set out, the Armada was in such a condition that the remnant of it could scarcely reach the Spanish harbours.

The fate of this invincible Armada was an event of world-wide interest. The remains of Spanish power and prosperity sank with it in the waves, and in England, now the victorious bulwark of religious liberty, a new development began. England had found her element, soon to rule in it as a great power.

Now began the great maritime development of this country. The time of voyages of conquest and discovery, when Drake, Raleigh, Howard, and Frobisher gave importance to the English naval power, and colonial possessions were acquired in the East Indies and America. The foundations were laid of the greatness which was to develop itself during the next two centuries. Commercial enterprise, protected by a powerful fleet and fostered by wealthy colonies in the east and west, was greatly extended. It is, therefore, perfectly intelligible that Elizabeth's reign, and especially the latter part of it, should be regarded by Englishmen as the most prosperous period of their history. Fruitless laurels, and severe internal crises had been the results of the French conquests of Edward III., while the naval wars of Elizabeth introduced England into her own element, and opened up the natural sources of her power, so that her internal prosperity and external importance were developed simultaneously.

For this reason the English are accustomed to associate the rise of their greatness with this victory of Protestantism, and it explains the Protestant hue which the English nation has assumed since the sixteenth century.

Seldom has a reign closed so peacefully after long storms as that of Elizabeth (April, 1603), and when we compare the succeeding period, we cannot fail to be struck with the skill with which she adjusted those differences between regal and popular rights by which the country was so convulsed in the following decades.

This was partly the result of the gravity of a situation before which all minor differences vanished. Still, Elizabeth had a large share in it. Her government was very economical and well administered. Seldom had a ruler under difficult circumstances contrived so skilfully to avoid imposing unusual burdens on the people. Then she was prudent and dexterous in her way of going to work.

She held those sentiments of absolutism and regal power which belonged to all the Tudors, but she never challenged opposition to them by boasting, and took good care never to agitate the momentous question of the limits of monarchical and parliamentary rights. She well knew that their relations were ill-defined, and thought it prudent never to let them become matter of dispute.

But all this was changed immediately after her death. During the next reign there was not a trace of greatness in the government. Blunders, mishaps, and violent disputes about the rights of Parliament and the crown were the order of the day.

## PART XIII.

### THE REVOLUTION AND REPUBLIC IN ENGLAND

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#### CHAPTER XLIII.

JAMES I., 1603-25.\*

Character of the Monarch and unfavourable beginning of his reign.—The Gunpowder Plot, November, 1605.—The Contests of 1621.—Trial of Lord Bacon of Verulam.—The Question of taking part in the Bohemian-Palatinate War.—The Difficulties of Parliament.—Address of November, 1621, and Dissolution of Parliament.—The Spanish Marriage Scheme. Buckingham and the Prince of Wales.—Change in the Policy of England.—The Parliament of 1624.—Death of James, April, 1625.

#### CHARACTER OF JAMES I., AND UNFAVOURABLE BEGINNING OF HIS REIGN.

IT was universally admitted that Mary's son would be Elizabeth's successor before her death. Mary's right was indisputably established through him.

James VI. of Scotland and I. of England was the issue of the stormy marriage of Mary and Darnley, and he was

\* Besides the before-mentioned literature :—Annals of King James I. and Charles I., 1681. Wilson's History of Great Britain, 1653. Sidney, Letters and Memorials, 1746. Clarendon's History of the Rebellion, 1702. Memorials of Whitelock, 1732. Clarendon State Papers. Rushworth, London, 1682; Thurloe, 1742, and the Parliamentary Debates. Compare Guizot, Collection des Mémoires relatives à l'Histoire de la Révolution d'Angleterre, Paris, 1823, 28 vols.; Guizot, Histoire de Charles I., 6th ed. 1856; On Cromwell; besides the biographies of Leti, 1692; Villemain, 1819; and Merle d'Aubigné. Carlyle, Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell, 1845-57. Guizot, Histoire de la République d'Angleterre, 1854. The same, Histoire du Protectorat de Richard Cromwell, 1855. For a critique on the sources see Ranke's Engl. Geschichte, vol. vii.



born not long after the murder of Rizzio. He was two years old when his mother escaped to England, and then had for years been tossed hither and thither between the leaders of the Scotch nobility. He had not given any evidence of ability as ruler of Scotland. Awkward and unkingly in person, manners, and tastes, he had with difficulty maintained his position among the parties which were tearing Scotland in pieces, and the main inheritance of this period of perpetual warfare was an irritability about his royal rights, occasioned by the systematic attacks of the rigid Presbyterians. He had not attempted any interference abroad; he had even allowed his mother to die without any vigorous effort to avert her fate. It was mainly owing to his inaction and indifference that her hopes that Scotland would take up her cause were not fulfilled. The succession to the English crown was nearer to his heart than his mother's execution.\*

When, in July, 1603, he proceeded amidst the rejoicings of the people from Edinburgh to London, he entered upon an inheritance greater in extent than had been possessed by any king before him. England, Ireland, and Scotland were, for the first time, united under one sceptre; and though it was not an amalgamation of the three empires, their union considerably increased the power of their common ruler.

In this respect, the power which Elizabeth had inherited was thrown into the shade; but his character made it by no means likely that he would eclipse the brilliance of her reign. While Elizabeth frequently displayed masculine powers, it is often difficult to remember in James's case that we are in the presence of a man, the impression he made was so thoroughly effeminate.

He was not wanting in acquirements and cultivation; indeed, he might almost be called learned. He had taken part in the theological controversies then agitated in Scotland, and had now and then appeared as an author. He brought to the throne the petty literary vanity of a pedant; and this, as we have seen in the case of Henry VIII., is always a misfortune.

There was nothing in his character to inspire confidence or respect. His want of manliness, timorousness, and supineness in great things and small, his awkward shiftless-

\* Mignet.

ness, the plebeian vulgarity of his manners and mode of life, his occupation with trifles and childish whims, all contributed to give the impression of a person whom no one could esteem or had any cause to fear.

And with all this obvious weakness of mind and body were united prejudices about regal sovereignty which almost amounted to insanity. From these unkingly lips were heard sayings about absolute power and the unlimited rights of the crown which would scarcely have besemed personages like Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, and in his case they were simply ridiculous.

James I. was a fanatical doctrinaire of absolute monarchy; he had adopted as an article of faith the doctrine that the king was a second Providence upon earth, that all popular privileges were only favours granted by the throne, a doctrine which may have the most mischievous results to a weak head. His political wisdom consisted in boasting of these ideas.

In spite of their Magna Charta and their Parliament, the English were not accustomed to overmuch liberty: the Tudors had taught them to obey in a way which showed what a strong will might accomplish even with constitutional forms. Even Elizabeth had governed exactly as she pleased, though her manner of doing so was less severe; but she had never established as a doctrine, what the nation had submitted to in fact, nor attempted to settle the controversy as to their respective powers.

The rejoicings with which the beginning of James's reign was greeted soon gave place to general discontent. Under Elizabeth the people had been used to an economical, conscientious government; but now a careless and easy method of management was introduced, which was very expensive, and soon brought the finances into confusion. The people were exasperated by a swarm of Scotch place-hunters and assuming royal favourites. Elizabeth had had her favourites also, but they had not been expensive to the State; while those who helped King James to while away his time, consumed large sums of money, and were a disgrace to the crown.

The complaints about the rapacity of the Scotch, who "eat up the country like canker worms," were soon so loud, that the worst results might be anticipated.

Then his position with respect to the ecclesiastical ques

tion was doubtful, though this was less his fault than the result of the whole situation.

He was the son of a zealous Catholic, whose death had been regarded as a courageous martyrdom for her faith; he hated the Presbyterians, who wanted to set up an independent ecclesiastical community in opposition to him. The English Catholics therefore hoped that he would honour his mother's memory, and grant them more liberty. He had even given them secret promises to this effect; but his subsequent actions were not in accordance with them. He had a certain liking for the Roman Catholic Church, and was awed by episcopal authority; but then it must be for his benefit, not that of his subjects. He had not the least idea of making greater concessions to the Catholics; on the contrary, he made their position more painful, for which they recompensed him with mortal hatred.

The remnants of the party of the old conspirators, united with other persons, irritated by real or imaginary neglect, in forming a plan of horrible revenge.

They resolved to fill the cellars under the Houses of Parliament with gunpowder, and on the day of the opening of Parliament to blow up the whole of official England by one stroke, the royal family, the ministers, and the Upper and Lower House. It was an evidence of what deeds the party which had lost its leader in Mary was capable.

The scheme was ready for execution, when a Catholic lord, who had a brother-in-law among the accomplices, received a warning letter, in which it was said, among other things, "Though there be no appearance of any stir, yet I say they shall receive a terrible blow this Parliament, and yet they shall not see who hurts them."

The letter was communicated to the King, who was in perpetual fear of attempts on his life, and always appeared in a panoply of thick clothes, and he at once suspected gunpowder. The day before the opening of Parliament the cellars were searched, and one of the conspirators was found amongst the barrels employed in making the final preparations, and with a cheerful countenance he avowed his *Christian* project.

It need not be said that this affair made an immense sensation, and stirred up all the ecclesiastical hatred which had been raging in the country for more than half a century. Parliament, composed of members elected more freely than

formerly, gave expression to it in severe laws against the Catholics. King James, on the whole, maintained a position between the two parties. He was more severe to the Puritans than Elizabeth, and the Dissenters called him a secret Catholic; for in all cases of dispute he betrayed far more liking for the Catholic hierarchy than for the independent and rebellious spirit of the Protestants in and out of England. Still, he would have liked to get rid of the Pope and his connection with the Catholic powers.

James was not the man to talk of the divine right of kings; a monarch who was afraid of his Parliament should not have defied and threatened it, for he was always wanting money, and could not dispense with its aid. Yet what language did he not venture to use!

In the King's speech from the throne, in 1609, were the memorable words, "God hath power to create or destroy, to make or unmake at his pleasure, to give life or to send death; and to God both body and soul are due. And the like power have kings: they make and unmake their subjects; they have power of raising and casting down, of life and of death—judges over all their subjects, and in all causes, and yet accountable to none but God only. They have power to exalt low things, and abase high things, and make their subjects like men of chess: a pawn to take a bishop or a knight, and to cry up or down any of their subjects as they do their money."

Even to doubt the correctness of this doctrine he considered to be blasphemy and revolution; and all this from a man who could not see a sword without shuddering.

There could not have been a better method of bringing the delicate question of the relations between the King and people to an issue, and of compelling the people's representatives to settle what was in their power, and what in the King's, than by these blasphemous speeches.

And nowhere was this question more eagerly discussed than on English soil. If there were chartered, and what is more, exercised popular rights, it was in England. The mode in which they were exercised had undoubtedly always taken the colour of the age, and there was a certain oscillation according as the character of the sovereign or the force of circumstances turned the scale. What had not Henry VIII. and Elizabeth succeeded in accomplishing without Parliament, and on the other hand how the kings had to

submit to it during the civil wars ! Nevertheless under the Tudors, three principles were acknowledged to be in force—that new laws could not be enacted, nor new taxes imposed without the consent of Parliament, and that the responsible advisers of the crown might be called to account by Parliament. These rules were thoroughly established in the sixteenth century. Henry VIII. had promulgated all ecclesiastical laws through Parliament, and Edward VI. and Elizabeth had done the same. The Crown had often thrown the responsibility of its acts upon the ministers, in order to get rid of the odium attaching to them, and so culpable ministers and corrupt counsellors were continually summoned before Parliament. Even the principle of the consent of Parliament to taxation had never been a subject of dispute.

In short, to a certain extent royal and popular rights had comported well together, but this good understanding had mainly depended on the dexterity of the leading personages. But that an extravagant government like James's, which wounded the susceptibilities of the great parties, and with a most corrupt financial system, proclaimed its intention of upsetting the usages of public law, would soon put an end to the loyalty of Parliament was as clear as could be, especially as it was irritated by the perpetual demands of the Crown for money.

A circumstance not in itself important, but momentous in its results, gave rise to the conflict.

### THE CONFLICT OF 1621.

In order to raise money the Crown resorted to all sorts of devices, not exactly illegal, but sordid and corrupt. Besides a shameless trade in patents of nobility, which were a disgrace both to the government and the aristocracy, an abuse respecting monopolies had sprung up which was a decided injury to the prosperity of the nation. The Crown—even Elizabeth did not disdain to do it—sold the sole right to trade in certain articles to companies or individuals. As is well known, this system is condemned both by reason and experience ; but it was never carried on more recklessly than under James I., who in money matters, openly avowed himself to be a sick man urgently needing medical aid. This abuse had frequently been discussed in

Parliament, but complaints against it had always been in vain ; now, however, a new and worse abuse suddenly came to light.

The Lord Chancellor of England, Lord Bacon, one of the foremost thinkers of all times, sold not only monopolies but judicial sentences, thus making a prostitute of justice. The evidence against him was so conclusive, that he gave up all attempt at defence and confessed his guilt in abject terms. It cuts one to the heart to read the letter addressed to Parliament in April, 1620, by a man of sixty years of age, the first minister of the Crown and a European celebrity. It begins with the words :—

“Upon advised consideration of the charge, descending into my own conscience, and calling my memory to account as far as I am able, I do plainly and ingenuously confess that I am guilty of corruption, and do renounce all defence and put myself on the grace and mercy of your lordships.”

He then reckons up twenty-three cases in which, contrary to his oath and duty, he had received from parties for monopolies, sums of £50, £100, £200, £400, &c.\*

This business was of the greatest importance to England. The disgraceful acts of the Lord Chancellor were only symptomatic of a whole system of corruption. This trial of the first minister of the Crown, which was gone into with great minuteness in Parliament, affected the crown as well as the accused, the sentence against him was a condemnation of the government ; the people began to suspect that the whole administration was corrupt. It was a great success for Parliament to have deprived the arrogant King of his minister.

Another event now took place, which put the finishing stroke to the embitterment of the nation.

On the 24th of March, 1613, James's daughter, Elizabeth, had married the Elector Frederick of the Palatinate, amidst the rejoicings of the people. Frederick was greeted as the head of the German Union, and the marriage as the connection of England with German Protestantism. Then came his election as King of Poland, the defeat of Prague, the downfall of the winter-kingdom ; and James I. left his son-in-law, now wandering homeless about Germany, in the lurch, and made no appeal to Parliament for money, while

\* Cobbett, Parliamentary History.



there was yet time. Instead of helping the unhappy Count Palatine and his daughter, he scolded the rebels and the Usurper, and formed the project of marrying the Prince of Wales to the Spanish Infanta.

A commercial nation is never disposed to go to war for remote considerations, but this war lay near the hearts of the English; it was a struggle against the restoration of Catholicism which was achieving great successes, it was a question of the support of the cause for which England herself had sustained severe trials; this temperate peaceful nation was more eager for war than ever before. But James held back, not from weakness alone, but partly from legitimist scruples. His son-in-law was rebelling against the divine authority of the Emperor Ferdinand, with whose Spanish relations he was just negotiating a marriage, and not with much success.

For the usurped Crown of Bohemia, therefore, James would on no account do anything; but for the Palatinate, on the contrary, he declared with great emphasis that he would do all in his power.

When in January, 1621, he asked Parliament for money to protect the rights of his grandchildren in the Palatinate, and to help the good cause of liberty of conscience, he found a readiness which he had never met with before, but complaints of the great domestic grievances were now first seriously urged. Parliament was still sitting, and Bacon's impeachment keeping every one in suspense, when news came of the progress of Catholic restoration in Bohemia and Austria; the new dangers of the Huguenots in France, and the Protestants in the Netherlands, but notwithstanding the supplies granted by Parliament, James did nothing but make feeble declarations and diplomatic protests.

To the discontent with the failings of the administration, was now added irritation, occasioned by the weakness of the foreign policy of the government. The Lower House took upon itself for the first time to discuss foreign affairs: the war on the Continent and the errors of the government on a great European question. It was as yet a long way from revolution, but it was the first step towards it.

The King accused Parliament of going beyond its privileges, and prorogued it. Previous usage certainly justified this course, but the nation could not be blamed for making itself heard on so vital a question. For forty years and



more it had had a bitter feud with Spain, Hapsburg, and Rome. All the plots against Elizabeth—the war during the eighth decade; the invincible Armada; the gunpowder plot—had a common source; the nation's eagerness for war arose from a justifiable anxiety as to the effect which a victory of their mortal enemy on the Continent might have upon the liberties, political and religious, of their island empire.

When Parliament re-assembled in November, 1621, these sentiments were still more strongly expressed. The important question whether Parliament had a right to arraign the foreign policy of the government, pressed for a decision. The King again asked for money, not really to make war, but to continue the demonstrations which had made him the laughing-stock of Europe. Parliament would only grant it on condition that the King would give up the Spanish marriage; break up his alliances irrevocably with the Catholic powers; proceed with severity against the Catholics, and finally draw the sword in the Protestant cause.

These proposals were made to the King in an address, at that time of an unprecedented kind. A special complaint was added about the arrest of members of Parliament.

The King replied in a defiant letter to the Speaker, reproaching the House for meddling with things above their reach and capacity, forbade them to interfere with his government or in deep matters of state, and especially in the marriage of his son with the Infanta of Spain; and he finally declared that in cases of impropriety of conduct of members of Parliament, either in the House or out of it, he must reserve the right of punishing them.\*

This letter was intended to intimidate the Commons, but it rather acted as a challenge. One of the members expressed the feeling of the House when he said, "Our liberties are our freehold, and the fairest flower that groweth in the garden of the Commons, and if they be once nipped they will never grow again."†

The House insisted on liberty of speech as an ancient and inviolable right, and the King sent them another letter on the 16th of December, in which he said that he would not hear of rights and inherited claims, the House enjoyed

\* Cobbett. Immunity from arrest was granted, "*eundo, sedendo, redeundo*."

† Cobbett.

certain privileges by the grace and favour of the King and his predecessors, not by inheritance but toleration.

It is never the true interest of a government to agitate the question of existing and recognised rights. It is always a delicate one and was particularly so in England. Four hundred years had elapsed since Magna Charta was granted, and it did not contain everything that was now English law ; but the Englishman was accustomed to connect his rights with this treaty, and to talk to him of favours and concessions that might be withdrawn, was to put the people's notions of right to a severe test. To maintain that no rights exist except such as are conferred by the favour of the Crown is never conducive to the true dignity of royalty. It is not willingly borne from a powerful ruler ; Louis XIV. and greater men than he, were never forgiven for saying that the ruler was the state and *vice versa*, and a feeble and effeminate King should never have adopted such language.

Parliament did not long keep him waiting for an answer. On the 18th of December, the royal declaration was followed by a declaration of Parliament, which stated that "the liberties, franchises, privileges, and jurisdictions of Parliament are the ancient and undoubted birthright and inheritance of the subjects of England, and the making and maintenance of laws, and redress of mischiefs and grievances, which daily happen within this realm, are proper subjects and matter of counsel and debate in Parliament, and that in the handling and proceeding of those businesses, every member of the House hath, and of right ought to have, freedom of speech to propound, treat, reason, and bring to conclusion the same : that the Commons in Parliament have like liberty and freedom to propound, treat, reason, and bring to conclusion the same : that the Commons in Parliament have like liberty and freedom to treat of these matters in such order as in their judgments shall seem fittest, and that every such member of the said House hath like freedom from all impeachment, imprisonment, and molestation (other than by the censure of the House itself), for or concerning any bill, speaking, reasoning, or declaring of any matter or matters touching the Parliament or Parliament business ; and that if any of the said members be complained of, and questioned for anything said or done in Parliament, the same is to be showed to

the King, by the advice and assent of all the Commons assembled in Parliament, before the King give credence to any private information." \*

The first collision between absolute and constitutional monarchy had taken place at a time when the first only seemed to have any prospect of existence. Unlimited royal power had everywhere gained the ascendancy, partly in connection with, partly in opposition to the Reformation. In Spain, Italy, and Austria, the Inquisition had helped to establish ecclesiastical and temporal absolutism, in the Protestant German states, and the Scandinavian countries, on the contrary, the fall of a powerful state Church had raised a powerless monarchy to dignity and importance; in France, the first strong government which extricated the country from the confusion of the religious wars, allowed the ancient States-General to fall quietly into oblivion; nowhere were voices raised like those in England.

The conflict which arose in England in 1621, was in itself an anomaly in the universal tendencies of the age; but the protest of Parliament was the announcement of a spirit diametrically opposed to traditionary usage.

King James was furious. He immediately went to London, went down to the House with his privy councillor, summoned the secretary with the journal book, with his own hand tore out the protest, and had his own motion inserted in its place. The House was then dissolved, the chief leaders of the opposition committed to prison; others, like John Savill, taken into the King's service.

This mode of action laid bare the weakness of a King who imagined he could annihilate with a leaf out of the journal book what could not be erased from history, nor from the hearts of the people.

A contest had begun which was not to end till the throne of the Stuarts was in ruins.

THE SPANISH MARRIAGE.—BUCKINGHAM AND THE PRINCE OF WALES.—CHANGE OF ENGLISH POLICY.—DEATH OF JAMES, 1625.

Meanwhile, the King was overwhelmed with complications on the Continent. He had asked Parliament for money to save at least the Count-Palatine's hereditary possessions, but by failing to fulfil his promises he had

caused the unfortunate Elector to lose even them. The Emperor had dethroned him and made over the vacant dignity to Bavaria. The English nation was deeply affected by this blow. The King had acted throughout the whole transaction with incredible weakness and want of character, and as we now see by the despatches, had also been disgracefully deceived, together with the English nation, who regarded the cause of the Palatinate as their own.

James's weakness in this business was connected with a favourite scheme, which he did not give up till he had drunk the cup of ignominy to the dregs. His reverence for the family politics of the Hapsburgs, their method of governing, and their conception of sovereign dignity, led to an eager desire to unite his dynasty with theirs by a marriage, and in the success of this project, which after the events of 1587-8 was quite unlikely to be fulfilled, he saw, curiously enough, a solution of all the difficulties which encompassed him. He hoped for weighty support in Spain against his obstreperous Parliament. Spain was to spare him from drawing the sword by helping him in the Palatinate, and the price, without which it appeared as if the alliance was not to be had, toleration of the Catholics; and abolition of the strict parliamentary laws would have furnished him with a check upon the Puritans.

The negotiations dragged on for years. James would not bind himself without distinct promises from Spain, and Spain, with a clearer conception of the divergence between the two states, wished, at all events, to assure herself of the one advantage that England should not take an active part in the war. So the business came to a standstill.

The King and his favourite, Buckingham, then devised what they thought a most ingenious plan of breaking through the meshes of diplomacy. The King had himself, in his youthful days, carried off his bride under difficulties, why should not his son do the same, in true chivalrous fashion?

In the deepest secrecy the Prince of Wales and the Duke of Buckingham set sail for Spain, and appeared at Madrid on 7th March, 1623.

During this singular wooing, which, according to the strict forms of Spanish etiquette could only be carried on at a distance, the negotiations as to the conditions of an agreement assumed a more serious character. In order to gain Spain

over, King James allowed a liberty to the Catholics in England which filled the Protestants with alarm; but Spain was anything but complaisant, and would not agree to the restoration of the Elector Palatine, which with James was the main point. Besides this, Buckingham had a personal quarrel with the representative of this policy, Count Olivarez, and so he persuaded the Prince to a sudden departure.

Buckingham had conducted the whole business with the frivolity of a vain courtier: the report which he now gave of it was made up of lies which found no credence, and truths which proved nothing. It was not then known in London how far Spain had decided to go with the German Hapsburgs, and the future attitude of England towards Spain was very doubtful. It depended on the decision of the King, or the effects of the report of the irritated Buckingham.

But the Parliament of 1624 consented with undisguised pleasure to the communications, which showed that the government was at length giving up this unnatural plan. It agreed to all that Buckingham proposed against Spain; and as the King gave way on several old subjects of dispute, an understanding now took place between the Crown and Parliament which three years before would have seemed impossible.

The King's policy underwent an entire revolution. Instead of a Spanish Infanta, he now desired a French Princess as a daughter-in-law. Instead of an alliance with the Hapsburgs, he now sought to ally himself with their opponents; instead of repulsing Parliament with Stuart haughtiness, he now made advances to it, and agreed with it on all questions, foreign and domestic.

In December, 1624, the marriage treaty was agreed upon between his son and the Princess Henrietta Maria of France. James now entered into the war for the restoration of the Elector Palatine with an unlooked-for zeal, and was preparing for decisive action, when, on the 27th of March, 1625, he died.

## CHAPTER XLIV.

Charles I., 1625-49.—His Character.—The first two Parliaments, 1625-26.—The War with Spain and France.—The third and last Parliament.—The Petition of Right, 1628-9.—Charles I. without a Parliament.—The Earl of Strafford.—Archbishop Laud.—The Star Chamber.—The High Commission.—Ship Money, 1634.—John Hampden's Trial, 1637.

### CHARACTER OF CHARLES I.—THE FIRST TWO PARLIAMENTS.—THE WAR WITH SPAIN AND FRANCE.

JAMES I. was succeeded by his son Charles I., born 1600. His entrance into public life had not been very promising. He had allowed himself to be made a tool of in the Spanish marriage affair, and had covered the untruths of Buckingham's report with the shield of his name. He was, however, a different man from his father. He possessed considerable ability, was well educated, had a talent for shrewd observation, and indisputable adroitness in managing men and things. His characteristics were of that distinguished, winning, yet dignified kind which we consider to belong to a born prince. His appearance was kingly and commanding, and he had nothing of the studied haughtiness of his father, which contrasted so strangely with his slovenly exterior and plebeian habits. Even his enemies allowed that Charles was no common man in the days of his greatest misfortunes.

Without his father's bravado, he was much more daring in action. What to the one was but a flattering theory, was to the other the principle of his life. He was capable of staking his throne and his life on his principles. His father, with all his fine speeches, generally beat a retreat when things began to look serious. Not so his son; he staked everything till his crown and life were lost.

But he was less sincere and honest than his father, whose heart was on his tongue, and when his words and actions did not agree it was rather from weakness than insincerity. Charles knew how to control himself, weighed every word, concealed his thoughts, and was fond of tortuous paths. When he was most flattering and amiable it was necessary to be most on your guard against him. He held insincerity and faithlessness to be allowable in politics, but his home life was exemplary and amiable. A man with this courage and talent, these commanding, and at the same time seductive qualities, was a very different opponent from King James.

The King's first step was to summon a new Parliament, as was customary at the beginning of a reign. The themes of the congratulatory speeches were naturally the inheritance of the late King, the energetic prosecution of the Palatinate war, and the voting of the necessary subsidies. With this exception nothing can be more peaceable than these addresses and replies. Charles speaks with a winning openness and warmth which are quite inspiring. He expresses full confidence that Parliament will support the honour of its sovereign and his subjects, and assures them in writing that the maintenance of the faith of his fathers always has been, and always will be, sacred to him. Parliament replied in the same spirit. On June 22nd a motion was made for a good understanding between King and Parliament, when Rudyard said that "the late distastes between the late King and Parliament were the chief cause of all the miseries of the kingdom, the first turn of which towards a reconciliation was given by the now King, then prince; by which accrued more benefit to the subject than in any Parliament these many hundred years. What may we then expect from him being King, and having power in his own hands? His good natural disposition, his freedom from vice; his travels abroad; his being bred in Parliaments, promised greatly. Therefore he moved to take such course now to sweeten all things between King and people that they may never afterwards disagree." \*

But this frame of mind did not last long. When these ceremonials were over, it was plain to every one that there were questions on which the views of the two parties were by no means agreed, that the King wanted money, and when it was voted would dismiss Parliament in as friendly



a manner as he had greeted it, and Parliament would by no means consent to be used simply for this purpose.

The Commons frustrated the King's tactics, which in themselves were unskilful. It was a more brilliant assembly than any that England had ever seen. The eminent men who afterwards appeared on one side or the other were all in this Parliament. It was one of unusual power, for it had been formed in the period of prosperity and independence, which was the result of Elizabeth's happy reign. The members were mostly wealthy landowners of independent position, and they had very little moral counterpoise in the House of Lords, because James and Charles had committed the great error of making it compliant, but despicable, by making peers of a whole batch of courtiers.

The Commons demanded, before proceeding to vote subsidies, that certain grievances should be put an end to, particularly that a pledge should be given that the strict laws against the Catholics, who were supported by the Queen, should be enforced. A certain royal chaplain, Dr. Montague, had distinguished himself by attacks upon the Puritans, who were numerously represented in Parliament, and the Catholics were the zealous advocates of the Stuart doctrines of absolute royal power and the grace of God, which were abhorrent to the Puritans. It was on this subject that the first differences arose.

The religious fanaticism of the Puritans drove Charles, who was burning with impatience to begin the war, almost to despair. Instead of voting the needful subsidies, the Commons passed a law about the strict observance of the Sabbath, thundered against the Papacy, and petitioned for suspended Puritan preachers. Yet Parliament had consented to the war, and the King was loaded with the debts which his father had been compelled to incur on account of it. The doubtful manner in which Buckingham had employed the English ships had brought the enterprise into disrepute, and greatly increased the number of his personal enemies. The subsidies which Parliament at length granted were so small that the motion was looked upon as a vote of want of confidence, as was also the resolution to vote tonnage and poundage, the most lucrative source of the income of the Crown—it almost amounted to half—for one year only, instead of as formerly for the whole reign.

Parliament was prorogued, ostensibly because the plague rendered residence in London impossible, and convened again at Oxford, a loyal city ; but the sentiments of the Lower House did not improve, although the King had several times urgently begged for speedy grants, in the name of honour, security, and necessity. On the 25th of August, Parliament was dissolved, after a motion had with difficulty been passed in the Upper House voting tonnage and poundage for the whole reign.

In February, 1626, another Parliament was summoned. It met under the impression of an unfortunate expedition to Cadiz, which once more showed that, although the government was eager for war, it had no efficient soldiers. Former scenes were repeated, only increased bitterness was manifested on both sides. The keeper of the great seal, in his opening speech, spoke of the immeasurable distance between the sublime dignity and majesty of a mighty monarch, and the subjection and humility of loyal subjects, called the throne the source of all rights, and the laws the streams and rivulets by which they were conducted to subjects, &c. It seemed to the House as if they were listening to James I. again, only it was more serious, for the son was in earnest with what was mere nonsense with his father. Parliament was ready to grant higher, but still not sufficient subsidies, and not before the abolition of a long list of grievances which were a severe criticism on the whole administration. The Duke of Buckingham was even formally impeached ; but with obvious defiance the King contrived that he should be appointed to the office of Chancellor of the University of Cambridge, just vacated. Parliament was ordered to give up the impeachment, and to grant the money at once on pain of being dissolved. He even threatened them with "new counsels." The threat was soon followed by execution, for Digges and Elliot, the chief accusers of the Duke, were thrown into prison ; but Parliament interfered, and nothing being proved against them, the King was obliged to release them. Instead of intimidating the Commons, he had only produced irritation and bitter feeling. In June, Parliament was dissolved, like the first, after it had solemnly protested against the illegal exaction of tonnage and poundage, and demanded the removal of the hated Buckingham.

The system of force now appeared openly from under

the veil of half-friendly demands and threats, not so plainly as would doubtless have been the case had the King had an army to rely on, but still plainly enough.

Money it was necessary for the King to have at any price ; so, as Parliament refused it, he had recourse to a forced loan.

A Commission was instituted with full powers to raise it ; the Catholic party advised obedience from their pulpits and in printed sermons ; but the Puritans, who were the great majority of the nation, eagerly opposed it ; and in many places the loan was openly refused, with an appeal to ancient national laws. Those who refused were arrested, and the judges who would not pass sentence on them dismissed. The troops who had returned from the unfortunate expedition to Cadiz, were quartered on the contumacious to make them submit ; the support of the lawless soldiery was a new and heavy burden to the whole country. The war, too, which was to justify all these acts of violence, just now took an unfortunate turn.

On the occasion of suing for the hand of the Princess Henrietta Maria for his master, the frivolous Buckingham had dared to enter into an intrigue with the young Queen of France. This excited the anxiety of Richelieu, and when, through Louis XIII., he informed Buckingham that he must not show himself in France again, Buckingham vowed revenge, and persuaded his master to declare war against France, though they were still at war with Spain. With one hundred ships and seven thousand men, Buckingham went to the help of the Huguenots, in La Rochelle, but conducted the enterprise with so absurd a want of skill, that after the loss of two-thirds of his troops he had to return without accomplishing his purpose, covered with shame and disgrace. October, 1627, La Rochelle was lost ; English commerce suffered severely in the war ; British ships were seized ; the foolish enterprise was cursed in every home ; and deep and general discontent prevailed throughout the country.

#### THE THIRD AND THE LAST PARLIAMENT, 1628-29.—THE PETITION OF RIGHT.

Since the dissolution of the last Parliament, the Crown had been getting on as badly as possible. The war, which the King repeatedly, and from conviction, declared to be a

matter of honour for himself and his people, had brought nothing but loss and disgrace ; and the forced loan had sown deep hatred amongst the people, without removing his embarrassments. The scanty results of the forced loan were drained to the dregs, and it was needful once more to look about for a Parliament. Parliament had not been very complaisant even at the beginning of Charles's reign, before he had done anything illegal ; what could be expected from it now after all that had taken place ?

The representatives who assembled in March, 1528, had some of them been themselves imprisoned, almost all had suffered from the loan and the quartering of the troops, and their constituents were deeply embittered by the doings of the government at home and abroad.

The tone in which the King addressed the assembly foreboded no good. As usual, he contented himself with few words, and desired the Commons to do the same, "for tedious consultations at this time are as hurtful as ill resolutions. . . . Every man must now do according to his conscience ; wherefore, if you (which God forbid) should not do your duties in contributing what the State at this time needs, I must, in discharge of my conscience, use those other means which God hath put into my hands to save that which the follies of some particular men may otherwise hazard to lose. Take not this as a threatening, for I scorn to threaten any but my equals."

The keeper of the great seal then added that the King had had recourse to Parliament not from necessity, but as a favour.

The bitterest complaints of the first two Parliaments had related to the King's lukewarmness about the Papists ; but these were now thrown into the shade by grievances of another kind : taxation without consent of Parliament, the forced loan, arrest of members and private persons for refusal to pay unconstitutional imposts, and the quartering of foreign soldiery. There was now an almost revolutionary tone in the speeches. The same Rudyard who three years before, in a speech before the King, had spoken of his distinguished qualities as auguring good for the country, now broke out with the words, "This is the crisis of Parliaments ; by this we shall know whether Parliaments shall live or die ; besides, the eyes of Christendom are upon us—the King and the kingdom will be valued and disvalued

both by enemies and friends, according to the success of this Parliament. The cause why we are called hither is to save ourselves. We are not now upon *bene esse*, we are upon the very *esse* of it, 'whether we shall be a kingdom or no.'"

A very sharp speech was also made by Thomas Wentworth, afterwards Earl Strafford, who had himself been imprisoned for refusing a loan; but—and this points to his secret designs—he makes a great distinction between the King and the guilty advisers by whom he has been misled. Of these he spoke with the greatest bitterness.

In accordance with these sentiments, the first resolution of Parliament was a unanimous protest against arbitrary punishments and forced loans. Then, to conciliate the King, five subsidies were granted him, to his great satisfaction; but before this vote was formally passed, a solemn petition was granted against all grievances with an appeal to the ancient laws of the land. The King did all in his power to frustrate the discussion of this Petition of Right; he threatened to dissolve the House if it was not ready with the grants of money within a certain time. He then gave a solemn promise not to infringe any of the ancient statutes; it was therefore needless to insist on the petition. But it was all in vain. The bill was brought in, and passed both Houses.

The petition professes to be a corroboration and explanation of the ancient constitution of the kingdom; and after reciting various statutes recognising the rights contended for, prays "that no man be compelled to make or yield any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or such like charge, without common consent by Act of Parliament; that none be called upon to make answer for refusal to do so; that freemen be imprisoned or detained only by the law of the land, or by due process of law, and not by the King's special command, without any charge; that persons be not compelled to receive soldiers and mariners into their houses against the laws and customs of the realm; that commissions for proceeding by martial law be revoked."

The petition left the King the choice either of breaking with Parliament, or of declaring, by accepting it, that he had broken the laws of the country, and now consented to their re-instatement.

After many attempts to escape, he took the latter course. By the royal sanction, the Petition of Right became an

authorised interpretation of Magna Charta. In the long contest as to what was the law, the nation had gained the victory.

Nevertheless, there was much discord in this Parliament. The Commons did not desist from making violent attacks on Buckingham, and the contest was continued about tonnage and poundage, since the King would not give it up, and Parliament would not give up control over it. In June, therefore, Parliament was prorogued till January, 1629.

Before it re-assembled an assassination took place, which was regarded by the nation with the same satisfaction as the execution of Mary Stuart. The Duke of Buckingham was murdered by a certain Felton as he was about to embark on another expedition to La Rochelle.

When Parliament met, in 1629, both parties were resolved, unless an agreement could be come to, to declare open war.

In the Commons a protest was at once made against Popery and tonnage and poundage. When the Speaker, in compliance with the royal command, was about to conclude the sitting, in order to prevent the motion from being put to the vote, he was held fast in his seat by some of the zealous Puritans, while other members in vain attempted to liberate him.

Amidst great confusion the protest was carried. A royal official, who was sent down to Parliament on receipt of the news of those proceedings, found the door closed; and when the furious King sent his guard there was nothing to be done, for the sitting was at an end. Charles immediately dissolved Parliament, and in the House of Lords spoke in a very ungracious tone "of some vipers who had deluded many in the Lower House, but had not yet poisoned them." The guilty should not escape punishment.

A royal manifesto declared that all forbearance having been frustrated by the obstinacy of some evil-disposed persons who wanted to set the nation in flames, the King would now be compelled, until it should please him to do otherwise, to reign without a Parliament.

Immediately afterwards ten members of the Lower House were arrested, and condemned to pay fines varying from £500 to £2,000, and to be imprisoned during the King's pleasure. Some of them died in prison, among them Eliot, whose petition for some relaxation of his imprisonment was refused because it was not sufficiently humble.



Thus began the eleven years' reign without a Parliament, and the foundations were laid of the great convulsion in which the throne of the Stuarts was overturned.

CHARLES I. WITHOUT A PARLIAMENT.—THE EARL OF STRAFFORD AND ARCHBISHOP LAUD.

It was Charles's scheme to transplant to England the system which was at that time bearing such brilliant fruits in France; to set aside, as had been done there, the interests of the States, represented by Parliament, and burdensome legal usages, and by an energetic exercise of the royal authority in unison with the sentiments of the masses, to make himself as popular as Richelieu was in France.

The place vacated by Buckingham's death was now filled by a greater man.

Among the members of Parliament in the second decade, together with Pym, Hampden, and Eliot, one of the most gifted speakers was Thomas Wentworth. He represented the extreme opposition, and seemed ready to stake his life for the cause. He entered the Parliament of 1628 as one of those who had been imprisoned for refusing a loan. The vehemence of his demeanour in this assembly was what might be expected from such an experience; but, behold! Charles now gained this man for his minister.

Wentworth was a reckless and energetic party man, but did not possess the faithfulness to conviction which he was given credit for. His pathos was the studied warmth of an advocate, who well knew how to bring out the telling points of his case; but it did not come from his heart. His mind was engrossed with ideas of power and dignity; he had sought them in the paths of opposition; he found them as a minister. The opposition could not have had a more formidable adversary.

He was thoroughly versed in the weaknesses of Parliamentary parties and the arts of debate; he was in every respect well matched with his adversaries, and hated them with the implacability which the renegade feels for his former partizans.

Then, besides his oratorical powers, he possessed the talents of a really great statesman. He was born to command; in whatever he undertook his talents for organization were displayed, and he possessed more courage than most men.

He entirely broke with his past history, and as undaunted



as if no ideas were connected with his name, he appeared as the minister of a system which he had himself condemned, resolved to look all the consequences in the face, and if need were, to stake his life. His system must be condemned, but it must be admitted that he represented it in an imposing style.

His plan was to invest the British monarchy with the same absolute power which the crown possessed in France. A well-organized administration, composed of dependent officials, protected by dependent judges and an efficient standing army, was to supersede the joint government of the States, put down all resistance, but also render needless the interference of Parliament by judicious care for the welfare of the people. An able, well-meaning absolutism was what he aimed at, such as Richelieu had established; but there was this difference: in France the States-General had been overthrown in the confusion of a forty years' civil war, while the parliamentary power in England had not only always been closely in unison with the views of the people, but had acquired fresh strength during recent reigns.

By the side of the Earl of Strafford, stood another man who guided the ecclesiastical re-action of the next ten years. Archbishop Laud was a learned ecclesiastic of strict morals and personally honourable character; he had not the severity and consuming ambition which distinguished Strafford, but he was filled with a peculiar ecclesiastical fanaticism, which was as completely hostile to the sentiments of the strongest religious party in the country as was the unparliamentary government to old English law.

The element of ancient Catholicism which the Anglican Church had retained, and which the Puritans wished to efface, had obtained the ascendant in his weak head. He was possessed with ceremonial whims and theological absurdities, and tried to smuggle a number of hierarchical fancies into Anglicanism.

In Laud's narrow mind an episcopal ambition was concealed, which, not content with the consecration of new ceremonies and such comparatively innocent whims, was continually reminding the people that in the Church as well as the State, they had to obey an absolute will which plainly leaned towards a gradual Catholic restoration. The best hopes were entertained at Rome; the Jesuits held up their heads; and the court lady who went over to Catholicism at

once, because she did not wish to disappear "in the great crowd" of those who would follow, Laud at their head, hit, with all her frivolity, upon just the right expression for the sentiments of the great majority of the nation, if not exactly for the actual state of things, for Laud could scarcely be called a Papist.

This twofold re-action was too much for England. It is possible that Strafford's system might have achieved a certain success, but the people would not bear this perpetual challenge to their national sentiments by religious and ecclesiastical chicanery. The favoured clergy were playing a hazardous game. They had completely adopted the part of trainbearers to the novel absolutism; they advocated this breach of the constitutional law in sermons and pamphlets, they had a justification ready for every arbitrary act, and openly proclaimed that an episcopal canon was of more weight than all parliamentary laws, and that any ecclesiastical decree was sufficient to overthrow them.

This ecclesiastical and secular re-action had in its power, two tribunals, the Star Chamber and the High Commission, and fearful weapons they were.

The first was an extraordinary tribunal, which had existed from ancient times, and had been set up in periods of distress occasioned by internal party struggles. Under Henry VII. it had been recognised by Act of Parliament, but it was opposed to the spirit of Magna Charta, because government officials, not judges, had seats in it.

The Star Chamber was the powerful organ of an administrative justice, which was only to be called into use in exceptional cases, but it had power to decide questions relating to the property, liberty, and life of any Englishman without responsibility or right of appeal. It could be proved that this court had constantly exercised its functions, especially under Elizabeth, but it now assumed a state of activity such as had never been known before. It was not defined by any law what was or was not under the jurisdiction of this court, and English legal historians are not themselves agreed about it. It was generally understood that forgery, perjury, riot, maintenance, fraud, libel, and conspiracy\* were amenable to it. These were just the crimes connected with politics.

The Star Chamber had been borne with, because it had

\* Hallam, ii. 105.

been employed, especially by Elizabeth, with moderation, and in times when revolt and conspiracies of the most dangerous kind were common; a Government which had the great majority of the nation on its side, did not lose popularity by summary proceedings against a common foe.

The difference between the practice of Elizabeth and Charles I. was this, that under Charles the jurisdiction of this court was increased to such an extent, that the Englishman's chartered right not to be deprived of his natural judges became almost illusory, and that the people saw innocent persecuted patriots, and not criminals in the opponents of this government.

The proceedings of the Star Chamber were all the more detested as their obvious design was to enrich the King's treasury in a discreditable manner. For trifling offences, besides imprisonment, and the loss of both ears, a fine of several thousand pounds was inflicted, half of which fell to the King, even when he was in no way personally concerned. Those especially who opposed the many arbitrary imposts were brought before the Star Chamber. Thus, in 1632, a wine tax was in favour, and when the wine merchants refused it, the sale of the necessities of life to them was forbidden by the Star Chamber until they agreed to lend the King £6,000, and there were many similar cases.

What the Star Chamber was for Strafford, the High Commission was for Laud; neither was this a new thing, but had existed under Elizabeth, as an ecclesiastical court for the punishment of those who were considered heretics by the State Church.

Under Elizabeth, Papists and Independents, the heretics to the right and left of Anglicanism had been cited before it, and the latter especially, on account of their political contumacy, had received severe punishments. This was now carried further and further. The enigmatical position of Laud between Catholicism and Protestantism occasioned the same uncertainty as to what was the true and the false faith as had existed under Henry VIII.; trivial expressions by persons in private life sufficed to incur severe punishment. This part of the system also had a hateful fiscal character; fines were heavy and frequent, and the court even allowed its severity to be bought off. While indepen-

dents and even lukewarm Anglicans were laid under contribution with the greatest severity, the Catholics bought their greater freedom by heavy payments.

Apart from Laud's whimsical perversities, there was a strict unity of purpose in Strafford's unparliamentary government. The government was better administered than it had been for a long time, the court was a pattern of citizen-like simplicity, and only hated by the Puritans because it had not renounced all gaiety ; on the whole, intelligent care was exercised for the interests of the country and the prosperity of the masses ; the taxes imposed had not received the consent of Parliament, but the Puritans who ruled Parliament had enemies enough, and the Catholics, of whom there were not a few, fared better than in previous reigns. The resistance of the courts became more feeble ; individuals did indeed protest, but they paid in the end, and among the officials and ecclesiastics a school had arisen who willingly consented to the royal absolutism. In short, Strafford's determined but consistent energy had effected that things were borne which a few years before would scarcely have been thought credible.

To crown this edifice one thing was wanting, a standing army. The ship money was to serve to create this.

Ship money was a tax imposed for the equipment of ships which in ancient times were required to protect the coasts. It had always been an extraordinary war tax, mainly devoted to the maintenance of the fleet, and had been chiefly raised from the inhabitants of the maritime towns. But it was now to be changed into a general standing tax, not only to maintain the fleet, but also a standing army, and all this without consent of Parliament.

In spite of the submissive spirit which had been shown, it was feared that a time might come when the people's patience might suddenly come to an end, and in this case the Government would be quite defenceless without a standing army. Even the Continental states, which had never known anything like the English Parliament or Magna Charta, could not dispense with this safeguard of absolutism, how much less the English imitation of it, which had had but so short-lived an existence ! The standing army was to be the key-stone of the new monarchy. Even under Henry VIII. and Elizabeth no one had ventured to deny that such a tax could not be imposed without consent

of Parliament. That it was ventured upon now shows how far things had already gone.

The ship money was raised, and borne, though not without murmurs. Strafford thought he had conquered; only a few years of peace, he wrote from Ireland, and the nation would become accustomed to the Government, and the King would be a more powerful ruler than any of his forefathers. He thought the people would forget what they had once called their rights, and become accustomed to be ruled like the other nations of Europe. There certainly was a danger of this; and that it might not become overwhelming, a courageous man determined to give an example.

The English revere the memory of John Hampden, who, at a time of discouragement and hopelessness, ventured to stand up for the infringed laws of Parliament.

To forestall all opposition, the King had procured a sort of formal confirmation of his rights. He had laid before the judges whether he was not justified in imposing this tax in case of necessity, for the protection of the empire, and whether it was not for him alone to decide the question of necessity, and the judges, like faithful echoes, had answered him as he wished. It was high time, in this state of universal subjection, that the voice of an independent man should interpose.

John Hampden was not a man of brilliant talent like Strafford. He had but seldom spoken during the many years that he had sat in the House of Commons; but he was known there as a man of inviolable faithfulness to his convictions. They might be erroneous; but he was ready to seal them with his death. But he was by no means a revolutionary agitator, nor yet a Puritan zealot. He refused to pay the pittance of 20s. for ship money that was allotted to him, and appealed to the ancient laws of the country. He was put on his trial, which was just what he wished. If he lost his cause for himself, it would not be lost for his country; the public conscience would at last be roused, and this would be a great gain.

Hampden's trial (1637) excited great attention. The judges of the Star Chamber were uneasy—even their consciences pricked them; the majority by which he was finally convicted was very small, and it was not doubtful which side was the gainer in public opinion. Men began to talk once more, and with fresh excitement, of the forgotten

rights of old England, called to mind all their conflicts with the arrogance of the Stuarts; morally, the Government had already forfeited all the results of its exertions.

This was all, however, that was attained. The Government continued to raise the tax and to make military preparations. With many, the conviction of Hampden was a reason for renouncing all idea of resistance, seeing that in his case it had failed.

Even Hampden is said at this time to have given up all hope that things would mend. In fact, if he thought that his trial would be a signal for general resistance, he was entirely mistaken. It is said that he had resolved to seek a home beyond the sea with his then unknown relative, Thomas Cromwell, but that the Government was guilty of the unwise cruelty of refusing them permission. If such men were thinking of turning their backs upon their country in despair, their cause must have seemed hopeless indeed.

A year afterwards an important change had taken place in the situation. Complications arose which rendered the realisation of hopes which had seemed totally improbable more likely, and once more it was the unfortunate endeavour to bring about a reaction in minor ecclesiastical matters which occasioned the storm.

## CHAPTER XLV.

### THE TURN OF EVENTS.

**The Complications in Scotland, 1637-39.**—The Tumult at Edinburgh. —The Covenant, 1638.—The General Assembly at Glasgow, November, 1638.—The Fourth Parliament, 1640.—The Long Parliament.—First Measures against the Policy and Representatives of Strafford's System.—Indictment, Trial, and Execution of Strafford, May, 1641.

**COMPLICATIONS IN SCOTLAND.—TUMULT AT EDINBURGH.**  
—THE COVENANT, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE RETREAT OF CHARLES, AND THE FOURTH PARLIAMENT.  
APRIL, 1640.

**B**EFORE Charles I. learnt to make Scotland a counterpoise to England, and to keep one nation in check by means of the other, he had regarded Scotland as an English province which would submit to regulations common to the two countries with a better grace than England. This arose from a great misunderstanding of their relations with each other.

The Scotch nobles, with their extensive possessions, and great power over submissive vassals, could much more easily than the English resolve upon armed resistance to the crown; and during the minority of James they had become very unruly. Together with this overbearing aristocracy there was a clergy, who since the time of Knox had been filled with almost republican ideas of self-government. The two foes, therefore, of the king's autocracy in England were even more powerful and more dangerous in Scotland.

What course did Charles take in order to control them? He attempted to put the country into the power of a highly privileged state church, to intrust the highest offices in the state to a number of prelates, who were to keep the nobles and the Presbyterians in check by the same means and on



the same principles as those employed by Laud and his party in England. One archbishop was made Chancellor, nine bishops composed the privy council, prelates were in the treasury and in the highest courts. This gave great offence to the ambitious nobles, and occasioned great excitement among the inferior clergy who ruled the masses.

Instead of liberty of preaching, which was the usage, strict episcopal jurisdiction was introduced; instead of synods, presbyteries, and all sorts of other civic and ecclesiastical liberties, prelatical despotism was to be the order of the day; the existing state of things had prevailed for thirty years; the system which was now to replace it, and had partially replaced it under James I., implied a complete revolution, the worst of which was still unknown, and all this was the work of "Popery," the very sound of which made the Presbyterian blood boil.

Ever since 1635, when the canons respecting the judicial authority of the bishops were proclaimed, an ominous uneasiness was observable; but when the catholicising liturgy was introduced, which had given so much offence in England, the outbreak took place.

When divine service was performed for the first time in July, 1637, in the Cathedral of Edinburgh, according to the hated method, a noisy mob rushed in, exclaiming, "A pope, a pope! Antichrist, stone him!" they threw chairs at the bishop, insulted the clergy, and, after being with difficulty turned out, they filled the whole city with scenes of tumult, and the bishops scarcely escaped being stoned on their way home.

There was no European country where the masses were so ruled by Calvinism as in Scotland, but the indignation which showed itself in these stormy scenes surprised both friends and foes. The whole nation made the cause of the mob its own. Balaam's ass, as it was said in every pulpit, was otherwise a stupid beast, but, to the astonishment of everybody, the Lord loosed his tongue.

Charles remained firm to his purpose in spite of all representation; he proclaimed an amnesty, but declared at the same time that he hoped for ready submission to the liturgy, and so that took place which was now inevitable. Representatives of the greater and lesser nobles, the clergy, and the towns, met together and formed a provisional government, which found willing obedience throughout the country, and signed a covenant against any religious innovations, "To the

greater glory of God and the salvation of their King and country." The whole nation joined in it without distinction of age, rank, or sex; even the highest nobles did not hold back, for they feared that they should be left in complete isolation if they did not follow the stream. This was the famous Covenant of the 1st of March, 1638.

The King was compelled to give way, for he stood without an army, between two nations—one of which was in a state of discontent, the other in open rebellion. The way in which he retreated, step by step, from the growing demands of the Scotch, showed that he was only succumbing to necessity and betrayed his real weakness. Of all the modes of settlement proposed by Charles, the only one accepted was a General Assembly, which he hoped to be able to turn to his own purposes, but at its first meeting it almost openly proclaimed revolution.

Amidst a vast concourse, the General Assembly was opened at Glasgow, on November 21st, 1638. After the previous experience of the Royal Commissioner, Hamilton, the spirit of the proceedings might easily have been foreseen. The first act of the assembly was to bring an accusation against all the bishops, of heresy, simony, bribery, perjury, deceit, bloodshed, adultery, fornication, drunkenness, gaming, sabbath-breaking, &c. When the bishops protested, the Royal Commissioner dissolved the assembly for going beyond its province; it met again, and declared the episcopal power, the high commissioners, the canons, the liturgy, everything, in short, which the last two Stuarts had re-introduced into the Scotch Church, null and void.

The King now seemed to intend to resort to arms. A fine army of 20,000 foot, 6,000 horse, supported by a fleet manned by 3,000 men, was raised, and was to summon the rebels into the field again, when Charles suddenly changed his mind. The fear of a revolt in his rear, the conviction that he was not strong enough to subdue two nations, one only of which was at least a match for his troops, caused him to turn round. He yielded to the Scots, conceded all that the General Assembly had demanded, and was disposed again to try an English Parliament, which should grant him the means for a war with Scotland, a fatal step, for if it failed it was sure to result in just what he wished to avoid. It was certain that the Scots would remain under arms, and probable that the English would begin to defend themselves.

For ten years the laws of the land had been set at defiance. It was only the difficulty with Scotland which had caused them to be respected again. The cause of Scotland was also the cause of the English opposition. What could be expected from a Parliament assembled under such circumstances?

The fourth Parliament of the reign of Charles I. was opened on the 13th of April.

The King had generally been in a great hurry to ask for money, and this time he could not brook the least delay. "Never," he said "has a king had more serious and urgent need to appeal to his people than I at this moment." On account of a letter having been intercepted from some Scotch lords to the King of France, the Lord Keeper, Finch, demanded the means for a campaign against the Scotch traitors, which was to take place during the summer of the same year, but the urgency of these appeals contrasted strangely with the inevitable assurance that the Parliament owed the honour of being called together solely to the paternal favour of the most just, most religious, and most gracious of princes. With this exception, the speech was as gracious as the former ones, and contained besides, the assurance that the grievances should be redressed—if the subsidies were first granted.

Parliament was not taken in by this. It now comprised members who especially condemned the system of Strafford and Laud. Even those who, compared with the Puritans, might be called Royalists, were now in the opposition. They afterwards separated, but at that time there was but one party in the assembly, and it abhorred the existing régime.

It is highly interesting to watch the proceedings of this short Parliament, to observe how indignation at the abuses of the last eleven years now found expression. Even had the House been disposed to suppress these sentiments, the petitions that poured in from the counties would not have permitted them to be silent.

The first words uttered in the House were an evidence of the state of feeling. A Mr. Grimstone declared that the Scotch business was an evil without, while there was another within their own House which deeply affected them all. The commonweal was shamefully trodden underfoot, their property and liberties attacked, the Church divided, the

Gospel and its followers persecuted, and the country swarmed with greedy caterpillars, the worst of all Egyptian plagues, &c.

Pym then rose : he was one of the most eminent speakers of the opposition ; a Puritan in his religious opinions, and now beginning to adopt their political principles. In a speech of three hours he described the distressed state of the nation. He divided the sins of the Government into three groups. In the first, he included the infringements of the liberties and privileges of Parliament during the last eleven years ; in the second, the religious innovations ; in the third, the charges on property. But in all three it was his wish to maintain the great prerogative of the Crown, that "the King can do no wrong." In a pregnant and comprehensive speech, everything that had occurred was reviewed, from the treatment of the last Parliament to the latest acts of violence. It formed a complete bill of indictment against the system of the past eleven years ; nothing was omitted.

The House next moved for a report of the proceedings against certain members of Parliament, and appointed a committee upon the infringement of the privileges of Parliament, and all other grievances collectively.

The King urged that the subsidies should be granted first, and the grievances discussed afterwards. Flattering assurances were given about the ship-money, tonnage and poundage, &c., but it was resolved that the grievances should have the precedence. Pym's classification was adopted, and they were communicated to the Lords. They were for granting the subsidies first, but the Commons adhered to their resolution, and after being repeatedly urged in vain to depart from it by the King, both Houses were dissolved.

It was the fourth Parliament which Charles had dissolved, and it was the last. The next was to put an end to his reign.

Parliament had revealed the helpless isolation of the King. By that speech of Pym's the whole character of the system was laid bare to the country. Every individual had, indeed, had complaints to make, but with the then scanty press they had been individual grievances. It was Pym who had first given an exhaustive description of the state of things from these abundant materials, and a fearful bill of

indictment it was which was now circulated through the country in newspapers, pamphlets, and speeches.

Compelled by events in Scotland once more to summon a Parliament, the King had now committed the gravest error. He had inspired the hopeless with courage, fatally embittered the irritated, and given them by his own acts a handle for a fearful agitation.

THE LONG PARLIAMENT.—FIRST MEASURES AGAINST THE POLICY AND REPRESENTATIVES OF STRAFFORD'S SYSTEM.  
—NOVEMBER, 1640, TO SEPTEMBER, 1641.

The King's resources were now on the decline. By a final effort the courtiers and Catholic priests whom the King had enriched at the expense of the country were compelled to submit to a loan, and the campaign against the Scots was begun. They were already on the frontier when the Royalists advanced. Amidst perpetual assurances of loyalty—they only came to lay their wishes personally at the King's feet—their splendid army crossed the Tweed, and routed the vanguard of the Royalists on the first attack, so that the whole army fell into a panic. The money was soon exhausted, the soldiers mutinied, and the King lost courage. Strafford tried in vain to inspirit him and to persuade him to a rapid advance which should decide everything. He was already thinking of negotiating, and a last attempt to help himself by a House of submissive peers having failed, he again summoned Parliament.

This was the remarkable assembly called the Long Parliament. It survived the kingdom of the Stuarts, resisted another powerful government, was several times condemned to death and called together again; its history is inseparable from the general course of English politics to the Restoration. It was incontestably the most important representation that the people had ever had. Not that there were no weak elements in it—vacillation and indecision were not wanting in its attitude; but it carried on the contest with absolutism with great energy at a time when it was triumphing in the whole of Europe, without exception, and it afterwards gave Cromwell plenty to do. It was now in its prime; it ruled England for several years, was dispersed by Charles, but rose up again over his grave. In its debates we do not find a single voice raised for his

system ; all the men were in it who led the subsequent movement.

At the time of its assembling the whole situation already bore a revolutionary character, not of the wild and noisy sort that prevailed in France—it never came to a mobocracy—partly because the middle class enjoyed more confidence, and had retained more independence, partly because the Revolution was early under military control, and a Cromwell, statesman and soldier in one person, was utterly wanting in France ; but excited passions, stormy meetings, stirring sermons were not wanting in England any more than in France, there was even a spice of terrorism. Woe would have been to him who ventured openly to oppose Parliament and its adherents. The press worked upon the masses by means of sermons, pamphlets, and speeches, and London, now a powerful city, headed the movement.

The Long Parliament was ready with a decisive and systematic attack, not only on the system and its abuses, but also on the representatives of the policy of the last eleven years. It was stormed with petitions and complaints against the numberless abuses of the administration, and again Pym passed them systematically under review ; but it was clearly seen that nothing could be accomplished without the severest measures against the originators of all this evil. Laud, Secretary Windebank, Finch, keeper of the great seal, and inventor of the ship money, were accused of high treason, and were ordered to be arrested, as well as the judges who had been subservient to them, and the lords were powerless to prevent it. Finch and Windebank escaped, Strafford was in Ireland, Laud could do nothing ; the King found himself already forsaken by his advisers. In this helpless situation, he was obliged to give his sanction to a bill which limited his power of arbitrarily summoning and dismissing Parliament. This was the Triennial Act. Up to this time there had been no definite regulation on the subject. It was now settled that a new Parliament must be called every three years, and that no Parliament could be dissolved without its own consent before the fiftieth day.

As a matter of course, this put an end to the old contests about tonnage and poundage, forest-right, &c. The abolition of the Star Chamber and the High Commission was also the natural result of the general tendencies of



Parliament. They even went further, and proposed to decimate the representation of bishops in the Upper House, and to reconstitute it altogether, and thus to rob the King of his last support.

#### TRIAL OF STRAFFORD, MAY, 1641.

Amidst these agitated debates occurred the trial of Strafford. While the storm was brewing in Parliament against Laud, Finch, and Windebank, the most dangerous and guilty of all the King's advisers was lord-deputy of Ireland, where he was trying to save what might yet be saved. His idea was to hold his position in Ireland as long as possible, and thence, aided by the national hatred of the Catholic Irish against the Anglicans, to prepare a favourable and perhaps decisive diversion for the monarchy. He therefore advised the King not to recall him, and, at all events, not to summon him to London. I am not of opinion that it was care for his personal safety which induced him to give this advice, but rather that, if there was still any way of escape, these were the right tactics for the King, hedged in as he was by two rebellious kingdoms to endeavour to secure the support of the third, and to make it the seat of a counter movement. It was soon to be shown that to summon Strafford to London was the very worst thing he could do.

Very early during the session an indictment against him was carried by a committee of both Houses, and the King commanded his presence in London. In Ireland, with the army, he might still have served the King; but before Parliament the cause of both would be lost. But the King insisted. He promised that not a hair of Strafford's head should be hurt, though he could no longer insure his own safety. It was a fatal mistake to expose his faithful minister to the fury of Parliament, and Strafford's last words expressed the suspicion that the King intended to sacrifice him. I do not say this; but it was in the highest degree imprudent to sacrifice the only friend he had in the three kingdoms.

Strafford had scarcely arrived in London when the storm broke over him. Pym made a long speech, to show that in the abuses of the previous eleven years there had been a systematic attempt to destroy the ancient rights of the country, and to exchange its chartered liberties for a



modern despotism. And who was the originator of the scheme? The King? By no means. With a certain irony he still held to the dogma, that the King can do no wrong. He then went on to say that though, doubtless, many evil counsellors had worked together, one could be mentioned who took the foremost place in guilt among the betrayers of the country. This was the Earl of Strafford.

Then follows a long list of sins, in which, according to the fashions of the time, the blemishes of private life by no means occupy the lowest place.

Strafford arrived too late to occupy his seat in the House of Lords, and to prevent the passing of the Bill. When he appeared it had already passed, and he had to listen to the indictment on his knees, and then to go as a State prisoner to the Tower. Not a voice was raised in his favour. Falkland only, his personal enemy, gave a warning against hasty and irregular proceedings.

The trial before the House of Lords did not begin till March, 1641. The accusation of high treason was more easily made than proved. There was no doubt as to what constituted high treason according to English law; but the ordinary conception of it did not agree with the accusations against Strafford. According to a statute of Edward III., high treason was an injury to the King, his person, family, or authority; but there was nothing about an attempt to upset the fundamental laws of the country. The other accusations against him were of a number of separate crimes which could not be construed into high treason against the country.

It was upon this weakness of the indictment that his masterly defence was based.

He spoke not only with the power of an orator of the first rank, he exhibited the repose and confidence of a clear conscience: he conducted his case as if not he, but his accusers, were guilty of distorting and wishing to overthrow the laws of the land, and he also struck those chords which touch the feelings. It was only for the sake of his children whom he held by the hand, he said in conclusion, that he had so long claimed their lordships' attention. He awaited a just sentence, and commended his soul to heaven.

The effect of this speech was so powerful, as is testified even by his opponents, that the Commons doubted whether the Lords would find him guilty. They immediately

resolved upon an exceptional measure. If there was a gap in the laws, Parliament had power to fill it up. This was done by bringing in a Bill of Attainder, which was carried by a large majority. A Bill of Attainder declared him who was affected by it to be beyond the law. It had often been adopted under Henry VIII., but only as a weapon of despotism and lawless power. By such a law Strafford was condemned, and suffered death on the 11th of May.

He met death with the composure and resolution of a martyr in a holy cause. Without bitterness he requested the King to ratify the sentence, and only when it was done he exclaimed, "Put not your trust in princes, nor in the sons of men, for in them there is no salvation."

## CHAPTER XLVI.

### OPEN BREACH BETWEEN THE KING AND PARLIAMENT.\*

The King in Scotland, August, 1641.—Massacre of the Protestants in Ireland.—Return of Parliament in October, and the Separation of Parties into Cavaliers and Roundheads.—The Great Remonstrance, November, and the unsuccessful *Coup d'Etat*, January 3 and 4, 1642.—Commutations in London.—The First Parliamentary Army.—Departure of the King.—Return of Parliament, January 11, 1642.

THE KING IN SCOTLAND ; THE MASSACRE IN IRELAND.—  
RETURN OF PARLIAMENT.—CAVALIERS AND ROUND-  
HEADS.

ROBBED of his last weapons of defence, the King hoped to break the force of the storm by prudent temporising, to subjugate his adversaries by causing divisions among them, and, having secured breathing time in one place, to make himself master of another.

While the Commons, elated by their late success, were proceeding to effect radical changes in Church and State, to overthrow the episcopal constitution in the one, and to limit the royal power in the other, so as to render it completely impotent, Charles had a grand scheme for ridding himself of all his oppressors.

He informed Parliament that he should go in person to Scotland, to bring about a reconciliation between the two countries. His idea was to effect a separation between the causes of the two countries, to re-establish in the north the

\* Forster, Debates of the Great Remonstrance, November and December, 1641; London, 1860. The same, Arrest of the Five Members by Charles I. History of the Rebellion, by Werth, from authentic materials, chiefly from Clarendon. Review of it by Forques "Revue des deux Mondes;" April, 1861, and February, 1862. (The following representation is mainly based upon this.)

royal authority, of which he was so destitute in the south, to gain a strong party among the discontented, and especially the royalist nobles of the army just dismissed, and to collect proofs of high treason against his enemies.

At his desire, Parliament prorogued itself till his return, but amidst circumstances which plainly indicated great discontent. Before separating, both Houses formed a committee, of which Pym was president. Another committee was to accompany the King to Scotland.

In the middle of August, Charles appeared in Scotland. Men's minds were taken by storm. No native king had ever been so popular as was this same Charles, against whom they had just taken the field.

Peace was soon made ; but, at what a price ! Charles relinquished nearly all the crown rights that he had yet to lose. It was not surprising that the Scots should demand the Triennial Bill, since it had received the King's sanction in England, but the right was also granted to the Scotch Parliament at the end of every session to determine when and where the next should be held. It was also to nominate all the King's ministers, judges, and officers of State, and he had at once to submit to see his adherents superseded in the public offices by his opponents. He even loaded with honours and pensions the Presbyterian ministers whom he could never hope to gain for his cause, and felt himself rewarded when the leaders promised never to interfere in the ecclesiastical affairs of England.

While this reconciliation was going on a fearful revolt broke out in Ireland, which showed what Strafford had been doing there.

One of the most serious accusations against Strafford had been his despotism as governor of Ireland. It was supposed, therefore, that as a matter of course, with his fall the harsh government by which he had coerced the country, and made its resources and troops available to England, would cease. Ireland claimed the same rights that had been granted to England and Scotland, but, as things were, this would have produced absolute anarchy, and this was taken advantage of by the old Catholic party for waging a cruel war of revenge against the English Protestants in Ireland.

The Catholic Irish formed five-sixths of the population, the other sixth being English colonists, and under Strafford's

iron rule, the former had enjoyed a certain toleration of their faith, and might have expected the same from Charles and his Catholicising system. But they could not look for it from the nearly all-powerful Puritans; from them they could but expect the oft-threatened extermination of "Popery." To add to this, there was the ancient national hatred, and the memory of the revenge on the Ulster rebels, whose enormous possessions had, under James I., been conferred on thousands of English and Scotch immigrants. A horrible massacre of the Protestants now took place by the fanatical Catholics. The project had been formed in the deepest secrecy, and many thousands of the unsuspecting English were murdered almost in their sleep. The barbarous cruelties by which this massacre was accompanied, and which were inflicted by men, women, and even children, are enough to make one's hair stand on end. The lowest figure at which the number of victims is reckoned is forty thousand.

The Irish rebels declared that they were fighting for throne and altar, Pope and King. Even apart from these declarations, Charles's enemies gave him credit for having instigated the revolt. It was known that he wished to have employed the Scots against Parliament; it was known that he made all manner of attempts to draw the Royalists in Parliament over to his cause, to destroy the leaders of the opposition—why should he disdain to bring the Irish into the field against them also?

We can say almost to a certainty that this supposition was false. For a conspiracy of this sort projected by the King himself, a more favourable moment would certainly have been chosen; and if support from this quarter had been looked for, the conduct of the conspiracy would have been committed to such a man as Strafford, not to such persons as Phelim O'Neale or Roger More, whose loyalty could by no means be relied on.

Pym, the watchful president of the committee, had taken care to guard Parliament against Royalist intrigues. In spite of Charles's great caution, Pym was informed by Hampden of all his proceedings, and the report which he made to Parliament when it reassembled, on October 20th, was so serious, that it was resolved at once to place London in a state of siege, and to guard both Houses by train-bands night and day. This was an obvious interference with the prerogative of the crown; but this was dexterously dis-

guised, by devolving the command on the popular Earl of Essex, who had been intrusted by the King with this office during his absence. A member, then unknown, but who excited attention by his vehemence, Oliver Cromwell, proposed to call out all the militia of the kingdom for the defence of the country—the germ of the Parliamentary army, which he was afterwards to lead.

A further step was taken. The King was petitioned to dismiss his evil counsellors; otherwise Parliament, in spite of its loyalty, would be compelled to take measures for its own security and that of Ireland. By his evil counsellors were meant Hyde, Colepepper, Falkland, and others, who had formerly led the attack against Strafford's system, but were now on the King's side.

This throws a strong light upon the party divisions which during the six weeks' prorogation had taken place in the previously compact mass. Against the Star Chamber, the High Commission, tonnage and poundage, Parliament had stood together like one man. There had also been an overwhelming majority in favour of the security and increase of the privileges of Parliament; and even amongst the members, about sixty, who had voted against the Bill of Attainder against Strafford, those who were now to show that the race of Strafford was by no means extinct, were not found.

But now two hostile parties confronted each other, and on all decisive questions there was but a small majority and a very strong minority; these were the Cavaliers and Roundheads.

The one party consisted mainly of all the Catholics in the country, who sought in the regal power a support against the radicalism of the Puritans—the superior clergy, and the royalist majority of the aristocracy; the other consisted of the rigid Protestants in town and country, to whom religious and political liberty was one and the same thing. The one party wished to quell the agitation, so soon as the most necessary concessions were obtained; the other would not be satisfied so long as the King and popery retained the least power to infringe the laws of the land, or to restrict religious liberty.

There was as yet no Cromwell at the head of the latter party, but moderate men such as Hampden, Holles, and Pym. Pym's standpoint on the Church question is shown

by his confession of faith in the short Parliament in April, 1640. He said, "I desire not to have any new laws made against them (the Catholics), nor a strict execution of the old ones, but only so far forth as tends to the safety of his Majesty. There can be no security from Papists but in their disability. Laws will not restrain them, oaths will not; the Pope dispenseth with both, and his command acts them against the realm, in spirituals and in temporals, *ad spiritualia*."

His opinions about the royal authority were precisely the same. After all their bitter experience it was needful to erect strong defences against the abuse of it, in spite of Magna Charta and the Petition of Right.

#### THE GREAT REMONSTRANCE AND THE UNSUCCESSFUL COUP D'ETAT; NOVEMBER, 1641, TO JANUARY, 1642.

These parties were most strongly opposed to each other, when it was proposed by Pym and his adherents that a great remonstrance should be addressed to the King, but it was in reality intended to be an appeal from Pym to the people.

In a lengthy and systematic document, of not less than 206 paragraphs, Pym drew up a list of all the grievances under the rule of Charles I.; and on the other hand detailed the exertions of Parliament on behalf of English liberties, so that the country should be in the possession of documents which should enable it to judge between the King and the people's representatives. It is noteworthy that Pym now seems to have renounced the principle that the King can do no wrong, and had adopted the idea of his personal responsibility. The tactics of the Royalists, and especially of their recent accessions, were to make this question the battle-ground of debate, and to measure the strength of parties; every inch of ground was sharply contested, single propositions, single words even, were warmly debated for hours, every pretext for delay of the motion was eagerly seized upon, as if it were possible to starve the enemy by endless debates. This struggle lasted from the 9th to the 20th of November. Men's passions were naturally heated red hot. When the arrest of members of Parliament came to be discussed, Pym exclaimed, "Eliot's blood still cries for revenge," and the Commons rose and repeated, "His blood cries for revenge."



As the Remonstrance could neither be suppressed nor weakened, the royalists tried to effect that the King only should receive it, and not the public, and therefore demanded that it should not be printed: but Pym replied that the very object was that England might understand the situation of affairs, and take the side of those who defended her cause. On November 22nd, after a last passionate debate, the bill was passed by 159 votes against 148. The publication of the address was also voted after being vehemently opposed by Hyde and Falkland. After it was passed, Cromwell remarked to Falkland, "Had the remonstrance been rejected, I would to-morrow have sold everything I possess, and never have seen England more, and I know many other honest men of the same resolution." A bold attempt by one of the minority to divide the House by a protest by his party failed. Palmer who had moved it was sent to the Tower.

Charles just then returned from Scotland, and met with a brilliant reception by the citizens of London; he entertained great hopes, and assumed a tone of confidence in all that he said and did. The royalist heroes of the recent debates, Falkland, Hyde, and Colepepper, became his confidential advisers, and soon afterwards officially entered his service; the guard of the Houses of Parliament were dismissed; and the party of the Remonstrance, when they called attention to the insecurity of the Palace of Westminster, were told that so long as it required no guard Parliament did not require one either.

After the Remonstrance, both parties felt that a crisis was approaching. Each reproached the other with entertaining treacherous projects, and by degrees the populace of London was in a commotion. About the end of December there were several bloody skirmishes between the royal troops, joined by the students of the Inns of Court, and the apprentices and Thames watermen on the other side. The year ended amidst the most gloomy indications, and on January 3rd, 1642, the storm burst. The Commons were just discussing a scornful message from the King, who, to their repeated requests for a guard, replied that he himself was their protector against every danger—when in the Upper House, another royal message was delivered, accusing Lord Kimbolton and five of the Commons of high treason on seven counts. While the discussion was going

on in the Commons, Pym and Hollis were called out. They shortly returned, and Pym reported that his own, Hollis's, and Hampden's dwellings had been entered and their desks and chests sealed. The House declared this proceeding to be a crying abuse of their privileges, and asserted that violence against any member of the House must be met by violence. Just then the Royal Sergeant appeared, and demanded in the name of the King that the five members, Hollis, Haslerig, Pym, Hampden, and Strode, should be given up on a charge of high treason. The House received the message in gloomy silence; no one laid hands on the five members; and it was resolved to inform the King, by a deputation, that the House would take the King's demand into serious consideration, and that the members would be ready to answer any legal accusation. This first attack was therefore warded off, but the second followed the next morning. After a violent scene with the Queen, who is reported to have said, "Go, coward, and pull these rogues out by the ears, or never see me more," the King set out to accomplish what his sergeant had failed to do. At the beginning of the sitting, after the accused had vehemently protested against the "scandalous document," as they called the indictment, and had received permission to withdraw, the King appeared at the head of one hundred armed men before the doors of the House. Accompanied by his nephew, Charles of the Palatinate, brother of Rupert, he entered the House, advanced with a friendly greeting to the Speaker, and begged him to relinquish his place to him for a short time. Embarrassed and hesitating, he delivered a short speech, which has been preserved to us verbatim. Amidst assurances that the privileges of the House had not lain nearer to the heart of any monarch than to his, he declared with strong emphasis that in cases of high treason there could be no question of privilege; he had, therefore, expected obedience, and not a message in reply to his yesterday's summons. He then looked round for the well-known faces of his worst foes, and not seeing them, asked where they were. No one answered. Then he turned with the same question to the Speaker, who, being a timid man, fell on his knees, and said that in that place he had neither eyes to see nor ears to hear otherwise than as the House directed. "Well," said Charles, "since the birds are flown, I do expect that you will send them to me as soon as they return hither," otherwise he must

resort to other means to find them. "Their treason is horrible, and is of that kind that you will all thank me for discovering." Amidst loud murmurs, he left the House.

The King had proceeded to extremities, and had failed. He had not secured the leaders, and had exposed himself in an unexampled manner. Up to this time, he had kept up an appearance of wishing to keep the peace with his Parliament; but the scene of the 4th of January tore aside the mask. He was the old Charles of Strafford's time, the policy of the last eleven years was still uppermost.

THE COMMOTION IN THE CAPITAL.—THE FIRST PARLIAMENTARY ARMY.—DEPARTURE OF THE KING.

The fate of the five members depended mainly on the attitude which might be taken by the City of London in the difference between King and Parliament. Both parties hoped for its sympathies. The excitement about the events of the 4th of January was indescribable. At the first news of it the shops were closed, business was at a stand-still, and the idle populace poured into the streets.

The King did not believe that this excitement was unfavourable to him. Had he not met with a warm reception in his capital only a few weeks before? On the morning of the 5th of January, he proceeded, without any military escort, to the Guildhall, to encourage his friends and intimidate his adversaries; but he was assailed with curses and threats, rebellious voices were heard in the Guildhall itself, and on his return the people shouted after him "Privilege, privilege!"

While he was making this excursion, the Commons were declaring his proceedings against the five members, and his armed visit to Parliament to be an attack on the rights of the House, and adjourned for several days, appointing a committee to transact the current business. This committee placed itself in communication with the five members, who were concealed in the neighbourhood of Westminster, and now came the time when "king" Pym guided from his hiding-place the very movement which was to have been stopped by his arrest.

Meanwhile the London militia took up arms. A disturbance during the night of the 6th-7th of January, a report that the King had sent out armed men to take the five members, brought 40,000 armed citizens to their feet in the

course of an hour. To the 100,000 of the proletariat, who, since the Christmas of the preceding year, had occasionally dealt blows to the cavaliers with their halberds and sabres, were now joined the well-to-do citizens. The attitude of the metropolis in the strife was decided on.

The committee of Parliament now instituted a formal indictment against the King. Witnesses were called about the proceedings of the 4th of January, the warrant for the arrest of the five members which had been issued by the King alone was demanded from the two sheriffs of London, and finally, in open defiance of the King, it was resolved that the five members had the right to join the sittings of the committee; this they did, though a royal mandate had gone forth that no citizen of London was to receive them, nor furnish them with a ship to emigrate, and a fresh mandate had been issued to all officials to seize them wherever found.

The committee went further and further. The measures taken by the city for the protection of Parliament were pronounced to be meritorious, and every one who opposed them was denounced as the enemy of his country; a commander was appointed to guard the fortress and city, and for the 11th of January, the day of the re-assembling of Parliament, all the citizens who could bear arms were called out. The trained bands of the city received their orders; they were joined by 4,000 farmers from Buckinghamshire, countrymen of Hampden, who declared that they would die at the feet of Parliament if need were. The proletariats of the workshops, the Thames watermen, the militia of Southwark, offered themselves as a guard to Parliament, and the committee was in a position to organize an imposing Parliamentary army for the ceremony of the 11th of January. The resolution to do this already amounted to revolution.

Parliament appointed a leader for the troops raised in the city. All the officers and men had to sign the Parliamentary protest against the royal attempt. It was declared to be their duty to obey the House in spite of any other orders or counter orders, and their mission to repel any attack, come whence it might. And all this was for the protection of the "King, the kingdom, and Parliament."

The King had received regular intelligence of all this; with impotent rage he had seen one piece of his prerogative

go after the other. But this was too much. He could not and would not witness the entry of Parliament, the solemn return of the "traitors," whose death he had sworn. On the evening of the 10th of January he set out with his wife and children for Hampton Court.

The next morning, amidst indescribable rejoicings, the five members made their entry into the city, which was festively adorned. The banks of the Thames were occupied by companies of the militia, with copies of the protest on their pikes. The river was covered with boats and ships, from which salutes quickly followed each other. The persecuted members were received on the threshold of the palace by the whole House.

## CHAPTER XLVII.

### THE CIVIL WAR.

Prospects of both Parties.—Victories of the Royalists, October, 1642, to September, 1643.—Interposition of the Scots.—Presbyterians and Independents.—Defeat of the Royalists at Marston Moor, July, and at Newbury, October, 1644.—Oliver Cromwell.—The Self-denying Ordinance.

THE CIVIL WAR; PROSPECTS OF BOTH PARTIES.—VICTORIES OF THE ROYALISTS, OCTOBER, 1642; SEPTEMBER, 1643.

CHARLES did not anticipate when he left London that he would enter it again as a prisoner of state. It was his hope rather, and many things justified him in it, to make his entry into the capital at no very distant period as victor over all his enemies. The tide of revolution which had risen so high in the metropolis had not extended much beyond, and not at all to the Northern counties. The loyal members of the aristocracy, whose voices were drowned in London by the fury of the populace and the passions of the majority in Parliament, had more scope elsewhere; and if they had a legitimate centre, they might, with their influence upon the rural population, become a powerful instrument of royalist reaction.

At York, where the King fixed his temporary residence, he found himself in the midst of a daily increasing retinue from the highest circles of the aristocracy. Almost the whole Upper House, and a strong minority in the Commons, joined his cause. Since Parliament had deprived the bishops of their votes, and seemed disposed to overthrow the whole episcopal constitution, the temporal nobles saw that their own position in the State was threatened, as well as the monarchy; the Hotspurs among the Royalists,

who, in London, had been condemned to silence by the terrorism of parties, now regained speech and courage; the moderate party, also, who had formerly opposed the absolutism of the ministers and the crown, saw, in the now harmless King, the last defence against the ascendancy of a party whose aims appeared to extend beyond the monarchy itself. Parliament was undeniably in the path of complete usurpation. It might be excused as only the exercise of the right and duty of defence; but it was nevertheless a fact, though all that was decreed and done against the King, was, in accordance with the constitutional fiction, done in his name. In the name of the King, Parliament had nominated governors of all the counties, with the command of all the forces, the garrisons, and fortresses of the kingdom, though the King had naturally rejected the bill with indignation, for it gave all the defences of the country into the hands of Parliament to use against him. The further this was carried, the more decided would be the variance between elements whose relations had hitherto been undefined, so much the larger would be the number of the King's followers.

Both sides made preparations and carried on negotiations for months. At length, in 1642, Parliament stated its ultimatum in nineteen demands. Nothing less was demanded than the supremacy of Parliament over the whole State, the King included. The King was to choose his advisers according to the pleasure of the House, and without their consent no act of his was to be valid. All officials and the superior judges were to be appointed with the concurrence of Parliament, and were to be irremovable. No member of the royal family could contract marriage without the consent of Parliament. The laws against the Catholics were to be enforced, and divine worship and Church government reformed in accordance with the resolutions of Parliament. The militia laws were to be under Parliament; its jurisdiction was to extend to all sorts of crimes; a general amnesty was to be granted, with exceptions which Parliament was to determine; fortresses and castles could only be disposed of in accordance with its will; and no peer could be created without consent of both Houses.

These demands could not be accepted by Charles.

"These being passed," he replied, "we may be waited on



bareheaded, we may have our hand kissed, the style of Majesty continued to us, and the King's authority declared by both Houses of Parliament, may be still the style of your commands; we may have swords and maces carried before us, and please ourselves with the sight of a crown and sceptre (yet even these twigs would not long flourish when the stock upon which they grew was dead); but as to true and real power, we should remain but the outside, but the picture, but the sign of a King." \*

This was the last peaceful exchange of opinions between the contending parties; from this time it was a question of arms. In reviewing the forces of both, there was a manifest disproportion between them.

Deprived of his prerogative, without the fortresses, ships, troops, arms, or money of the kingdom at his disposal, when the King raised his standard at York he was like an adventurous pretender aiming to overthrow the legitimate government, with a retinue of noble retainers and a rushing stream of excited public opinion against him. Parliament had all that the King lacked, all the munitions of war in abundance, and as the money in hand was not sufficient to support the army, a loan was issued; within ten days the treasury was filled with plate contributed by the families of the favourable party, to be coined into money.

The levy of troops amidst the general enthusiasm was most successful.

Under the impression of these things, the opinion might well be entertained in Parliament that, if the King did not prefer to submit without drawing the sword, the war would be ended by a single blow. But the event was very different.

The first engagement, on October 23rd, at Edge Hill, did not yield a decisive victory to either party; but it showed that the Parliamentary army had nothing equal to the well-drilled cavalry of the brave cavaliers. Prince Rupert put the enemy's left wing to flight on the first assault, the right wing was repulsed, and, had it not been for the too vehement pursuit of the royal reserve, by which the infantry was subjected to a fierce attack by the Parliamentary army, the day would have been lost to the latter. After the confidence with which the army of the Earl of Essex had set out from London, it made the impression,

and produced the results, of an actual defeat. The King pushed on towards London; Parliament anxiously began to negotiate, and was not pacified till the Earl of Essex was on the spot, and, strengthened by 24,000 of the London militia, arrested the King's progress.

The King established his winter quarters at Oxford, the only city really true to him, and made vigorous preparations for the spring campaign.

The year 1643 brought one success after another to the Royalist arms. The Earl of Newcastle succeeded in subjecting all the northern counties to the King, a political progress against which some military failures did not weigh heavily in the scale. The result was the same in the west. In Cornwall the Royalist nobles rose against the rebellion, offered their vassals to the King, drove two Parliamentary armies, at Stratton and Lansdown, from the field, and after Prince Maurice had beaten Waller, the best of the Parliamentary generals, at Roundway Down, they joined the royal army at Oxford. Prince Rupert had previously fallen upon and routed part of Essex's army, on which occasion Hampden received a fatal wound; and soon after Rupert stormed Bristol, the second city in the kingdom.

On September 20th, a battle took place at Newbury, in which Falkland fell, and which ended for the Earl of Essex with an honourable retreat to London. In the main, the advantage was on the Royalist side, and the partial successes won by Thomas Fairfax and Oliver Cromwell in the north did not effect a decision, as, soon after the victory of Wakefield, Fairfax's army was completely routed at Atherton Moor.

All the energy of the Parliamentary committee, of which Pym was one, was required to keep down the discontent which never fails to take possession of a party obstinately pursued by misfortune.

The most rigid measures were therefore taken against every tendency to cry for peace, or to give but a lukewarm support to the war. Compulsory taxes were levied, multitudes of Royalists imprisoned and robbed of their property, and when a conspiracy was traced, the leaders were hung before their own doors.

INTERFERENCE OF THE SCOTCH.—PRESBYTERIANS AND INDEPENDENTS.—THE CAMPAIGN OF 1644-5.—DEFEAT OF THE ROYALISTS AT MARSTON MOOR AND NEWBURY.

The situation of the Parliamentary party had taken a most unfavourable turn. The war which they had hoped to decide by a few powerful strokes had brought them nothing but misfortune. Their ill-disciplined recruits were almost everywhere beaten, and were deeply discouraged; the generals were at variance, and had lost confidence in their party; the means for the support of the army were only to be obtained by the greatest exertions; unpopular financial measures, such as the excise devised by Pym, had become necessary, and mutinous voices were heard among the party.

In these difficulties, Pym, who was never at a loss for resources, entered into an understanding with the Scotch that they should make an unexpected diversion in the King's rear, just where he had been most successful during the past year.

On the other side of the Tweed the Royalist victories had been watched with almost as great anxiety as in London, where an attack might at any moment be looked for.

The concessions which Charles had made in his distress, in order to separate the interests of the two kingdoms, were so entirely opposed to his personal inclinations and past policy, that no one could suppose that, once victorious over the English Parliament, he would be willing to be merely the shadow of a King in Scotland.

Out of the common danger rose the alliance, offensive and defensive, between the Scotch and English Parliament, formally entered into on the 17th of September, 1643.

According to the words of this treaty, the object of the alliance was not only to maintain the rights of both Parliaments against the Royalists, but to extirpate Popery, episcopacy, and the episcopal form of church government, and to substitute a new and reformed one in the three kingdoms. By this the Scots intended the Presbyterian form; but the English had been cautious enough to express their intentions in terms so general, that the question may be considered an open one: "Reform of the Church in England and Ireland according to the Word of God and the example of the purest churches."

In fact, on this point Parliament by no means agreed with the Scots. By the side of a minority of Anglicans, who secretly held to the episcopal constitution and the semi-Catholic form of worship, was the Presbyterian party, who favoured moderate Calvinistic views, mortally hated Popery, but would have been well content with the continuance of episcopal authority if deprived of its political privileges, and on this subject, as on politics, wished to avert radical innovations. Then there were the Independents, whose influence was increasing. They were the extreme left of the Puritan party, and wished for a formal revolution in Church and State.

The Independents had constructed a religious, ecclesiastical, and political creed of their own, based on the principles of extreme Calvinism. It was a curious mixture of Old Testament reminiscences, Calvinistic dogmas, and political radicalism. They had become a sect of strong mystical hue; the preaching of the millennial kingdom, then speaking with tongues and religious ecstasies, distinguished their worship from all previous services; their taste for Old Testament names, a special garb, their gloomy strictness and boast of monastic contempt for the world, made them outwardly peculiar. They hated not only the Romish Church, and all that the Anglican Church had retained of its usages: they wished to have no priests, and held that every believer was a priest. No congregation of the "Godly," as they styled themselves, would tolerate any man above it; the strictest democratic equality was demanded for it as a whole, though it might be composed of the dregs of the people, as well as for every individual;—was not the Redeemer a carpenter's son? was not his teaching addressed to the weary and heavy laden?

They were a singular race of mortals. He who thinks to dispose of them as hypocrites, spares himself the trouble of characterizing them; but he does not account for their great significance. Hypocrisy is not capable of ruling the masses as they ruled them, nor of dying for their cause as they died. They were undoubtedly fanatics of the wildest sort, and some of their sayings almost bear the stamp of religious insanity; but many of them are deeply thought out, and produced a most powerful effect. Cromwell's speeches, with all the Puritanical flourishes which belong to the fashion of the age, display an earnestness and

depth, an eloquence and striking delineations of the situation, which rise far above any other memorials of this period.

This sect was profoundly in earnest with its creed; to others it might appear like madness, but its members were resolved to die for it. They had imbibed with their mothers' milk the rigid relentless energy of a struggling church, and had maintained it in many a conflict. It was thus that they achieved extraordinary success. A party, which numbered scarcely one-tenth of the nation among its followers, ruled the three kingdoms with more effect than ever an absolute government or an assembly has ruled France; and Cromwell, though he knew that almost the whole kingdom was against him, not only ruled the country for ten years, but dictated laws to Europe.

The consequences of the civil war between Charles I. and Parliament, after it had been waged with decided ill success by the latter, inspired no party with such cool determination as the Independents.

The fiction of a war in "the name" of him against whom it was waged, was at once thrown overboard. The idea of the restoration of a constitution, which, just because it was impossible with this monarch had led to war, was now simply laid aside—the possibility of a reconciliation with Charles I. was no longer thought of. The result was that this party alone waged war with thorough energy and determination; while the Presbyterians, the Earl of Essex at their head, could not but be accused of a certain half-heartedness. They wished for the restoration of ancient rights, forgetting how far they had already got beyond them.

In the following campaign this contrast was to be fully brought out, and the participation of the Scotch, however much their help might be desired, could but help the process, for their Presbyterian Church government was almost as hateful to the Independents as the Anglican itself.

The first decisive conflict of 1644 related to the possession of the northern counties, and their centre, York.

Reinforced by the Scotch, who had been advancing since February, and by the army of the Earl of Manchester, in which Cromwell served, Fairfax had in the summer collected a force strong enough to undertake the assault of York with a prospect of success. The siege had begun when Prince Rupert arrived with 20,000 men, and contrived by a dex-

terous operation to throw his whole force into the city. Contrary to the advice of the Earl of Newcastle, he gave battle on the open field. The greatest passage of arms which the war had hitherto seen took place on July 2nd at Marston Moor. A bloody contest went on for hours, but Cromwell's distinguished generalship at length decided the day, and the Royalists suffered a fearful defeat. York, the King's most trustworthy support in the northern counties, was lost.

Meanwhile, two armies, under Essex and Waller, had undertaken a combined attack upon the Royal camp at Oxford, but with these generals' usual want of success. On June 29th, Waller was signally defeated at Copraby bridge; and on September 1st, Essex's army was involved in a great defeat, and he himself only escaped in a boat.

But now Parliament put considerable reinforcements at their disposal, and commanded Manchester and Cromwell to join them. With these forces, the King was again attacked, on October 27th, at Newbury, and, after an obstinate defence, driven back to Oxford. Cromwell urged taking speedy advantage of the victory, so that the war might be ended by a great stroke; but this was opposed by Manchester, which gave rise to fatal dissensions between these generals. Charles owed it to these quarrels alone that he occupied his winter quarters without molestation. During this winter the dispute between the Presbyterians and Independents ended in an open breach, and the man who was henceforth to influence so largely the fate of England and of Europe, came into the foreground.

#### OLIVER CROMWELL.\*

Oliver Cromwell was born amidst limited circumstances, on April 25th, 1599, at Huntingdon. On his mother's side he was related to the Stuarts, on his father's to that Cromwell who was for a time minister to Henry VIII., and received the name of Malleus Monachorum.

He grew up in a moderately prosperous household, in which Puritan piety and strictness of morals were old traditions. The stories of his having passed through a wild and passionate youth have been contradicted. However bitterly his enemies might hate him, they were compelled to allow

\* Oliver Cromwell (after Carlyle's description) in Raumer's *Taschenbuch*.



that his private and domestic life was exemplary. Piety, discipline, and purity in family life never celebrated a more beautiful triumph than in his family.

Though not unversed in learning, Cromwell was designed for a farmer. At the time when the conflict between the Crown and the Parliament began, he was still a quiet, monosyllabic countryman, simply and honestly pursuing his rural occupations. He formed a respectable middle-class marriage, founded a domestic hearth, and all his ways and doings were those of a contented English farmer. Decided, characteristic religious tendencies began, however, to show themselves. He diligently attended the prayer-meetings of his fellow-professors, devoted his savings to the Puritan travelling preachers, zealously took part in their missions, and occasionally undertook a proselytizing journey himself. No less significant was his connection with the eminent patriots of those times. John Hampden was his cousin, and he may have received his first political interests from him.

He first appeared as a politician in the memorable Parliament of 1628. His maiden speech consisted of but a few words, but they were on a subject which was, with him, a matter of conscience. He spoke of Popish intrigues which a preacher in his neighbourhood had been carrying on, and for which he had been rewarded by his bishop with a benefice. Such occurrences were then frequent. "If these," said Cromwell, "are the means of rising in the Church, what can we expect?" Then came the eleven years of absolutism. Cromwell was now simply the farmer again, and a patriarch in his little congregation. He occupied himself with prayer-meetings and preaching journeys, went about among the "quiet in the land," who might be relied on in case of need, and he became one of the most influential persons in his community.

In the Parliament of 1640, he was in his place again. Once he spoke for the ill-used secretary of the fanatical Prynne, at another time for the rights of poor peasants and for the Scotch. He was an offence to the Cavaliers, with his large frame, harsh voice, plain coat, and fervid eloquence. When Hampden was asked "who that sloven was," he said, "That sloven whom you see before you hath no ornament in his speech; that sloven, I say, if we should ever come to a breach with the King (which God forbid), in such a case, I say, that sloven will be the greatest man in England."



Then came the breach ; and among the first who made sacrifices for the Parliamentary cause, was Cromwell.

Now forty-three years of age, and the father of six children, he contributed first three and then five hundred pounds of his property. With his eldest son, a hopeful youth, he joined the Parliamentary volunteers, thus staking his family, his happiness, and his property. He kept up communication with Cambridge, and contrived that two companies of volunteers should be established there, and the treasures of the University saved for Parliament. No one could then say whether the path in which he was boldly leading the way might not lead to the scaffold, and he was like a voluntary victim breaking down the bridge behind him. Unlike the Presbyterians, then the great majority in the nation and in Parliament, who thought it possible to fight against the King in the King's name, Cromwell took up the war from the first in terrible earnestness. "He who draws the sword against the King," he used to say, "must throw the sheath into the fire ;" and he told his company that his commission was indeed to fight for King and Parliament, but he hated ambiguity ; let each man ask himself if he, like himself, could make up his mind, in case he came upon the King in a fray, to shoot him down like any other man ; let not him who could not do so serve under him.

When the first victories of the Royalists took place, he told Hampden that it did not surprise him ; they could not hope with hirelings, serving men, and day labourers, to make head against noblemen with honour, courage, and resolution in their hearts. They must get men of spirit, who would be as ready to go into the fire as the nobles, or they would always be beaten ; and he acted in accordance with his advice. He had a wonderful talent for military organization ; though not brought up to it, he had the true instinct.

Instead of the mob of discharged soldiers and deserters of which the Parliamentary army was composed, he tried to attract the best of the middle classes into it, and to create a genuine citizen army. This ideal army was to be a political body, filled with the same spirit, and modelled after the fashion of the company he had formed of his countrymen. He therefore created a few squadrons of Puritans, soon amounting to fourteen, which should serve as a pattern for the new army.

In these, as it was said, half in jest, half in earnest, his

"saints" were represented; the quiet companions of his prayer-meetings, the singular fanatics of the conventicles, square-shouldered citizens and peasants, with gloomy looks and coarse attire. It was like a fraternity of psalm-singers and devotees in arms. Cursing, swearing, feasting, was not found here as in other camps; prayer was offered and services were held; laymen appeared as preachers, just as the illumination came to them, as was customary in their peaceful services at home. The Puritan congregation was transferred to the camp, with all their singularities, but also with their religious enthusiasm, their discipline, fear of God, and devotion to their cause. It was totally different in the other army, in which the lawless behaviour of the troops, and the discontent of their distinguished leaders spoiled everything.

It was of stuff like this that the squadrons were composed who first opposed the onslaught of the dreaded Cavaliers, and were soon to drive them out of the field.

At Marston Moor, Cromwell and his Puritan horsemen first gained a decisive victory. The hitherto unvanquished Cavaliers of Prince Rupert had, as Cromwell said, been cut down like stubble by their swords; he had projected a similar blow for the main part of the royal army after the victory of Newbury, but he had met with unlooked-for opposition, not of a personal character, but based on a difference of principle. His general, the Earl of Manchester, was a skilful soldier, but on the subject of the aims and merits of the war, his opinions were those of all the Parliamentary leaders, especially the Earl of Essex, who, belonging to the highest nobility, and having only torn himself away from his equals after severe mental struggles, had no idea of annihilating the King, or even of introducing a new constitution.

For this party the war was only a means—a heroic means, indeed—of compelling the King to constitutionalism, to which he would not be brought by friendly measures. A complete victory, therefore, over him, which would at the same time annihilate the monarchy, was considered by them to be a misuse of their arms, and a great evil.

At Newbury this had come plainly to light. Cromwell asked leave to attack the royal army in the rear with his cavalry brigade, proposing that the Earl, if he preferred it, should remain with the rest of the troops in inaction; but

the Earl absolutely refused, giving no other reasons than that if beaten there would be an end of their demands, and that they would be at once executed as rebels and traitors.

Even if this answer expressed the whole truth, there was an idea of reconciliation and return at the bottom of it which Cromwell had long ago given up. Cromwell was resolved to put an end to these half measures. While amongst his enemies, the remote possibility of an indictment against him as a radical incendiary was under consideration; he was acting with so much skill, that his adversaries first learnt what his intentions were from the result.

On December 9th, 1644, the situation was discussed in Parliament. Cromwell rose, to give expression to the general discontent. The war had now been going on for two years; they had suffered many defeats, and gained but few victories; enormous sacrifices had been demanded in money, men, and property, yet as good as nothing was attained, for what was gained one day was lost the next; in winter they began to think how much blood had been shed in vain, how much money spent, and how much land devastated. The suffering people ascribed the blame to Parliament; and if it did not find a remedy all confidence in it would be lost. The people thought the great gentlemen in Parliament had no interest in bringing the war to a close; for so long as it lasted they were in power, and held important posts, but when it was over their glory would be at an end.

This talk, with which he did not agree, must be met. The war must be carried on in a different manner; the army must be put on a fresh footing; and, to render this possible, an act of self-denial was necessary for all those who were taking the lead, and, as true patriots, this would not appear to them as too great a sacrifice.

Before this, one of the "Saints," Henry Vane, had informed the House that all the preachers at the late festival had, by a wonderful concurrence, spoken from their pulpits against the members of Parliament remaining in their lucrative offices. This was the finger of God; this was the work of the Holy Spirit; Parliament should give an example of self renunciation; besides, by the removal of so many members, the numbers in the House were im-

paired. Before the war he had himself held a lucrative office in the Treasury; but he voluntarily resigned it, and he wished that others would do the same.

These were the preliminaries to the Self-denying Ordinance, which was passed after a vehement contest. It excluded all the members of both Houses from all civil and military offices. Before it was passed, Cromwell had attained his object. The Presbyterian generals, Essex, Warwick, Manchester, Denbigh, Waller, and others, had resigned. A stratagem was required to except Cromwell, who was both an officer and member of the Commons. During the discussions, Fairfax had him sent for to the army, and **before long no one said any more on the subject.**

## CHAPTER XLVIII.

### THE CATASTROPHE OF CHARLES AND OF THE PARLIAMENT.

Defeat of Charles at Naseby, June, 1645.—He takes refuge with the Scots, who sell him to the Presbyterians.—Mutiny of the Army against Parliament.—Abduction of the King.—March to London.—First Purge of Parliament, August, 1647.—The King's Flight to the Isle of Wight.—His Trial and Execution, January 30th, 1649.

DEFEAT AT NASEBY.—THE KING'S REFUGE WITH THE SCOTCH.—SOLD TO THE PRESBYTERIANS.—MUTINY OF THE ARMY AGAINST PARLIAMENT.—ABDUCTION OF THE KING, AND ENTRY INTO LONDON.

FROM this time the war and the military system of Parliament bear a totally different aspect. What had been begun by Cromwell on a small scale was carried on on a larger one. The whole army was inspired by the spirit of the Saints; the officers were intrusted with the duties of priests; preaching and psalm-singing were introduced into the camp, the wild doings of which a great part of the Parliamentary army had been guilty, in common with the Royalists, ceased; and, since Cromwell and Fairfax had held the command, it had been free from its previous lukewarmness.

With this strictly-disciplined army, in which a trust in God prevailed bordering on Mohammedan fatalism, Cromwell, to whom Fairfax was in fact subordinate, defeated the Royalists at Naseby, on June 14th, 1645. After this day good fortune entirely forsook the King; one city and county was lost after another. Cromwell not only knew how to conquer, but to take advantage of his victories. He was always at the heels of the Royalists, and did not rest till the party was annihilated.

One prospect still opened before the unhappy King.

The Scotch had become uneasy at the victories of the Independents. The fanatical Presbyterians feared the supremacy of the radical enthusiasts, and would have nothing to do either with their creed or their church constitution. The King was not in a position to retract any of his concessions to them; from the Independents, on the contrary, they had nothing to hope. Out of these elements the French ambassador combined a tempting picture, which the King was the less able to withstand, as since the spring of 1646, at Oxford, he had been daily expecting a blow from the hands of the enemy. Thus arose his resolution to take refuge with the remnant of his faithful followers in the Scotch camp.

On May 5th he appeared before Newark, followed by a Parliamentary decree, threatening any one with death who should harbour the fugitive King.

Agreeably surprised by this unexpected proof of royal confidence, the Scotch persuaded the King to give up his last weapons; they made him order all the royal garrisons which had hitherto held out against Fairfax and Cromwell to surrender to Parliament. This done, they negotiated with Parliament about a ransom for their royal captive. The cunning and worldly wisdom of the Scotch is proverbial; this act was even more than Scotch.

The war which they had undertaken, in order to make England Presbyterian, and to place the covenant on firm ground, had, according to their reckoning, cost two millions, and the possession of the King furnished them with a means of indemnifying themselves. After long chaffering, they agreed to liberate the King for £400,000, half to be paid immediately, the rest in two instalments.

At first, even the Scotch Parliament felt the business to be so disgraceful that a resolution was passed that the King should be protected and his liberation insisted on; but it was informed by the General Assembly that as the King had opposed the Covenant, his fate no longer concerned the "Saints," and so the transaction was completed.

Upon his journey from Scotch to English imprisonment, the King once more experienced the royalist sympathies of the masses. Sympathetic tears and exclamations accompanied him to Holdenby, where rough treatment awaited him, which only gave place to better, when English parties began to disagree about his fate.

It is difficult to say exactly what the Presbyterians intended to do with the King when he was in their power. The commissioners who had taken possession of him at Newark reverently kissed his hand ; but at Holdenby he was treated like an arrested criminal. His suite was dismissed, all intercourse with the outer world was cut off ; he was even deprived of his chaplains because they had not signed the covenant. One thing alone was certain amidst all these contradictions, that the Presbyterians who had the majority, both in and out of Parliament, did not desire a republic or abolition of monarchy, and therefore regarded the spirit of the Independent army as its worst foe.

They intended, therefore, before any further steps should be taken, in some way or other to get rid of this army.

In Parliament it was now said, "The war is over ; there is no longer a hostile army ; the treasury is exhausted ; why keep a large army in the field for nothing, when there are no means to support it ?" It was proposed to send some of the troops to Ireland, to dismiss others, and to keep only a small reserve in case of need. Once rid of the hosts of the Saints, the rest would arrange itself, and Parliament could discuss at ease what to do with the King and country.

But they were mistaken in thinking that they could so easily get rid of those who had won the victory, and had in the long struggle lost reverence, not for the King only.

Scarcely had the news of the plans of the majority reached the camp, through the Independents in Parliament, than the army began to move. Besides their large arrears of pay, the troops demanded not to be treated as Janissaries or hirelings, to be disposed of at pleasure without being consulted. The demands of the Saints were put together in a definite form in a petition to Fairfax, and as Parliament only met it with threats, open mutiny broke out. The camp became an opposition Parliament ; the officers met as the Upper, the men as the Lower House, and passed independent resolutions in defence of their rights against the interference of the London Parliament. And when Parliament commanded that the troops who would not go to Ireland should be forthwith dismissed, the army not only refused obedience, but despatched a division of five hundred horse to Holdenby, seized the King in presence of the astonished parliamentary commissioner, and soon after Cromwell removed the whole army to St. Alban's.



With his hand on his sword, Cromwell demanded the dismissal and arrest of eleven members of Parliament who had been guilty of high treason—Hollis, Waller, and other leaders of the Presbyterian party were among them. Parliament demurred; but the eleven thought it best to withdraw, and the army was so far pacified as to remain at St. Alban's.

It was, indeed, only a short delay of the catastrophe. Cromwell wished to avoid open violence, and proposed a circuitous path which, while making less commotion, would as surely lead to the goal.

During the panic of the last few days, when the news of the King's abduction had been quickly followed by that of the approach of the enraged Saints, and the Londoners expected to be given up to the fury of the soldiery, Parliament had one support—the city militia, who, from the first, had been true to the Presbyterians. It was to be deprived of this last weapon before the army set its foot upon its neck.

The army demanded that a change should be made with the militia, and especially that the Presbyterian commander should be dismissed. Parliament conceded this unheard-of demand; but the masses rose up, the apprentices and watermen of 1642 opposed these measures, and insisted that the resolution should be rescinded. It was now plain to the army, who were only waiting for such a pretext, that Parliament was not its own master, and that their advance must be eagerly desired; and when the speakers of both Houses, accompanied by eight peers and sixty of the Commons came and begged for help, there was no longer any delay.

Twenty thousand gloomy-looking Independents marched into the city and came to the rescue of Parliament on the 6th of August, 1647. There was no want of discipline in their conduct, but there was an end to the liberty of Parliament. All its recent acts were declared null and void; the militia were given over to the Independents, and some opponents who were specially compromised were arrested and imprisoned. This was the first mutilation of this remarkable assembly. Professedly it was but a blow struck against the previous majority, but in reality parliamentaryism itself had received a fatal stroke. What was left of it existed only by favour of the army and its leaders.

The King also felt the effects of this event. Up to this time his imprisonment in camp had been less severe and more honourable than with the Presbyterians. Up to within a short time before his abduction he had been negotiating with them, and terms appeared likely to be made. He had been so well treated in the Independent camp that he thought himself courted by both parties, derived courage from the idea that they could not settle matters without him, and imagined that he should again be able to employ one against the other. He was shrewd enough to perceive that Cromwell belonged to the future, and tried to make advances to him; offered him the command of the army, to make him a peer, a duke, &c. What Cromwell thought of all this we do not know. He probably did what he had great dexterity in doing—escaped these snares under the plea of rustic awkwardness, for he knew the King's cunning. One thing is certain, that continued intimacy with the King would have deprived him of his influence with the army, and that an intercepted despatch from the King to the Queen would have undeceived a man less shrewd than he was. In this the King said that it was his wish to unite not with the English army, but with the Scotch, the mortal enemies of the Independents. He should know how to rise against these fellows when the right time came. Instead of the garter—which he had promised to Cromwell,—there would be a hempen cord for them.

**FLIGHT OF THE KING TO THE ISLE OF WIGHT.—THE SECOND CIVIL WAR (JULY—SEPTEMBER, 1648).—THE SECOND PURGE OF PARLIAMENT, DECEMBER, 1648.—TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF THE KING, 30TH OF JANUARY, 1649.**

After Cromwell withdrew from the King, the Independent preachers raised an alarm against him; a threatening agitation arose, which increased daily. Forsaken by all, and in fear for his personal safety, during the night of the 11th of November the King escaped to the Isle of Wight.

This was highly imprudent. He did not thereby escape from his gaolers; for the governor of the island was Hampden's son-in-law, and Cromwell's most trusted ally, and he cut himself off from communication with his friends, thus proving anew that there was no reliance to be placed on

his promises, that negotiation with him was vain. He might be recaptured at any moment, and would then be in the hands of doubly embittered enemies.

It had now become impossible for Charles to remain King of England. It would be to frustrate the whole significance and aim of the civil war to replace him upon the throne. But the great question was what should replace him, and the answer had not become any clearer.

There had, indeed, been a project for establishing a sort of interregnum—for persuading the King to abdicate, and of setting up a parliamentary regency in the name of the Prince of Wales. This plan also put the restoration of Charles out of the question, but it had long fallen into the background with the Independents as not going far enough. For them there no longer was a King.

On the 3rd of January, the motion was carried that no further message from the King need be received, and that he no longer had any voice in the reorganization of the State. On this occasion Cromwell said that while the King was solemnly talking to them of peace, he was negotiating with the Scots in order to involve them in a fresh war.

It was not long before this fresh war really broke out. Fourteen thousand Scots attacked the country to fight for the King. The native Royalists held up their heads; disturbances broke out in the navy, and there were inflammable materials enough in the country to occasion a general conflagration. Even against the resolution in Parliament declaring the Scots to be enemies, there were ninety courageous votes.

In London all was quiet, but scarcely had the Independents advanced to meet the Royalists, when Parliament threw off the terrorism which had held it in check. The Presbyterians assumed the leadership again, recalled the eleven dismissed members, reversed the resolution of the 3rd of January, and renewed negotiations with the King in the Isle of Wight. With great difficulty, after long negotiations, a project of a treaty was formed, but by the time it was submitted to Parliament the situation of parties without was entirely changed.

All the revolts had in turn been quelled, and with 8,000 men Cromwell had attacked and cut in pieces the 30,000 Scots and Royalists.

The result was a peace, which put an end to the alliance

for the King, and confirmed anew the union of the two kingdoms, 26th of September, 1648. The camp parliament of the Independents now resolved on their own account that the King should make amends for the blood that had been spilt, and that the Parliament had forfeited its right to existence by its treaty with Charles. But in spite of this, Parliament voted for the treaty with the King by a hundred and twenty-nine against eighty-three, so there was a fresh "purge."

Early in the morning of the 6th of December, 1648, Westminster was surrounded by two regiments under the command of Colonel Pride, formerly a drayman, and they carried off forty-one Presbyterians. One hundred and sixty members more were excluded, and in the Parliament thus purged there were now but from fifty to sixty fanatics of the Independent sect.

It was now necessary to come to some decision about the King. Immediately after the resolution of the military Parliament, he had been brought from Newport and placed in more secure imprisonment. The question was what to do with him. To liberate him, especially after recent events, appeared to the Independents impossible. The King had made himself a terror to them by everything that makes a monarch dangerous. His unfathomable cunning, his oft-proved treachery, his talent for recovering himself after every defeat and setting one party against another; his impur-turbable obstinacy on all questions connected with the royal authority, and the episcopal constitution; and finally the sympathies of the most powerful classes make it perfectly intelligible that the party which had won all the victories of the civil war, and could but look for fearful retribution on a restoration of the monarchy, had adopted the resolution, "Either he or we!"

The fate of England was in the hands of an army not composed of hirelings but of glowing patriots. They looked upon the King as the enemy of the country imprisoned with his weapon in his hand, and they asked themselves, "Which shall win?"

What Cromwell thought of this question we learn from a letter which he wrote at this time to his friend Governor Hammond, in the Isle of Wight, under date of the 25th of November, 1648, in which he says among other things:—

"You say, 'God hath appointed authorities among the

nations, to whom active or passive obedience is to be yielded. This resides in England in the Parliament. 'Therefore active or passive resistance,' &c.

"Authorities and powers are the ordinances of God; but I do not, therefore, think the authorities may do *anything*, and yet such obedience be due. All agree that there are cases in which it is lawful to resist. The query is, whether ours be such a case.

"To this I shall say nothing, but only desire thee to see that thou findest in thy own heart to two or three plain considerations. First, whether *Salus Populi* be a sound position, or if (secondly) the whole fruit of the war is not like to be frustrated, and all most like to turn to what it was, and worse? and this contrary to engagements, explicit covenants, with those who ventured their lives upon those covenants and engagements. Thirdly, whether this army be not a lawful power called by God to oppose and fight against the King upon some stated grounds. Let us look into providences; surely they mean somewhat. They hang so together, have been so constant, so clear, unclouded. Malice, sworn malice against God's people, now called "Saints," to root out their name; and yet they—"these poor Saints"—getting arms, and therein blessed with defence, and more! If the Lord have in any measure persuaded his people, as generally he hath, of the lawfulness, nay of the *duty*—this persuasion prevailing upon the heart is faith, and the acting thereupon is acting in faith; and the more the difficulties are the more the faith."\*

Cromwell had, as we know without this testimony, accustomed himself, without any self-deception, to the idea that it was not a case for a judicial sentence, but of measures of defence, and for the public good. It was in this light that it was looked at by him and his army, and he laid no claim to any other law. This dangerous man must be rendered harmless, and that he would not be so long as he lived.

It was not a trial that was begun during the last few days of the old year and the beginning of the new, but a court martial held by the army on a traitor imprisoned sword in hand.

The attempt to carry on the proceedings in a constitutional manner failed. The accusations made by the Rump Parliament, January 1st, 1649—high treason, by overthrowing the laws of the land and instigation of civil war—was

\* Carlyle, Cromwell's Letters and Speeches.

indignantly rejected by the Lords. The Speaker, who was to have been one of the judges, declared that he would rather be torn in pieces than take part in so reckless a proceeding.

There was, therefore, nothing left for the Commons but to proclaim a new revolutionary law, which was done January 4th. It declared that under God, the people are the source of legitimate power, that the power of the Commons in Parliament assembled is supreme, that the people are bound to obey whatever is declared to be law by them, even without the consent of the King or the Peers.

On January 20th, Charles Stuart, as he was now called, appeared before the tribunal, under the accusation of being a tyrant, a murderer, a traitor, and the enemy of his country. Since he had been brought to London, he had vacillated between fear of assassination and the hope of being set free at the last moment through the disputes of parties among themselves, but for what now happened he was not prepared. He had thought that it would not go so far as a legal trial, were it but the shadow of it, before all the world. But he soon controlled himself, and adopted the only right course. He behaved like a King who is in the right, who can be put to death, but not humbled. "I die as a martyr," he used to say, and to the last he behaved like a witness to monarchical constitutional law, as opposed to the victorious revolution.

He did not defend himself, for he was not before judges. Every word that he uttered was a protest against the proceedings to which he was subjected. He interrupted the secretary who read the words that the legal power was intrusted to him, by saying that he was King by hereditary right, and asked him what right had he before whom he was brought, to try him. This was on the first day of the trial. On the second day, when he was about to answer in the same style, he was not allowed to speak, and nothing was left for him but to write down in prison what he wished to say. In these observations he distinctly said that he could easily have refuted every word of the accusation, but that that would have been to acknowledge the tribunal, and to deny the ancient principle of constitutional law, according to which "the King can do no wrong."

Sentence of death was passed on the 25th of January, and the execution followed on the 30th.

## CHAPTER XLIX.

### THE COMMONWEALTH, WITHOUT KING OR HOUSE OF LORDS.

Cromwell's Position after the Death of Charles I.—Parties, Republic and Monarchy.—Subjugation of Ireland and Scotland, 1649–51.—War with Holland.—The Navigation Act, October, 1651, and the Peace of April, 1654.—The Constitutional Experiments.—Dismissal of the Long Parliament.—The Constitution of December, 1653.—The Parliament of 1654–5 and the Military Government.—The Parliament of 1656–7.—Proposal of a Monarchy.—The Upper House of January, 1658.—Cromwell's Death, September 3rd, 1658.—Richard Cromwell and the end of the Republic.

### CROMWELL'S POSITION AFTER THE DEATH OF CHARLES I. —STATE OF PARTIES, REPUBLIC AND MONARCHY.

THE whole history of Cromwell's reign shows how little the King's death was adapted to free the new Government from embarrassment. The difficulties which it was supposed were got rid of, were not got rid of; and the King's death advanced the cause of his adherents more than that of the Independents.

It is not, however, a parallel case with the murder of Louis XVI. In the one case, the King wanted to annihilate the ancient constitutions of the country, in the other, the King had voluntarily resigned his formerly absolute power; in the one case a man was put to death who deserved pity rather than fear or hatred, whilst Charles I. was a foe almost more dangerous from his virtues than his faults. Louis was a helpless prisoner, slaughtered like a victim; Charles might be considered to have challenged his foes to fight against him. The differences of the times must also be taken into account. The seventeenth century was far less sensitive, even about



the lives of princely personages than the philosophical age of humanity.

But murder was still murder. Even Cromwell did not deceive himself as to the fact that he had no right to judge the King. It was an exceptional measure, which did not annihilate the monarchy. On the contrary, the murder of 1649 awoke it to new life. England was, far more than the France of 1790, a monarchical country. Even after the removal of the King, a great deal remained which made the monarchy indestructible. Its existence for centuries, the growth of the country with it, its many pillars in the Upper House, and in the hierarchy, and among the land-owning nobility. The head of it might be abolished, and tailors and shoemakers made into peers, but the old preponderance of the large estates was not thereby got rid of. The State Church might be deprived of its temporal and ecclesiastical privileges, yet it would still be one of the mightiest factors in the country, which could only be done away with by a massacre, and for all these elements the King's death was a day of excitement and encouragement. The great majority of the English nobles now formed a passive opposition, which would not lightly endanger themselves by violent measures, but bided their time, and gradually left Cromwell in isolation. It was the same with the English State Church, a power that might be repressed, but not crushed. The masses were never gained over to oppose her. I am, therefore, of opinion that if by the death of the King, Cromwell thought to give a fatal blow to the monarchy, he utterly failed of his purpose; he only conferred on it the glory of martyrdom, which caused its sins and mistakes to be forgotten, and prepared for it a glorious restoration in the future. I do not imagine that the return of the Stuarts would have been greeted with such feverish enthusiasm had not the nation been burdened with the consciousness that there was a fearful deed between them, that they had to atone for the murder of a King. Just so I think that had it not been for the death of Louis XVI. the Bourbons would never have been restored in France.

A republican constitution was introduced, but it had no foundation in the condition and sentiments of the people. Cromwell had to rule with the minority of the nation, as represented by the fifty thousand Saints. It was the result of this false position that he projected schemes the impos-

sibility of which he best knew himself. It is noteworthy that he gradually withdrew from his own party as he more and more plainly saw its untenable position.

But just then he was the only man who knew how to govern England. No other party had a more competent man, and no opponent had a party which could be compared to his. And the remarkable thing is how rapidly he adapted himself to his high position—how firmly the Huntingdonshire farmer maintained himself at the head of three kingdoms amidst perpetual struggles for existence.

Above all, he restrained the excrescences which had appeared in this, as in every revolution. Even among this calm and sober people there were fanatics, and they were dangerous to Cromwell because they had in some measure infected the army. The stragglers in every great revolution—people who preached the abolition of marriage, property, and all social distinctions—appeared here also, but with this difference, that the crimes which generally go hand-in-hand with this nonsense did not prevail. The teaching of the Levellers\* was nothing more than programme and attempt when Cromwell interfered. He had himself risen out of the revolution, held his authority as a fief from it, and yet he restrained it. This was the first test of his genius as a ruler, and in his situation it was more difficult than in the France of 1793.

This symptom of beginning dissolution of his own party demanded all the more speedy interference, as the Royalist party was essentially strengthened since the death of Charles. Since the 30th of January, 1649, it had withdrawn in deep embitterment, but there were many indications that it was quietly gathering up its strength, and that when a favourable opportunity occurred, it would not shun an open breach with Cromwell. It had been joined more and more by the Presbyterian party. It was the Presbyterians who had begun the contest with absolute monarchy, and carried it on for years; but they had no more idea of putting an end to monarchy itself than of putting the King to death, and openly expressed their abhorrence of the act. Cromwell had never had much support in the provinces; not a single county could be named in which the Independents ruled supreme. That independent spirit which had often

\* See Ranke, iii. 328.

made itself heard against the King, without intending to impugn the monarchy itself, was sure now to be directed against Cromwell, and the more so as the new form of government was opposed to all the traditions of the country.

Thus Cromwell could only rely for support upon the army of 50,000 men, and this was a two-edged weapon. With all its military discipline, this army was but an armed body of men who had their own views upon questions of Church and State, had maintained them in many a fearful trial, and probably intended to stand up for them in the future with equal fanaticism. Cromwell might dictate laws to Europe, but still he was bound to his 50,000 Saints; and he knew perfectly well that they were no cheaply-bought soldiery, who would have been just as ready to have obeyed their successful leader as king, but a republican party under arms, full of the wildest fanaticism. A time came when it was expected abroad, by the Stuarts, and even by the Royalists, that Cromwell would have accepted the Crown offered him by Parliament, but the 50,000 Saints would not suffer it. They stood in the foreground, confronted him with the spectre of the beheaded King, and the old democratic banner—he declined the crown. More prudent than many others in a similar situation, he calculated his means, and took care not to go beyond them.

He wished to establish a permanent civil administration, but his only support was a military force which did not comport with it; he wished, in fact, to form an English constitution which should reconcile the old aristocratic structure with the new democratic doctrines; but all his attempts were frustrated by his antecedents. He was himself the man to shake off the narrow limits of his party, but they could not be persuaded to any compromise. The elements for a republic were wanting in the nation, and he was not the man for the monarchy.

But amidst these vast difficulties he went his way with astonishing firmness, as if no care or cloud hung over him; and we must continually recur to his modest origin to estimate rightly his extraordinary talents. To add to the internal difficulties of his position, Ireland was unsubdued, Scotland in open rebellion. The three kingdoms, therefore, were thoroughly at variance. In Scotland, the King's death had been the signal for the revolt of the Royalist party, and

Cromwell had to wage two fearful wars before he could think of establishing a civil administration. He succeeded in doing what the Stuarts had never done; he subjugated all three kingdoms, and ruled them as no King had done before him.

#### SUBJUGATION OF IRELAND AND SCOTLAND.—WAR WITH HOLLAND.

During the last four years, Ireland had been the scene of various widely-differing projects. In 1645, a Papal nuncio, Rinuccini, had arrived, who laboured with much success to promote a Catholic restoration and separation from England; but after the death of the King, a Presbyterian, Lord-Lieutenant Ormond, had succeeded in bringing about a Royalist coalition between Catholics and Protestants, English and Irish, to revenge themselves on the Independents for the death of Charles I. This coalition ruled the whole island, and was in possession of all the fortresses.

In 1649, Cromwell set out to oppose them with a select troop of his veterans—as usual, after spiritual preparation for the enterprise. In this case, as against the Scots, his virtuosoship consisted in inflaming the religious enthusiasm of his Saints, and their hatred of royal tyranny to such a degree, that their feelings may be compared to the fatalistic valour of the Islam armies in their prime.

The campaign against the Green Isle, which was begun in the middle of August, was a brilliant one. Three of the most important fortresses were taken on the first assault, and merciless sentence passed upon the vanquished enemy. Cromwell reports with pride how thousands of Irish were cut down for the greater glory of God. It seemed as if it was intended, not only to annihilate the enemy, but the whole population. Cromwell was summoned to Scotland before he could complete the subjection of the island; it was left to his successor, Ireton.

This much was immediately attained, Ormond's coalition was destroyed. The English went over in masses to the camp of the Independents, while the Irish alone were subjected to this war of extermination. Ireton behaved if possible more relentlessly than Cromwell; and out of the victories of these two men arose the new administration of Ireland, that military dictatorship which distributed its

fruitful lands among the Saints of the English army, and left nothing to the inhabitants but emigration or beggary.

The ruling party of the Presbyterians in Scotland had replied to the news of the beheading of Charles I. by the proclamation of Charles II. as King of Great Britain, and at once entered into negotiations with him at the court of his brother-in-law, William II., in Holland. He responded to the appeal, but with mixed feelings, for the proffered crown was not to be had for nothing. He was to sign the Covenant, and renounce all those prerogatives for which his father had contended up to the time when he laid his head on the scaffold. In temporal matters he was to be subject to Parliament; in ecclesiastical ones to the General Assembly. The one was as much opposed to his convictions as the other; but the Scots spared him no humiliations when he sought evasions. He had to sign a declaration, in which he condemned his parents for the idolatry which had called down the wrath of God upon their family. If he refused, he would be given up to the Independents, as his father had been.

The Scotch now created an army, which was as purely Presbyterian as that of their enemies was Independent; and in the summer of 1650 the war began.

On his invasion of Scotland, Cromwell found himself at first in a situation similar to that of the army of the League in Bohemia, in 1620. He longed for a speedy decision; his army was suffering from sickness and famine, and the enemy was encamped behind fortified walls, without, at first, allowing himself to be seen in the open field.

At the beginning of September, after a fruitless march to Edinburgh, he arrived with his famished, demoralised troops near Dunbar. On the heights near, lay the Scots, far superior in numbers. Their leader, Leslie, was justly of opinion that victory might be gained without a battle by gradually manœuvring the Independents, who were not in possession of a single secure position, out of the country. But the General Assembly, in its short-sighted zeal, was of a different opinion. It had made the discovery around the green table that the enemy was caught in the trap, and that to let him escape would be to deprive God's cause of its laurels.

So they gave Cromwell the satisfaction of offering battle. As they advanced, he exclaimed, "They are coming down; Heaven has given them into our hands!"

The conflict began early in the morning of the 3rd of September. Before sunrise, Cromwell threw himself with an irresistible bound upon the right wing of the enemy, while the left wing was held fast by a cannonade, and he gained a complete victory early in the day.

The Scotch army was almost annihilated, and several towns—Edinburgh among them—fell into the hands of the victors. Cromwell was in the way to conquer the whole country; he was already at Perth, in the heart of Scotland, when Charles II. formed the bold project of advancing with his army, which he had with difficulty re-assembled, to England, to threaten the enemy in the very seat of his power.

On the 1st of August, 1651, he appeared with about 11,000 men on the other side of the English boundary, expecting a general revolt of the discontented counties and their royalist aristocracy. But he was mistaken. Some isolated revolts did, indeed, take place, and he reached Worcester without meeting with any opposition; the city even welcomed him; but the masses did not stir, and whenever there were any symptoms of it they were immediately put down by the Independents.

Charles's cause was lost before Cromwell arrived. Cromwell again defeated him at Worcester, and the Royalist revolt was at an end. Scotland was quiet for a long time, though not really pacified.

It is an honourable testimony to the steadfast character of the English people, that opposition did not cease to a system whose representative they admired, but the principles of which they condemned, in spite of all the successes of the Independents. Perhaps Cromwell's manifest inclination to elate the people by brilliant foreign enterprises arose partly from this fact, for that had been the weak point with the Stuarts. His idea might be to divert the nation from its unsatisfactory domestic politics.

This did not prevent his being daily threatened with attempts at assassination, so that he had to carry loaded pistols about him. But his foreign policy was of that nature, that even the sworn enemies of his system, if they had a spark of national pride, could not fail to be carried away with it, and to acknowledge that the great Puritan had accomplished what no legitimate monarch had done before him. After his arms had subjugated the three kingdoms, he began to contend for the dominion of the seas.



His brother in the faith, Robert Blake,\* transferred the spirit of Puritan warfare to the navy, drove the royalist corsairs, Prince Rupert and Prince Maurice, before him, humbled Portugal, and, after a long struggle, conquered Holland—the great maritime state of the age. England entered into the northern coalition, joined France in an alliance against Spain, and soon there was no complication in Europe, great or small, in which Cromwell did not take part. He made himself the guardian of definite interests on the Continent. Protestantism had a strong support in him. He even interposed at Turin, to gain more liberty for some Waldensian communities in Savoy. Even Louis XIV. did not refuse his homage. It went against him to address the murderer of his uncle as “*Mon cousin* ;” but he said to his minister, “*And even if you had to call him ‘Mon père,’ you would be obliged to do it, for he is the most powerful man in Europe.*”

The diplomatic representatives of the young republic had not met with a friendly reception anywhere abroad ; but at the Hague and Madrid they had been received with open enmity. Scotch emigrants at the former had assassinated the English ambassador, Doreslaus, in May, 1649 ; and in the following year, at Madrid, an agent of Parliament had also been murdered by Englishmen as he sat with loaded pistols at table, and in both places public opinion had sided with the murderers. From the connection between the house of Orange and the Stuarts it was not to be expected, if the former retained any influence, that it would fall into the scale of the republic. While the Spanish Government interposed with some severity about the murder of the ambassador, the court of Orange became the centre of all sorts of intrigues against the republic, and permitted the new ambassador, St. John, to be publicly ill used. Although they had themselves risen out of revolution, the Orange family behaved as if they had been the oldest legitimate power in Europe. Cromwell had least of all expected this from Holland. He had projected an alliance, offensive and defensive, between the two republics, a common policy of their Protestant and republican interests against the encroaching system of absolute Catholic monarchy.

\* Robert Blake, Admiral and General-at-Sea : based on family and State papers. By Hepworth Dixon, 1858.



But there was no inclination for this in Holland; they only beheld in Cromwell the dangerous rival on the seas, whose supremacy would only have been strengthened by such a league.

The little naval war with Holland was already going on, when a step was taken by England of the utmost fundamental and practical importance.

The Navigation Act of 1651, without mentioning Holland by name, struck a mortal blow at her commerce. It consisted, with very little exception, of the exchange of wares produced not at home but in foreign countries. The Navigation Act now ruled that all wares from abroad could only be carried in English ships, under pain of confiscation of the ship and cargo; all goods from the Continent only in English ships, or in those of the country producing them.

The Dutch colonial and transit trade was by this measure entirely cut off by the English market. This was the occasion of the following war; and so useful a measure was it for England, that it was only a few years ago that she dispensed with this crutch. There was no better means of establishing England's supremacy—maritime and commercial—and it did, in fact, lay the foundation of England's greatness. The Dutch still had the first fleet in the world, the best ships of war, the greatest naval heroes of the age; and yet fate would have it that the admired admirals—Van Tromp, De Ruyter, De Witt—had to strike their sails before a hitherto unknown sailor, Robert Blake.

The war began with the seizure of Dutch merchant ships, soon reaching the number of a thousand, and was decided by a number of naval engagements, greater or less, in the course of which the Dutch Armada was nearly annihilated. The three days' engagement between Portland and La Hogue, February, 1653, and that of two days near Dunkirk, June, 1653, showed that the supremacy of the young English fleet was indisputable. The Peace of April, 1654, was dictated by Cromwell. Holland had to submit to the Navigation Act, to renounce the favour of the Stuarts, and attach itself to Cromwell's policy.

These were feats which not only won transitory fame, they were lasting achievements; from this naval war dates the position of the English fleet; from this Peace the undisputed sovereignty of England over the seas.

Cromwell had formed a just estimate of the importance

of this policy to his domestic system. He had no need to enter into many considerations by which legitimate powers were hampered, but he must not expose himself to discredit: his reputation was his sole title-deed; it must be kept clear as the day.

In all these difficult complications, by a singular combination of skill and good fortune, he was successful, with one exception, in the establishment of a permanent civil domestic administration.

CROMWELL'S CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENTS.—DISMISSAL OF THE LONG PARLIAMENT.—THE CONSTITUTION OF DECEMBER, 1653.

The "Commonwealth without King or Lords," as the Republic was officially styled, was at first governed by a Council of State composed of forty-one members, the majority of whom were in Parliament, and this ruled in accordance with the regulations of the Rump, the remnant of the Long Parliament. The Council of State was entirely in Cromwell's hands; but the Rump Parliament chose to have a will of its own, and was a source of perpetual embarrassment to him. As long as the war had lasted against the Royalists in Scotland and Ireland, no great discord had come to light. In February, 1652, both parties had joined in an amnesty, but soon decided differences arose out of various small discontents; war broke out more and more between the army and Parliament. Parliament wished to get rid of the inconvenient and now superfluous Saints, the army was tired of the everlasting speech-makers, and was disposed to disperse them by force, as they had done twice before.

Parliament no longer enjoyed any credit either with the army or the nation. Even at the time when the Purge took place by means of the army, the doings of the assembly were universally hated, and the army's *coup d'état* had been very popular.

There were still fifty or sixty members of the old Parliament left, and their harsh and self-seeking administration remained just as it was. A number of petitions poured in, general discontent made itself heard about the way in which members of Parliament managed the confiscated estates for their own benefit or that of their relations, the number of

unworthy officials sent by Parliament into the provinces to look after the interests of their own relations, the injustice of the Presbyterians, &c.

The army took up all these grievances, and, in stormy addresses, demanded the dismissal of these wrong-headed representatives of the country. Cromwell permitted these sentiments to increase till the question was ripe for interference.

At first he tried in Parliament itself, with the help of the votes in his favour, to carry motions adapted to get rid of this inconvenient Assembly. On the 13th of November, 1652, he succeeded in this by a motion which set a definite limit to the existence of this everlasting Parliament. But they could not come to any agreement as to the laws by which the future House was to be constituted.

The Assembly wished to insure the re-election of its members into the new Parliament, the army and Cromwell wished for an entirely new House. They were involved in a dispute ostensibly upon this point or that; but really about the executive power and their own existence.

The discussion of the election laws took a course which the army could but consider very unfavourable; it began to consider that it was itself the only true Parliament, and had more than once decidedly interfered as such.

In April, 1653, the breach took place.

On receiving intelligence that the decisive question was to be discussed on the morning of the 20th of April, Cromwell entered Parliament, and had the approaches to the House occupied by the military. During the debate, he rose and gave the assembly a catalogue of its sins, and finally informed them that they were no longer a Parliament; that they had proved themselves unworthy of the name, and must immediately leave the room. The doors then opened, the musketeers entered and dispersed the assembly.

Cromwell now summoned an assembly of notables, as it would have been called in France, from amongst his own party. This was the Short, or Bare-bone Parliament, so called, which met at Whitehall, 144 in number, in July, 1653.

The flower of the Independent sect had seats in it, and their doings were in unison with the spirit of this party. The Short Parliament does not deserve the sport which is made of it by nearly all parties in England.\* Its attempts

• For a just estimate of it, see Ranke, iii. 417.

at reform were radical and thorough, and, though only partially successful, they were meant in earnest, and struck at all the real existing grievances in England. The attacks upon the chaos of English law and criminal proceedings, regulations about debtors, the establishment of the principle of civil marriage, the attack upon ecclesiastical tithes—all this proves a praiseworthy zeal to advance the interests of the nation.

But these projects occasioned fearful embitterment amongst all classes of the people, and Cromwell saw that by changes so radical he would lose his last support in the nation; but a programme was put forth for future times which was not in vain.

Discord broke out in the assembly, and Cromwell's musketeers were again of service. A project for a constitution was put forth by a minority of the notables, who, however, had the army on its side, by which the assembly placed the supreme power in the hands of a Lord Protector of the Republic, and conferred this dignity on Cromwell.

The constitution of December, 1653, bears less the stamp of a revolutionary period than might have been expected. Circumstances like those which then existed are not generally adapted for the formation of good constitutions, but this one, considering the way in which it arose, was a very commendable work, and contains much that the Whigs to this day look upon as progress.

The Lord Protectorate was a constitutional office, limited by the army and Parliament, and was specially distinguished from the monarchical dignity by the fact that it was not hereditary.

Law and justice were to be administered in the name of the Lord Protector. He distributed offices and dignities, had the right of pardon, except for murder and high treason, and all confiscated property fell to him. In all other cases he was bound to the Council and Parliament.

The Council of State consisted of twenty-five members, and was chiefly composed of military men. The Protector could neither nominate nor dismiss any member of it at his own pleasure. When vacancies occurred he had to choose in accordance with the proposals of the Council. It was only in unison with the Council that he could decide on questions of war and peace, or form alliances, dispose of

the army, or proclaim regulations as provisional laws. They also nominated the Lord Protector's successor.

The power of making laws belonged exclusively to Parliament, against the statutes of which the Protector's veto only had a delaying power; all bills were to receive his sanction, but if it was not given within twenty days, they became law without it.

The standing army was to consist of 20,000 foot and 10,000 horse. The Protector had an absolute veto upon the diminution of the means once voted for their support.

Parliament was to meet regularly every three years. Should the Protector not keep to this rule, the Council was to summon it, and, in case they also neglected to do so, the sheriffs of the counties, under pain of high treason. During the first five months of its meeting an ordinary Parliament could only be prorogued or dissolved with its own consent; an extraordinary one, after three months.

Parliament was to number four hundred members for England, thirty for Scotland, thirty for Ireland. The election laws secured, as far as possible, an equal representation of the classes possessing property; every one had a vote, and was eligible for election who possessed £200 of movable or immovable property, except Catholics and rebels, who had fought against Parliament.

Rotten boroughs were disfranchised. The counties had 261 seats in Parliament, and were more uniformly represented than has been the case before or since. The fault of this constitution was not that it was too liberal. The Whigs have often said, in relation to it, that their ideal also was a State without a House of Lords, or a State Church, based upon universal suffrage. No; the mistake was that, according to this constitution, Cromwell governed only with a democratic minority, while the powerful aristocratic factors of the previous Upper House and the offended State Church remained in the background. It was a question whether these elements were not strong enough, without taking part in Parliament, to render the whole system untenable by passive resistance.

It was evidently a relief to Cromwell when the Constitution was solemnly inaugurated. On the 16th of December, as holder of the new dignity, he received the homage of the heads of the State amidst great pomp, took the oath to the Constitution, and had the sword and great seal delivered to

him. The ceremony was much like an enthronement: he was lord of the three kingdoms, as no king had been before him; the title only was wanting to make him the equal of sovereigns.

Then followed the glorious year 1654: the brilliant peace with Holland, the humiliation of Portugal, the treaties with Sweden and Denmark, by which a projected coalition against England was frustrated; in short, the beginning of a commanding position on the Continent.

Cromwell now summoned his first constitutional Parliament for the 3rd of September, the anniversary of the victories at Dunbar and Worcester.

The elections were perfectly free; there was no limitation imposed, or even allowable influence used by the Government; and as the Royalists, either from shyness or timidity, kept in the background, the votes were given to purely democratic elements.

#### THE PARLIAMENT OF 1654-5 AND THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

On September 3rd, 1654, Parliament met. Cromwell delivered a proud speech. None of his utterances of this kind are of the stiff and formal character of modern times; they were the effusions of a man, not of the schools, but of deeds, who, as he himself once said, considered it to be his mission to "speak things." He often lost himself in misty reflections, or in edifying exposition of passages of Scripture; but on all decisive questions, the sound sense of this wonderfully-gifted man was conspicuous. It was especially the case with this speech.

Cromwell spoke of the errors of the last Parliament, of the desires of the Levellers, who wanted to turn things upside down, and who therefore could not be allowed to continue in power.

He said:—"As to the authority in the nation—to the ranks and orders of men, whereby England hath been known for hundreds of years—the 'natural' magistracy of the nation, was it not almost trampled underfoot by men of levelling principles? I beseech you, did not that levelling principle tend to the reducing of all to an equality? which I think, if obtained, would not have lasted long! And that the thing did and might well extend far is mani-

fest, because it was a pleasing voice to all poor men, and truly not unwelcome to all bad men. . . . Such considerations and pretensions to 'liberty of conscience,' what are they leading us toward? Liberty of conscience and liberty of the subject,—two as glorious things to be contended for as any that God hath given us; yet both these abused for the patronising of villanies! Insomuch, that it hath been an ordinary thing to affirm, 'that the restraining of such pernicious notions was not in the magistrate's power.' . . . So, likewise, the axe was laid to the root of the ministry. 'It was Antichristian; it was Babylonish,' said they. . . . The former extremity we suffered under was, that no man, though he had never so good a testimony, though he had received gifts from Christ, might preach unless ordained. So now, I think, we are at the other extremity, when many affirm that he who is ordained hath a nullity, so that he ought not to preach, or not be heard." \*

Against these and other ruinous excrescences a remedy had been found in the Constitution which might speak for itself, but which must not be interfered with.

He then glanced at the foreign relations of the Republic, mentioned the honourable treaties which had been concluded with Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and Portugal, while a similar one with France was in prospect. "And," he said, "I daresay there is not a nation in Europe but is very willing to ask a good understanding with you." He concluded, among other things, with the words, "As I said before, a door of hope is open. And I may say this to you: If the Lord's blessing and his presence go along with the management of affairs at this meeting, you will be enabled to put the top-stone to the work, and make this nation happy." †

At first Cromwell's hearers were affected by his lofty modesty; but then the democratic spirit of the majority felt repulsed by the advice to abide by what had been accomplished, and to build upon the foundation already laid.

His opinion was that the Constitution, without reference to its origin, should now be expressly acknowledged as

\* Cromwell's *Letters and Speeches*, vol. iii. p. 21, &c. (abridged.)

† Ibid., p. 35.



legal, and that the previous fruitless strife should not begin again. But the democrats were of a different opinion. They had not made the Constitution; consequently, it was not binding on them, and they rode their principles to death in a way that is never more dangerous than at such times.

Cromwell had hoped, with their help, to put an end to the revolution; instead of that, they renewed the strife which had given rise to it. He now delivered a second warning speech. He reminded them that he had not called himself to the office of Protector, but that he had been called to it by the will of God and of the nation; that the constitution was not his work, but the work of the army. He says, "The soldiery were a very considerable part of these nations, especially all government being dissolved, and nothing to keep things in order but the sword! And yet they—which many histories will not parallel—even they were desirous that things might come to a consistency; and arbitrariness be taken away, and the government be put into the hands of a person limited and bounded, as in the Act of Settlement, whom they distrusted the least, and loved not the worst."

"I have to say:—The wilful throwing away of this government, such as it is, so owned by God, so approved by men, were a thing which,—and in reference not to *my* good, but to the good of these nations and of posterity,—I can sooner be willing to be rolled into my grave and buried with infamy than I can give my consent unto. You have been called hither to save a nation. Through the blessing of God, our enemies were hopeless and scattered. We had peace at home. These things we had a few days ago when you came hither. And now? And now to have our peace and interest thus shaken, and ourselves rendered hereby almost the scorn and contempt of those strangers who are amongst us to negotiate their masters' affairs. To give *them* opportunity to see our nakedness as they do, a people that have been unhinged this twelve-years day, and are unhinged still?—as if scattering, division, and confusion came upon us like things we desired.

"Who can answer for these things to God or to men—to the people who sent you hither, who looked for nothing but peace and quietness, and rest and settlement? When we come to give an account to them, we shall have it to say,

‘Oh, we quarrelled for the *liberty of England*.’ The liberty of England, the liberty of the people, is made so safe by this Act of Settlement, that it will speak for itself.”\*

In conclusion, he demanded from all the members a written declaration that they acknowledged the Constitution as legal, a proviso that was specially made in the writs for future representatives. The majority signed, but the proceedings did not take a more favourable course. The assembly persisted in not considering itself a legislative assembly, but as one whose object it was to form a constitution in placing the sovereignty of the people above every other consideration, thus again rendering the existing state of things entirely uncertain.

On the 22nd of January, 1655, he made a third speech, and represented to them the fruitlessness of their contention about trifles. “Instead of peace and settlement—weeds, nettles, briars, and thorns have thriven under your shadow! I say, the enemies of the peace of these nations abroad and at home, the discontented humours throughout these nations, by which products I think no man will grudge to call by that name, of briars and thorns,—they have nourished themselves under your shadow! They have taken their opportunities from your sitting to conclude that there would be no settlement?”†

After a long and severe lecture in this tone he dissolved the Parliament.

The Royalists looked on with no little satisfaction. To see the great Independent at variance with his own party, the new order of things overturned at the very outset, was more than they had hoped for. They thought that the harvest was ripe. Conspiracies were set on foot, a great revolt was prepared, when Cromwell interposed with his usual energy and usual success. The democrats also began to stir; an adventurer preached in the streets of London that the traitor should be got rid of, and a pamphlet came out called “Killing no Murder.”

But Cromwell was a match for his enemies, and it is interesting to observe how he proceeds. The Royalist leaders were treated with all the severity of the law; they were executed, and their misguided accomplices were

\* Cromwell's Letters and Speeches, extract from Speech III., p. 43

† Letters and Speeches, p. 76.

treated with comparative leniency ; precisely the way in which a ruler in such circumstances should act. Against his old democratic foes he could not restrain a certain amount of irritation ; they were tried, imprisoned, and afterwards privately released.

A more strict domestic administration was introduced. The country was divided into thirteen districts, each under the command of a Major-general, who was intrusted with extensive authority.

In each of these thirteen districts a militia was levied under command of the Major-general, and supported by an income-tax of a tenth imposed upon the Royalists. This militia maintained order and security in town and country, and put a strict moral discipline in force after the fashion of Calvinistic Geneva. Themselves subjected to a relentless discipline, they saw that the laws against drunkenness, cursing, and swearing were strictly carried out. All public-houses not absolutely indispensable were suppressed, horse-racing, cock-fighting, and plays forbidden.

Each district thus had its own independent militia, and a trustworthy general as governor ; such a government could not be surprised by any *coup d'état* from the right or the left.

To Cromwell's honour it must be said that, under the form of military despotism, he ruled as liberally as possible, and that the warfare which he was obliged to wage to the end did not make him hardened or gloomy.

Above all things, under him the nation enjoyed a liberty of conscience which was before unknown ; this raises him high above all parties.

In 1656, he could say to Parliament, " Our practice since the last Parliament hath been to let all this nation see that whatever pretensions to religion would continue quiet, peaceable, they should enjoy conscience and liberty to themselves ; and *not* to make religion a pretence for arms and blood. If men will profess,—be they those under Baptism, be they those of the Independent judgment simply, or of the Presbyterian judgment,—in the name of God encourage them, countenance them ; so long as they do plainly continue to be thankful to God, and to make use of the liberty given them to enjoy their own consciences ! Men who believe in Jesus Christ, and walking in a profession answerable to that faith, who live upon the grace of God—they are the members of Jesus Christ, and are to Him

the apple of his eye. Whoever hath this Faith, let his form be what it will, he walking peaceably, without prejudice to others under other forms; it is a debt due to God and Christ. If a man of one form will be trampling upon the heels of another form; if an Independent, for example, will despise him who is under Baptism, I will not suffer it in him. If, on the other side, those of the Anabaptist judgment shall be censuring the Godly ministers of the nation who profess under that of Independency, or if those that profess under Presbytery shall be reproaching, traducing, and censuring of them as I would not be willing to see the day when England shall be in the power of the Presbytery, to impose upon the consciences of others—so I will not endure any reproach to them. But God give us hearts and spirits to keep things *equal*. I have had some boxes on the ear and rebukes—on the one hand and the other; some censuring me for Presbytery; others as an inletter to all the sects and heresies of the nation. I have borne my reproach; but I have, through God's mercy, not been unhappy in hindering any one religion to impose upon another." \*

Cromwell did not abolish the strict laws against the Catholics, because as a party backed by the Jesuits they could but be always the enemies of his system; but he administered them leniently, or did not enforce them when the Catholics fulfilled the duties of good citizens. Jews, also, and Quakers, enjoyed his clemency, which was quite in contrast to the general practice of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

It also appeared to be his wish to show, by the liberty of the press and the election laws, that in spite of his usurped power, and the severe forms under which it was often exercised, England enjoyed more liberty under him than under many a government before him and around him. He often used to say to the Democrats, "Patience; when I am no more you will see what sort of liberty the Stuarts will give you."

Characters like his, amidst such bitter experience, often become harsh, defiant, and misanthropic; but Cromwell seemed to be softened rather than embittered by it; and it is one of the great features in the character of the man,

that, rising to European greatness from a modest position, he proved himself no less able to bear success than misfortune and trial.

All that is great and glorious in a gifted nation found in him a zealous protector; learning flourished under him, and the great poet and thinker, John Milton, was among his most intimate friends.

PARLIAMENT OF 1656-7.—PROPOSAL OF A MONARCHY.—  
CROMWELL'S DEATH, SEPTEMBER 3RD, 1658.

A new Parliament became necessary to provide means for the war which Cromwell had undertaken, in conjunction with France, against Spain. He had caused Penn to set sail for America, and Blake to the Spanish waters, with despotic powers. The Spaniards had laid an embargo on the English ships, and thereby inflicted great injury on the commerce of England before any compensating advantage had accrued; for the immense sacrifices demanded by the war, neither the ordinary resources, nor the tax upon the Royalists, sufficed. He therefore resolved to summon a new Parliament.

He hoped that having taken a lesson from the fate of its predecessor, it would take a view of things more favourable to him. The elections did in fact turn out better, and even the Royalists began to be more reconciled both to him and his system.

Parliament was opened on the 17th of September, 1656. It was of importance for the money question that just then Blake and Montague had the good fortune to capture a fleet of Spanish ships in Portuguese waters, laden with silver, which yielded a booty of a million sterling.

The house was divided into two very decided parties—a republican-military and a constitutional one; which last, in order to put an end to uncertainty, perpetual conspiracies and outrages, projected the establishment of a new monarchy.

At the beginning of the year 1657, the proposal was made that the Lord Protector should conform to the ancient monarchical constitution, and exchange the title of a republican official for that of King. The proposal came from Cromwell's friends; and in spite of the loud murmurs of the majors-general, the motion was carried for a change in the constitution towards a monarchical form.

A monarchy could not be created on the basis of the democratic constitution of 1653. It was necessary to go further—to restore the Upper House, to try to attract once more the aristocratic elements in the country; and when the great landowning interest was again represented in the government, it might be hoped that the monarchy itself would take root. This was also Cromwell's idea. He had succeeded in much in which previous governments had failed. If he could now succeed also in giving fresh support to his work by restoring their rights to the old conservative elements—the nobles and the State Church, thereby reconciling them to himself and his system, he might hope that it was founded for future times.

Let it not be supposed that this attempt arose from the petty human vanity of the parvenu. Among all his motives, this had less weight than any. A remarkable change had taken place within him. He had learnt much from recent experience; he had learnt that it was impossible to govern this country in peace with a purely democratic representation and a purely military administration, if the great landowning interest, which ruled the counties socially, maintained a hostile or passive attitude. He therefore wished to come to terms with these sulky foes, and the contemporary sources of information assure us that had he succeeded in this, the restoration of the Stuarts would have been impossible. The new monarchy would have been reconciled with the ancient conditions of law and power.

Cromwell had never been in a more delicate position. On the one hand, he saw before him the highest aim of political ambition; on the other, a step which might rob him of the fruits of the labours of his life.

The obscurity of his first utterances on the subject of this proposal are perfectly intelligible. It is plain that he wishes to gain time, to take counsel with himself; and what he said in confidence, proved the real indecision of his state of mind. When the mover came and told him that the matter looked well, Cromwell laughed, and said, "Thou foolish fellow!"

He cared but little for Parliament, but a great deal for the army, and there was no doubt whatever as to the opinion of that. When he sounded his generals, he heard but one voice. His old comrades would not hear of a king. "A king," they said, "is a tyrant; we will not have one."



The aversion of the army, therefore, upon whose shoulders he had risen, was indubitable. He did not thwart it; it might be contrary to his own wishes, but he knew what the decision must be. Many a great man in a similar position has not been able to withstand the temptation of sacrificing the firm foundation of his power to a more brilliant position. Cromwell was great enough to withstand it, to resolve not to break with those who had raised him up. He knew how little the transitory friendship of the Royalists would avail him,\* whom the first breeze would probably blow from his side; and rightly estimated that the defection of his Saints would be of far greater importance. He therefore declined the crown, and said in his answer that he would be content to remain the first constable of the nation. On the other hand, he prevailed upon Parliament to permit the establishment of an Upper House, and only accepted as his prerogative the favour of naming his successor.

Thus a monarchy was averted, but an important step towards it was taken by the creation of a House of Lords in order to reconcile the Conservatives to the revolution.

It was difficult to fill the House in a satisfactory manner; the great families kept aloof, and in their place relations and complaisant partisans had to be chosen from among the lawyers and officers; and many of the latter had been draymen, tailors, or other artisans. Worse than this was the conflict which broke out between the two Houses immediately after they assembled, on the 20th of January, 1658, by which the very foundations of the Cromwellian constitution were again endangered. The Commons vehemently declared that there was no House of Lords, it had been legally abolished, and every one of them had taken the oath to the "Commonwealth without King or House of Lords." In vain Cromwell endeavoured to mediate; the discord could not be healed, and on the 4th of February, 1658, he was compelled to dissolve this Parliament also. He did it with the words, "And let God judge between you and me."

More successful than this attempt to close the revolution by the construction of a peaceful constitution, was the Protector's foreign policy.

\* For their opinion see the report of Giavarina.—*Ranke*, iii. 538.



The defensive alliance with France had, in March, 1657, assumed an offensive character. Mardyke and Dunkirk were conquered by the English, Jamaica maintained against the Spaniards. The star of the English arms, the European position of the Protector were in their zenith, when, on September 3rd, an eventful day for his destiny, he died.

His death softened many a bitter feeling, people now knew what they had lost. England had never been more powerful than under him, she had become the first empire in Europe; even Louis XIV. and Mazarin bowed down before him; all the great powers of the Continent felt his influence, which was not only the result of English commerce, but of the great modern ideas of liberty of conscience and the Reformation.

Apart from Oliver's past history, no man ever occupied a throne more worthily than he did; and never did a revolutionary usurper so spare the germs of civil liberty. This was the salvation of England: she would have bled to death under the Stuarts, if the traces of his labours could have been so speedily lost; and it was his memory which finally ruined them.

Calmly and with undisputed right, like a legitimate successor to a throne, Cromwell's son, Richard, assumed the office of Protector; but his government was weak and incompetent in every respect. Having early lost his energy through a dissolute youth, he preferred the pleasures of life to the difficult calling of a ruler. As things would not go on as he wished of themselves, in May, 1659, he resigned. The generals who governed the districts of the country divided the inheritance; and a state of things ensued, in which the oppression of usurpation was felt tenfold, and which yet did not bring with it the greatness and security for the sake of which so much had been forgiven to Cromwell. This anarchical despotism of the generals, the conflicts between the republican and royalist parties, was the best preparation for a state of mind to which the restoration of the Stuarts seemed like redemption. Amidst the acclamations of the people, and the gloomy silence of the Independents, Charles II. was recalled, the defunct Rump Parliament brought to life again; and the same Parliament which had once decreed the fall of the Stuarts now sealed their restoration.



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